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This thesis studies the formulation and expression of Egyptian nationalism in the 
period 1882-1919. In particular, it argues that Egyptian nationalism, rather than having 
the territorial nation-state as the highest form of nationalist expression, was composed of 
multiple overlapping and contingent identities. Furthermore, this thesis will draw 
attention to inter-and intra- elite rivalries between power bases within Egypt, including 
the office of the Khedive, the urban elite, landowners, European powers, and Ottoman 
representatives; and the way in which these vying groups affected the growth and 
composition of the Egyptian nationalist movement. This thesis also contends that the 
policies and ideologies of Egyptian nationalists were both contingent and fluid, as were 
the self-identities of the Egyptian population. Egyptian nationalism in the late-nineteenth 
and early-twentieth centuries took many of its characteristics and methodologies from the 
global context of competing imperialisms as well as trans-national anti-colonial 
movements. Therefore, this thesis seeks to locate Egyptian nationalism in the period 
1882-1919 within the global and local context of competing power bases and popular 
expectations.  
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“The People are asleep my darling” 
So she’d tell him; 
He, too, 
Was careful not to wake the People, 
To endure its dreams 
Like a kid’s kicks 
To ape its slack tongue like a fool, 
To crawl before it on all fours 
That he might tell it the story of creation... 
--Mohab Nasr (translated by Robin Moger) 
 
 
Chapter One: Introduction 
 
 
In the wake of the 2011 Egyptian Revolution that deposed President Hosni Mubarak 
(President, 1981-2011) and mobilized large and diverse swathes of the Egyptian population, 
numerous commentators began to compare the Egyptian Revolutions of 1919 and 2011, many 
making the determination that both revolutions were ultimately failures as a result of the inability 
of the movements’ leaders to reify popular support into organizational capacity.1 While certain 
demands were echoed across class and ideological divisions, both revolutions clearly meant 
different things to different segments of the population. For example, for some, the revolutions 
promised increased access to power, while for others, they portended important social and 
economic reforms. Early comparisons of the 1919 and 2011 revolutions posited 1919 as a 
“nationalist” revolution and 2011 as a “people’s revolution.”2 Because the 1919 Revolution 
asserted territorial nationalism in the face of British colonialism, rather than deep socio-
economic change, 1919 can be considered a nationalist revolution. The early leaders of the 2011 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Ahmed Naguib Roushdy, “A Tale of Three Revolutions,” al-Ahram Weekly, Issue No. 1198 (22 
May 2014) ; Omnia El-Shakry, “Egypt’s Three Revolutions: The Force of History Behind This Popular Uprising,” 
in Bassam Haddad, Rosie Bsheer, and Ziad Abu-Rish, The Dawn of the Arab Uprisings: End of an Old Order? 
(London: Pluto Publishing, 2012); and Khaled Fahmy, “The Constitution, the Revolution,” al-Ahram Weekly, 20 
December 2012.  
2 El-Shakry, “Egypt’s Three Revolutions,” 8. 
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uprising proposed not only a change of governmental leadership and organization, but also a 
fundamental shift in the structure of society, making it, at least initially, a “popular” revolution. 
Nevertheless, at least from the perspective of the emerging dominant national ruling elements, 
neither revolution aimed at the radical transformation of the social structure or class relations. In 
the 1919 Revolution, the Wafd, which previously had a small popular base, stepped into the role 
of voice of the Revolution, which resulted in a significantly more conservative outcome. 
However, as the 2011 Revolution has faded further into the past, the similarities to 1919 become 
clearer. As in the case of the Revolution of 1919, the reason the Egyptian revolution of 2011 
failed to fundamentally alter state structures is that it did not fundamentally change the social, 
political, and economic structure of the country. Too many historically-entrenched centers of 
power and a multitude of popular loyalties that were never brought together under the umbrella 
of one movement proved disastrous for the revolutionaries in both 1919 and 2011.  
Beyond the slogans of national unity and popular support lay a complex assemblage of 
forces, each with their own expectations and reasons for joining the nationalist movement. The 
revolutionary leaders of the period 1882-1919 failed to capitalize on their popularity in order to 
mobilize popular opinion to build a strong, institutionalized movement. History is replete with 
examples of political groups that seize power on a wave of mass mobilization, only to revert to 
the politics of pragmatism and self-interest under the mantle of revolutionary ideals. This, 
combined with the competing power bases of local elites, was what plagued the early Egyptian 
nationalists. 
This thesis seeks to locate Egyptian nationalism in the period 1881-1919 within the 
global and local context of competing power bases and distinctive expectations. In particular, 
Egyptian nationalism will be assessed within both the global context of world-wide empires, as 
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well as the burgeoning trans-national anti-colonial movement. Furthermore, this thesis will draw 
attention to inter-and intra- elite rivalries between power bases within Egypt, including the office 
of the Khedive, the urban elite, landowners, European powers, and Ottoman representatives, and 
the way in which these vying groups affected the growth and composition of the Egyptian 
nationalist movement. This framework, then, seeks to draw attention to the context, 
contingencies, and complexity of Egyptian nationalism, as well as overlapping Egyptian self-
identities and self-interests.  
Moreover, this thesis attempts to broaden the context of late-nineteenth and early 
twentieth-century Egyptian nationalism from a singular focus on the particularism of fighting the 
British to include the power struggles between nationalists, the palace, the Ottoman Empire, 
competing local elites, transnational groups and loyalties, and changing global norms. There was 
certainly a clear division between Western imperialism (though European colonialism itself was 
divided along competing national lines) on the one hand, and various Egyptian rival forces of 
internal nationalism and independence, on the other. This division was clear, and included all 
stripes of Egyptian nationalism in the fight for independence from the British. However, this 
unification of various stakeholders was often undermined by contending local interests. 
Nationalists, elites, and the position of the Khedivate were often in conflict because of competing 
local interests, despite their agreement on the importance of Egyptian independence. The 
meanings of nationalism, anti-colonialism, and independence itself were debated and negotiated 
between these varying elite bases of power.3 And the different Egyptian movements for 
                                                 
3 Many elites who supported Egyptian independence or expansion of their own power vis-à-vis the British or the 
Khedive were worried about the cooptation of nationalist and constitutionalist language by certain groups, 
cooptation which led, for example, to revolts of peasant farmers and revolts in the South. For more on the 
incongruity between the state-centered Cairene nationalist project and the self-identification and self-interest of 
subject populations, see Zeinab Abul-Magd, Imagined Empires: A History of Revolt in Egypt (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 2013.) 
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nationalism and independence must be seen within the global context of internal European 
colonial rivalries, the state of the Ottoman Empire and her relationship with Egypt, and 
connections with other anti-colonial nationalist movements.  
Lost in the attempts to view the Egyptian nationalist movement as a linear progression 
beginning with the ‘Urabi Revolt and ending with, alternately, the 1919 or 1952 Revolutions (or 
as not having yet found its completion) are the complexity and contingency that consistently 
defined Egyptian nationalism and the movement for independence. The fluid policies and 
ideologies of the Egyptian nationalists were, throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, contingent and focused on the group, movement, or transnational identity – the 
Khedive ‘Abbas Hilmi, the Ottoman Empire, the Young Turks, Germany, or European 
Socialists, for example - that might give them the most leverage and support toward their 
ultimate goal of independence at any given moment. Furthermore, Watani Party leader Mustafa 
Kamil and his successors became extremely adept at playing to their audiences: liberal (or 
secular) nationalism to Europeans and Westernized Egyptians, and conservative adherence to 
Islamic values to their Ottoman and traditional Egyptian audiences.4 Thus, any classification of 
Kamil or others, or of the movement as a whole, as one specific thing or another is 
fundamentally flawed. The failure of this strategy was, of course, that it resulted in a movement 
with little direction and no consistent allies or position, particularly after the Khedive ‘Abbas 
Hilmi was deposed in 1914, and the Ottoman Empire was defeated in the First World War. 
Furthermore, the nationalist movement in this period was characterized by inter-elite rivalries 
and alternative definitions of what nationalism and independence would ultimately mean.  
                                                 
4 This ideological ambivalence has been developed by Fritz Steppat, Nationalismus und Islam bei Mustafa Kamil 
(Leiden: Brill, 1956.) 
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Rather than attempting to define Egyptian nationalism as a narrow, singular ideology, it 
is necessary to view the movement as an essentially self-regarding, locally-centered movement 
that was not only willing to change strategies, allegiances, and rhetoric to fit the moment, but 
was also motivated by a collection of various groups, each of which possessed a complex set of 
loyalties and identities. With the exception of a handful of true ideologues, most supporters of 
Egyptian nationalism and independence tailored their message around potential patrons, rather 
than out of an abiding loyalty to one ideology or another, and represented specific vested 
interests. Viewing late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century social and political movements as 
representative of contingent and rival interests is much more useful for examining Egyptian 
nationalism than are frameworks that see the movement in terms of religion or ethnicity. 
Cultural critiques of nationalism have tended to valorize an ahistorical notion of 
indigenous culture while denouncing or ignoring the machinations and cunning of political self-
interest.5 A more correct understanding of Egyptian nationalism requires that one make a 
genuine effort to analyze the material through a framework in which Britain, the West, and 
Western narratives and expectations are not the center of discussion. The assumption that there 
are enduring ideologies or even an enduring nationalism outside of individual self-interest does 
not hold up to scrutiny. Instead, it must be acknowledged that various groups have specific 
concerns and contingent alliances and allegiances.  
This thesis also seeks to interrogate the contingent and fluid nature of Egyptian self-
identity. Traditional scholarship on Egypt upholds a theorized juxtaposition between Egyptian 
territorial nationalism and other loyalties, such as Arabism, Islamism, Ottomanism, or Third-
Worldism. However, the complex web of personal allegiances and loyalties held by Egyptian 
                                                 
5 Yoav Di-Capua, “Embodiment of the Revolutionary Spirit: The Mustafa Kamil Mausoleum in Cairo,” History & 
Memory, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Spring/Summer 2001), 97. 
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individuals, communities, and entrenched interests were significantly more complicated. 
Egyptians at the time did not generally make distinctions between various loyalties and 
identities, such as imperial, religious, political, or ethnic; and revolutionary leaders found little 
difficulty in utilizing any or all or those loyalties as they proved useful to the national project of 
independence. Like other anti-colonial nationalist movements, Egyptian nationalist leaders were 
usually content to relax some of their ideological dictates in order to achieve or maintain political 
autonomy.6 Egyptian nationalism was not generally in competition with trans-nationalist ideas 
and movements. As Dennis Walker notes,  
al-Hizb al-Watani’s (The National Party) commitment to Egypt’s political unity was not 
nationalism of the exclusive total Western type dividing humanity up into atomistic nation-state 
units with freedom to fluidly alter associations formed with other nation units as change of interest 
decrees. [Mustafa] Kamil’s Egyptian nation could not gain the singleness of commitment exacted 
by the European nation because al-Hizb al-Watani’s thought imposed a plurality of political 
communities, the pan-Islamic as well as the nation.7  
 
The multi-polarity of the Egyptian nationalist movement, the competing interests of local actors 
who found their voice in various parties and organizations, and the contingent and fluid self-
identity of Egyptians makes a singular narrative of Egyptian nationalism impossible. Instead, the 
push for Egyptian independence must be seen as a complex web of allegiances and identities, 





                                                 
6 It may also be noted that, despite the supposed failures of Pan-Arabism, Pan-Africanism, and the like, they 
achieved considerable successes as adjuncts to nationalist liberation movements (and in the political careers of many 
nationalist leaders.) 
7 “Mustafa Kamil’s Party: Islam, Pan-Islamism, and Nationalism,” Islam in the Modern Age, Vol. 11 (1980), 230-9 
and Vol. 12 (1981), 107; James Alexander, The Truth about Egypt (London: Casell Press, 1911), 74-7. See, also, 
Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid, Egypt and Cromer (London: John Murray, 1968), 184. 
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Although there has been considerable work done on the development of Egyptian 
nationalism under the British Occupation (1882-1952), most have been imperially-defined 
political histories, such as that of P.J. Vatikiotis, in which the role of the Great Powers in internal 
political maneuvering is the central feature.8  Comparative works have largely placed the 
formation of Egyptians’ national identity in a regional context in relation to Ottomanism before 
World War I or Arab nationalism after it.  In these works, Egyptians’ relationships outside of the 
Middle East are rarely examined, and the works that do look farther afield tend to do so 
assuming solidarity based upon Islam.9 Likewise, the complicated and overlapping identities of 
Islamism, Arabism, Ottomanism, and the like across periods are seldom contextualized or 
appreciated.  
Juan Cole’s Colonialism and Revolution in the Middle East examines Egyptian 
motivations during the 1881 ‘Urabi Revolution; and identifies a “proto-nationalism” arising out 
of Egyptians’ identification of themselves as distinct from both the Turco-Circassian elite, and 
Europeans and other “foreigners” such as Syrians.10 This notion of “proto-nationalism,” also 
referred to by scholars such as Nikki Keddie and Elie Kedourie, is somewhat problematic, 
however. It wrongly privileges loyalty to a territorial nation-state above all other forms of 
identification, and assumes that loyalties based on any other criteria are not only incomplete, but 
                                                 
8 P.J. Vatikiotis, The History of Modern Egypt (Baltimore, MD:  Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991.) 
9 Noor-Aiman Iftikhar Khan, “The Enemy of My Enemy: Indian Influences on Egyptian Nationalism, 1907-1930,” 
(Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Chicago, 2006), 17-19. 
10 Juan R.I. Cole, Colonialism and Revolution in the Middle East: The Social and Cultural Origins of Egypt’s ‘Urabi 
Revolt (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993.) In this work, Juan Cole examines Egyptian sources on the 
1881 Revolution and has theorized that the Revolt was largely fueled by resentment of European financial 
encroachment as well as internal tensions arising from the preponderance of a “Turco-Circassian elite” in the 
government and military at the expense of native Egyptians. This work contradicted much of the accepted imperial 
historiography, in which the specter of religious fanaticism play a large role in explaining the ‘Urabists’ motivations. 
Historians had also accepted parts of this explanation because of the connections many of the original ‘Urabists and 
other nationalists had with Jamal al-Din al-Afghani.  
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in direct contradiction to territorial nationalism.11 Israel Gershoni and James Jankowski’s two 
works on the development of Egyptian national identity also examine a wider range of materials 
than that produced by the political elite and recognize more of the local cultural expressions of 
Egyptian identity.12 Gershoni and Jankowski discuss at length the existence of multiple 
allegiances for Egyptians throughout the twentieth century: Ottoman, Arab, Islamic, Eastern, and 
“Pharaonic,” the latter of which they posit as the most congruous with territorial nationalism. 
However, the authors see each of these identities as distinct and incapable of coexisting with any 
other. Rather than framing these various identities as mutually exclusive, this thesis seeks to 
argue that these loyalties cannot be mutually constitutive of national political identity.  
In Redefining the Egyptian Nation, the authors equate cultural nationalism with territorial 
nationalism, and Pharaonism with Egypt, which leads them to consider references to Islam or 
Arab culture as indicating a nationalist identification beyond Egypt, which they refer to as 
“supra-Egyptian” forms of identification. This formulation leads them to conclude that, although 
supra-Egyptianism retained some conception of an Egyptian state, its ideology “served to 
undermine Egyptian territorial nationalism.”13 The authors argue that interest in Islam or 
Arabism, for example, signifies a subordination of feelings of Egyptian primacy to other, larger 
political identities. In fact, however, no subordination occurred. Certain individuals or groups 
may identify with Islamic, Arab, or other local or transnational interests and ideologies; 
nevertheless Egyptian nationalists did not see these various loyalties as competing or mutually 
exclusive. Gershoni and Jankowski acknowledge that they are dealing with “orientations” that 
                                                 
11 “Pan-Islam as Proto-Nationalism,” The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 41, No. 1 (1969), 17-28; Elie Kedourie, 
The Chatham House Version, and Other Middle-Eastern Studies (New York: Praeger, 1970.) 
12 Israel Gershoni and James Jankowski, Egypt, Islam, and the Arabs: The Search for Egyptian Nationhood, 1900-
1930 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987) and Redefining the Egyptian Nation, 1930-1945 (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1995.) 
13 Gershoni and Jankowski, Redefining, 213 
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are not equivalent to “ideologies”; they admit also that these orientations overlap, and that the 
same “producers” often held Eastern, Islamic, and Arab loyalties.14 This thesis will attempt to 
show that no categorical distinctions existed between these various identities; instead, multiple 
loyalties and identities coexisted around a core vision of an Egyptian territorial state, whatever 
the dominant ideology of the moment.  
The dominant historiography of modern Egypt has also preferred to see nationalism in 
Egypt as a purely modern phenomenon. Most scholars have pointed to what they see as a radical 
discontinuity between a national identity which they posit came to Egyptian intellectuals around 
the turn of the twentieth century, and earlier forms of Egyptian identity. This argument assumes 
two things however: firstly, that the specific history of European nationalism is the natural model 
reproducible elsewhere; and, secondly, that national identity is a teleological phenomenon 
leading ultimately to identification only with a territorial nation-state.  Thus, the significant 
transition in this view is from a loosely-defined “culturalism” to nationalism, i.e. to the 
awareness of the nation-state as the ultimate goal of the community.15 The effort to place 
nationalism as a distinctively modern phenomenon, however, has tended to fix and objectify 
what is really a subjective, fluid, and elusive phenomenon, namely the multiple meanings of the 
nation to citizens of the nation-state. This work will attempt to contextualize Egyptian national 
identity in the period 1882-1919, with a view less to its distinctiveness than to its changing and 
fluid relationships to other visions of political and social community.  
Two assumptions of the modernization theory of nationalism must be interrogated in 
order to examine a less static, more contextualized nationalism. The first of these is that national 
identity is a radically novel form of consciousness. However, as this thesis will show, individual 
                                                 
14 Ibid., 36 
15 Prasenjit Duara, “Historicizing National Identity, or Who Imagines What and When,” in Geoff Eley and Ronald 
Grigor Suny, Becoming National: A Reader (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 153-4. 
10 
 
and community identities and loyalties are never fully subsumed by territorial nationalism and 
should be considered in their complex relationships to other historical and cultural identities. The 
second assumption is the privileging of the grand narrative of the nation as a collective historical 
subject, which essentializes nationalist movements to a deep historical cause rather than practical 
realities of lived experience. Very specific, very local concerns of Egyptian nationalists, and the 
various divisions of the population at large informed the course and nature of Egyptian 
nationalism in the period 1882-1919. Nationalism is rarely the singular identification with the 
nation-state to the exclusion or subordination of other identities, but rather represents the site 
where very different views of the nation contest and negotiate with each other.16 
The specter of Pan-Islamism also haunts any discussion of the nature of Egyptian 
nationalism. Kedourie, Kramer, and others have argued that Egyptian nationalism was at least 
partially defined by a religious character. However, this framing of the argument is overly 
simplistic; it does not address the root causes of the nationalist movement, particularly as 
nationalist leaders repeatedly disclaimed religious motivations. The self-interested use of 
religious rhetoric is accepted as a utilitarian political discourse when discussing Christian 
nations; and, thus, it should receive the same analysis in Muslim ones. Nikki Keddie’s work on 
Jamal al-Din al-Afghani demonstrates some connections of what she calls a “proto-nationalist” 
nature, but the link does not extend beyond Afghani himself.17 Moreover, the historical 
connection between Egyptian and Indian nationalists calls into doubt many of the conclusions 
reached by those who have examined the transnational identity of the Muslim world, and have 
described many Egyptian-Indian contacts as Pan-Islamic. Works addressing Egyptian 
                                                 
16 Duara, Historicising National Identity, 151-2. 
17 Nikki Keddie, Sayyid Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani: A Political Biography (Berkeley, CA: University of California 




nationalism have been largely in a regional context in relation to Egyptians’ perceived 
Ottomanism before the First World War and of Arab nationalism after it. In these works, 
Egyptians’ relationships outside of the Middle East are rarely examined, and the works that do 
look further afield tend to do so assuming solidarity based on Islam. This, however, is a crucial 
mistake in studying the history of Egyptian nationalism. 
  As this study will show, Egyptians found identities based on religion, culture, and the 
nation-state to be mutually reinforcing rather than competitive. Andersonian theories of 
nationalism under-represent the ways in which religion, language, ethnicity, and the like 
underpin many nationalisms in the global South and the manner in which transnational social 
formations can often be successfully co-opted for nationalist purposes.18 A more complete 
explanatory framework would incorporate these alternate forms of identity as mutually 
reinforcing and often supportive of the nation rather than diametrically opposed to it.19 
Communities were and are variously split by internal feuds and brought together by common 
purpose in historically contingent ways. For example, Copt and Muslim workers could unite to 
                                                 
18 The same has historically been true of such transnational ideologies as socialism. Juan R.I. Cole and Deniz 
Kandiyoti, “Nationalism and the Colonial Legacy in the Middle East and Central Asia: Introduction,” International 
Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 34, No. 2 (May 2002), 190-1. Sami Zubaida’s essay, “The Fragments Imagine 
the Nation: The Case of Iraq,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 34, No. 2 (May 2002), 205-215, 
suggests the ways in which the case of Iraq poses problems for the Andersonian approach to religion and 
nationalism. 
For a scholarly exchange on the applicability of Anderson’s theory on Egyptian nationalism, the role of print culture, 
and the importance of the secularization of the liturgical language, see Charles D. Smith, “Imagined Identities, 
Imagined Nationalisms: Print Culture and Egyptian Nationalism in Light of Recent Scholarship,” International 
Journal of Middle East Studies 29 (1997): 607-22; Israel Gershoni and James Jankowski, “Print Culture, Social 
Change, and the Process of Redefining Imagined Communities in Egypt”, International Journal of Middle East 
Studies 31 (1999): 81-94.  Charles D. Smith, ‘”Cultural Constructs’ and Other Fantasies: Imagined Narratives in 
Imagined Communities; Surrejoinder to Gershoni and Jankowski’s “Print Culture, Social Change, and the Process of 
Redefining Imagined Communities in Egypt,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 31 (1999): 95-102; Ziad 
Fahmy, “Popularizing Egyptian Nationalism,” 37. 
19 This claim of a radical disjuncture between what Anderson and others consider “pre-modern” identities and 
“modern nationalism” is exaggerated. Scholars of world systems theory and globalization in all periods have written 
about the complex networks of trade, pilgrimage, and migration, which linked populations to wider communities 
and political structures. Moreover, even if the reach of the nation-state is limited, the widespread presence of 
common cultural ideas link communities to each other and, often, to a concept of a territorial state. This illustrates 




oppose landowners and company supervisors without sacrificing local and communal identities; 
Egyptians might support the Ottoman Empire as a bulwark against Western imperialism, but not 
as a political sovereign in Egypt. It was possible for an Egyptian nationalist in this period to be a 
loyal supporter of the Ottoman Empire, a fervent believer in Arabism, and a proponent of an 
independent Egyptian nation-state, for example. This thesis argues that nationalism in Egypt 
coexisted and grew symbiotically with its relationship to other forms of political and social 
community.20 In addition, this thesis will show that not only is there no inherent contradiction 
between territorial nationalism and loyalties to larger groupings, but also that the nationalists 
under study never themselves saw any contradiction. They did not articulate an either/or 
mentality in regards to territorial Egyptian nationalism, loyalty to a transnational Islam, 
utilitarian bonds with the Ottoman Empire or khedive or foreign governments, and Arab cultural 
ties. Egyptian nationalist leaders only ever expressed any hesitation at multiple identities was at 
the thought of a loss of political sovereignty, as displayed in their opposition to any federated 
Arab political structure. The evidence presented here deliberately complicates the categories that 
have heretofore been discussed in opposition, or at least in contrast to, the nationalism that 
sought a territorially sovereign nation-state as its cultural and political goal. Nationalism was not 
always in competition with trans-nationalist ideas and movements.21 
This thesis, therefore, disputes the conclusion that supra-Egyptianism “undermined 
Egyptian territorial nationalism,” causing “Egypt [to be] subsumed into the wider frameworks of 
identity represented by the Islamic umma or the Arab nation.”22 As Sami Zubeida and Roger 
Owen have postulated, it is not that “radical Islam or Arabism were meaningless alternatives to, 
                                                 
20 Ilham Khuri-Makdisi, The Eastern Mediterranean and the Making of Global Radicalism, 1860-1914 (Berkeley, 
University of California Press, 2010), 169. 
21 Khan, 11-12. 
22 Ibid., 213 
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say, Egyptian Pharaonism, but rather that their imaginings too were subordinated to the model of 
the territorial nation.”23 Furthermore, Robert Young’s description of nationalism as a language 
“in which the power struggle between colonizer and colonized for domination and self-
determination operates, functioning as a concept through which a cluster of specific issues and 
grievances were brought together and politicized” is helpful.24 When nationalism is interpreted 
as only one of multiple forms of interaction within a community, useful and arguably primary 
but hardly exclusive or static, the roles of other functions in the interaction become easier to 
grasp.  Identification with other groups can be seen as supplementary, even complementary, to 
territorial nationalism. Thus, Egyptian nationalism, in its official and unofficial political forms, 
as well as in its cultural incarnations, communicated its goal of territorial independence in 
conjunction with Ottomanism, Islamism, Bolshevism, and Arabism, among other transnational 
ideologies and affiliations, as well as local issues and local elites, throughout the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries.25 When viewed through the lens of patterns of authority, historical context, 
class distinction, legitimacy, and religious prerogatives, a seemingly capricious shifting of 
alliances reappears as pragmatic and thoroughly consistent. Thus, this thesis investigates the 
agency of Egyptians in constructing and negotiating national identity. This thesis also draws on 
Prasenjit Duara’s sophisticated treatment of the subject of nationalism in the context of East 
Asia, which allows for the co-existence of nation-states and transnational, cultural entities, with 
the latter possibly being absorbed by the former. Academic discourse has often declined to 
classify trans-national identities as a form of nationalism, although it is difficult to see why, 
                                                 
23 Gabriel Piterberg, “The Tropes of Stagnation and awakening in Nationalist Historical Consciousness: The 
Egyptian Case," Israel Gershoni & James Jankowski (eds.), Rethinking Nationalism in the Arab Middle East (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 49. See also, Sami Zubaida, Beyond Islam: A New Understanding of the 
Middle East (London: I.B. Taurus, 2011) and Roger Owen, State, Power, and Politics in the Making of the Modern 
Middle East (London: Routledge, 2000.) 
24 Robert J.C. Young, Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction, (Oxford; Blackwell, 2001), 173.  
25 Khan, 16. 
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analytically, a form of identity that bases itself on a sense of religious, cultural, or ideological 
identity is less authentic than secularist, ethnic, or linguistic movements. Insofar as most trans-
national ideologies are predominately localistic in nature despite their apparent universalism, 
they can usually be co-opted for nationalist purposes. Nationalism, like any other identity, is a 
field of contestation rather than a stable essence; and struggles over the definition and place of 
diverse loyalties and identities can be variably articulated with a national sense of identity that is 
itself fluid and changing.26 The use of examples such as those of expatriate nationalists, 
connections between anti-colonial nationalists, the continuation of Ottoman loyalties, the use of 
nationalist rhetoric by Egyptian elites, as well as contestations between those elites, allows one to 
demonstrate that there were, in fact, multiple aspects to the formulation of Egyptian nationalism. 
In this way, it may be shown that phenomena of diverse and transnational loyalties may 
transgress, but do not necessarily subvert, the nation-state.27  
In addition to the multiple overlapping and contested definitions of Egyptian nationalism, 
this thesis will also address the internal Egyptian rivalries of various elite groups and power 
bases. What is offered in this thesis is an attempt to engage with Robert Hunter and Khaled 
Fahmy’s arguments on nineteenth-century Egyptian nationalism by applying their analyses to the 
late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries.28 In his work, Egypt under the Khedives, Robert 
Hunter argues that the decline and fall of vice-regal absolutism in Egypt was integrally related to 
changes in Egypt’s political and administrative order - in particular, the establishment by key 
                                                 
26 Cole and Kandiyoti, 197. 
27 See, for example, T. Brennan, “Cosmopolitanism and Internationalism,” in D. Archibugi, ed., Debating 
Cosmopolitics (London: Verso, 2003), 40-50; Prasenjit Duara, “Transnationalism and the Predicament of 
Sovereignty: China, 1900-1945,” American Historical Review, Vol. 102, No. 4 (October 1997), 1030-51; P. Cheah, 
“Given Culture: Rethinking Cosmopolitical Freedom in Transnationalism,” Boundary 2, Vol. 24, No. 2 (Summer 
1997), 157-97; Carolien Stolte and Harald Fischer-Tine, “Imaging Asia in India: Nationalism and Internationalism 
(ca. 1905-1940),” Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 54, No. 1 (January 2012), 67. 
28 F. Robert Hunter, Egypt Under the Khedives, 1805-1879: From Household Government to Modern Bureaucracy 
(Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 1999); Khaled Fahmy, All the Pasha’s Men: Mehmed Ali, His Army, 
and the Making of Modern Egypt (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 1997.) 
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members of the ruling elite of ties outside the vice-regal household which weakened their 
loyalties and attachments to the ruler. This allowed for a mutually-beneficial collaboration 
between certain elite sectors and European politicians and financiers. European intervention in 
1875-79 precipitated the breakup of a ruling group, therefore, which had already been penetrated 
by “outside” influences. Without the support of collaborating officials bent upon “reform,” 
European control could not have been established as it was after 1875. The establishment of 
imperialism in Egypt, then, is seen by Hunter to have been a more complex and subtle 
phenomenon than is commonly thought – one with profound cultural as well as economic roots, 
and a strong indigenous base. This thesis attempts to shift framework of the study of the 
Egyptian nationalism from viewing both British policies and Egyptian nationalism through the 
lens of imperial politics and simple reactionism, and instead through local contextual politics and 
social movements. 
Similarly, in his monograph, All the Pasha’s Men, Khaled Fahmy interrogates the 
nationalist tradition of Egyptian historiography which has posited Mehmed Ali Pasha (r. 1805-
1848) and his “national” army as key movers and organizers of a modern Egyptian nation-state. 
Mehmed Ali Pasha was not, in Fahmy’s view, seeking to divorce Egypt from the Ottoman 
Empire to create a new, independent nation; but rather to establish his own dynasty within the 
loose structure of the Ottoman Empire. Fahmy argues against the assumption that any difficulties 
incurred on the road to national realization were not due to internal factors, but rather were 
caused by external, malicious forces, particularly the British. The author opposes the distinction 
between internal and external factors, arguing that all of these forces were inextricably 
intertwined. In locating Mehmed Ali within an Ottoman context and seeing him as an ambitious 
ruler determined to secure the rich Egyptian province for himself and his progeny, Fahmy 
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follows a recent trend in Egyptian historiography, sustained by such scholars as Ehud Toledano 
and Jane Hathaway, which emphasizes Egypt’s adherence to a larger Empire and stresses the 
Ottoman character of Egyptian elite culture and institutions.29 Moreover, Fahmy criticizes the 
nationalist version of Egyptian history and its assumption that “Egypt” has always been a 
unified, self-contained, clearly recognizable identity and that its inhabitants have always realized 
– through their strong attachment to its soil, and through their conscious links to its history – that 
they are, and have always been, clearly and exclusively “Egyptian,” and that this identity exists 
outside and apart from various self-identities; and that Egyptians saw themselves as such first 
and foremost, and not as Muslims or Ottoman subjects, for example. Considering the multitude 
of conflicts in place between monarchical power and nationalist aspirations which date to well 
before the ‘Urabi Revolution of 1882, the disjuncture in the literature on Egyptian nationalism 
between periods is problematic. A more viable framework for the study of Egyptian nationalism 
must take into account the complex processes, dynamics, and disjunctures that characterized 
Egyptian identities and the Egyptian independence movement in the period 1882-1919.30   
 
Organization  
In this dissertation, chapter two offers an historical introduction to power sharing 
between elites in late nineteenth century Egypt, the ‘Urabi Revolution, and the British 
                                                 
29 Ehud R. Toledano, State and Society in Mid-Nineteenth-Century Egypt (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 1990); Jane Hathaway, The Politics of Households in Ottoman Egypt: the Rise of the Qazdaglis (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997.) 
30 In this work, Fahmy further argues that Muhammad Ali did not aim to achieve independence for “Egypt,” but 
intended to carve out a small empire for himself and for his children after him. It also argued that Great Britain, 
which is usually taken to have opposed Mehmed Ali ferociously and to have “prevented Egypt from reaping the 
fruits of her military victories” was not antagonistic to Muhammad Ali’s reform policies in Egypt, but was against 
his empire-building efforts that she saw as challenging and endangering her own possessions in Asia.  
In short, rather than seeing Mehmed Ali as striving to achieve independence on behalf of the Egyptian nation, and 
instead of viewing Great Britain as the main obstacle in this endeavor, Fahmy argued that Mehmed Ali was seeking 
the establishment of a secure personal rule for himself and his household in Egypt. 
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Occupation of Egypt. Chapter three analyzes the 1919 Revolution and provides a background for 
discussion of the national movement and its leaders. Chapter four discusses the complex 
interplay of Egyptian nationalist leaders, the Khedive ‘Abbas Hilmi, the Ottoman Empire, Sultan 
Abdülhamid, and the Young Turks in order to further explore the varieties of national and trans-
national identities which animated Egyptian nationalists in the period under discussion. Chapter 
five details the European campaign of Watani Party leaders, as they attempted to galvanize 
international public opinion behind their quest for independence. In chapter six, the effects of the 
deposition of the Khedive ‘Abbas Hilmi in 1914 and the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in World 
War I on the Egyptian movement, which had supported them, is considered. Chapter seven 
compares the Egyptian national movement with the two other primary anti-British nationalisms 
of the period, namely the Indian and Irish. Finally, chapter eight explores the intersection of local 
concerns, new transnational movements, focusing particularly on the global spread of 
communism and the new international push for self-determination after the First World War. 
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Chapter Two: Historical Introduction 
 
 
The Urabi Revolution of 1881-2 was a socio-political movement that expressed 
discontent with both foreign control and the continuing presence of the landed Turco-Circassian 
elite at the highest levels of government and society. The modern Egyptian nationalist movement 
is often dated from the ‘Urabi Revolution; however, the forces that would drive Egyptian 
nationalism for decades were already in evidence well before ‘Urabi’s movement.1 In particular, 
nineteenth-century Egypt was characterized by a complex mix of competing power centers, 
including the office of the khedive, the Ottoman Empire, Turco-Circassian elites, European 
financers and governments, Egyptian landowners, a new class of urban elites, and an underclass 
of workers and fellahin. State repression of political freedoms, crippling taxes, class and ethnic 
discrimination, and a khedive who was perceived as ultimately siding with Europeans over 
Egyptians, were all part of the mix of issues that contributed to the popular support for the ‘Urabi 
Revolution, and which continued to plague Egypt. Despite having differing interests and visions 
for the future of Egypt, a diverse cross-section of the Egyptian public participated in and 
supported ‘Urabi’s movement.  
The web of personal interests that ultimately led to the ‘Urabi Revolution, and which 
would continue to define Egyptian politics for at least the next seventy years, began in the years 
preceding the Revolution. The turbulent politics of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries in Egypt was the result of a complex set of motivations that included personal rivalries, 
political ambitions, and support of various national political factions.  
                                                 
1 The ‘Urabist army was the single most important threat to British domination of Egypt, so it was disbanded in 
1882. At the time of the Revolution, it had a nominal strength of 11,000 or 12,000 men and effective strength of 
8,769, down drastically from 57,000 in 1878. (Alexander Scholch, Egypt for the Egyptians!: the Socio-political 
Crisis in Egypt, 1878-1882 (London: Ithaca Press, 1981), 137.) Contemporary observers estimated the army’s 
strength at 12,000 during the revolution. (Muhammad Mahmud al-Saruji, al-Gaysh al-Misri fi al-Qarn al-Tasi 
‘Ashar (Cairo: Dar al-Ma’arid, 1967), 385-6.) 
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Another stimulus to nationalism in late nineteenth-century Egypt was the discontent 
engendered by growing economic hardship. This was the combined result of poor harvests (the 
1877 Nile flood was unusually low); the increasingly heavy tax burden, an undue share of which 
was borne by the poorest Egyptians; the growth of private indebtedness to foreigners; and the 
continued deterioration of the Egyptians’ position in global trade and manufacturing relative to 
Levantine and European competition. In 1878, after a low Nile, poor harvests, and rising military 
outlays, Khedive Isma’il (r. 1863-1879) surrendered much of his authority to a “European 
cabinet,” which was headed by Nubar Nubarian (1825-1899) and included English and French 
ministers. Ironically, Ismail’s reign saw the collapse of the absolute power that he and his 
predecessors had wielded for three-quarters of a century. In 1875, Europe began a political 
intervention that led to Ismail’s deposition and exile in 1879. In four short years, vice-regal 
power was dismantled piece by piece until little was left of the edifice of absolutism constructed 
by Muhammad Ali. After 1879, Egypt’s viceroys continued as khedives, but the absolute power 
symbolized by this title was gone forever. The decline and fall of vice-regal power in Egypt 
cannot be explained by European intervention alone, but was also related to social and 
institutional changes in the state system between 1849 and 1874. After 1875, men from within 
this elite began to separate themselves from the viceroy. Some collaborated with European 
policymakers and financiers to compel the khedive to surrender his financial resources and a 
large measure of his power; others, while not breaking with the ruler, began to join the 
movement of protest against European influence that was developing in the countryside and the 
capital. In this way, the ruling combination of men grouped around the royal house was broken 
up, and highly centralized power collapsed. By the 1870s, two new kinds of interests had 
emerged: a local, rural interest where certain officials possessed social and economic power in 
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the countryside; and a European interest, where officials pushed “reforms,” helped advance the 
policies of particular European states, and facilitated the spread of European civilization 
generally.2 
Collaboration with local elites thus ensured European financial and political control 
without an official occupation. However, the breakup of the combination of forces on which 
Egypt’s government had previously rested released social forces hostile to Europe; and Ismail, 
taking advantage of popular resistance, was able to take back a degree of power. Ismail’s return 
to power forced the Europeans to adopt a tactic that they had long threatened but had always 
resisted: to bring pressure upon the central government in Istanbul, and in June 1879; Ismail was 
deposed as viceroy of Egypt. The rapidity with which Ismail lost his power in the years after 
1875 can be explained by reference to circumstances that had been building up in the preceding 
period and which by the mid-1870s had reached a critical point. This same series of issues would 
plague ‘Abbas Hilmi and his relations with the complicated tangle of power centers in Egypt, 
including landed elites, the Ottoman Empire, and European governmental officials. Native 
Egyptian stakeholders would, in addition, have complicated relationships with Egyptian 
nationalist groups, whose popular support they required, but whose potential for reforming social 
and political realities was frightening to local elites.  
Unfortunately for Ismail, because Britain and France were, by the late nineteenth century, 
acting in concert to apply pressure on the Khedive over European financial concerns, Ismail was 
unable to play one European power off against the other; and was forced to acquiesce to 
European demands. This fact, however, gave rise to resistance from two different quarters: a 
substantial number of Egyptian elites, as well as the general Egyptian population, vehemently 
                                                 
2 F. Robert Hunter, Egypt Under the Khedives: 1805-1879: From Household Government to Modern Bureaucracy, 
2nd Edition (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 1999), 35-6. 
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denounced Ismail’s cooperation with European financiers, viewing this control as tantamount to 
handing Egypt’s administration over to foreigners.3  
Among the first reactions to Ismail’s acquiescence to European demands came from the 
Egyptian military. In February 1879, the government had decided to place on half pay a large 
number of army officers, who salaries were already deeply in arrears. Unrest within the army 
was growing, and most officers held Europe and its strict control of Egyptian finances as 
responsible for their plight. Isma’il initially supported ‘Urabi and the Egyptian army officers’ 
movement to gain more power vis-à-vis Turco-Circassian and European elites, with whom the 
Khedive also had power struggles; and his attempt to manipulate military and clerical 
dissatisfaction to put an end to direct European representation on the cabinet briefly succeeded.4 
By March 1879, the public display of grievances by native Egyptian officers who had been put 
on half-pay led to the resignation of the European cabinet and its replacement by one headed by 
army officer Muhammad Sharif (1826-1887). European bondholders and their governments 
suspected that Isma’il had engineered the uprising to regain absolutist rule. Other members of the 
Egyptian elite, such as the ulema and landholders, took the nationalist protests as an opportunity 
to offer their support for the Khedive against the European powers with the quid pro quo that 
Isma’il move toward constitutionalism and parliamentary rule. In June, Ottoman Sultan 
Abdülhamid, acting on the advice of European ambassadors, dismissed Isma’il in favor of the 
                                                 
3 Theodore Rothstein, Egypt’s Ruin (London: Eifield, 1910), 30. Under agreements reached between the European 
powers and Ismail, two European controllers were appointed, one to receive and remit revenue pledged to the 
payment of loans to the Debt Commission, the other to supervise the accounts of government departments. In 
addition, a board composed of one Egyptian, two English, and two French, representatives to manage the railroads 
and port of Alexandria was created. Europeans were then in control of vital areas of Egyptian administration; and 
Egypt was saddled with debt payments amounting to approximately two-thirds of its estimated annual revenue. 
4 FO 141/128, Borg to Vivian, no. 1, Cairo, 18 February 1879; FO 141/125, Vivian to Salisbury, no. 57, Cairo, 15 
February 1879; FO 141/125, Vivian to Salisbury, no. 59, Cairo, 19 February 1879; FO 141/25, Vivian Salisbury, no. 
71, 22 February 1879; see Alexander Scholch, Egypt for the Egyptians!: the Socio-Political Crisis in Egypt, 1878-
1882 (London: Ithaca Press, 1981), 66-73; and F. Robert Hunter, Egypt Under the Khedives: 1805-1879: From 
Household Government to Modern Bureaucracy, 2nd Edition (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 1999), 
215-6; Cole, “Of Crowds and Empires,” 118. 
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latter’s son Tawfiq.5 But in 1880, discontent with the new khedive began to surface; in addition 
to the complaints of native Egyptian army officers, the recurring issues of European penetration 
and high taxes had not dissipated. In fact, Isma’il’s deposition in June 1879 did not at all dampen 
the political unrest among Egyptians. The Assembly demanded expanded power, and Egyptian 
army officers again asserted claims to play a greater role in political decisions.6 The unpopular 
Khedive Tewfik died in January 1892 and was succeeded by his young son, ‘Abbas Hilmi (r. 
1892-1914), who quickly clashed with British Consul-General in Egypt Lord Cromer (1883-
1907), transforming himself into a unifying national figure around which the divided nation was 
finally able to rally.7  
Through 1881, power in Cairo was held by an uneasy coalition of Nationalist officers, 
constitutionalist civilians, and the Khedive, with pressure from European powers. No parties 
seemed willing to overthrow or silence the nationalists, however. Sultan Abdülhamid, for 
example, sent a mission to Egypt in October 1881, but his emissaries, apparently unable to 
decide whether Egyptian nationalism or European intervention posed the greater threat to 
Ottoman interests, managed only to encourage both sides to expect the Sultan’s support. Neither 
Britain nor France wanted to see the rise of an extreme Nationalist regime, which might 
repudiate the state debt or endanger the lives and property of European residents, take power; but 
                                                 
5 Tawfiq soon turned against the Nationalists, exiling Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani, proroguing the Legislative 
Assembly, suppressing Nationalist newspapers, reducing the size of the Army, and rejecting proposed constitutions. 
6 Ann Elizabeth Mayer, “’Abbas Hilmi II: The Khedive and Egypt’s Struggle for Independence” (2 volumes), 
(Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Michigan, 1978), 5-6. 
7 Also in 1892, British colonial government marked the anniversary of its first decade in Egypt with the publication 
of Alfred Milner’s England in Egypt (London: Edward Arnold, 1907), the director-general of Egyptian accounts, 
which celebrated British accomplishments justifying its continued occupation. When that book was translated into 
Arabic, it had the opposite effect demonstrating the extent to which the occupation usurped khedival economic and 
political powers fueling greater support for a khedive led nationalist opposition.(Roger Owen, Lord Cromer: 
Victorian Imperialist, Edwardian Proconsul (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2004), 247-8, 269-70.) The 




neither were they, and especially not Britain, willing to intervene militarily.8 By the end of 1881, 
the nationalist unrest was increasingly blamed on the ‘Urabists by European governments; the 
‘Urabists, in turn, placed blame on the Khedive; and the Khedive, fearful of the potential power 
of a Nationalist coalition, asked the British to intervene militarily.9 Like the Khedive, the 
ministers depended upon foreign troops to stay in power.  
In June 1882, the British navy bombarded the port of Alexandria at the urging of 
Egyptian Khedive Tewfik (r. 1879-1892) in an effort to put an end to a revolutionary movement 
led by Colonel Ahmed ‘Urabi.10 The ‘Urabi Revolution (1881-2) saw the Egyptian military 
capitalize on more general societal discontent, which had been brewing for years, in an attempt 
to usurp the Ottoman-backed Khedive and push forward a more representative government.11 
‘Urabi (1841-1911) rose quickly through the ranks of the military, but his career was stalled 
under Khedive Isma’il, who favored army officers of Turkish or Circassian origin. After 
Isma’il’s deposition, ‘Urabi backed the emerging National Party, but his primary loyalty was to 
the group of discontented ethnic Egyptian officers who began protesting in February 1881 
against War Minister ‘Uthman Rifqi’s (1839-1886) perceived favoritism to Turco-Circassian 
officers. Following a successful push to have Rifqi replaced in the War Ministry on 9 September 
1881, and fearing a khedival counterplot, the Nationalist officers surrounded Abdin Palace, 
confronted Tawfiq, and obliged him to establish a constitutional government headed by 
Muhammad Sharif (1826-1887) and to enlarge the Egyptian army. Still fearing a betrayal by the 
                                                 
8 Arthur Goldschmidt, Jr., “The Egyptian Nationalist Party,” (Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Harvard University, 
1968), 31. 
9 Mayer, 7-16. 
10 For a detailed overview of the timeline of the Revolt and the composition of the populations involved, see Juan 
R.I.  Cole, “Of Crowds and Empires: Afro-Asian Riots and European Expansion, 1857-1882,” Comparative Studies 
in Society and History, Vol. 32, No. 1. 
11 The ‘Urabi Revolution was characterized by ‘Urabi’s declaration to Khedive Tawfiq, delivered on 9 September  
1881, “In the name of God, other than whom there is no God, we shall no longer be inheritable, and from this day on 
we shall not be enslaved.” 
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Khedive, the Nationalists took steps to weaken the Turks and Circassians within the officer 
corps, also stirring up popular feeling against the European powers.  
The ‘Urabi Revolution must also be seen in its historic and geographical context. Only 
one year before, the French had established a protectorate over nearby Tunisia. ‘Urabi’s popular 
appeal can partly be explained by the perception that he was standing up to the Europeans, who 
were increasingly seen as impinging on both Egypt’s political sovereignty and financial well-
being. In addition, though the Ottoman sultan actually opposed ‘Urabi’s movement, it did not 
stop ‘Urabi from successfully posing in Egypt as the defender of Ottoman claims to Egypt. The 
Anglo-French opposition to a leader of ‘Urabi’s popularity helped create an adverse image of all 
Europeans and their local allies in Egypt. The multiple poles of support for the ‘Urabi Revolt 
represented a temporary alliance among land owners, constitutionalists, and junior army officers, 
which emerged as a result of significant forces of change produced during the preceding few 
decades. Over the course of the nineteenth century, wealthy Egyptians joined with their Turco-
Circassian counterparts to exert political pressures on the office of the khedive, and to insure 
state policies were in the elites’ interests and chosen after consultation with them. In addition, a 
burgeoning constitutionalist movement pushed by the new Egyptian elite was influenced by their 
desire to be protected from khedival power through a mechanism of government outside the 
reach of royal prerogatives. 
Contributing to the support for the ‘Urabist movement and the general social and political 
turbulence of late nineteenth century Egypt, Egyptians exhibited acute dissatisfaction with the 
monarchy, which was widely seen by the early 1880s as having allied with representatives of 
Western governments and financiers. For his part, Tewfik was frightened by the burgeoning 
popular opposition to Khedival autocracy. When the nationalist agitation grew, he relied ever 
25 
 
more on the representatives of France and Britain to protect him from his politicized subjects 
who were demanding a democratized regime in which power would be shared with 
representative institutions. As the crisis deepened to the point of military confrontation, Tewfik 
sided with the British invasion force that was sent to quell the ‘Urabist Revolution.12 The 
Revolution was put down by the British, and Tewfik was reinstated on the throne; from that 
point on, however, the monarchy remained dependent on British support for its survival, which 
caused a critical crisis of legitimacy for the monarchy which did not subside over the succeeding 
decades.13 What the nationalized segment of Egyptians appreciated most about ‘Urabi was his 
defense of the independence of Egyptian (and royal) government and his attempt to restrain 
international intervention. They faulted Tewfik for policies which they perceived as giving away 
the interests of the state in exchange for international support for the khedive’s formal right to 
rule. Once the British entered Cairo, ‘Urabi surrendered, was tried for treason against the 
khedive, but ultimately spared execution. Khedive ‘Abbas Hilmi (1874-1944, r. 1892-1914), son 
of Khedive Tawfiq who began his reign in 1892 following his father’s unexpected death, allowed 
‘Urabi to return to Egypt in 1901; but ‘Urabi did not join the later National Party of Mustafa 
Kamil.14 Not only did Tewfik’s support of the major powers that occupied Egypt make him the 
“most unpopular man in all Egypt” but also assured that he “[would] be written in history as...the 
prince who brought the English into Egypt.”15 Tewfik’s loss of legitimacy was clearly expressed 
in the Official Journal of 25 July 1882:  
                                                 
12 Mayer, 40. 
13 Much of the reason for the British support of the monarchy was the belief that a strong centralized state was the 
most likely means of ensuring financial solvency for European investors. 
14 Far from welcoming back the heroes of the ‘Urabist Revolution with open arms, ‘Abbas Hilmi was bitterly 
opposed to their return. ‘Abbas was unwilling to forget the disrespect he felt they had shown to the institution of the 
monarchy and to his father, in particular. (FO 78/4957, Cromer to Salisbury No. 212, 10 December 1898; Mayer, 
153-4.) 
15 Muhammad al-Khalif, “Ahmed ‘Urabi, al-Za’im al-Muftra ‘Aliyhi,” in Raja’ al-Naqqash, “Amirat Nabilar,” Al-
Ahram al-Dawli, 13 February 2003, 378-9. 
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Every native knows the Khedive has brought ruin upon his country, first, by listening to the advice 
of the English Representative, and, secondly, by bringing the fleet, which opened fire on the forts 
of Alexandria...The Khedive, (after the British occupied Alexandria), instead of returning to Cairo 
to complete the military preparations and to encourage his troops by his presence, took refuge on 
board the enemy’s fleet with his household...the Khedive, who sold the nation and the country to 
our bitterest foe.16  
 
Tewfik returned to his throne in Cairo in 1882; and British attempts to calm the situation by 
showing clemency to the rebels only weakened Tewfik further. According to historian Afaf Lutfi 
al-Sayyid Marsot,  
In spite of its avowed intentions, every step the British government was to take in the direction of 
reaffirming the Khedive’s power was to have the opposite effect – to weaken it, thereby giving 
England a firmer hold over Egypt. For example, in its handling of the court martial of the 
insurgents, the British government made the Khedive look like “a man of straw” to the 
Egyptians.17 
 
As evidence of his limited capacity to rule, the khedive’s desires to punish the leadership of the 
revolution were frustrated by the British occupation authorities demanding his weakened 
political position. 
Egyptian elites, European representatives, and the Khedive all feared that, had the 
‘Urabists succeeded, what emerged would have been indigenous representative government in 
the hands of the landowning elite in perfect congruence with the local distribution of economic 
power. The great mass of Egyptians resented the growing influence of Europeans over all aspects 
of life in Egypt. Many landless and smallholding peasants disliked the growing affluence of the 
great estate holders and supported those elements around ‘Urabi who argued that the land 
belonged to those who tilled it. When the danger of land seizure by fellahin became obvious to 
the estate holders who joined ‘Urabi out of a desire to forestall European intervention, dislike of 
the Turks or desire to restore Egyptian power over local economic structures, they abandoned 
                                                 
16 Extract from the official journal, al-Waqa’ia al-Misriyya, 25 July 1882, English translation enclosed in No. 229, 
Sir E. Malet to Earl Granville, Alexandria, 9 September 1882, FO 407/23/2879, 101-2. 




‘Urabi and went over to Tewfik and the British army.18 Furthermore, it was clear that the reforms 
of the period in the Ottoman Empire and the similar reforms in Egypt would, if carried to their 
logical conclusion, have destroyed the independent power of the notables and the modes of 
political action it made possible. In addition to the more narrow power struggles of Egyptian 
elites, the ‘Urabi Revolution also, then, highlights the class divisions within Egyptian society; 
these cleavages between urban workers, fellahin, and urban and landholding elites would have 
deleterious effects on the ability of Egyptian nationalists to create a cohesive movement. Elite 
interests were threatened by the more radical undercurrents of the Nationalist movement 
throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, preventing the establishment of an effective 
nationalist organizational capacity. The bulk of 'Urabi’s support came from the Egyptian masses; 
class was thus at the heart of Egypt’s failure to achieve a united national stand against the 
British.19 Here, class and national cleavages overlapped so forcefully that workers who rose up 
against their managers could be seen as ‘Urabist heroes.20  
In Cairo, the British military occupation of 1882 meant that one of the foreign 
representatives became, in effect, ruler of Egypt; in uneasy collaboration with the palace. This 
conferred on the other representatives, in particular that of France, and on the Ottoman high 
commissioner a new importance as the only possible foci of opposition but it also limited their 
efficacy, since the presence of a British army gave the British consul-general a power which they 
could not challenge.21 In addition, the British attempted throughout this period to ally with 
Egyptian elites, who in most areas had interests in common with the British; and European 
                                                 
18 Jeffrey G Collins, The Egyptian Elite Under Cromer, 1882-1907 (Berlin: K. Schwarz, 1983), 281. 
19 Amira Sonbol, The Last Khedive of Egypt: Memoirs of Abbas Hilmi II (Reading, UK: Ithaca Press, 1998), 18. 
20 FO 141/161, Beaman to Malet, no. 46, Cairo, 4 July 1882; Cole, “Of Crowds and Empires,” 122-3. 
21 Albert Hourani, “Ottoman Reform and the Politics of Notables,” in William R. Polk and Richard L. Chambers, 
Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East: the Nineteenth Century (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1968), 64-7. 
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advisors quickly emerged as a new source of patronage for Egyptian elites opposed to the power 
of the khedive. But once the monarchy became political, it could no longer serve as a rallying 
point for all the forces of society. Other members of the Ottoman family, and of the related 
Egyptian khedival family, began to come forward as points around which loyalty or discontent 
could crystallize.  
Upon his accession, ‘Abbas began a brief and unsuccessful campaign of overt rebellion 
against British authority that summer (1892). In January of 1893 ‘Abbas dismissed Mustafa 
Fahmi and appointed Fakhri Pasha as Prime Minister. Before the appointment could be 
announced, Cromer received authority from the Foreign Office to take any steps necessary short 
of increasing the British garrison in order to thwart the appointment. ‘Abbas was forced to back 
down but had gained in popularity by his public opposition to the British.22 After a series of jabs 
at British authority, the young Khedive discovered that his own government would not back him 
against Cromer. In January of 1894 the Prime Minister, Riaz Pasha, pleaded with him to 
apologize for disparaging remarks the Khedive had made about British officers of the Egyptian 
army.  
After this lesson, ‘Abbas adopted a covert policy of opposition through third parties. 
From 1894 until the summer of 1895, the Khedive directed opposition to approval of the 
government budget in the General Assembly and Legislative Council. Then in the summer of 
1895 the Ottoman Sultan sided with the British against him, so ‘Abbas felt compelled to turn 
back for some time toward the British for support. He secretly helped to finance the career of the 
nationalist Mustafa Kamil from 1895 to 1904. The Khedive lent his financial support to several 
of the political parties that developed around Mustafa Kamil such as the Nationalist Party and the 
                                                 
22 Marsot, 109-112. 
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Society for the Revival of the Nation (Gam’iyya li-Ihya’ al-Watan.)23 The Khedive also helped 
finance the popular newspaper, al-Mu’ayyad, of Shaykh ‘Ali Yusuf. Although ‘Abbas Hilmi lost 
all overt contests for power with the British rulers of Egypt, he played a major role in reviving 
the Egyptian national movement from 1895 until the Anglo-French Entente Cordiale of 1904. He 
covertly encouraged such Egyptian financial elite members as ‘Umar Bey Sultan and Prince 
Gamil Toussoun to back Nationalist Party publications like Mustafa Kamil’s Egyptian Standard. 
Realizing that no major European power would back him against the British after the Entente, 
‘Abbas moved away from the nationalists and bowed to British authority on 9 November 1904, 
when he first attended the British parade in Abdin Square on the occasion of Queen Victoria’s 
birthday.24 Like Tewfik before him, ‘Abbas was part of the “native screen” behind which the 
British ruled Egypt. Cromer described this most eloquently.  
Broadly speaking, the system of government which now prevails in Egypt involves the 
interposition of a native screen between the English Government and the Anglo-Egyptian officials 
on the one hand, and the native population on the other hand. Whether this is in itself a good form 
of government may be open to question... But so long as this system lasts, it is essential that our 
native screen should be effective, and that it should fulfill the main objective for which it is 
intended, that is to say, that it should truly serve to hide from the native population that they are in 
great degree governed by foreigners.25 
 
The Khedivate was an institution with little power under the British occupation through 1907. 
Tewfik accepted his role as part of the “native screen” and ‘Abbas Hilmi rapidly learned that he 
could play no other role without the support of his own ministers. Egypt’s representative 
institutions served as a forum for the country’s large landowners to add their presence to this 
screen. Egypt’s pseudo-parliamentary institutions under the occupation were designed by the 
British to have a powerless advisory role. Parliamentary government in general offers a vehicle 
                                                 
23 Arthur Goldschmidt, “The Egyptian Nationalist Party,” in P.M. Holt (ed.), Political and Social Change in Modern 
Egypt (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), 313. 
24 ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Rafi’i, Mustafa Kamil, ba’ith al-haraka al-wataniyya (tarikh Misr al-qaoumi min 1882 ila 
1908), 5th Edition (Cairo: Dar al-Ma’arif, 1984), 183, 249. 
25 Cromer to Salisbury, FO No. 138, 26 February 1889. 
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for stable rule of the middle class. In a semi-colonial context such as that of Egypt at the end of 
the nineteenth century, the indigenous middle class was too weak to provide stable government 
and prevent foreign invasion. In an unstable political environment, many elements of the 
Egyptian political and economic elites welcomed the foreign invasion. Once British troops had 
defeated organized resistance, the occupying power naturally emasculated local parliamentary 
institutions and made them into a legitimizing screen for foreign rule.26  
In a bid to stabilize power in Egypt to their advantage, the British attempted to strengthen 
traditional Egyptian ruling institutions and, as much as possible, used those institutions to 
camouflage their firm control of Egyptian affairs. Restoring khedival authority after it was 
severely shaken by the ‘Urabi Revolution was by far the most important British policy goal. 
This, however, was an almost impossible goal to achieve, for the simple reason that Tewfik had 
been viewed by many as a traitor for siding with the British against the ‘Urabists.27 The end 
result of the Occupation was to return to something like the status quo ante, with the authority of 
the khedive fully restored, the Law of Liquidation, which governed the distribution of Egyptian 
state revenue to the Debt Commission, working smoothly, and the British alone filling what had 
been the Anglo-French role. 
Nevertheless, despite his weakness, the Khedive had some room to maneuver because of 
the ambiguity of England’s position in Egypt. The Occupation was not sanctioned by 
international law. Egypt was definitely not a British colony. So the British needed the 
collaboration of the Khedive and other Egyptian figureheads through whom they could 
                                                 
26 Collins, 202-7. 
27 Robert L. Tignor, Modernization and British Colonial Rule in Egypt, 1882-1914 (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1966), 48-50, 66-69; Ziad Fahmy, “Popularizing Egyptian Nationalism: Colloquial Culture and Media 
Capitalism, 1870-1919,” (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Michigan, 2007), 123. 
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administer the country. Britain’s indirect government of Egypt through Egyptian pawns came to 
be known as the Veiled Protectorate. 
 
 
The Veiled Protectorate 
The shock of the Occupation and the introduction of a British administration kept 
organized opposition to the British from forming within Egypt for over a decade. The British 
military occupation dissipated the Egyptian revolutionary energies, and Egyptians found 
themselves having to fight for constitutional rights vis-à-vis the Khedive and Egyptian elites and 
for independence from the British at the same time. There had been a short-lived secret political 
group calling itself the Society of Vengeance (Jami’yat al-intiqam) which had plotted to expel 
the British and punish ‘Urabi’s “betrayers;” but it was discovered in 1883 and its members were 
imprisoned.28  
The British Occupation may have interrupted Egyptian nationalist agitation, but it also 
gave the movement a sharper focus. The presence of a foreign power allowed various strains of 
the Egyptian national movement to unify against a particular goal: opposition to the British. 
Political alignments began to appear again in the 1890s, although nationalist parties were not 
officially formed until 1907. From 1892, the British were faced with an ambitious and decidedly 
anti-British new Khedive, Tawfik’s seventeen-year old son ‘Abbas II, usually referred to as 
‘Abbas Hilmi. The new Khedive resented the limits imposed upon him by Lord Cromer and the 
British administration, and began searching for opportunities to increase his own power by 
                                                 
28 Among them was a young Sa’d Zaghlul, who would lead the Wafd almost three decades later. Released and 
“rehabilitated,” he became a favorite of Cromer by 1906; but after World War I, he was one of the most visible 
critics of the Occupation. (Noor-Aiman Iftikhar Khan, “The Enemy of My Enemy: Indian Influences on Egyptian 
Nationalism, 1907-1930,” (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Chicago, 2006), 34-41.) 
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undermining the Occupation. He also pushed the Sublime Porte to intervene on his behalf, 
usually unsuccessfully, as the Ottomans had little to gain by antagonizing the British by the early 
twentieth century.  
‘Abbas had a great deal of personal animosity toward Cromer, who had humiliated him in 
a showdown early on; but the Khedive also remembered the fate of his deposed grandfather 
Isma’il. So ‘Abbas settled for outward submission and behind-the-scenes opposition through the 
actions of Mustafa Kamil and others. In an effort to undermine the position of the British, 
increase his domestic popularity, and gain leverage in his power-plays against the Occupation 
administration, Khedive ‘Abbas Hilmi likely helped fund the first organized anti-Occupation 
groups and periodicals. Among the earliest efforts along these lines was the paper al-Mu’ayyad 
(“The Supporter”), founded by journalist Shaykh ‘Ali Yusuf (1863-1913) in 1889, which 
developed a strong following as a religiously-oriented daily and adopted a policy of defending 
Khedive ‘Abbas Hilmi as the rightful ruler of the country upon Tawfiq’s death.29 Soon after 
‘Abbas Hilmi took power, al-Mu’ayyad included nearly weekly articles praising the Khedive and 
his devotion to the Egyptian people.30 
Beyond the intra-Egyptian rivalries between the Khedive, native elites, and popular 
nationalists, both Great Britain and the Ottoman Empire competed for power and influence in 
Egypt. The Great Power rivalries that had kept the “Sick Man of Europe” propped up for the 
previous few decades had aligned themselves in such a way that the Ottomans were content to let 
the British control Egypt in return for support against Russian advancement in Ottoman-
                                                 
29 ‘Ali Yusuf was known primarily for his promotion of traditional values and hostility to the British and was one of 
the most influential writers of his day, though in the historiography he has often been viewed as little more than a 
“tool” of ‘Abbas Hilmi. 
30 ‘Abbas Hilmi’s friendship with ‘Ali Yusuf became common knowledge in 1904, when the Khedive supported ‘Ali 
Yusuf’s marriage to the daughter of an important member of the ashraf over her father’s objections. This move cost 
‘Abbas Hilmi and ‘Ali Yusuf considerable respect in traditional society. This scandal was very public and 
particularly damaging to al-Mu’ayyad, as it was for some time the only Muslim-owned and Islamically-oriented 
daily paper in Egypt.  
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controlled territories.31 Indeed, in the early years of the Occupation, France turned a more 
sympathetic ear to those opposing Britain than the Ottoman Empire tended to do. Even this 
support, however, vanished when the Anglo-French Entente Cordiale of 1904 was concluded, 
allowing Britain a free hand in Egypt in return for French freedom of action in North Africa.32 
With this agreement, the Egyptian nationalists lost one of their most powerful potential allies 
against the British.  
Though temporarily stifled by the British Occupation, the nationalist movement in Egypt 
was given renewed energy by the Dinshawai Incident of 1906.33 On 13 June 1906, a group of 
five British officers went pigeon shooting in the village of Dinshawai located in the Nile Delta. 
The practice was a common sport among Army personnel stationed in the provinces and was 
resented by villagers, who complained about not being compensated for the birds they had raised 
and about the damage caused by young men trespassing onto their fields. When some villagers 
tried to stop the men, an altercation broke out in which between one and four villagers, including 
a woman, were shot and injured, and an officer fleeing the melee died of heat exhaustion. The 
Occupation authorities, fearing a “pan-Islamic uprising,” reacted with draconian measures and 
tried fifty-two villagers for murder in a hastily-called special tribunal.34 Only fifteen days after 
the incident itself, twelve of the convicted were sentenced to hard labor, eight to public flogging, 
and four were hanged in an effort to curb any further episodes of “fanaticism” from occurring.35 
                                                 
31 The title of the “Sick Man of Europe” was given to the Ottoman Empire by other European countries, as a result 
of the Empire’s extensive loss of territory, revenue, and relative power. 
32 Khan, 43-8. 
33 Dinshawai has been immortalized in Egyptian nationalist history by a number of poems, and to this day remains a 
synonym for British injustice. 
34 An 1883 law allowed attacks on the Army of Occupation to be tried outside of civil courts, and there was no 
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The campaign around Dinshawai was carried forward by what were then relatively new media:  
the newspapers, printed pamphlets, and plays as well as songs.  This media campaign did not 
cause the revolution but it certainly helped to spread a sense of revulsion and politically 
conscious antagonism to the state.  In addition other new media were just being deployed such as 
the telephone and telegraph which, for the first time, made it possible to communicate from 
Alexandria in the north to Aswan in the south instantaneously.   
News of the incident and the disproportionate punishments offended even the most 
conservative Egyptian opinion and reinforced much of what Nationalist leaders like Mustafa 
Kamil (1874-1908) had been arguing for years about the tyranny of a foreign occupation. This 
incident was considered by many Egyptian nationalists to be the watershed of the nationalist 
revolution, as it quickly galvanized popular attention and drew sharp attention to the British 
Occupation which heretofore had been somewhat obscured by the figure of the Khedive and the 
technical suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire.36 Historian Muhammad Rifa’at’s Ta’rikh Misr al-
Siyasi fi al-Azmina al-Haditha isolates the Dinshawai incident of 1906 as a turning point in 
national history and in the nationalist movement.37 The subsequent resignation of Lord Cromer 
(1841-1917) as Consul-General in 1907 was “the first victory for the Egyptian nationalist 
movement since the ‘Urabi revolt.”38 The long-term significance of the Dinshawai Affair and 
subsequent executions was that they provided the atrocity needed to catalyze the movement of 
opposition to British rule in Egypt across class and other divisions. The executions alienated 
                                                                                                                                                             
motivation, unless one was to argue the reaction would have been different if a woman other than imam’s wife had 
been shot. Indeed, there was not even proof of murder, as the army officer had died of heat stroke. 
36 Yoav Di-Capua, “Embodiment of the Revolutionary Spirit: The Mustafa Kamil Mausoleum in Cairo,” History & 
Memory, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Spring/Summer 2001), 91. Kamil was also keen to publicize the incident in Europe to 
discredit the British Occupation. Kamil’s account in Le Figaro, “A la nation anglaise et au monde civilise,” caused 
widespread revulsion among Europeans predisposed to think the worse of British rule in Egypt. (The text of the 
article, printed 11 July 1906, is reproduced in L’Angleterre en Egypte (Paris, 1922), 151-9.) 
37 Muhammad Rifa’at, Tarikh Misr al-Siyasi, 2 Volumes (Cairo, 1929.) 
38 Israel Gershoni and James Jankowski, Commemorating the Nation: Collective Memory, Public Commemoration, 
and National Identity in Twentieth-Century Egypt (Chicago: Middle East Documentation Center, 2004), 194. 
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many Egyptians who had formerly accepted British rule, including the Coptic population, which 
had hitherto been suspicious of Kamil’s pan-Islamic appeals and devotion to Ottoman interests.39 
As a result, in a shift begun in 1892, national representative institutions provided a focal point for 
moderate nationalist criticism of the occupation after 1906. This growing agitation at the end of 
Cromer’s period of rule resulted in the re-emergence of indigenous political parties whose major 
goal was greater power for local elites.  
Aside from the immediate political benefits acquired by the nationalists, Dinshawai, with 
the help of the newly emerging mass culture, was quickly and effectively reified into a functional 
national myth.40 Among the positive side effects of the crisis was the fact that it served to restore 
the identity of the Khedivate as an institution separate from European advisors after years under 
Tawfiq when it had appeared to merge with the Occupation. Prior to 1906, much of the 
nationalist agitation had been directed toward the Khedive and native bases of authority; but the 
Dinshawai trials made direct focus on ridding Egypt of the British Occupation inevitable. So 
widespread was the importance of the Dinshawai incident and subsequent trial that none of the 
individuals involved in the prosecution of the Dinshawai villagers escaped unscathed. The judges 
at the trial included three Englishmen, in addition to the Egyptian judges Butrus Ghali Pasha and 
Ahmad Fathy Zaghlul.41 The lawyer for the defense was Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid and the 
prosecutor was Ibrahim al-Hilbawi.42 Lutfi al-Sayyid publicly established his nationalist 
credentials with his role, while Hilbawi and Zaghlul spent the rest of their lives trying to 
                                                 
39 Salama Musa, The Education of Salama Musa (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1961), 29, 31f. The most prominent Copts in the 
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rehabilitate themselves in public opinion; and Ghali’s assassination was intimately connected to 
his role in Dinshawai.43 
With the increase in popular support for nationalism following the Dinshawai trials, 
several native Egyptian political parties were formed. Though Mustafa Kamil had been the 
leading nationalist leader in the country for more than a decade, he did not officially organize his 
movement into a political party until late in 1907. The principles of the new Nationalist Party, al-
Hizb al-Watani, were first publicly articulated by Kamil in a 22 October 1907 speech made at the 
Zizinia Theater in Alexandria.44 The Party’s three main principles were the immediate 
evacuation of British forces; the unification of the Nile Valley including the Sudan; and the 
formation of a constitutional political system. While the Party’s demands included both the 
evacuation of British troops and the adoption of a constitution, as a matter of policy the official 
line had always been that no negotiations could take place with the British while British troops 
remained on Egyptian soil, thus making it difficult to work directly with the state apparatus to 
effect any type of change in the structure of governance until independence was achieved. The 
initial reluctance of the Nationalist Party to push too hard for a constitution was due to the fact 
that the Khedive was not in favor of a constitution and was thus likely to withdraw his support if 
that demand were pushed too hard. In the early years of the Party, the support of the popular 
Khedive and his financial assistance were particular assets for the Watanists.  
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In addition to the Watani Party, other official parties organized in the first years of the 
twentieth century. Unlike the more popular Watani Party, the Umma party was comprised mostly 
of wealthy Pashas and represented the interests of the educated landowning elites. The Umma 
party was developed in part as a reaction to the more radical nationalists of the Watani Party 
whose demands included socio-economic policies which would threaten elite interests.45 The 
Umma Party was officially established on 21 September 1907, and favored a more gradual road 
to independence, advocating the need for consulting with and benefiting from the British 
whenever possible. Inherent in this policy was an aversion to any change in the stability of the 
status quo and a general distrust of the masses, who were deemed not ready for political 
independence.46 While the British administration acted against the National Party leaders and 
institutions and infringed the political rights of the Party’s activists, British officials encouraged 
the Umma Party and strove to co-opt it into the colonial apparatus.47 Finally among the new 
parties was Ali Yusif’s Constitutional Reform Party, which had very little to do with 
constitutions or reforms, and which was primarily funded by the Khedive to support his policies 
and as such was viewed with suspicion by most Egyptians. 
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Chapter Three: The Revolution of 1919 
 
 
"The revolution was like a beautiful woman. She charmed us, and we fell in love with her and 
killed the tyrant to marry her, but she was just a trick -- another burden to add to our heavy load, 




The Revolution of 1919 is celebrated in Egyptian nationalist historiography as a time of 
unusual solidarity, with students and bureaucrats joining peasants, and the religious leadership of 
Muslims and Copts supporting one another. Though their respective motives varied, what 
distinguishes the 1919 Revolution was the participation of all classes of Egyptians to one degree 
or another in opposition to British authority. Political leaders, students, lawyers, workers, 
peasants, and Bedouins all played various roles in the Revolution. Further, the Revolution saw a 
unique union of the main religious communities in Egypt against the British.2 Coptic priests 
delivered fiery speeches in the Azhar, while Muslim leaders spoke in Coptic cathedrals. In 
addition to this, numerous Egyptian women joined the demonstrators and set forth their demands 
supporting the Wafd in written petitions, as well as in protest marches in the streets of Cairo on 
16 and 20 March.3  
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Many women joined these demonstrations, with some leading their own, a story that has been frequently recounted.  
Whereas the extent of women’s participation in the 1919 revolution is debated, the event is considered a pivotal one 
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Prelude to a Revolution 
 
 
With the outbreak of World War I, Egypt’s anomalous position as a privileged Ottoman 
province under British military occupation (a status referred to as the “veiled protectorate”) 
became unsustainable when the Ottoman Empire joined the Central Powers. As a result of their 
wartime alliance with the Ottoman Empire, the Watani nationalists, who had heretofore been the 
acknowledged leaders of the Egyptian nationalist movement, found themselves sidelined by Sa’d 
Zaghlul and the Wafd. As a result of their cooperation with Ottoman efforts directed at Egypt 
between 1914 and 1918, and the Ottoman Empire in the First World War, Watani Nationalists 
had limited influence in Egypt after the War. Muhammad Farid's death in November 1919 also 
removed the most important of the exiled Nationalist leaders from the scene. The allowed the 
Wafd Party, and Sa’d Zaghlul, to come to the fore as the leading force in Egyptian nationalism. 
The 1919 Revolution itself, then, was inspired and led by individuals who had been pre-War 
ideological rivals of the Watanists (members of the Umma Party led intellectually by Ahmad 
Lutfi al-Sayyid and politically by Sa`d Zaghlul). While the Wafd co-opted prominent former 
Watanists into their ranks (Muhammad `Ali `Aluba and Mustafa al-Nahhas, for example), they 
did so on their own terms. Once the new Wafd seized the lead in nationalist demonstrations in 
the spring of 1919, the exiled nationalists were left outside looking in. The change in leadership 
at the head of the movement for Egyptian independence from the Watani to the Wafd Party 
would result in a more conservative revolution, as the Wafd was populated by elite elements 
unwilling to allow for the realization of the more popularly-based Watani programs. Issues of 
class, then, were at the heart of Egypt’s failure to achieve a united national stand against the 
British. Even though Egypt’s peasants are usually described as passive bystanders who appear in 
history in sporadic outbursts, their support of the nationalist movement took many forms and was 
40 
 
quite consistent. It is clear that the 1919 Revolution meant different things to different segments 
of the population; but, at least from the perspective of the emerging dominant elements, the 
Revolution did not aim at the radical transformation of the social structure or class relations, but 
rather at the assertion of territorial nationalism in the face of British colonialism.  
 
The Revolution 
When popular discontent arose in Egypt after the 1918 Armistice, the British Foreign 
Office refused to discuss the Egyptian question with either a delegation of nationalist leaders 
headed by Sa’d Zaghlul or even to receive a deputation of Egyptian ministers, and it became 
clear Egypt would not be represented or discussed at the Paris Peace Conference.4 When the 
delegation was told that the Government of Egypt would send its own official representatives, 
they started a public campaign to be declared the official delegation of the Nation. They argued 
that the British-controlled Government was not representative of the Egyptian people and could 
not be trusted to place Egyptian interests before those of the British. Egyptians, still not 
recovered from War-time stresses, and perhaps emboldened by the declaration of the Fourteen 
Points by U.S. President Woodrow Wilson in January 1918, responded favorably by signing 
petitions and powers of attorney, and demonstrating against the Occupation. The British decision 
to exile Zaghlul and other representatives of the Wafd to Malta rather than allow them to attend 
the Peace Conference in 1919 allowed several distinct Egyptian grievances and demands to 
coalesce around a single popular issue, namely the removal of the British from Egypt. This, 
along with the public support of Zaghlul and the Ward, resulted in the Revolution of 1919. The 
                                                 
4 Of the officially recognized Arabic newspapers, only Al-Muqattam and Al-Watan wrote against the demonstrations 
and called for an immediate return to “public order.” (See for example, Al-Watan, 10 March 1919; Al-Muqattam, 11 
March 1919; Ziad Fahmy, “Popularizing Egyptian Nationalism: Colloquial Culture and Media Capitalism, 1870-
1919,” (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Michigan, 2007), 267. 
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economic and political crises of World War I, the forced conscription of Egyptians, the state 
appropriation of cotton production, and the forcible provision of supplies for British troops 
resulted in a crisis of political control.  
The immediate cause of the 1919 Revolution was the British refusal to allow the 
Egyptian delegation to attend the Paris Peace Conference, and the arrest of the group (who would 
become the Wafd)  including Sa’d Zaghlul, who had petitioned the British High Commissioner 
Wingate to represent Egypt and argue for independence at the Conference. On 8 March 1919, 
military authorities arrested Sa’d Zaghlul, Ismail Sidqi, Muhammad Mahmud, and Hamad al-
Basil; and by 9 March the four were deported to Malta.5 The decision to exile Zaghlul and “some 
of his associates” was predicted by British officials to produce a calming effect and “a temporary 
reaction” in favor of the British. High Commissioner Reginald Wingate went as far as 
confidently declaring to the Foreign Office that the exile of Zaghlul “should discourage and 
discredit the extremists.”6 On the other hand, Residency advisor Milne Cheetham notified the 
Foreign Office of these events and commented that he did not believe that the deportations 
would do anything to dampen the nationalist movement. The initial result, he predicted, would 
be one of “irritation and sympathy with the deported ringleaders.”7 As events were soon to 
demonstrate, Cheetham’s prediction was correct, if understated. 
In addition to this proximate cause, the Revolution was also rooted in deep and obvious, 
though varied, political grievances.8 Egyptians resented the creation of a British protectorate at 
the outbreak of World War I and then the introduction of martial law during the course of the 
                                                 
5 John D. McIntyre, Jr., The Boycott of the Milner Mission: A Study in Egyptian Nationalism (New York: Peter 
Lang, 1985), 26-32. 
6 FO 371/3714/39198, Sir Milne Cheetham, “Egyptian Political Situation,” 9 March 1919. 
7 FO 407/184/69, Cheetham to Curzon, 9 March 1919. 
8 The classic work in Arabic on the 1919 Revolution is ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Rafi'i’s, Thawrat sanat 1919, 2 Volumes 
(Cairo: Maktabat al-Nahda al-Misriyya, 1946.) 
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War. Masses of Egyptians suffered when their livestock and then labor were confiscated to aid 
British military campaigns.9 Leading nationalists were also determined to use Woodrow 
Wilson’s seeming endorsement of national self-determination to have this principle applied to 
Egypt after the War. In addition, just as the First World War and the attendant British military 
and political programs were seen as an affront to Egyptian national pride, so the War revealed in 
stark terms the foreign control of the Egyptian economy and the disabilities created by this 
dependence. Thus, the Revolution included the participation of a wide range of groups with 
differing interests and ideological orientations which were, nevertheless, coherent and articulate 
in their demand for an end to the Occupation government. 
In the urban context, 1919 represented the consolidation of a labor movement (trade 
unions, labor activism, nationwide strikes) created by the intersection of national and class 
issues.10 Such labor movements were enveloped within the anti-colonial nationalism of the time, 
while more radical leftist groups were unable to gain a foothold in the context of the Wafd’s 
moderate nationalist platform of removing foreign economic and political exploitation. Further, 
the mobilization of the peasantry and momentary subversions of the rural order did not in fact 
materialize into a wide-scale peasant revolution. Some have argued that the nationalist call for 
“independence, freedom, and justice” could not have held the same meaning for peasants, who 
                                                 
9 Latifah Salim subscribes at least in part to this thesis.  See Latifah Muhammad Salim, Misr fi al-Harb al-‘Alamiyal 
al-Ula, 1914-1918 (Cairo: Al-Haya al-Misriyya al-‘amma lil Kitab, 1984), 118.  Nathan Brown provides a good 
picture of the degree to which British control and manipulation of the local market allowed them to succeed in this 
venture (Nathan J. Brown, Peasant Politics in Modern Egypt: the Struggle against the State (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 1990), 199; Ellis Goldberg, “Peasants in Revolt – Egypt 1919,” International Journal of Middle 
East Studies, Vol. 24 (1992), 262. Over one-third of Egypt’s peasants were paid laborers, however, and even those 
in the ambiguous situation of sharecroppers might have sold food crops they received in shares in an inflationary 
market, thereby losing command over food later. (See Alan Richards, Egypt’s Agricultural Development 1800-1980: 
Technical and Social Change (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1982), p.61-3.)  
10 Numerous workers’ groups went on strike during the 1919 Revolution, including workers from government and 
private printing presses, the Cairo electric company, postal and communications workers, taxi and carriage drivers, 
and  government bureaucrats. The role of workers and workers’ syndicates in the Revolution is addressed in Joel 
Beinin and Zachary Lockman, Workers on the Nile: Nationalism, Communism, Islam, and the Egyptian Working 
Class, 1882-1954 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987.) 
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sought to liberate themselves from the colonization of their economic life by landowning 
interests, as it might have had for the urban intelligentsia.11 However, the mobilization of 
workers and peasants in support of the Revolution did not result in social or economic benefits 
for these groups. Instead, as the Wafd continued to consolidate power, it also continued to 
oscillate between populism and social conservatism. Composed mostly of elite urban effendiyya 
and landowners, the interests of Wafd leaders would not have been served by a wider revolution 
calling for radical socio-economic change, though that was what was eventually promised by the 
Watani Party. While both the Watani and Wafd parties were eager to coopt labor movements to 
support goals of independence, neither party wanted to allow worker and peasant demands to 
outstrip Party control. And elites, while desirous of national independence, were too fearful of 
popular revolt to fully support a more thorough socio-economic revolution. So, the revolution 
that united the urban populace wound up scaring elitist politicians, largely because of the peasant 
revolts in the south against landowners. Many Wafdist leaders were landowners themselves; and, 
so, it is not surprising that the new Egyptian majlis would be representative of elite interests and 
result in a fundamentally conservative outcome. Wafdists sought, primarily, to compel the 
British to transfer power to the indigenous elite. Had the Wafd leadership wanted to extend the 
uprising, they might have offered land reform to the peasantry, but for practical and ideological 
reasons the Wafd generally declined to undertake such steps. 
 
March and April, 1919 
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The 1919 Revolution may be divided into two stages: the violent and short period of 
March 1919, which involved large-scale mobilizations by the peasantry in rural areas that were 
suppressed by British military action; and the protracted phase beginning in April 1919 which 
was less violent and more urban, with the large-scale participation of students, workers, lawyers, 
and other professionals.  
On the morning of 9 March 1919, students of the Faculty of Law left their classes and 
marched into the streets protesting the deportation of the nationalist leaders. These students were 
also able to persuade others from the Faculties of Agriculture, Commerce, Engineering, and the 
higher colleges to join them. The demonstrators marched to Qasr al-Aini Hospital and the School 
of Medicine, where they urged students there to join the protests. Eventually police were able to 
successfully disperse the crowds, but not before making over 300 arrests. Cheetham played down 
the significance of the student protests by writing to the Foreign Office that “Sa'd [Zaghlul] was 
at one time Minister of Education and popular amongst the students, and some manifestation on 
their part was to be expected.”12  
The days following 9 March 1919 witnessed the spread of the Egyptian revolutionary 
movement beyond the students, however. Early on the 10th of March, organized student groups 
began forming and marched toward central Cairo. On this second day of the protests, students 
from al-Azhar called for a general strike and joined the student protests.13 In addition, transport 
workers went on strike and protests began in Alexandria, protests which Cheetham described as 
being composed of the “riff-raff of the town.”14  
                                                 
12 FO 407/184/70, Cheetham to Curzon, 10 March 1919; McIntyre, 26-32. 
13 As ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Rafi’i observed, “the Azharites were in the front lines of the demonstrators...and were the 
most numerous of the students in courage and enthusiasm as well as among the strongest of the workers in spreading 
the spirit of the revolution and spreading strikes among the classes of the people.” (al-Rafi’i, Thawrat Sanat 1919, 
vol. 1, 202-3; McIntyre, 76-7.) 
14 FO 407/184/70, Cheetham to Curzon, 10 March 1919; FO 407/184/151, Cheetham to Curzon, 22 March 1919; FO 
371/3714/40278, Cheetham, “Deportation of Egyptian Independence Leaders,” March 10, 1919; see, also, ‘Abd al-
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On the 11th, the lawyers of the Egyptian Native Courts in Cairo went on strike; and clerks 
from the ministries of Public Works and Education walked out of their offices. By the 12th of 
March, revolutionary protests had spread from Cairo and Alexandria to peripheral cities in the 
Delta, such as Damanhur and Tanta, in the latter of which British troops opened fire on a crowd 
of approximately three thousand demonstrators who were attempting to seize the railway station. 
Eleven were killed and fifty-one wounded.15 Two days later, soldiers manning an armored car 
patrolling the Sayida Zeinab quarter of Cairo were attacked and subsequently opened fire on a 
crowd of Egyptians, killing thirteen and wounding twenty-five. Five looters were caught that 
morning and summarily shot. The situation appeared increasingly serious, as far as the British 
authorities were concerned, particularly when reports came in that the provinces were also 
joining the Revolution.16  
By 15 March, many communications facilities had been destroyed; in Qalyub, railway 
tracks were pulled up and trains attacked. British military personnel were also assaulted and 
killed. Women joined the demonstrations on 16 March, carrying banners that read “long live 
freedom and independence” and “down with the protectorate.”17 On that same day, the numbers 
of revolutionaries gathered at al-Azhar to hear speeches given by the Wafd Party reached 80,000. 
By noon on the 15th, all telegraph and telephone lines north of Cairo, with the exception of the 
military line to Alexandria, had been cut; at Qalyub, just north of Cairo, crowds stormed the 
railway station and pulled up the tracks, thus cutting railway communications between Cairo and 
Alexandria and Port Said. In addition, numerous trains were attacked and sacked, and train 
                                                                                                                                                             
Adhim Ramadan, Tatawwur al-Haraka al-Wataniyya fi Misr, vol. 1 (Cairo: Dar al-Katib al-Arabi lil-Tibaa wal-
Nashr, 1968), 134; McIntyre, 26-32. 
15 See Misr, 12 March 1919; Al-Muqattam, 13 March 1919. 
16 FO 407/184/151, Cheetham to Curzon, 22 March 1919; McIntyre, 26-32. 
17 FO 371/3714/41569, Cheetham, “Military Report,” March 15, 1919. 
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stations were burned.18 By 19 March, certain provinces were in open revolt: in the Delta and 
Upper Egypt, crops were destroyed and railway stations were burned. In Zifta, in Upper Egypt, 
an independent Republic was proclaimed. According to British reports, by mid-March the 
situation in the Delta was deteriorating fast: “Reports from the provinces show trouble at 
Damietta and demonstrations at Mansura and attempts are being made to interrupt 
communications.  Telegraph lines have been cut in several places, apparently with the view to 
isolating Cairo and railway lines from Tanta to Menouf.”19 Unrest also spread into Upper Egypt 
with large demonstrations and the cutting of railroad tracks and telegraph wires.20  
During the 18th and 19th, the Revolution was perhaps at its height. The provinces of 
Behera, Gharbia, Munufia, and Daqualia were in a state of open revolt; almost all of the railway 
stations had been burned and many agricultural roads had been destroyed; and Ottoman flags 
could be seen flying in some of the delta villages. In addition to the popular protests, a strike of 
governmental officials which began on 2 April continued to cripple the administration of the 
various ministries throughout most of April, despite intensive efforts by a new Egyptian cabinet 
headed by four-time premier Husayn Rushdi Pasha (1863-1928) to persuade the striking officials 
to return to their posts.  
Also at this time, mosques in Cairo, particularly al-Azhar, assumed increasingly 
important roles as the centers of opposition to the status quo that Great Britain was attempting to 
maintain in Egypt. This particularly alarmed British officials, as mosques were considered off 
limits to British authorities and soldiers; and, therefore, especially suited to serve as centers of 
the Revolution. Al-Azhar University, in particular, played a significant role by providing a safe 
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house for revolutionary activities, thereby putting nationalists to a certain extent outside the 
reach of the British authorities. Though the British were careful not to forcibly enter al-Azhar or 
other mosques, they nonetheless had regular spies who attended many of the meetings and wrote 
lengthy reports detailing subversive activities.21 The mosques of Cairo were also used as centers 
for communication during the strike of government officials that had been ignited by Secretary 
of State for Foreign Affairs Lord Curzon’s (1859-1925) praise of the officials’ behavior during 
the March uprising. During part of this strike, which began in early April and lasted for three 
weeks, the Committee of Government Officials that was directing the strike met each morning 
and evening to make its decisions. Each morning it would send representatives to different 
mosques and churches where public servants from various ministries were gathered in order to 
receive their instructions as to whether they should continue the strike or return to work.22 
Further, during the middle of April, British military intelligence reports noted that the employees 
of each ministry or department had their own mosque for meeting and coordinating revolutionary 
actions. For example, the employees of the Ministry of Justice reportedly met at the Hanafi 
mosque; those of the Ministry of Education met at the Shaykh Saleh Mosque; the employees of 
the Ministry of Waqfs met at Ibn Tulun Mosque; postal employees gathered at the Husayn 
Mosque; and the employees of the National Printing Press convened at the Awlad Inan Mosque. 
The delegates for the General Strike Committee were also selected at these local gatherings.23 
 
Significance 
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Though the 1919 Revolution accomplished the immediate goal of obtaining official 
independence from Great Britain through the 1922 unilateral granting of independence and is 
remembered in nationalist historiography as a unique moment of national cohesion, its ultimate 
significance may still be called into question. Certainly the Revolution did not result in the 
"complete independence" [al-istiqlal al-tamm] which was its stated goal. The 1922 unilateral 
British termination of the Protectorate over Egypt, and the accompanying declaration that Egypt 
was now independent, was fatally compromised in the long run by Britain's reservations and the 
continuing British military presence on Egyptian soil.24  
But from the perspective of the dominant leadership of the time (the Wafd), the 
Revolution appeared quite successful. Egypt did become an independent parliamentary 
monarchy, with the Wafd functioning as the dominant nationalist movement for the next thirty 
years. To be sure, successive monarchs did their best to undermine parliament (often quite 
successfully), and the Wafd only held ministerial office for approximately eight years between 
1924 and 1952. But, from the perspective of the early 1920s, the Wafdist leadership had good 
reason to present the nationalist movement they led from 1919 to 1922 as a success. In the 
1920s, disgruntled Watanists aside, the Egyptian public largely accepted this claim. It was only 
from the 1930s onwards that large numbers of Egyptians came to question the "success" of the 
1919 Revolution in terms of both true political independence and social change. Nevertheless, 
given both Egypt's social structure in 1919 (a society dominated by the upper classes) and Great 
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Britain's interest and power in Egypt, it is unlikely any Revolution could have been successful in 
obtaining all of the goals of the nationalist movement.  
Sa’d Zaghlul had never belonged to the National Party; and his fellow delegates had, for 
the most part, supported Hizb al-Umma. But from that time until the 1952 Revolution, the Wafd, 
first as a popular movement and later as a parliamentary party, was the main standard bearer of 
Egypt’s independence struggle. Although the Watanists no longer occupied the Egyptian 
spotlight, their role in the 1919 Revolution was significant. They persuaded the Wafd to state as 
its goal the “complete independence” of Egypt.25 When the Wafd set up its central committee to 
gather financial contributions and signatures designating the Wafd as the sole spokesman for the 
Egyptian people, existing Nationalist groups and individuals helped greatly. Examples include 
the leaders of the Lawyers Syndicate in 1919, Ahmed Lutfi and Muhammad Hafiz Ramadan.26 
     The expatriate Nationalists backed Zaghlul, despite their doubts about his consistency, 
and offered what help they could. But for his part, Zaghlul stated that he did not want Farid or 
any other leading Nationalist in his delegation because of their wartime association with 
Germany. According to, the Wafd also refused to pay for Farid’s medical expenses during his 
final illness. Essentially, Sa’d Zaghlul had taken over the lead role in the independence 
movement at a time when the Nationalists had no president (‘Ali Fahmi Kamil was exiled in 
1921-22) and their newspapers were often banned.27 
Meanwhile, the expatriate Nationalists were split into factions. Shaykh Jawish, still based 
in Berlin, headed a faction that included the former Ottoman ambassador in Berne, Fu’ad Salim, 
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the son of Colonel Latif Salim.28 Fu’ad Salim had been a close friend of Mustafa Kamil. He later 
became secretary of the National Party, and then an Ottoman Foreign Service Officer.29 Its main 
rival was the “Egyptian Committee,” an outgrowth of Muhammad Fahmi’s “Young Egypt 
Congress” movement in Geneva, whose members had broken with the Turks and the Germans 
early in the War. Then there was also a group around ex-Khedive Abbas, who was still 
contending for the restoration of his throne, his son’s right of succession, and his Egyptian 
properties.30 All of these groups agitated for Egypt’s independence, but with no significant 
results and no impact on the National Party in Egypt.31 Only a few National Party members who 
had weathered the First World War in Egypt were important in postwar politics. Muhammad 
Hafiz Ramadan, Muhammad Zaki Ali, and Abd al-Rahman al-Rafi’i would become cabinet 
ministers without leaving the National Party.32 
 
 
The Milner Mission 
 
Following the outbreak of the 1919 Revolution, the British Government replaced 
Reginald Wingate with Lord Allenby as Special High Commissioner; and the latter attempted to 
quiet the country through a combination of military repression and dialogue with the Wafd and 
the Egyptian Government. The British Government then sent a special Mission of Inquiry to 
Egypt under Viscount Milner to ascertain “the causes of the late disorders,” and was told in 1920 
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by the six-man commission that the entire country was “solidly Nationalist…and likely to remain 
so.”33  
The Milner Mission was tasked with determining the causes of the 1919 Revolution and 
making proposals for the most suitable form of government for Egypt under the Protectorate. 
Curzon had intended the mission to curtail what he saw as the dangerous radicalism of Lord 
Allenby, but it was seen by Milner in a different light. Milner favored a move away from direct 
British control of Egyptian administration, which had become a feature of the wartime situation, 
and a return to a limited British role in administration, leaving the rest to Egyptians. The Sudan, 
he believed, must stay under British control and Britain should also control the foreign policy 
and the defense of Egypt. These ends, he concluded, could best be achieved through an Anglo-
Egyptian treaty, and he abandoned the idea of maintaining the protectorate. His proposals, which 
went beyond his terms of reference, were presented in summary form to Curzon in May 1920.34 
The Commission recommended terminating the Protectorate and setting up a bilateral treaty of 
alliance between the Empire and Egypt, an idea that was supported in principle by both Allenby 
and Zaghlul.35 To forestall difficult negotiations that would require Egyptian acquiescence to 
requirements that the British Empire felt were absolutely necessary to its own interests, the 
British Government issued a unilateral Declaration of Independence for Egypt on February 28, 
1922, which reserved a number of points of sovereignty for the Empire but did allow Egypt to 
declare the Constitution of April 20, 1923, and hold popular elections. 
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The international dimension of its colonial project colored the British response to 
Egyptian nationalist activity in several ways. British policy towards Egypt during the period 
from 1919 through 1922 was shaped by specific political, economic, and strategic 
considerations. The British believed that whatever decision they made with regard to granting 
Egypt some form of independence would set a precedent; and that other regions which they 
administered, such as India and Ireland, or held under a mandate from the League of Nations, 
such as Palestine or Iraq, would demand equal treatment. British officials were acutely aware 
that nationalist intellectual and political leaders closely followed political developments around 
the world and that they possessed the ability to stir up anti-British feelings among the masses. In 
addition, owing to post-War economic troubles in Great Britain created by a world trade slump 
and Great Britain’s responsibilities elsewhere in the Middle East, the British could ill-afford a 
disruption of their trade and communications links with and through Egypt; nor could they afford 
the cost of maintaining a large garrison there. Only the ultra-conservative Morning Post, of all 
London’s prestigious dailies, came out against the 1922 agreement, which it regarded as “a sheer 
surrender”:  
It would be much simpler to announce Egyptian independence and the dissolution of the 
Protectorate by Proclamation, and much more graceful than to have it come about as a result of 
bargaining…it is a direct invitation to the agitators in India to follow in the footsteps of the 
Egyptian Nationalists and to be content with nothing less than they have secured.36  
 
Internationally, the Egyptian Revolution of March 1919, followed a month later by the 
Amritsar massacre and its aftermath in India, challenged the stability of the British Empire.37 By 
the following month the British were at war with Afghanistan, and they were being challenged 
by Mustafa Kemal’s nationalist movement in Turkey. By the end of 1919, also, the Persian 
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government had refused to ratify the Anglo-Persian “Agreement” issued by Curzon. In July there 
was a revolt in Iraq against the new British occupation. In addition, the Syrian Revolution of July 
1920 marked the beginning of the French mandate there; and the upheavals of 1919 in the 
Bashgir and Tatar Republics, the fighting in the 1919-20 in Kirghizstan, Georgia, Armenia, and 
Azerbaijan showed the desire of Russia’s Asian borderlands to escape from her control. Most of 
the Asian continent was in crisis, and much of this crisis impinged upon British interests.38 In 
this global moment of flux, the British determined it was in their best interest to strike up an even 
more solid alliance with Egyptian elites, who could attempt to keep popular discontent under 
control if the British, in turn, agreed to give the upper classes a certain amount of power and 
status.  
One of the more severe critics of the “Milner-Zaghlul agreement” was then Secretary of 
State for War Winston Churchill. In a memorandum, Churchill asserted that if the accord were 
applied to Ireland with “small omissions,” it would constitute an acceptance of the demands of 
the Irish nationalist leader de Valera. He also stated that Great Britain “should adhere to the 
broad ideal of full self-government within the Empire and under the Crown for all parts of the 
King’s Dominions, whether in Egypt, Ireland, or India... [and] all demands to break away from 
the British Empire and British Crown should be perseveringly withstood.”39 Another cabinet 
member who opposed the “Milner-Zaghlul agreement”” was Secretary of State for India E.S. 
Montagu. He was appalled that the Milner Mission would negotiate with ‘extremists” and he 
similarly likened Zaghlul to Eamon de Valera and Mahatma Gandhi. Montagu stated that any 
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1981), 358-9. 
39 Memorandum by the Secretary of State for War regarding the Egyptian Proposals, 24 August 1920, C.P. 1803 in 
Cab. 24/111 and Curzon Papers, MSS. Eur. F. 112/260. 
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concessions granted by the British commission of inquiry in Egypt would serve only to increase 
difficulties in administering India. 
For all the British misgivings surrounding the Milner Mission, Egyptians were also 
dissatisfied with what they saw as the limited possibilities for independence available under the 
Commission. The mission, led by Lord Milner, did not arrive in Egypt until December 1919 and 
was met by a generally successful Egyptian nationalist boycott that strove to force the British to 
deal only with Sa'd Zaghlul, still in Europe and identified in the popular consciousness as the 
voice of Egyptian nationalism.40 Nevertheless, on the eve of the Mission’s arrival in 1919, the 
newly-appointed Egyptian Ministry under Yusuf Wahbah was resolved, as reported by the High 
Commissioner, to cooperate loyally with Lord Milner’s enquiry.41 This subservient position, 
coupled with the stalemate in Paris where the Egyptian Delegation under Sa'd Zaghlul had failed 
to secure a hearing at the Peace Conference, increased the bitterness of the nationalists in Egypt. 
A boycott campaign against the Milner Mission, which was ordered by the Wafd Central 
Committee in Cairo, received overwhelming support from all sections of Egyptian society. This 
highly organized movement occupied a large segment of the Egyptian nationalist movement 
                                                 
40 When a delegation visited al-Azhar’s Rector and asked him to declare his opinion on the Milner Mission, he 
replied that it was necessary to boycott the British group and that he was planning to convene a meeting of the 
ulema’ to protest the Mission’s presence in Egypt. At the meeting that convened at al-Azhar on 17 December the 
Grand Mufti officially endorsed the claim for Egypt’s complete independence. (FO. 407/185/407, Allenby to 
Curzon, 18 December 1919; McIntyre 99.) 
41 A serious challenge to the Muslim-Coptic entente arose in the middle of November when Muhammad Said’s 
ministry resigned over the issue of the imminent arrival of the Milner Mission. Many Egyptians interpreted this 
event as an attempt by Britain to shatter the unity of the two religious communities and more recent Egyptian 
historians tend to explain Wahbah’s selection similarly. (Muhammad Anis, Dirasat fi Watha’iq Thawrat 1919 
(Cairo: Maktabat al-Anglu al-Misriyya, 1963), 50-1; Tariq al-Bishri, Al-Muslimun wa al-aqbat fi itar al jama’a al-
wataniyya, 2nd Edition. (Cairo: Dar ash-Shuruq, 1988), 132; and ‘Abd al-‘Azim Muhammad Ramadan, al-Fikr al-
thauri fi Misr qabla thawrat 23 yuliyu (Cairo: al-Jamiyat al-Misriyah lil-Dirasat al-Tarikhiya, 1978), 227-8.) The 
Copts’ decision to accept the office and thereby work under the British protectorate drew a sharp and immediate 
response from a number of Coptic nationalists, the Central Committee and the press.  
On 15 December, eight days after the arrival of the Mission in Cairo, a medical student attempted to assassinate 
Wahbah, who was seen as a traitor to the Nationalist cause. (The Egyptian Gazette, 16 December 1919; John D. 




during the several months of the Mission’s visit and it solidified the Wafd leadership’s hold on 
power, a fact which was ignored by the Mission until the last moment. According to Foreign 
Secretary George Curzon,  
The agitation continued to grow in intensity until it culminated in serious riots in Alexandria on 
the 24th and 25th October 1919, and recourse had to be made to the assistance of British troops to 
restore order. These disorders were repeated a week later, and on the 16th November, were 
reproduced in Cairo.42  
 
While the Wahbah government was determined to cooperate with the Milner Mission, the 
remaining members of the Watani Party dismissed the Mission as another British strategy to 
prevent full Egyptian independence. In an article in the Berlin-published “Aegyptische 
Korrespondenz: Organ der Agyptischen Nationalpartei in Deutschland”, nationalist journalist 
Sheikh 'Abd al-Aziz Jawish argued against what he saw as the attempts made by Lord Milner to 
bring the Egyptian representatives ‘Adli Yaqan and Sa’d Zaghlul to a compromise that would 
weaken the anti-colonial movement in the country. Jawish wrote, “We know the roots of British 
politics and their final aims. The entire style of Milner’s project was unmistakable that there 
were no difficulties to identify the underlying intention.”43  
The postponement of the Mission’s departure for Egypt may well have diminished its 
chances for dealing successfully with the situation in Egypt. Though the March 1919 protests 
had been ended by force, little had been done to address the more fundamental sources of tension 
and unrest in the country. Allenby’s 5 May dispatch reported that the nationalists were urging 
                                                 
42 Earl Curzon to the House of Lords, 15 November 1919, FO 407/185, no. 329 
43 ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Shauisch, “Aegypten in den Krallen Britanniens,” in Aegyptische Korrespondenz, Berlin, no.1, 
1921, p. 1. To coordinate the action of the Berlin-resident Egyptians against the new form of colonialism practiced 
in Egypt after 1922 an “Egyptian National Defense Committee” was established in the summer of 1922. The 
Secretary-General was the lawyer Yahya Ahmad ad-Dardiri who was closely associated with the National Party and 
was former vice-president of the Egyptian union of students Sphinx society in Switzerland. In September 1922 the 
committee convened a National Congress of Egyptians in the Orient Klub, with the participation of delegates from 
Egypt, Belgium, France, Italy, Austria, and Switzerland, which expressly opposed the sham independence decreed 
by Great Britain. However, by this point, the German press considered the Zaghlul-led Wafd as the official 
representative of the Egyptian national movement, whereas the German-based National Party, by now almost 
without influence in Egypt, spent much time criticizing the Wafd.  
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strikes to impress Lord Milner’s Mission, which according to rumor had already left for Egypt.44 
By 16 May more evidence to the same effect had been uncovered. Allenby’s weekly report to 
Curzon noted that “... the young extremists were now redoubling their efforts on the matter of the 
circulation of seditious pamphlets, secret newspapers, etc.” He also called attention to a new 
feature of these efforts by the nationalists, “attacks on prominent individuals, such as Mudirs, 
and Mamous [sic], who were accused of being traitors.”45 Finally he added that plans were being 
laid “...to organize a great demonstration of protest against the expected Commission of 
Investigation whenever it should arrive.”46 To facilitate the Mission’s visit to Egypt, the British 
government used “all possible means of suppression, such as the arrest of the principal notables, 
of the intelligent and enlightened young men, the internment of the Ulema of al-Azhar 
University, together with the press censorship and the dispersion of national demonstration with 
British guns.”47 All of these measures, admitted Zaghlul, would reduce the number of public 
demonstrations against the Milner Mission, but would not break the people’s resistance to the 
British Protectorate. A letter published in the Egyptian press further exemplifies the efforts to 
create a strong consensus vis-à-vis the Milner Mission. Its author suggested that every village 
should circulate a letter to be signed by the village omdehs, shaykhs, and heads of families. The 
proposed letter would state, “We the inhabitants of [blank] under the jurisdiction of [blank] 
province, declare that our only claim is complete independence, and we refuse to answer any 
question put to us by any authority which denies our right.”48 The author suggested that one copy 
                                                 
44 FO 407/184/289, Allenby to Curzon, 5 May 1919. 
45 FO 407/184/363, enclosure, Allenby to Curzon, 18 May 1919; McIntyre, 46-7. 
46 FO 407/184/363, enclosure, Allenby to Curzon, 18 May 1919; McIntyre, 46-7. 
47 FO 407/185, no. 276, Sa’d Zaghlul to Earl Curzon, 9 December 1919. 
48 Egyptian Gazette, 20 October 1919; al-Ahram, 18 October 1919; McIntyre, 58. 
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should be sent to the mudir (local governor), while another should be sent to the Central 
Committee of the Wafd.49  
Just three days after the Mission’s arrival in Egypt, Milner wrote Curzon that much of the 
Egyptian populace had committed themselves to the idea of “complete independence”:  
It (the idea) has been passed from mouth to mouth throughout the country, it is a sort of spell of 
charm, which everybody shouts, chants, sings, mutters, writes, [and] telegraphs...[even] 
responsible men, the most influential in the country, have let themselves be carried away into 
joining the outcry.50  
 
Indeed, the Egyptians greeted the Mission’s arrival with political demonstrations and strikes by 
students, lawyers, and workers.51 On 28 December, Milner warned British Prime Minister David 
Lloyd George that until Egyptian agitation for “complete independence” had subsided, Egypt 
would “continue to be a thorn in our side...and exercise a disturbing influence on our position in 
the whole of the Near East and to some extent also in India.”52 The fact that all elements of the 
Egyptian population had taken part in both the Revolution of 1919 and the boycott of the Milner 
Mission, and no element of Egyptian society was willing to ally with the British in the immediate 
aftermath of 1919, forced the hands of the British in allowing for a measure of independence.  
                                                 
49 Egyptian Gazette, 20 October 1919; al-Ahram, 18 October 1919; McIntyre, 58. 
50 Milner to Curzon, 10 December 1919, FO 848/11; B.L. Carter, The Copts in Egyptian Politics (London: Croom 
Helm, 1986), 294. 
51 G.B., Parliamentary Papers, Egypt NO. 1 (1921), Cmd. 1131, p. 4; ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Rafi’i, Thawrat 1919: 
tarikh Misr al-qawmi min sanat 1914 ila sanat 1921 (Cairo: Dar al-Ma’arif, 1987.), Vol. 11, p. 75. 
52 FO 848/11, Milner to Lloyd George, 28 December 1919. 
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The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries witnessed the rise of internal and international 
actors which significantly changed the operations of the Ottoman imperial system. The family of 
Mehmed Ali had effectively wrested control of Egypt from the Ottoman sultan. However, the 
sultan remained Egypt’s nominal suzerain – a status Britain was loath to officially contest, and 
the Sultan retained significant local popularity in Egypt. Throughout the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, many Egyptians still expressed affinity to the Ottoman Empire, and not only, 
or even primarily, out of a sense of loyalty to the Sultan in his role as Caliph. Because the legal 
status of Egypt as a vassal of the Sublime Porte had been sustained de jure but not de facto since 
the British Occupation, arguments against the Occupation often appealed to the Ottoman Empire 
as a potential savior of the Egyptian people from the hands of the British. In addition, though 
jealous of his power vis-à-vis the sultan, the Khedive did not want to completely sever ties with 
the Ottoman Empire, since his legitimacy lay in his position as viceroy of the sultan; and the 
khedive was well aware that only the Ottoman Empire could protect him from a complete 
political takeover by the British. For their part, the British supported the Ottoman Empire to a 
degree, due to their desire to prop up the “Sick Man of Europe” as a bulwark against Russian 
expansion. At the same time, the British did not want the Ottoman Empire to have extensive 
control in daily events in Egypt; and they leaned heavily on their ability to control the khedive. 
The Sultan’s status was legally based on the recognition by the European Powers that Egypt was 
a part of the Ottoman Empire and that the Khedive was the Sultan’s vassal, invested by the 
Sultan with certain rights and powers, and formally exercising those powers in accordance with 
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the Sultan’s firmans.1 In fact, the British, their hands tied by international law and other powers’ 
interests, were particularly anxious to demonstrate, through various symbolic means, that Egypt 
remained a nominally Ottoman territory occupied temporarily on behalf of the Sultan. Indeed, 
the British derived their precarious legitimacy as occupiers of Egypt from their recognition of 
Ottoman sovereignty over the country.2  
The strange tangle of allegiances between Watani nationalists, Umma Party members, the 
Khedive, the British, and the Ottoman Empire created by the fact of the British Occupation and 
nominal Ottoman rule resulted in a series of contingent policies and alternating alliances 
characterizing much of the period 1882-1919. In his first years as Khedive, ‘Abbas Hilmi worked 
vigorously to conciliate the Ottoman Sultan and to win over Ottoman authorities to the idea that 
their interests in Egypt were jeopardized by the British presence. Nevertheless, Ottoman 
authorities were not eager to take on the British directly.3 The British intercepted an 1894 
communication from Ottoman High Commissioner Ahmad Mukhtar Pasha (1839-1919) to the 
Porte in which he wrote that ‘Abbas Hilmi was very unhappy with the Sultan’s advice to the 
Khedive to stay quiet regarding what he saw as Britain’s undue influence, but in which the 
Sultan also dismissed ‘Abbas Hilmi as “a temperamental colt.”4  
The Sultan’s position as Caliph (and as the person many saw as the last non-European 
check on Western imperial powers) and the popular support this position engendered, was the 
only real power he possessed on the ground in Egypt.  Public support for the Ottoman Empire 
                                                 
1 Beginning in 1892, the Sultan insisted that ‘Abbas Hilmi pay him a yearly visit in Istanbul, a gesture purported to 
stress the formal link between Egypt and the Ottoman Empire. (L. Hirszowicz, “The Sultan and the Khedive, 1892-
1908,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 8, No. 3 (1972), 292-6; Oded Peri, “Ottoman Symbolism in British-occupied 
Egypt 1882-1909”, in Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 41 (January 2005), 108-9. 
2 Peri, 108-9. 
3 The British were far too important in terms of European power politics and possible military assistance to the 
Ottoman Empire for the sultan to risk provoking the British Government over the issue of Egypt. 
4 FO 800/114, Currie Papers No. 101, 9 March 1894. Mukhtar Pasha resided in Cairo from 1887 as High 
Commissioner, although Cromer claimed that the office had no official status in Egypt. 
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increased following the 1911 Italian attack on the Ottoman province of Tripolitania. The 
nationalists were outraged at this new instance of European aggression, and many Egyptians 
called on their government to intervene on the Ottoman side. The British forced the Egyptian 
Government to declare its neutrality, however. As a result, the Nationalists took great pleasure in 
attacking this stand, which contravened Egypt’s legal status as a privileged Ottoman province, 
and they started subscription drives to aid the Ottoman armed forces.5  
The Khedive ‘Abbas Hilmi was perhaps the actor most prone to switching alliances in 
order to maintain his position, as his power base was heavily contingent on both the Ottoman 
Empire and the British Government; the khedive had little on which to base any independent 
legitimacy. To resist the influence of the British, Khedive ‘Abbas Hilmi allied himself with pro-
Ottoman and Islamist Egyptian nationalists, and courted representatives of Britain’s European 
rivals in the Middle East.6 Nevertheless, the Watanists expressed only a tenuous loyalty toward 
the person of the Khedive; he was a means to Egypt’s independence, but they held no loyalty to 
either his person or the position. According to journalist Salama Musa (1887-1958),  
During the first period of his rule, the Khedive Abbas had been the pivot of the Nationalist Party, 
which he had also helped financially. He was even pushed further in the direction of nationalism 
by several personal insults made to him by Cromer. Cromer had his political education and 
training in India, and he treated the Egyptians in the same way as the English had treated the 
Indians fifty or sixty years ago...It was due to the Nationalist Party, and more in particular to the 
efforts of the young Mustafa Kamil, that the national movement grew in scope and raised the 
objects of its aspirations. When Cromer saw that he was unable to win his struggle against it, he 
resorted to stupid methods of violence, and even of criminal savagery.7 
 
‘Abbas was at least nominally a nationalist (at least as far as that identity positively 
impacted his own position) who ardently believed that a nationalist movement would force the 
                                                 
5 al-‘Alam, 9 October 1911; al-Liwa, 29 October, 1908; Arthur Goldschmidt, “The Egyptian Nationalist Party,” 
(Ph.D. Dissertation, Harvard University, 1968), 270-1. 
6 Amira Sonbol, The Last Khedive of Egypt: Memoirs of Abbas Hilmi II (Reading, UK: Ithaca Press, 1998), x. See, 
for example, J1135/292/6, Allenby (Cairo), 20 April, 1925, “Activities of ex-Khedive,” and FO 141/650/1, “Abbas 
Hilmi Pasha.” 
7 Salama Musa, The Education of Salama Musa (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1961), 30-1. 
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British authorities to grant Egypt some measure of self-rule. That some of the nationalists ended 
up opposing ‘Abbas Hilmi more than they did the British was due to several reasons which 
historians have examined: a belief that it was easier to deal through the Ottoman Empire, Egypt’s 
suzerain, and convince it to help Egypt gain its freedom from an occupation that the Sultan had 
condoned; a conviction that the British were bound to evacuate Egypt but the Khedive was there 
to stay and therefore his power needed to be curtailed; and a feeling that by the beginning of the 
century the Khedive had given up the battle against the British presence.  Rightly or wrongly the 
Khedive and the nationalists eventually parted ways, each convinced that the other was wrong or 
had sold out.8 Despite his financial contributions to nationalist groups, ‘Abbas Hilmi feared the 
popularity of the Nationalist Party. If the majority of Egyptians became dissatisfied with the 
status quo, there was always the danger that the public opinion for which Kamil claimed to speak 
might, like the earlier nationalist movement of ‘Urabi, be turned against the Khedive himself. As 
proconsuls, both Lord Cromer and Sir Eldon Gorst played on this fear, the latter more 
effectively. Initially, at least, the Khedive had enjoyed relative popularity with both the general 
population and the more strident nationalists.9  
Despite various attempts to court and placate nationalist groups and public opinion, 
‘Abbas Hilmi’s commitment to the nationalist cause was questioned by both radical and 
conservative nationalist groups. The larger issue, however, was that each group which could 
potentially function as an effective patron for the cause of nationalist independence also had 
reason to ally themselves against popular nationalism on occasion. On the one hand, there was 
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9 The journal Abu Naddara published a comic in 1893 which attempted to explain the Khedive’s position vis-à-vis 
the Nationalists and the British. In the comic, though only Wilfrid Blunt, the pro-Egyptian nationalist British 
activist, and the Egyptian fellahin are actively opposing British rule, ‘Abbas Hilmi is portrayed as concerned by 




the new landowning class, which was still finding its way into the political process. Landowners 
were willing to cooperate with the Khedive, but they were unwilling to anger the British, who 
imported the cotton on which their livelihood depended. As for the old Turco-Circassian 
aristocracy, natural allies of the Khedive, the events of the 'Urabi Revolution were something of 
a rude awakening. Together with the landowning class, the old aristocracy feared the spectacle of 
an uprising which was as class-oriented as it was nationalistic. Hence the landowners and elites 
who made up the Umma and Wafd parties were willing to cooperate with the British even while 
they hoped for the ultimate departure of the latter.10  
The Khedive also engaged in divided and sometimes mutually exclusive alliances in 
order to shore up his own power base. For example, in order to retain popular legitimacy, his 
loyalty to the office of the Sultan-Caliph had to be on display, but ‘Abbas Hilmi was also jealous 
of his power vis-à-vis any interference from Istanbul; while his popularity also depended on his 
publicly rebuking the power of the British, he could not go too far to anger them, as proven by 
his 1914 deposition; and, while his own interests were served by a conservative independence 
movement, the popular movement of Mustafa Kamil was a necessary ally in the pursuit of 
popular legitimacy.11  
For ‘Abbas, the Khedive’s connections with the Sultan and the Ottoman Empire operated 
as something of a counter-weight for ‘Abbas Hilmi to the British Occupation government. As 
much as the Khedive personally disliked the Sultan, he favored preserving Ottoman prerogatives, 
as this prevented the British from obtaining an absolute monopoly of power in Egypt.12 In 
                                                 
10 Sonbol, 15. 
11 The British deposed ‘Abbas in December 1914, as a result of the entrance of the Ottoman Empire into World War 
I on the side of the Central Powers. He was replaced by Husayn Kamil (r. 1914-1917), who was given the title of 
Sultan. 
12 A particularly odd manifestation of the selective loyalty to the Ottoman Sultan was the 1906 Taba Incident. On 
this occasion the Khedive supported the British stand since it concerned Egypt’s sovereignty over the Sinai. Kamil, 
on the other hand, supported the Ottoman position and saw no contradiction between the Ottoman government 
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particular, the more closely the Sultan’s prerogatives were linked to religion and his role as 
caliph, the better able ‘Abbas Hilmi was to defend them against British interference, as the 
British were loath to interfere with religious matters. The British were extremely reluctant to 
meddle in religious affairs because of their constant fears of arousing the forces of Islamic 
“fanaticism” and provoking a corresponding popular revolt.  
 
‘Abbas Hilmi and Abdülhamid 
An important source of friction between the Khedive and Ottoman Sultan Abdülhamid (r. 
1876-1909) were the activities against the Sultan on Egyptian soil. According to what khedival 
advisor Ahmad Shafiq had learned, the Sultan’s view was that, while he had treated ‘Abbas 
Hilmi like a son, ‘Abbas had not acted accordingly; but rather had allowed Young Turks and 
Armenians to pursue their anti-Hamidian activities in Egypt unhindered.13 In 1894, the Sultan 
protested through Ottoman High Commissioner in Cairo, Mukhtar Pasha, against two Arab 
weeklies, al-Mushir and al-Ra’y al-‘Amm, published by Christian Syrians, which printed articles 
against the Sultan, the Sublime Porte, and Islam. One of these articles called for a rising against 
the Sultan and attacks on Muslims, about which Abdülhamid protested in vain. In 1899, he again 
complained that the Khedive was supporting two Islam-oriented journals, al-Khawatir and 
                                                                                                                                                             
wanting to build a railway to Aqaba which, if built, would enable it to intervene militarily in Egypt, and Egypt 
exercising sovereignty over all of its territories. The British, for their part, were well aware of the inherent 
contradictions in the positions of the Khedive and the Nationalists, noting in 1908 that “It is interesting to note the 
first signs of what the nationalists really do want. They certainly don’t want the khedive uncontrolled by a 
parliament any more than they want us. The portion that fan the agitation – newspaper writers and advocates – want 
the country for themselves…” However, the Khedive’s concurrence with the British actions set him against both the 
great majority of Egyptians who supported the Sultan in the conflict, and prominent Egyptian nationalists who felt 
that Ottoman support was key to driving the British out of Egypt. (For a thorough study of this affair, see John C. 
Hurewitz, “Egypt’s Eastern Boundary: the Diplomatic Background of the 1906 Demarcation,” in Ammon Cohen 
and Gabriel Baer (eds.), Egypt and Palestine: A Millennium of Association (868-1948) (New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1984), 269-83; Arthur Goldschmidt Jr., “The 1906 Taba Affair,” Al-Abhath, Vol. 33 (1985), 23-39; Peri, 112. 
13 Ahmad Shafiq (1860-1940), whose memoirs are a major source for Egyptian politics during ‘Abbas’ reign, 
headed the Khedive’s Arabic and European Chancery for many years. 
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Rashid Rida’s al-Manar, in contradiction of the Sultan’s authority. A more serious development 
was the escape of Murad Bey, one of the Young Turk leaders, to Cairo where he started a 
journal, Mizan, in January 1896.14 The Sultan demanded that the Khedive arrest Murad Bey, but 
the British authorities refused to allow the latter’s deportation. The British did not fail to note 
that ‘Abbas Hilmi began showing a notably more cooperative attitude to them after his falling 
out with the Sultan; and Cromer concluded that he would not have to worry about the possibility 
of the Sultan intervening on ‘Abbas’ behalf in the near future.15 Not surprisingly, ‘Abbas Hilmi 
resented Cromer’s efforts to increase British control over Egypt’s administration. The Khedive’s 
reaction to a series of provocations from Cromer was the encouragement of a more robust 
nationalist movement directed solely against the British occupation.  
A ministerial crisis in 1893 presented the Khedive ‘Abbas Hilmi with his first 
opportunity to openly defy Cromer and the Veiled Protectorate.16 Among the positive side 
effects of the crisis was that it served to restore the identity of the Khedivate as a separate 
institution from the British administration after years under Tewfik when the Khedive’s office 
                                                 
14 For more on the activities of Mırancı Murad in Egypt, see M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, Bir Siyasal Düşünür Olarak 
Abdullah Cevdet ve Dönemi (İstanbul: Üçdal Neşriyat, 1981), 191-209. For a content analysis of the issues of Mizan 
published in Cairo, see Birol Emil, Mırancı Murad Bey: Hayati ve Eserleri (İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat 
Fakültesi, 1979), 143-53. 
15 Cromer, Abbas II, 63. The journal al-Nil, which received funding from the Sultan, ran articles sharply attacking 
both the Young Turks and the Khedive for sheltering them. On the other hand, it was reported that the Khedive 
granted Murad Bey money to publish Mizan. 
16 In January 1893, Cromer took the position that the Khedive should govern through his ministers, as required by 
law. However, this meant that ‘Abbas Hilmi would have to govern through individuals who had become accustomed 
to doing the bidding of the British. ‘Abbas Hilmi was not averse to relying on ministers; but, if he had to do so, he 
wanted ones who would serve his ends, rather than those of the British. In particular, the Khedive wanted to oust the 
then Prime Minister, Mustafa Fahmi, whom the Khedive believed did nothing but implement Cromer’s dictates to 
the letter. ‘Abbas Hilmi was able to replace Fahmi when the latter fell ill in December 1892.  Cromer objected to 
‘Abbas first choice, however, on the grounds that the Khedive’s choice was a Christian and his nomination would 
offend Egyptian sentiment. Cromer’s real objection was the candidate’s demonstrated hostility to the British. 
Despite ‘Abbas Hilmi’s pressure, Fahmi refused to resign. However, ‘Abbas had the legal right to dismiss a Prime 
Minister. In the face of Fahmi’s refusal, the Khedive sent Fahmi a letter of resignation, and informed Cromer that 
Fahmi had resigned and a new Ministry had been formed under Hussain Fakri. ‘Abbas Hilmi’s response to Cromer’s 
threats was to state that he would rather abdicate than take Fahmi back as Prime Minister. After a series of 
negotiations, a compromise was reached under which a new Ministry would be formed while ‘Abbas Hilmi would 
sign an agreement for publication indicating his willingness to abide by British advice on all important matters, and 
state his desire for cordial relations with them. (Mayer, 100-105.) 
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had appeared to be nothing more than a subsidiary of the Occupation. The early opposition of the 
Khedive to Cromer also had a dramatic effect on ‘Abbas Hilmi’s prestige within Egypt. Already 
a popular monarch, ‘Abbas Hilmi became a hero in the eyes of many of his countrymen by virtue 
of his opposition to Cromer. In the midst of the 1893 crisis, delegations representing all classes 
of Egyptian society from the provinces as well as from Cairo flocked to his palace. Speeches 
were delivered expressing admiration for his courage and support for his position. ‘Abbas Hilmi 
spoke before a delegation representing the native courts, saying that he would defend Egypt’s 
legal rights without concern for his own person, provoking a storm of applause and prayers for 
his life. Delegations continued filing in until the evening, the palace courtyard fairly “rippling” 
with them, in Shafiq’s words. Hundreds of cables of support came in from all parts of the 
country. A group of young students led by Mustafa Kamil attacked the headquarters of the pro-
British al-Muqattam in retaliation for the attacks on ‘Abbas Hilmi for inciting nationalism in 
connection with the ministerial incident.17  
The ministerial crisis was singled out by journalists as a highly significant turning point 
in relations between the Khedivate and the Occupation. For example, the newspaper al-
Mu’ayyad discussed the crisis from all possible angles on its front page for many months.18 By 
Cromer’s estimate, fully nine-tenths of the Egyptian official class from ‘Abbas downward had 
turned suddenly hostile. The Proconsul commented bitterly:  
For the first time the Egyptian Government, backed by an Assembly, which, although not 
representative of the whole country does really represent some influential classes, has publicly and 
officially declared that they want us to go, and all this is done under the inspiration of an 
inexperienced, headstrong boy of no particular talent.19  
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It also did not escape the attention of the British that support for the Khedive had spread to the 
Egyptian Army. A nervous Cromer badgered the British government to permit an increase in the 
British garrison in Egypt in case the support began to bubble over into an open rebellion.20 
‘Abbas Hilmi benefited initially from the fact that he had no rival for popular support on 
the domestic political scene. Though often ineffective, ‘Abbas Hilmi’s moves to assert his 
independence from Cromer had a galvanizing impact on the attitudes and enthusiasm of young 
Egyptians. ‘Abbas began his reign with a store of credit and good will which his early 
confrontations with the British in the first years of his reign had earned him. He took advantage 
of the momentum of popular support, exerting himself to consolidate his gains and mobilize 
public opinion behind him. To this end, he heavily subsidized nationalist journalists.21 During 
the honeymoon phase of ‘Abbas Hilmi’s relationship with the nationalists, Mustafa Kamil 
proclaimed the virtual identity of the Egyptian people and the Khedive, who represented its 
rights and aspirations. By supporting the Khedive, Kamil stated, Egyptians risked provoking 
British wrath, for the British were aggravated at the sight of Egyptians’ devotion to their 
monarch; and the British government was conspiring in every way to alienate the loyalty of 
‘Abbas Hilmi’s subjects from him. According to Kamil, he was beloved as no monarch had ever 
been as the greatest defender of Egypt’s rights.22 Khedival advisor Shafiq explained the renewal 
of nationalist sentiment after ‘Abbas Hilmi’s accession as follows: “The people saw in him a 
symbol of their revolt against the intrusiveness of English policy in the era of his father 
                                                 
20 Ibrahim Amin Ghali, L’Egypte Nationaliste et Liberale, de Moustapha Kamel a Saad Zagloul (1892-1927) (La 
Haye: M. Nijhoff, 1969), 168-9; Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid, Egypt and Cromer: A Study in Anglo-Egyptian Relations 
(London: Murray, 1968), 117. 
21 Jacques Berque, L’Egypte, Imperialisme et Revolution (Paris: Gallimard, 1967), 165; Ahmad Shafiq, 
Mudhakkirati, Vol. II, Parts I and II (Cairo: Matba’at misr, 1932), Part I: 272; Part II: 56-7, 134, 160; Mayer, 141-3. 
22 ‘Ali Fahmi Kamil, Mustafa Kamil fi arba’a wa thalathina rabi’an, Vol. VI (Cairo, al-Liwa, 1908), 73, 117, 120, 
121-2; Mayer, 141-3. 
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(Tewfik).”23 As a symbol, ‘Abbas Hilmi was effective in his early years; it was later, when he 
had to function as a leader, that his deficiencies became obvious. Nationalist groups saw no issue 
with the Khedive so long as their activity was predicated on the removal of the British from 
Egypt; it was more difficult to maintain a strong bond between the nationalists and the Khedive 
when discussions turned to constitutional reforms and curbs on royal authority. 
As long as the British clamped down on Egyptian political freedoms, ‘Abbas could pay 
vague tributes to concepts of democracy without having to demonstrate his willingness to share 
his power with his subjects in practice. For many nationalists, the cause of national independence 
was bound up with the notion of popular freedom expressed in a parliamentary government, 
which was seen as a way to remove the power of the British Occupation, the royal household, 
and the collaborationist elite. The attempts in the last years of Isma’il’s reign and the first years 
of Tewfik’s reign to establish representative institutions were aimed at curbing the exploitative 
activities of European power which the khedivate did not resist – where it did not actively 
collaborate with them. Thus, when ‘Abbas Hilmi stood up to Cromer, it was natural that many 
Egyptians would infer that he favored the type of governmental reforms that would increase the 
ability of Egyptians to resist Western incursions, and that he would be in sympathy with the 
democratization of government. The push for constitutional reforms and increases in 
representative government had made progress in the decades before the British Occupation and 
the reestablishment of Khedival absolutism, which in Egypt was a cover for foreign domination 
of the country.24  
Therefore, it was equally important for ‘Abbas to disavow his own absolutist ambitions, 
as it was for him to publicly oppose the British administration. In a front-page editorial in al-
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Mu’ayyad in 1893, Shaykh ‘Ali Yusuf, the Khedive’s journalistic spokesman, addressed himself 
to Cromer and denied that ‘Abbas Hilmi wanted to rule Egypt in the absolutist manner of his 
ancestor Isma’il and also disputed Cromer’s contention that whereas Tewfik had shown 
democratic inclinations, ‘Abbas Hilmi was a despot.25 That a conservative such as Shaykh ‘Ali 
Yusuf, who appears to have been quite comfortable with the autocratic style of ‘Abbas Hilmi, 
should have felt it necessary to publicly deny charges that ‘Abbas Hilmi was an autocrat evinces 
the awareness in ‘Abbas Hilmi’s circle that his popularity was conditioned on the assumption 
that he would favor democratic reform as soon as the Occupation was eliminated. Fortunately for 
him, ‘Abbas Hilmi was not immediately called upon to show his hand. Because it was commonly 
known that the Veiled Protectorate of the Cromerian regime ran the government, ‘Abbas Hilmi 
could garner support from those who saw him as a monarch of constitutionalist inclinations 
without these inclinations ever being put to the test.26 
 
The Struggle between the Khedive and Watani Nationalists 
Crucial to the Khedive’s public image as a legitimate leader of Egypt was his support of 
the nationalist Watani Party. Indeed, ‘Abbas Hilmi provided leadership in his early years and 
fostered the nationalist movement in practical ways, assisting with the formation of nationalist 
societies, subsidizing nationalist agitators, and disbursing large endowments to the nationalist 
press.  In the absence of alternative outlets for discussion, such as a parliament or parties, the 
press gave the nascent nationalist movement and other currents in Egypt a voice in political 
discussions. There was an explosion of periodicals and newspapers, some of which were 
financed, alternately, by ‘Abbas, the British, the French, or by other personalities and powers.  
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However, the movement that ‘Abbas Hilmi had set in motion soon outstripped him and 
his conservative policies.27 From being a hero of the resistance to the British Occupation, Abbas 
came to be seen by an ever larger segment of the Egyptian population as a corrupt tyrant who 
had no sympathies for the aspirations of his subjects to participate in the government. This view 
of ‘Abbas Hilmi only increased in the period that followed the Denshawai verdicts in 1906. 
Despite the public favor certain to be garnered by taking up the cause of those accused in the 
Denshawai trials, ‘Abbas Hilmi remained awkwardly passive throughout the trials – some 
indication of his unwillingness to expose himself to Cromer’s wrath by openly taking a stand 
against the Occupation. Somewhat surprisingly, the Khedive did not try to exploit the 
groundswell of public opinion in Egypt against the verdict or the critical reaction to the British 
Occupation that these drastic measures provoked in Europe to shore up his own popularity. Not 
only did ‘Abbas Hilmi refuse to commute the sentences of the villagers; when he learned that the 
public executions had been carried out on the basis of an order issued in his name, but regarding 
which he had not even been consulted, ‘Abbas Hilmi, though furious, did not make a public 
protest.28 ‘Abbas Hilmi calculated, no doubt, that his hold on power was too precarious at this 
moment to risk any open confrontation with the British regime.  
By 1907, Kamil and increasing numbers of traditional nationalists who had remained 
loyal to the Khedivate became disillusioned with the person of the khedive. In the face of the 
Khedive’s more cautious behavior regarding the British, Nationalists viewed his conduct as 
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likely to weaken support for their campaign to oust the British and to return the governance of 
Egypt to the Sultan and his deputy the khedive.29 ‘Abbas Hilmi’s pursuit of his own personal 
interests had, over time, turned him into something of a liability for the traditionalist faction of 
the nationalist movement to which Mustafa Kamil belonged. British anti-imperialist Wilfrid 
Scawen Blunt (1840-1922) records in his diaries a conversation with Mustafa Kamil on 15 July 
1906:  
Of the Khedive ‘Abbas he tells me precisely what [Muhammad] Abdu always said about him of 
late years, that he had become corrupted. ‘I knew him well,’ Mustafa said, ‘before he came to his 
present position, as we are exactly the same age within three months, and I saw much of him while 
we were both being educated in Europe. He was then charming, and full of patriotic ideas, and I 
was his devoted adherent, absurdly so, but now he has fallen entirely into the hands of rogues, and 
thinks of nothing but making money, and he is also in the hands of his Hungarian mistress 
(Countess Torok). He has in this way lost all his friends and has ended by having no influence 
whatever in Egypt. If he had any courage he might over and over again have held his own against 
Cromer and done incalculable good for his country, but he cares nothing now for his country, only 
for money. He puts up with endless indignities from Cromer, who has a hold over him through the 
knowledge of his rascalities; and he clings to his £E100,000 a year, his civil list allowance, and 
makes himself Cromer’s servant.30  
 
In addition to a general dissatisfaction with ‘Abbas Hilmi, the Khedive was criticized for specific 
actions, such as his attendance at the King’s Birthday Parade, and more general charges were 
also brought by implication.31 In particular, increasing numbers of Egyptian nationalists began to 
suspect the Khedive had designs on increasing his personal power, and for this reason was more 
amenable to the British. The British, in turn, were accused of plotting to establish a counter-
Caliphate in the Arab world under their control, presumably with ‘Abbas Hilmi as the anti-
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Caliph. The Sultan was reported to be valiantly resisting the imposition of foreign financial 
controls over the Ottoman Empire (presumably as an implied contrast to Isma’il’s behavior in 
Egypt) and to have said that he would prefer to be the last Caliph rather than a second khedive.32 
Because of Mustafa Kamil’s careful courting of popular opinion and his popularity as a 
spokesman for the nationalist mainstream, his increasing public estrangement from ‘Abbas Hilmi 
was significant; and Mustafa Kamil’s public criticisms of ‘Abbas Hilmi hurt the latter in 
nationalist circles. ‘Abbas Hilmi also showed a distinct lack of philosophical commitment to the 
goals of nationalism. In Kamil’s devotion to the principles of liberal democracy, he was now 
more of a threat than a support to the Khedive’s domestic authority. By the first decade of the 
twentieth century, there was more to be gained for the Khedive by throwing his lot in with the 
British than in clandestine intrigues with the Nationalists against them. As a result, by 1904 the 
possibility of an anti-British coalition, comprising France and possibly other Continental Powers, 
the Ottoman Empire, the Palace, and the Nationalists, had foundered because of the weakness 
and the different goals of the constituent parties.  
‘Abbas Hilmi’s separation from the nationalists was made even more evident by the 
growing Nationalist consensus surrounding constitutional reform. The tension between the call 
for a constitution and the need for khedival support would become a recurring theme in 
nationalist ideology. The increasing nationalist and popular support for a constitution exposed 
the embarrassingly large gap that separated the Occupation regime, wedded to the khedivate as 
the lynch-pin of the Veiled Protectorate, from politicized Egyptians, who almost unanimously 
rejected the old form of government in favor of a more democratic one.33 In 1900, Kamil had 
already written his first appeal for a representative system of government, which was to be 
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guaranteed by a written constitution.34 He then developed the idea of constitutionalism, by which 
he meant representative government, into one of the main tenets of his party program - a policy 
hardly consistent with ‘Abbas Hilmi’s desire to strengthen his own authority.35 Salama Musa 
described the situation in this way:  
I was struck by the new nationalist attitude voiced in al-Jarida, which I may briefly indicate as 
follows: The struggle must be concentrated on the central issue of nationalism, namely, that Egypt 
is for the Egyptians, and not for any foreign power. The people must govern themselves by means 
of a constitution so that the Khedive will not be an absolute ruler over the country. This call led to 
a relapse of the old nationalist party, and also to the Copts embracing the cause of nationalism 
which had hitherto scared them. The constitutional movement began to spread throughout the 
people; as to the Khedive ‘Abbas, he tried to stem the tide, if not actually oppose it.36  
 
However, Kamil’s relations with ‘Abbas Hilmi were often strained, particularly between 1904 
and 1906, and specifically on the questions of a constitution and public opinion, Kamil continued 
to be publicly supportive of the Khedive as the legitimate figure of Egyptian sovereignty in the 
face of the British. Khedival support of the Nationalist Party was still crucial despite 
fundamental ideological differences. 
 
‘Abbas Hilmi and Lord Cromer 
In the autumn of 1906, ‘Abbas Hilmi made his peace with the nationalists, hoping to get 
revenge on Cromer, to cover his bets in case the British left, and to steer the Nationalists away 
from an ‘Urabist (i.e. anti-Khedivist) orientation.37 For the Nationalists, palace patronage would 
set the example for ministers, government functionaries, and notables. It would also provide 
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needed financial support for their expanded political and journalistic activities, especially the 
creation of English and French versions of al-Liwa, which Mustafa Kamil had already 
announced as his means of converting European public opinion to the Egyptian cause.38 Meeting 
secretly at a mosque near his summer palace, the Khedive made an agreement with Kamil and 
other leading figures of the nationalist movement to open the Nationalist Party (which had begun 
ten years earlier as a secret society headed by ‘Abbas) to public membership and to form a 
corporation, capitalized at £E20,000, to sustain the projected Nationalist dailies, The Egyptian 
Standard and L’Etendard Egyptian. Much of the money would be provided by the Khedive, or 
by wealthy princes and notables acting at his behest.39 For the next year, the Khedive remained 
in secret contact with the Nationalists while his public position remained necessarily 
ambiguous.40  
By late 1906, when ‘Abbas Hilmi had begun to mend his relations with the nationalists 
out of political necessity, his relations with Cromer were especially strained.41 In fact, even in his 
quieter years, ‘Abbas Hilmi was far from being the submissive puppet that the Veiled 
Protectorate system envisaged. In the spring of 1906, Cromer was still complaining that ‘Abbas 
was working steadily to inflame what the former considered to be Islamic sentiment. In Cromer’s 
opinion, ‘Abbas Hilmi invariably discouraged all Egyptians of moderate and reforming 
tendencies, and paid and encouraged those notable for their “Anglophobia” and “fanaticism.”42  
Cromer also charged ‘Abbas with encouraging the Nationalists’ demands for a 
representative legislative body, which Cromer claimed was playing with fire, as such a body 
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would oppose ‘Abbas and expose the Khedivate itself to peril.43 Behind this warning was an 
apprehension on the part of the British that ‘Abbas Hilmi, in his attempts to win nationalist 
support and to strengthen his position in Egypt, would recklessly play along with nationalist 
demands for democratization. The British predicted that ‘Abbas Hilmi would not be able to 
control these demands for democratization and that they would undermine the khedivate, and, 
thereby bring down the Veiled Protectorate.44 The presence of the khedive remained necessary 
for the function and appearance of British rule in Egypt; in this way, the khedive’s status was 
minimally guaranteed. However, there was a chance in these circumstances that the British 
would retreat, and ‘Abbas Hilmi could not afford to be identified with the British when and if the 
hoped-for steps toward Egyptian independence were made, lest he find himself like his father, 
Khedive Tewfik, faced with massive rejection of his legitimacy.  
 
‘Abbas Hilmi and Sir Eldon Gorst 
When the Occupation seemed to be gaining a firmer hold on the political situation after 
Cromer’s departure in 1907, and when it was possible to work out a rapprochement with the 
British, ‘Abbas Hilmi abandoned his nationalist allies.45 Subsequently, Mustafa Kamil began to 
separate himself from ‘Abbas Hilmi after the beginning of the Khedive’s policies of entente with 
the Occupation regime under Gorst.46 Even before Gorst formally took office, Mustafa Kamil 
had warned that the Proconsul would try to drive a wedge between ‘Abbas Hilmi and the 
nationalists by treating ‘Abbas Hilmi well and reaching an understanding with him. Soon after 
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Gorst started his tenure in 1907 and ‘Abbas Hilmi’s collusion with the new Occupation regime 
had been demonstrated, Mustafa Kamil announced that whether ‘Abbas Hilmi had good relations 
with the British was a matter of indifference. Sharply departing from the position that he had 
taken in the early years of ‘Abbas Hilmi’s reign, Kamil announced that the nation should not be 
bound by ‘Abbas Hilmi’s personal views of the Occupation, and that the khedive alone should 
not govern the nation. Instead, Kamil emphasized the rights of the Egyptian people and service 
to the cause of the nation which was above all rulers and all individuals.47 The effect of Gorst’s 
Entente policy on the popularity of the Khedive was illustrated by Salama Musa as follows:  
the most important cause that made the public oppose the Khedive was his so-called policy of 
reconciliation. The English, having seen that Cromer’s policy towards the Khedive had resulted in 
making the latter a national hero who started intriguing against them, appointed as the new 
Commissioner in Cairo Sir Eldon Gorst. He befriended the Khedive, and increased his powers; 
and the Khedive was so much taken in by this change in British policy that he began to oppose the 
nationalist movement and cooperated with the English, thus embarking upon a policy of 
reconciliation which was detrimental to the nation’s progress.48 
 
The Khedive’s initial support for the constitutionalist trend in Egyptian nationalism had 
been part of a campaign to portray the Occupation as a force opposed to Egyptian freedom. 
‘Abbas Hilmi had welcomed this propaganda in the days of his strained relations with Cromer’s 
regime, when such advocacy had no political repercussions for him. Cromer’s brusque 
personality, on top of the Dinshawai trial, had drawn the Palace and most strains of nationalist 
opinion together into an uneasy alliance. By a gentler approach aimed particularly at winning the 
Khedive over to his side, Gorst was able with his entente policy to separate these diverse factions 
of nationalists, which now constituted themselves as separate political parties.49 The changed 
situation under the entente policy with Gorst, therefore, caused ‘Abbas Hilmi to align himself in 
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opposition to the Majlis and any groups calling for constitutionalism.50 After the 1908 
Revolution in Turkey led to intensified agitation for an Egyptian Constitution, the Khedive and 
his advisors, rather than going along with the clamor that Egypt should emulate the Turks and 
adopt a constitution, produced a counter-demand: Egyptians should be allowed to participate in 
the new Ottoman Parliament in Constantinople. This notion harmonized well with the Khedive’s 
general policy of Ottoman solidarity, though it was probably intended to distract Egyptians from 
their demands for internal constitutional reform since there was no real possibility that the 
Occupation would allow Egyptian membership in the Ottoman Parliament.51  
The policy which Gorst pursued of developing Egypt’s representative institutions did not, 
as was charged by British alarmists, signal a trend toward turning the country over to the 
Egyptians. Representative institutions in Egypt had only as much power as the central authority 
was willing to delegate to them, and Gorst had no desire to change this system.52 He only wanted 
to provide malcontents and activists with a forum to criticize the government that could function 
as a safety valve to reduce the political tensions that had mounted dangerously in Cromer’s last 
years. These representative institutions had no power to check the actions of the Occupation or 
the Khedive without prior consent, and their role remained merely an advisory one. However, the 
British also needed to consider their own domestic expectations of the purpose of the Egyptian 
occupation. Gorst had to take into account British home opinion that demanded the introduction 
of more effective representative government, as the project of British colonialism was predicated 
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on the promise of “preparing” subject populations for independence and self-government.53 
While British public opinion may have been content with the composition of the Egyptian 
government, domestic Egyptian opinion was increasingly dissatisfied. Increasingly, popular 
opinion considered the Egyptian government despotic and tyrannical, as it neither represented 
the nation, nor was guided by a constitution. One Egyptian was quoted as asking how it was 
“that the Turkish nation managed to obtain a constitution, notwithstanding that the Egyptians, 
who [we] re much more intelligent, ha[d] not obtained one.”54 Another proposed to use force to 
obtain a constitution for the country, pointing out that Egypt was no less a nation than France, 
which had done this during its own revolution. Speeches condemning the rule of a single 
individual or commending governments that did consult their people were also quite common.55 
The implication that ‘Abbas Hilmi would not grant Egypt a constitution without prior 
British approval provoked a negative reaction in articles published in al-Liwa and al-Jarida. For 
the Khedive to make the granting of an Egyptian constitution dependent on British approval was 
tantamount to recognizing the legitimacy of the British position in Egypt. There had already been 
indications that ‘Abbas Hilmi had no intention of granting a constitution regardless of British 
willingness to consent to one. The suspicion of al-Jarida was that ‘Abbas was looking to expand 
his own power by cooperating with the British under the entente policy.56 
While many nationalists believed that the Khedive had shied away from a constitution for 
his own selfish purposes rather than because of the British, the Khedive was still the only 
authority to which they could or would appeal. Muhammad Farid insisted in al-Liwa that 
Egyptians would demand a constitution from the Khedive, the legal authority in Egypt, not from 
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Britain which had no right to be in Egypt. Kamil trusted, he asserted, that Gorst’s cajolery would 
not lead ‘Abbas Hilmi into making mistakes, and professed not to believe the charges that 
‘Abbas was just trying to divert the thrust of the constitutionalists’ drive from Egypt to London 
and that the Khedive’s advocacy of a constitution had been merely made as a part of an effort in 
earlier years to get rid of Cromer (though Kamil had no trouble repeating the charges in 
numerous articles and speeches.) Kamil suggested that ‘Abbas Hilmi might be in a situation 
similar to Ottoman Sultan Abdülhamid’s, where palace courtiers had become a barrier between 
the ruler and the people.57 
The radicalization of Egyptian politics increased dramatically by the end of 1908. Despite 
attempts to continue to work with ‘Abbas Hilmi, matters had reached a stage where the 
Nationalist Party was openly accusing the Khedive, its former patron, of betraying the nation. 
Following Kamil’s death in 1908, the founder of the Watani Party was replaced by the more 
radical Muhammad Farid (1868-1919) and ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Jawish (d.1929), the latter of whom 
was to prove a particularly determined enemy of the Khedive.58 This radicalization was aided by 
the fact that the Watani Party lacked effective, centralized leadership, which contributed in part 
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during the First World War, working on “Pan-Islamic” journals for the Central Powers. Muhammad Farid, Awraq 
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142-55; Anwar al-Jundi, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Jawish: min Ruwwad al-Tarbiyah wa al-Sihafa wa al-Ijtima’ (Cairo: al-Dar 
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and the Arabs: The Search for Egyptian Nationhood, 1900-1930 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 6-8. 
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to the radicalization of some of its splinter groups. Moreover, Farid lacked the leadership skills 
of Kamil, and the party fell to a certain degree under the ideological influence of Jawish.  
At the same time, ‘Abbas Hilmi’s ability to control the Nationalist Party had waned 
considerably by the time of Kamil’s death in 1908. As the attacks on the Khedive grew in the 
press and reached a point where he was being openly accused of betraying the nation and 
collaborating with the British against Egypt’s interests, ‘Abbas Hilmi himself started pressing for 
the revival of the 1881 Press Law.59 This, despite an initial rejection of Gorst’s proposal to 
reinstate the law on the grounds that current laws were sufficient and that application of the 1881 
law would be likely to occasion unrest.60 According to the memoirs of Ahmad Shafiq, president 
of the Khedival Council at the time, ‘Abbas Hilmi warmed up to the idea of increasing press 
censorship, in part because of some pressure from Gorst and mounting attacks by the nationalist 
press which accused him of betraying his nation to the British. After some consultation with his 
advisors, the Khedive asked Butrus Ghali (1846-1910), the newly appointed and increasingly 
unpopular Prime Minister, to reinforce the 1881 Press Law.61  
In the wake of the passage of the Press Law, one of the strongly nationalist newspapers 
wrote a kind of epitaph for the bond that earlier united the people with the Khedive. Gorst’s 
politics, it claimed, had divided the nation into two camps, and had detached the mass of the 
                                                 
59 The press law of 1881, which was originally enforced from 1881 until 1894, primarily attempted to control all 
Egyptian periodicals through the forced implementation of a number of regulations.  All new and existing 
newspapers, for instance, were required to register and acquire permission to print from the Department of Interior.  
The most intriguing clause in the law was article 17: “The Interior Minister (Nazir al-Dakhiliyya) of this government 
is empowered to outlaw the entry, distribution, and sale of any newspaper or pamphlet printed outside of Egypt’s 
borders. All who smuggle, distribute, sell, or possess a forbidden newspaper or periodical published outside of 
Egypt will be fined anywhere from one to twenty-five Egyptian pounds.” (Ziad Fahmy, “Popularizing Egyptian 
Nationalism,” 115.) 
60 ‘Abbas Hilmi had found the old laws serviceable. He was, for example, able to have two individuals subjected to 
harsh sentences for their involvement in the distribution of a hostile poem in 1897. (Mayer, 213-4; Shafiq, Vol. 
III,173-4; Ziad Fahmy, “Popularizing Egyptian Nationalism,” 196.) 
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population from the Khedive, formerly their only powerful ally.62 Opposition to the Press Law 
occasioned the first of many public demonstrations against the Egyptian government itself, as 
opposed to just the British Occupation, that functioned as expressions of popular repudiation of 
‘Abbas Hilmi’s actions.63 ‘Abbas later tried to justify the Press Law as a measure that he was 
forced to take by the actions of “extremists.”64 Of course, it was the Nationalist Party – the most 
broadly based and representative of all the Egyptian parties – and its newspapers against which 
the Press Law was primarily directed.65 
Not surprisingly, the repressive measures which the government was taking had the effect 
of inciting more bitter and outspoken criticism rather than quieting dissent. The newspaper Qutr 
al-Misr directly attacked ‘Abbas Hilmi and made remarks interpreted as incitement to 
assassination. At times, the attacks in newspapers were veiled insinuations, as was the case of an 
article which listed the traits of bad rulers, which corresponded exactly to the faults found by 
opponents with the Khedive. One article described a bad ruler as one who was hated as a 
monarch, who had allowed foreigners to dominate his country, and allowed these foreigners to 
help him to consolidate his throne. The article referenced the ‘Umayyad Caliph Walid II (r. 743-
44), who was accused of giving himself up to drink and debauchery, taking a shameless mistress 
(likely a reference to the Khedive’s mistress, Countess Török), and violating Islamic precepts; 
                                                 
62 FO 371/660, Enclosure No. 15677, 17 April 1909. The same paper was later suppressed under the Press Law for 
an attack on several minsters. FO 371/1115, Kitchener to Grey No. 39144, 16 October 1911. Khalil Mutran (1872-
1949) penned the following poem on the 1909 reinstatement of the Press Law: “Disperse her best men by land and 
sea / Slaughter her free men one by one / The good shall remain good till the end of time / And so shall the evil 
remain. / Smash all the pens, would that prevent / Hands from engraving the stone? / Cut off the hands, would that 
restrain / Eyes from looking in anger? / Put out the eyes, would that prevail / Against the fiery breath? / Stop then 
the breath, for that would be / The utmost you could do to us / We would then be saved from you / And for that we 
would offer our thanks.” (M.M. Badawi, “Ten Modern Arabic Poems,” Journal of Arabic Literature VI (1975), 130-
9.) 
63 Mayer, 227-8. 
64 Shafiq, Vol. II, Part II, 173-79. 
65 Ahmad Rashad, Mustafa Kamil (Cairo: Matba’at al-‘Ada, 1958), 57. There were numerous instances of the 
Nationalist Party’s papers being prosecuted. See, for example, FO 371/894, Cheetham to Grey No. 38356, 21 
October 1910; FO 371/1363, Kitchener to Grey No. 21921, 22 May 1912; FO 371/1363, Cheetham to Mallet No. 
47501, 9 September 1912; FO 371/1364, Kitchener to Grey No. 52216, 30 November 1912. 
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and the ‘Abbasid Caliph al-Mu’tasim (r.833-842), who relied on a non-Muslim minister (a 
reference to Butrus Ghali), and indulged drinking and debauchery. The article blamed sovereigns 
in general who were greedy, cruel, corrupt, and who had taken on bad associations, all to the 
detriment of the nation.66 
Nevertheless, despite the increasing opposition to his authority, and in part because of his 
forced abdication in 1914, ‘Abbas Hilmi retained a great deal of popularity in Egypt throughout 
World War I and through the 1919 Revolution. Prominent members of the royal family 
continued to harbor pronounced pro-Ottoman sympathies even after the Khedive’s deposition, as 
did a large segment of public opinion.67 On the day that Prince Husayn Kamil succeeded ‘Abbas 
Hilmi as ruler and assumed the new title of Sultan, “in the Cairo Mosques the prayer for the 
Moslem [sic] Khalifa was repeated three times in succession and each time response was general 
and loud, whereas [the response] to the prayers for the Sultan of Egypt was feeble or 
inaudible.”68 Meanwhile, in Constantinople, Farid persuaded the Shaykh al-Islam to issue a 
fatwa that condemned Husayn Kamil to death, on the grounds that he had “violated the authority 
of the Ottoman Caliphate over the Egyptian province, which was an integral part of the Ottoman 
Sultanate.”69 A few of the popular songs and street chants circulating at the time mentioned the 
Khedive as a heroic, almost messianic figure who would return from exile and rescue Egypt from 
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67 Ronald Storrs, The Memoirs of Sir Ronald Storrs (New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1937), 152; War Office (WO) 
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68 Storrs, Memoirs, 153. Husayn Kamil (1853-1917) was Sultan of Egypt from 19 December 1914 until his death in 
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Pasha, did not accept the installation of the new ruler, and were arrested and subsequently taken out of the country. 
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the British.70 Another British intelligence report noted that in the popular areas of Cairo, “street-
boys, lower-class natives, seed vendors, etc., have been publicly singing  a new song in the 
vernacular in which open insinuations are made regarding the arrival in Egypt of the ex-Khedive 
(‘Abbas II) and [Ismail] Enver Pasha,” presumably to deliver Egypt from British rule. This song, 
the report continued, also contained “uncomplimentary remarks about the [British] G.O.C. 
(General Officer Commanding.)”71 
 
The Khedive and the Sultan 
By the final years of the nineteenth century, relations between ‘Abbas Hilmi and the 
Sultan Abdülhamid had reached such a low point that in private ‘Abbas Hilmi voiced his belief 
that Abdülhamid wanted to depose him.72 It came back to ‘Abbas Hilmi that the Sultan had taken 
to referring to him in terms roughly equivalent to “that crazy kid” (al-walid al-majnun in 
Shafiq’s translation of the Turkish).73 Indeed, by the end of 1897, the Sultan’s disenchantment 
with ‘Abbas Hilmi had grown to the point that he was reportedly talking about the prospect of 
replacing the entire Muhammad ‘Ali dynasty with a regular Ottoman governor who would be 
appointed every five years, expressing a willingness to allow the British Occupation to continue 
indefinitely.74 Abdülhamid had apparently come around to the view that the ambitious Khedive 
only meant trouble, and that the British had no interest in changing the status quo in Egypt, to the 
Sultan’s benefit. The Sultan had to consider also that the likely outcome of a successful 
                                                 
70 A popular rhyming chant that was often sung in the street declared: “Allah hay ‘Abbas gayi” (God is eternal and 
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campaign against the British in Egypt would be the Khedive’s resumption of Muhammad ‘Ali’s 
anti-Ottoman policy.75 
At the same time that ‘Abbas Hilmi was attempting to placate the Sultan in order to 
strengthen his own position vis-à-vis the British, he also began to financially support the Young 
Turks resident in Egypt in an attempt to offset efforts by the Sultan to reassert the Porte’s rights 
of ownership to Egypt. In addition, in 1895 ‘Abbas Hilmi began to support the idea of replacing 
the Ottoman caliphate with an Arab one and installing himself as caliph. Steadily until World 
War I, and less for nationalist than personal and dynastic reasons, ‘Abbas Hilmi promoted his 
and Egypt’s claims to leadership of the Arab world, as well as Cairo’s suitability as the seat of a 
new caliphate.76 This continued flirtation on the part of the Khedive with ideas about an Arab 
caliphate with Egypt at its center put him at odds with both the Hamidian regime and the Young 
Turk government. According to the British Foreign Office, “Although he did not say it in so 
many words, his Highness expected to replace the Sultan of Turkey as sovereign of these 
regions.”77  
 
Kamil, Farid, and the Nationalists Embrace the Sultan 
                                                 
75 Adding to the Sultan’s existing animus towards ‘Abbas Hilmi, a plotter in Yıldız was able to persuade the Sultan 
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76 For a discussion of Mehmet ‘Ali’s supposed nationalism as dynasty building, see Khaled Fahmy, All the Pasha’s 
Men: Mehmed Ali, his Army, and the Making of Modern Egypt (New York: American University in Cairo Press, 
2002.) 
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(1972), p. 303-6; James Jankowski, “Egypt and Early Arab Nationalism, 1908-1922,” in Rashid Khalidi, Lisa 




Unable to rely on ‘Abbas Hilmi to represent Ottoman interests in Egypt, the Sultan found 
alternate supporters. Among the most vocal of these was Mustafa Kamil, who remained 
throughout his life a fervent supporter of the rights of the Sultan vis-à-vis Egypt, primarily 
because he believed the Ottoman Empire was the surest way for the British to be removed from 
Egypt.78  ‘Abbas Hilmi and Mustafa Kamil initially shared a conviction that the support of the 
Sultan was the best hope for forcing British evacuation.79 They had the support of the Ottoman 
regime in this endeavor; Constantinople was disseminating pro-Ottoman propaganda by means 
of subsidized journals in Egypt and was the center for various operations for more or less secret 
societies promoting the Sultan’s influence.80 Whether in declaring that “we love the Ottoman 
state, because in our character as Muslims we see that it protects Muslims in the East and 
watches over the venerable, sacred territories,” or in proclaiming that “the support of the 
Egyptian nation for the Sublime State is a nationalist demonstration against the British 
Occupation,”81 Kamil based an Egyptian orientation towards the Ottoman Empire on the grounds 
of the benefits to Egypt which he believed would proceed from it.82  
As early as 1898, Mustafa Kamil had written a study entitled Al-Mas’ala al-Sharqiyya, 
(The Eastern Question), warning of the dangers to the Muslim world in the European threat to 
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Egyptian Bookstore, 1970), 228. 
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the Ottoman Empire; denouncing the British in particular for their policies of divide and rule, 
and for their purported backing of the idea of an Arab Caliphate in order to split the Ottoman 
state; and concluding with an appeal for all Muslims to support the “sacred Islamic Caliphate” of 
the Ottomans.83  For his defense of the Empire, Kamil was awarded the titles of “Excellency” in 
1899 and “Pasha” in 1904.84 In 1907, the Hizb al-Watani officially included as part of its 
program the summons to Egyptians to “strive to strengthen the relations of cordiality, the bonds, 
and the integral connection between Egypt and the Sublime State.”85 Despite the fact that, in 
many ways, the claim to a universal caliphate was as much a burden as an opportunity for the 
Ottoman Empire, the prestige of the Ottoman caliphate reached a global peak from the 1880s to 
1920s (well beyond the original intentions of the Ottoman government.) A new, racialized notion 
of the Muslim world increased the caliphate’s religious significance, despite the powerful 
arguments against the theological validity of the Ottoman claim to the Sunni caliphate.86 
Nevertheless, by World War I, the legitimacy of the Ottoman caliphate was rarely questioned. 
This legitimacy, however, was based more on the representation of the Sultan as a final bulwark 
against colonial encroachment than any genuine religious feeling.87 
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However, while Kamil supported the Ottoman claim to formal sovereignty over Egypt, he 
by no means wished to see effective Ottoman authority reestablished over the country. In 
Kamil’s words, “We want an ‘Egypt for the Egyptians,’ and we absolutely reject any foreign 
yoke, and any foreign domination.”88 His basic goal was thus an independent Egypt, with a 
revived Ottoman Empire being seen as useful in the attainment of that aim:  
Slanderers have cast it at us that we wish to evict the English from Egypt in order to give her to 
Turkey [sic] as an ordinary province: that is to say, that what we want is not independence and 
self-government but a change of rulers...This accusation is an insult to civilization and civilized 
men, and a judgment on the Egyptian people, that it can never progress or reach the level of other 
peoples.89 
 
Kamil himself located his advocacy for a continued Egyptian connection with the Ottomans in 
the potential utility of that bond for the liberation of Egypt from the British Occupation. 
According to Kamil,  
We [Egyptians] are concerned more than others with the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, because 
the integrity of its domains is the foundation upon which our legal rights against the action of the 
English is based. We must not forget that whatever we demonstrate which has to do with the 
support of Turkey [sic] is viewed and considered by us as part of the Egyptian cause against the 
English.90  
 
Moreover, Kamil refused to allow his Ottoman orientation to drift into a religiously-based 
nationalism throughout his tenure as leader of the Watani Party; his consistent position was that 
both Muslims and Copts in Egypt were “one umma, indeed one family,” and that nothing should 
be allowed to disrupt their national unity.91 Nor did his pro-Ottoman sentiment extend to his 
desiring the renewal of effective Ottoman political authority over Egypt; he rejected the 
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accusation of his opponents that he wished to expel the British only to restore direct Ottoman 
rule.92 The Watani Party maintained that, after the Anglo-French agreement of April 1904, as 
they were in need of an international basis for their opposition to British policies, they had 
nowhere to turn but to the Ottoman Empire.93 Such Ottoman linkages were, therefore, not 
generated by any real desire for Ottoman or Islamic unity, much less for direct Ottoman rule, but 
rather generally advocated Ottoman assistance to remove the British occupation, with an eye 
toward eventual Egyptian independence.  
The British Occupation also served to imbue Egypt’s connection to the Ottoman Empire 
with both a nostalgic sheen and a perceived utility that it had not previously possessed. Loyalty 
to the Ottoman Sultan was one of the few possible avenues of resistance to British domination; 
and the diplomatic support of the Ottoman state was seen as a potential lever to be used against 
the British.94 The image of the Ottoman sultan as the head of an alternative empire with full and 
equal diplomatic relations with the European powers was a powerful pull. Both of Egypt’s major 
poets of the period, Ahmad Shawqi and Hafiz Ibrahim, as well as several lesser known figures, 
such as Ahmad Muharram, Ahmad al-Kashif, Ahmad Nasim, ‘Abd al-Halim al-Misri, and ‘Ali 
al-Ghayati, wrote poetry extolling the Ottoman state, its reigning Sultan Abdülhamid II, and 
calling on Egyptians to continue to be loyal to both. Mounah A. Khouri has summarized the 
general tenor of their poetry as follows:  
They all seemed to maintain that Turkey [sic] was the only outside force which could protect their 
country from being absorbed into the British Empire. Consequently they laid great emphasis on 
the importance of keeping Turkey [sic] strong and independent and of preserving the authority of 
the Ottoman Sultan, who was also the Caliph, and who, as such, was ultimately entitled to the 
allegiance of all Muslims...The Sultan’s victories over his enemies were exalted as glorious 
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festivals while his defeats at their hands were portrayed as great tragedies inflicted upon the whole 
Muslim world.95  
 
While there was unquestionable praise for and loyalty to the Ottoman Empire and its 
Sultan expressed by Egyptian poets in the 1882-1914 period, there was also a goodly dose of 
pragmatism and defensiveness to be found in their poetry. Thus, while ‘Ali al-Ghayati declared 
to the Sultan that “O Commander of the Faithful, our hearts wait upon you with great passion,” 
he immediately stated the operative reason for that loyalty being that Egyptians were “hoping to 
find in you a savior from our misfortunes.”96 Ahmad Shawqi voiced much the same motivation 
at greater length in his “Ra’y Amir al-Mu’minin”:  
Victorious Imam, / We seek thy intercession. / Let thy powerful sword defend us,/ For Egypt has 
need of thee, / O unconquerable Lord of Islam. / Our rulers have betrayed us, / Like grey waterless 
clouds. / Raise thy voice for our deliverance. / For thou art the only savior of Egypt / And Egypt 
has need of thee.97 
 
Much of the feeling of Egyptian-Ottoman unity was not the result of affection for the 
Sultan-Caliph in distant Constantinople; but, rather, a manifestation of local nationalistic 
development and of hostility to foreign domination.98 Given this heavily contingent basis for 
Ottomanism in Egypt, by no means are all those who expressed sentiments of loyalty to the 
Ottoman Empire to be classified as “religious” nationalists or even Ottomanists. Instead, many of 
the proponents of the Ottoman bond were largely hoping to use the Empire as an instrument in 
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the achievement of another, more fundamental concern, namely the liberation of Egypt from the 
British Occupation.99 Supporters of the Watani Party pointed out that the Sultan was, de jure, 
Egypt’s suzerain, and that his help was needed to remove her de facto rulers, the British. As 
such, Kamil saw his first task as winning European and Ottoman support for the Khedive against 
Cromer.  
Nevertheless, few things made the British in Egypt more uneasy than witnessing the 
devotion of so many Egyptians to the Sultan’s cause. Knowing that they were seen as usurpers of 
the Sultan’s rights, so-called “pan-Islamic feeling” was the continuing obsession of Occupation 
officials. While British authorities were alarmed at the increasingly close ties between Egyptian 
nationalists and Constantinople, so long as the Ottoman Empire was officially neutral in the First 
World War, British authorities could only spy on the agitators of their colonies and hope for the 
cooperation of their Ottoman hosts in eventually stopping them. Of course, from the perspective 
of the Ottoman Empire, much more traction could be gained in terms of global power by aiding 
the efforts of anti-British nationalists than from allying with the British. A good part of the 
explanation for this position comes from the tendency at the time to view the modern world in 
terms of two antagonistic camps (East/West, Muslim/Christian), with the former being under 
assault from the latter, and to assume that Eastern/Muslim survival was contingent upon 
Eastern/Muslim solidarity.100 In this worldview, the Sultan was positioned as the most likely 
leader of a trans-national anti-imperialist, anti-European alliance. 
Kamil was somewhat nervous about his closeness with the Sultan, fearing aspersions on 
his patriotism at home. The marriage of Egyptian nationalism with Ottoman Islamic unity 
movements was one of convenience, not love, for most Egyptians. Though many Arab and 
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Eastern European nationalists would align themselves against the Ottoman Empire, Egyptian 
nationalists in the beginning of the twentieth century felt their interests were served more in 
allying with their weaker, nominal rulers, the Ottomans, against their more powerful occupiers, 
the British. In general, the Watanists tended to be Ottomanophiles and often used religious 
rhetoric in their speeches and papers, although the Party always wanted autonomy for Egypt, no 
matter which empire claimed her. To Kamil’s supporters, his espousal of Ottomanism and 
Islamism was tactically defensible; Egypt’s oppressor was Britain, not Turkey. And despite 
Kamil’s continued support of Turkish and Muslim causes, there is no evidence to show that he 
genuinely expected the Ottoman Empire to liberate its Egyptian province from the British.101 
Mustafa Kamil also resolutely rejected the idea of a rapprochement between Britain and the 
Sublime Porte, as it would mean the end of all hope of Egyptian independence. If the Ottoman 
Empire waived its right to suzerainty over Egypt, the Egyptian question would be buried.  
For his part, ‘Abbas Hilmi grew increasingly concerned about Kamil’s ties with the 
Sublime Porte in the first years of the twentieth century.102 The Khedive’s distrust was both a 
cause and a result of the shifting ideological orientation of Kamil’s propaganda. Formerly, Kamil 
had upheld the Khedive’s rights as legitimate ruler of Egypt. To Europeans, Kamil had appealed 
for national or collective intervention to halt Britain’s usurpation of the Khedive’s 
prerogatives.103 To Egyptians, he had lauded the Khedive’s patriotism, his affection for his 
people, and his efforts to promote education and revival of the national spirit; and had urged his 
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fellow citizens to unite around their ruler to repel the British enemy.104 After he founded al-
Liwa’ in 1900, however, Kamil began to attack not only the British themselves, but also the 
Egyptian ministers who obeyed the orders of their British advisors.105  
Other Egyptian political parties were less enthusiastic about the idea of supporting the 
power of the Ottoman Empire. The common motto of Umma-affiliated Egyptian nationalists was 
“We wish the Turks all success – from afar”; and there was no desire to trade the British for a 
German or Turkish military occupation.106 Rather than wait for Ottoman aid, members of the 
Umma party pushed internal reform as the path to Egyptian independence, receiving a boost with 
the creation of the Legislative Assembly in 1913.  Made from a merger of the General Assembly 
and Legislative Council, the project had been supported by Lord Kitchener, who replaced Gorst 
after his death in 1911.  In al-Jarida, Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid of the Umma Party rejected the 
notion of a continuing Egyptian political bond with the Ottoman Empire. Lutfi’s writings are 
studded with criticisms of what he saw as the pro-Ottoman Islamist trend of the early twentieth 
century. Lutfi denied any objective reality of the movement, crediting it only to “the brain of The 
Times correspondent in Vienna;” he decried the concept of the entire Muslim world constituting 
a political unit as “an imperialist principle” useful primarily for facilitating renewed Ottoman 
domination over other Muslim-majority regions; and he enjoined Egyptians to “repudiate today 
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as they have in the past, any accusation of religious bigotry, i.e. ‘Pan-Islamism and 
fanaticism.’”107 
 
The Young Turks In Egypt 
Another dimension of the complex web of Egyptian nationalist loyalties and alliances 
was provided by the presence of Young Turk dissidents in Egypt from 1895 until the Young 
Turk Revolution of 1908. The Young Turks found a significant source of support in the person 
of the Khedive. Although ‘Abbas Hilmi was not truly an ally of the Young Turks, he 
occasionally collaborated with them when their activities served a purpose useful to his own 
cause, even employing some Young Turk members among his private staff. As a result, the 
Sultan subsequently regarded ‘Abbas Hilmi as an enemy. Nevertheless, ‘Abbas Hilmi had no 
interest in allowing the Young Turks to operate openly in Egypt and did his best to comply with 
the Sultan’s orders that they be returned to Constantinople, or at least ousted from Egypt. Some 
‘Abbas Hilmi personally arranged to have sent back to the Sultan, and he informed on others.108 
Abdülhamid blamed ‘Abbas Hilmi for not exiling the Young Turks; he refused to accept the 
Khedive’s excuse that he was unable to go against the British and was not responsible for the 
toleration shown to Ottoman dissidents in Egypt. But, in this case at least, the Khedive was 
telling the Sultan the truth; ‘Abbas Hilmi could not move against the Young Turks in Egypt 
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because the laws behind which they took refuge were decided by the Occupation authorities, and 
any measures ‘Abbas Hilmi took against them would be blocked by Cromer.109  
Young Turk dissidents began arriving in Egypt in large numbers in 1895; by the time of 
the 1908 coup, the Committee of Union and Progress already had extensive contacts with both 
the Khedive and other Egyptian nationalists.110 In addition to Young Turk opponents of 
‘Abdülhamid’s regime, Egypt was also a haven for Armenian and Syro-Lebanese dissidents. The 
British allowed critics of the Hamidian regime to publish and meet freely in Egypt. Though 
much lip service was paid to the English tradition of freedom of political speech and thought, the 
policy had several political benefits to the British. The Sultan complained intermittently to the 
British about Young Turk activities in Egypt, but the British were in a position to exact a quid 
pro quo from him which he was unwilling to give: the suppression of the so-called 
“Anglophobe” press in Egypt that operated with the participation and financial support of the 
Sultan and High Commissioner Mukhtar Pasha.111 
As noted above, a large portion of the ambivalence shown by Abdülhamid toward ‘Abbas 
Hilmi was a direct result of the many Young Turk publications emanating from Egypt starting in 
the mid-1890s. The Sultan’s strict press censorship pushed many journalists to emigrate to 
Europe or Egypt; and the Young Turks resident in Egypt took full advantage of the opportunity 
to publish more freely.112 Newspapers reached Constantinople from Cairo in greater numbers 
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than they did from Europe; and this led to increased influence for Cairo-based Young Turks, 
such as Mızancı Murad, one of the most prominent of the Young Turks.113 
The premier organ of the Young Turks in Egypt was the journal Kanun-ı Esasi, which 
printed its first edition on 21 December 1896, with a mission statement to enlighten the public 
and liberate the “sacred homeland” in the name of Shari’a and patriotism.114 An Arabic edition 
of Kanun-ı Esasi was also published in Cairo, in the hope of bringing Arab public opinion to the 
side of the Young Turks and inspiring it to turn against Sultan Abdülhamid. It was also hoped 
that, in this way, the Young Turks might be able to capitalize on the idea of Islamic solidarity, 
which up to this point had been the purview of the Sultan. Kanun-ı Esasi appeared weekly and 
addressed itself to the policies of Sultan Abdülhamid, the issue of the Islamic caliphate, and 
Islamic world issues.115 Şura-yı Ümmet, the main political journal of the İttihad ve Terakki 
Cemiyeti (Committee of Union and Progress), was also published in Cairo (as well as Paris) 
between 1902 and 1908. It was the most widely circulated and influential opposition tract inside 
or outside the Ottoman Empire. Al-Muqattam, the organ of the British occupation, likewise often 
printed articles in favor of the Young Turks; the need for reform, the corruption of ‘Abdülhamid, 
and the necessity of reestablishing the constitution were the most frequent themes. 
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The political climate in Egypt in the early 1890s encouraged opponents of the Hamidian 
regime to flock there.116 Because of the British presence, the Sultan could not easily persecute or 
even extradite his critics; it was relatively easy for the Young Turks to publish their newspapers 
and journals freely; and they often received financial assistance from ‘Abbas Hilmi and princes 
of the khedival family. The Young Turks were aware and suspicious of the Khedive’s 
opportunistic policies aimed at strengthening his position vis-à-vis Abdülhamid, but they took 
advantage of his goodwill whenever possible.117 Some disaffected members of the khedival 
family joined the ranks of the Young Turks in more active cooperation: for example, Prince 
Muhammad ‘Ali and, most significantly, Sa’id Halim, the future Ottoman grand vizier, worked 
with the group surrounding Young Turk dissident Ahmed Riza.118 
While the Khedive supported the Young Turks as a bulwark against the power of the 
Sultan, he also feared the commonality of goals they shared with Egyptian nationalists pushing 
for a constitution and limits on khedival authority.119 The main reason for ‘Abbas Hilmi’s 
reluctance to fully support the Young Turks was the group’s appeal to Egyptian nationalists and 
constitutionalists; khedival power could easily be subjected to the same sorts of attacks from 
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Egyptian nationalists that the Sultan had received from the Committee of Union and Progress. 
‘Abbas Hilmi had good reason to be nervous about the encouragement that the Turkish example 
could give to the Egyptian nationalists, who were increasingly clamoring for institutional curbs 
on khedival authority.120 Indeed, just as ‘Abbas Hilmi had feared, the Young Turk Revolution of 
1908, which forced ‘Abdülhamid to restore the long-suspended Ottoman constitution, breathed 
new life into the Egyptian constitutionalist movement.121 Rumors were deliberately circulated in 
Egypt that ‘Abbas Hilmi was planning to give Egypt a constitution after he returned from his 
summer visit to Anatolia in September 1908. Actually, when ‘Abbas returned to Egypt he had 
only the most negative things to say in private to the British about the administrative chaos and 
corruption that prevailed in Constantinople in the aftermath of the Revolution and professed to 
believe that it was “absurd to think of granting Egypt a constitution.”122 He acknowledged, 
however, that the movement for a constitution would grow, blaming Sa’d Zaghlul (1859-1927) 
for the escalating tensions.123 
‘Abbas Hilmi criticized the Young Turk revolutionaries for their disrespect for the Sultan 
and showed no inclination whatsoever to rejoice at Abdülhamid’s tribulations, which might soon 
become his own, whatever the two men’s past acrimony might have suggested.124 In the spring 
of 1910, the mouthpiece of the Young Turks, Tanin, to which ‘Abbas Hilmi was reported to have 
made handsome contributions earlier, began criticizing Egyptian policy, with the inevitable 
reflections on ‘Abbas Hilmi. In particular, the journal protested against the criticism of the 
Young Turk regime in al-Mu’ayyad, which was widely recognized to be a palace organ, and 
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against the hospitality that it alleged Egypt had shown to refugees from Anatolia who had been 
connected with Abdülhamid’s regime.125  
Although the Watani Nationalists had generally supported the Sultan and condemned the 
Committee of Union and Progress, because they saw the Sultan as the party more likely to be 
able to deliver Egypt from the British Occupation, they quickly switched their allegiances after 
the 1908 coup.126 The Nationalists interpreted the Young Turks’ coup of July 1908 as a victory 
for the constitutionalist principle which they too had begun to espouse, even though the Young 
Turks showed no immediate concern for Egypt. Egyptian Nationalist leaders were pleased, if 
skeptical, at the restoration of the Ottoman Constitution, which they hoped would strengthen 
their own campaign for Egyptian constitutional reforms.127 The statement from ‘Abbas Hilmi 
that he would not support an Egyptian constitution caused an irreparable break in his relationship 
with Muhammad Farid, who subsequently published two articles accusing ‘Abbas Hilmi of 
having supported the Nationalists, not out of true conviction or love for Egypt, but only to get rid 
of Cromer and enhance his own position.128  
In 1908, shortly after the Young Turk Revolution, an official wrote to British army 
general and High Commissioner of Egypt Sir Reginald Wingate, “I quite agree with you that 
nationalism in Egypt is bound to receive an impetus from recent events in Turkey, and I have no 
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doubt that officers of Turkish origin and sympathies may become unduly slanted.”129 The British 
were, likewise, concerned with the effects of Young Turk thought on Egyptian Nationalists. 
There was concern that the Young Turk Revolution, proving very popular in Cairo, would have 
an effect on Egyptian Nationalists; and, most frighteningly for the British, would affect the 
opinions of army officers.130 British officials feared that Egyptian nationalism would receive a 
considerable boost from the activities of the Young Turks and that “a number of foolish and 
enthusiastic young officers” would emulate the actions of the Party and attempt to impress their 
views on the government. 131 The army was seen to be especially vulnerable to infiltration by 
Young Turk ideas, particularly since there were a “considerable number of officers with Turkish 
blood and Turkish sympathies.” 132 In general, it was believed that the Young Turk Revolution 
would make things considerably more difficult for the British in Egypt.133  
The Administration under Herbert Kitchener (1850-1916), therefore, wasted no time in 
disseminating anti-Young Turk propaganda throughout Egypt. It plainly aimed at fanning racial 
hatred between Arab and Turkic populations in much the same manner adopted by Gerald 
Fitzmaurice in his “whispering campaigns” against the Young Turks in Constantinople preceding 
the 1908 Revolution.134 A 1913 Egyptian Gazette article declared,  
The struggle is between Semitic Mohammedan and Turk Mohammedan…Race is the fundamental 
fact. And the Turk physically differs from the Arab somewhat as a drayhorse differs from a Derby 
winner. Greater still is the difference intellectually and spiritually, between the slow, placid, 
steady, autocratic, materialistic, unspeculative, unaesthetic Turk, and the quick-witted, restless, 
democratic, political, romantic, artistic, versatile Arab…135  
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As coincidence would have it, the anti-Young Turk rhetoric conducted by the British in Egypt 
reached a fever pitch at precisely the same time as Ottoman statesman and four-time Grand 
Vizier Mehmet Kamil Pasha’s (1833-1913) involuntary exile in Cairo in the spring of 1913, an 
indication of the identity of interests, and of the mutual hatreds, which now bound the British 
Foreign Office with the “Old Turk” opposition represented by Kamil Pasha.136  
 
Arab Dissidents, Young Turks, and Egyptian Nationalists 
The Young Turks also found common cause with the Syro-Lebanese population in Egypt; 
like the Young Turks, they had come to Cairo – by choice or force – because of their opposition 
to the Sultan and their demands for reform. Some Syrian intellectuals had left their country in the 
late 1870s, lured by the liberal atmosphere of Cairo under Khedive Isma’il. These authors and 
journalists were joined by a second wave that arrived during the early years of British 
occupation. British rule allowed the proponents of Egyptian nationalism, as well as the 
supporters of the Khedive ‘Abbas Hilmi, the British, and the French, to write relatively freely 
and to openly criticize Ottoman policies.  
In the period preceding the First World War, Cairo functioned as a meeting place for both 
Arab nationalists, exiled from Ottoman territory, and Young Turk activists. Links did exist 
between the various Arab communities and the Committee of Union and Progress before 1908; 
however, not surprisingly, those relationships were characterized by mistrust on both sides. For 
the Young Turks, though the Arabs often expressed themselves in Ottoman terms, the latter were 
problematically separatist. Criticizing the Ottoman administration and denouncing corruption of 
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Turkish leaders in the Arab provinces, some Arab activists worked for reform along the lines of 
the Young Turks, but many worked to detach themselves from the Empire.137  
While there was a natural arena of conflict between Arab nationalists and the Young 
Turks, Egyptian Nationalists tended to get along well with the members of the Committee of 
Union and Progress, at least initially. The British occupation made Egyptian Nationalists 
naturally turn to the Ottoman Empire as a source of potential protection. In addition, at least in 
the view of Mustafa Kamil, the boundaries between Egyptian nationalism, Ottomanism, and 
Islamic solidarity, remained poorly defined. In his thinking, Egypt had an Egyptian identity that 
belonged to a larger Ottoman identity, which in turn was encompassed by a larger Muslim 
identity. Furthermore, the concept of Arab nationalism was largely absent from Egyptian 
nationalist thinking; this likely goes far to explain the relative absence of conflict between the 
Young Turks and Egyptian Nationalists.138 Much to the chagrin of the Watanists, however, the 
Young Turks, who were anxious to protect their newfound power, were not initially disposed to 
quarrel with Great Britain over the latter’s occupation of Egypt, just like the Sultan before them.  
Because Great Britain had the ability to help the Young Turk government, the Young 
Turks in Egypt became increasingly disenchanted with the anti-British Egyptian nationalists. The 
main reason for the Committee of Union and Progress’ change of opinion regarding the Egyptian 
Nationalists was the Young Turks’ growing suspicion of Britain’s intentions, particularly after 
the 1907 British alignment with Russia (which offered a potential for the growth of the Pan-
Slavic threat to Ottoman nationalism.) Farid’s assurance to the Young Turks that the Nationalists 
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would collaborate with the Ottoman Empire against the British in Egypt was, therefore, 
welcome.139  
The absence of conflict did not necessarily mean that the Young Turks had a high 
opinion of Egyptian Nationalists, however. In his memoirs Mücahede-i ve Milliye Gurbet avdet 
devirleri, one of the most prominent Young Turks, Mızancı Murad, says of Mustafa Kamil and 
Shaykh ‘Ali Yusuf, the first two leaders of the Egyptian Nationalist movement:  
Mustafa Kamil is a charlatan, as was Sheikh Ali, who is nothing but an idiot who shines in neither 
his profession nor his thought. Their opposition to the English is the result of the encouragement 
and deference of the French. If you ask them, they will explain that their goal is to see the French 
supplant the English. They are incapable of talking about nationalism or thinking about the 
independence of Egypt.140  
 
Therefore, though some Egyptian Nationalists viewed the Committee of Union and Progress’ 
coup as beneficial for their movement, the Young Turks were initially uninterested in allying 
with the Egyptian Nationalists.141 Enver Bey, the hero of the 1908 coup, made a speech in 
September of that year praising Britain’s work in Egypt and disclaiming any ties with the 
Nationalists. ‘Ali Fahmi Kamil, who went to Constantinople within a month of the coup, failed 
to obtain any official endorsement of his Nationalist Party’s objectives.142 According to British 
Conservative Party member and journalist Leo Amery’s assessment,  
The Nationalists are very much down at present; the Young Turks are giving them no 
encouragement and everyone is turning against them. They are much annoyed with Shauki Bey, 
the Khedive’s Poet, for having written a few days ago in the Moayad [sic] that the Egyptians were 
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not yet ripe for a constitution, and that in any case the matter rested with England. He could not 
have written this without the consent of His Highness.143  
 
A good portion of the Young Turks also continued to support the British occupation of Egypt. In 
his memoirs, Veliyyudin Yakin, one of the Young Turks in Egypt, painted a portrait of Cromer 
as the reformer of Egypt. Yakın also devotes a short chapter of his book to Cromer, in which he 
compares the latter to Mıdhat Paşa, Namık Kemal, Prince Mustafa Fazıl, and other symbols of 
Ottoman liberalism, titled “The Reformer of Egypt.”144 Support of the British Occupation of 
Egypt was a politically expedient position for the Young Turks, as it essentially cost them 
nothing and gained them the possibility of British assistance in the more pressing concern of 
Russian expansion. 
While Young Turk opinion of the Egyptian Nationalists tended to be negative, Ali Yusuf 
and Mustafa Kamil similarly believed the Young Turks to be misguided, particularly in the 
latter’s willingness to deal with the British.145 Egyptian Nationalist leaders criticized the Young 
Turks for their opposition to the Sultan, whom the Nationalists felt was far better placed to be a 
bulwark against the British. In a similar vein, Nationalist Party leaders mocked the Young Turks 
for behaving in a way which Watanists believed to be against the interests of the Ottoman 
Empire. According to the Watanists, the Young Turk belief that a foreign enemy (in this case the 
British) would come to their aid was foolish at best. A Watani article in al-Liwa argued,  
Our Turkish Brothers who still dream of friendship with England say it did not become our enemy 
at this point …How is it that a healthy mind can imagine that the British state which occupies 
Egypt by cunning, Sudan by force, urges the Arab nation to revolt against its majesty the great 
Caliph and pushes Muslims to divide through fear… [will] one day become a sincere and loyal 
friend of Muslims and Islam?146  
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Thus, much as the Nationalists craved the support of Constantinople against the British, 
they did not immediately benefit from the 1908 coup that brought the Young Turks to power. 
The Nationalists’ past loyalty to Sultan ‘Abdülhamid did not endear them to the new regime in 
Constantinople. This loyalty had arisen partly from Kamil’s flirtation with Islamic unity 
movements, but also from a prudent decision to fight only one foreign oppressor at a time. 
Britain, not the Ottoman Empire, controlled Egypt after 1882; and Kamil’s Nationalists 
accordingly saw the former as the enemy and the latter as an ally, at least temporarily. 
Meanwhile, the British, once the defenders of Ottoman territorial integrity, were drifting further 
from the Ottoman court; and British public opinion had largely turned against Abdülhamid, 
viewing him as a violent oppressor of Christian minority populations. The Egyptian Nationalists, 
however, viewed the Ottoman Empire embodied by the Sultan as the enemy of their enemy, the 
British; and, likewise, viewed the Sultan’s domestic enemies, the Young Turks, as the enemies of 
Egyptian independence.147 Since the Nationalists had already lost the support of France and the 
Khedive, they naturally wanted to preserve their ties with the Ottoman Government, the one 
remaining power center with an interest in opposing a permanent British occupation of Egypt.  
There was also considerable tension between Egyptian Nationalists and Syro-Lebanese 
émigrés working in Egypt. Many Egyptian Nationalists of the pre-War period expressed 
particular resentment over what they felt to be the privileged position and pro-British attitude of 
the Syrian community resident in Egypt, characterizing them as intruders. The appearance of the 
newspaper al-Muqattam, published by Syrian émigré Faris Nimr, seemed to send a signal that 
the Syrians were in collaboration with the British, and hostile to the Egyptian Nationalist cause. 
In January 1893, a student demonstration led by Mustafa Kamil attacked the offices of al-
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Muqattam. Although Kamil had not intended the demonstration to be specifically anti-Syrian, the 
Syrian population of Egypt reacted angrily. According to Kamil, however,  
The Egyptians honoured these people and were good to them, but they returned charity with insult 
and kindness with evil and proclaimed their enmity to the fatherland and its people. They have 
opposed every Egyptian who demanded the rights of the country and upheld the honor of his 
people and fatherland.148 
 
Both Kamil and Farid shared an attitude of hostility toward the Syrian community in Egypt. The 
Watani Party press publicly criticized Muhammad Rashid Rida’ and other Syrians for their 
efforts aimed at Ottoman decentralization; in the Watanist view, by weakening and dividing the 
Ottoman Empire, they would only serve British desires to extend imperialism over the bulk of 
the Muslim world.149 
 
The Question of Arab Unity 
Arabism offered a potential alternative to an Ottoman affiliation for Egyptian nationalists. 
However, after 1882, the difference between British imperialism in the Nile Valley and 
continuing Ottoman rule in Arab Asia presented the peoples of the two regions with 
fundamentally different political problems. Even in the years immediately prior to World War I, 
when Arab nationalism emerged as an organized force within the Ottoman Empire, any Egyptian 
tendency to become associated with it was greatly diminished by the Arab movement’s own 
exclusion of Egypt from its purview.150  
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In 1898, Mustafa Kamil’s The Eastern Question attacked the idea of an Arab Caliphate as 
a British-inspired scheme for sowing dissension in the Ottoman Empire, and his antipathy to 
Arab separatist tendencies, if anything, increased as he came to give greater emphasis to the 
Ottoman bond as a potential counterweight to the British presence in Egypt.151 Mustafa Kamil’s 
successors at the helm of the Nationalist Party were equally opposed to Arab separatist trends 
when these appeared more openly in the years after 1908. The Watani Party’s publicist, Shaykh 
‘Abd al-‘Aziz Jawish, throughout his career a vehement advocate of Muslim solidarity and 
political cooperation, wrote articles attacking Arab political activities that were critical of the 
Ottoman Empire and called on Arabs to remain loyal to the Sultan-Caliph.152 In 1911, 
Muhammad Farid wrote an unflattering account of the new Arab Nationalist movement, 
attributing the desire for Arab autonomy in the Fertile Crescent in part to the ambitions of the 
local Arab elite to gain greater access to government office, and in part to British machinations 
aimed at weakening the Ottoman Empire “so that they can set up an Arab Caliphate in its stead 
which they would place in the hands of slaves of greed and avarice, [thus] making [British] rule 
over the Islamic world complete.”153 
The leaders of the Egyptian Revolution of 1919, as nationalist leaders before them, 
perceived no direct connection between their movement and the parallel nationalisms developing 
in neighboring Arab territories. The most significant action by Egyptian Nationalist Party leaders 
concerning the Arab nationalist movement was an explicit rejection by the Party’s 
Administrative Council of the suggestion made by pro-Arab activist ‘Aziz ‘Ali al-Misri (1879-
1965) that the Party support Arab aspirations for autonomy within the Ottoman Empire: 
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according to Muhammad Farid’s diary, the Council discussed the suggestion at length, but 
eventually “we refused to cooperate [with Misri] in his work, after we explained to him the 
disadvantages of dividing the two races within the state.”154 In order for the Ottoman Empire to 
have any standing to push for Egypt’s independence from Britain, it had to remain strong; from 
the Egyptian perspective, anything that undermined that possibility, including Arab nationalism, 
was against their own interests. Members of the Watani Party, fearful of a split between Muslim 
and Copt nationalists, were also leery of becoming involved with an Arab nationalism they 
perceived to be sectarian in nature. 
Farid’s writings leave no doubt as to his fundamentally negative attitude toward an Arab 
identity framework. As an Egyptian nationalist and a pragmatic Ottoman loyalist, Farid rejected 
Arabism both as a framework for cultural-historical affiliation and as a political movement. It 
was with great concern that Farid followed the development of the Arab opposition movement 
from 1909 to 1918. Arab nationalism, he believed, presented a challenge to the integrity and 
unity of the Ottoman Empire, which would deny Egypt her best chance of liberation from British 
occupation. In a state of war, Farid reasoned, Arab nationalists would subvert the Ottoman 
Empire’s very existence, seriously reducing the prospects of waging a successful military 
campaign to liberate Egypt. The fact that Arab opposition groups were supported by the British 
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made them even more objectionable to Farid; and, on numerous occasions, he accused Arab 
populations of treason against the Ottoman Empire.155  
Despite his opposition to Arab nationalism, Farid was extremely critical of the 
persecutions and executions of Arab nationalists in Syria at the hands of Minister of the Ottoman 
Navy and Triumvirate member Cemal Pasha (1872-1922).156  This, he was convinced, was a 
ruinous policy for the Ottoman Empire, as it inflamed Arab public opinion and pushed them 
toward revolt and secession. Several passages in his memoirs suggest that Farid understood 
(without accepting) the predicament of the Arab nationalists and their motivation to rebel. The 
Arabs, like the Egyptians in this matter, were the victims of what they viewed as the Committee 
of Union and Progress’ aggressive Turkification policy.157  The Ottoman government, according 
to Farid, should have “come to an agreement with the other Muslim races, maintaining the 
independence of each race in internal policy.”158  This was the Empire’s only hope of survival: 
by preserving the consensus and solidarity among all its constituent ethnic groups as the 
foundation of its integrity and unity.  In a conversation held with Max von Oppenheim, leader of 
the German government’s Oriental Section, against the background of the Arab Revolt of 1916-
1918, Farid stated that “the Ottoman Empire cannot survive unless it reorganizes itself as the 
Germanic union has done, allowing each nationality its own internal autonomy.”159 Farid utterly 
rejected the pro-British and anti-Ottoman Arab Revolt.  It was, he believed, a disaster for the 
Ottoman Empire and for Islam, an event which hastened the Ottomans’ defeat in the War. When 
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he learned, in late July 1916, of the Arab revolt in the Hijaz, he condemned it bitterly, not least 
because he was convinced that it was the result of intrigues between ‘Abbas Hilmi and the 
Arabs.  To Farid, the Revolt was, above all, an act ‘against the Ottoman Empire,’ fomented with 
the aid of the Khedive and the British, the enemies of Egyptian nationalism.160 It was Farid’s 
belief that, in instigating the Arabs, ‘Abbas sought only to fulfill “his ancient project to create the 
Egyptian sultanate and Arab caliphate to serve the British and himself and get revenge on the 
Turks.”161  
When news of the 1916-1918 Arab Revolt reached Egypt, the local reaction was 
disappointing to Oriental Secretary Sir Ronald Storrs, who had expected Egyptians to support the 
Arab uprising against the Ottoman Empire. The Egyptian intelligentsia, he admitted, reacted to 
the Arab Revolt with “a feeling of stupefaction mingled with uneasiness…the Sharif [Husayn] 
represented as a rebel and against the Khalifa and the servile instrument of the English…”162 The 
marginality of the Arab Revolt to Egypt and Egyptian opinion appears to have persisted for the 
duration of the War. When the British in late 1916 feared imminent collapse of the Revolt, 
reports from their officials in Cairo estimated that such a collapse would not influence the British 
position in Egypt in any significant manner.163 A lengthy report on “Egypt and the Arab 
Movement” in the summer of 1917 estimated that, save for some “Ottoman Arabs” in Egypt who 
supported the movement and those elements of “Turkish extraction” in the country which were 
opposed to it, “Moslem [sic] opinion in Egypt as a whole continues to be entirely apathetic to the 
Arab movement for independence.”164 By March 1918, a meeting of British officials in Cairo 
that was devoted to analyzing the situation in the Arabian Peninsula assumed the unpopularity of 
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the Arab Revolt in Egypt: as High Commissioner Sir Reginald Wingate summarized Egyptian 
sentiment in the context of discussing a possible attempt by Sharif Husayn to assume the title of 
Caliph, any such gambit “would be received coldly in Egypt, where the Sharifian movement has 
gained little sympathy.”165  
Already during the period 1909-1911, Farid suspected that ‘Abbas Hilmi was abetting 
Arab nationalist associations and individuals who wanted to establish an “Arab sultanate” or 
“Arab caliphate.”166 In July 1913, Farid wrote that ‘Abbas Hilmi’s intrigues lay behind the pro-
Arabist activity of ‘Aziz ‘Ali al-Misri. In early 1915, Farid continued to claim that ‘Abbas 
Hilmi’s “hatred for the Turks is matched only by his plots to get closer to the Arabs. He is still 
interested in creating an Arab sultanate including Egypt, Syria, and the Arab lands.”167 The 
Khedive’s purpose, according to Farid, was to set “the Arabs against the Empire.”168  
The opposition to Arab nationalism was not confined to the Watanists, either. Lutfi al-
Sayyid, the leading spokesman of the Umma Party, was equally unsympathetic toward pre-War 
Arab nationalist currents. In 1911, an article in the Umma Party organ al-Jarida addressed “The 
Arab Question.”169 While admitting that the Arabs were underrepresented in the Ottoman 
Parliament, Lutfi al-Sayyid viewed current Arab-Turkish political tensions as an internal 
Ottoman matter that should be amicably resolved. His disinterested advice on the subject was 
that, rather than forming parties and undertaking anti-Ottoman agitation, the Arabs should study 
the Ottoman Constitution and attempt to rectify their grievances within the Ottoman 
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framework.170 He continued to oppose Egyptian involvement in Arab affairs up until World War 
I, in 1912 terming both “pan-Islamism” and “Arab unity” as “delusions and fancies,” and in 1913 
asking the rhetorical question: “Is not an Egyptian who asserts his affiliation with Arabdom or 
Turkdom proving that he despises his fatherland and his people?”171 In the same year, when two 
Syrian notables came to Egypt to promote (in Lutfi’s characterization) “the annexation of Syria 
to Egypt,” Lutfi was opposed to the idea, characteristically because “[he] did not see it as being 
in the interests of Egypt.”172 Thus the two leading political trends in pre-War Egypt were in 
substantial agreement in seeing Egypt’s interests ill-served by Arab nationalism, and in 
demonstrating an appreciable reserve about the value of that movement generally, and 
particularly for Egyptian interests. For Egyptians of the pre-War era, Egypt could be seen either 
as a national unit completely separate from its neighbors or as one of several national units 
within a larger Muslim community currently represented by the Ottoman Empire; but, in any 
case, it was not involved in the emerging Arab nationalist movement –Egyptian problems had no 
connection with the current problems of the Arabs. The Egyptian nationalist movement that 
occurred immediately after World War I was thoroughly Egyptianist in its goals and activities; as 
such, it neither had any links with nor desired any connection with the parallel Arab nationalist 
movement in Arab Asia. 
Though there is a temptation to see the anti-colonial nationalism of Egyptians as a 
movement that should be sympathetic to the anti-colonial movement of Arab nationalists, the 
manifestos and declarations of the Umma Party, Wafdists, Watanists, and lesser political parties 
in the revolutionary period simply ignored any direct relationship between Egypt and the Arab 
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nationalist movements in the Levant and Arabia. Even writer Taha Husayn (1889-1973), who in 
the interwar years did much to promote Arabic as a common language, readily accepted that the 
focus of Arab cultural and linguistic unity should be on Egyptian nationalism rather than pan-
Arabism. Similarly, Rashid Rida, enlisted to rationalize the Arab nationalist alliance with 
England to a largely skeptical audience, had great difficulty in countering the claims of Syrian, 
pro-Ottoman Druze Amir Shakib Arslan: Arslan’s denouncement of the “policy of foreigners 
who wanted to suggest that there were difficulties between Arabs and Turks and in order to 
exploit them to their own advantage, take over Ottoman territories, and turn them into colonies,” 
was, for many, an unanswerable indictment of the Arab Revolt, particularly in view of its well-
known British sponsorship.173  
The concept of Arab “unity” was only infrequently discussed in Egyptian political circles 
in the 1920s; and what little opinion was voiced on the subject tended to both exclude Egypt 
from the terms of discussion and to be pessimistic concerning the possibilities of Arab unity. 
Looser ideas of Egyptian-Arab political cooperation for common ends were occasionally put 
forward, but they were usually phrased in terms of pragmatic approaches that would ultimately 
benefit Egyptian territorial nationalism. The utility of Arab unity was evident insofar as cultural 
and educational cooperation went, but its value in political spheres was consistently questioned. 
Although there were lofty sentiments about Arab brotherhood and the unity of the Arabic 
language, for many, and especially for Egyptians, Arab nationalism’s only appeal lay in what it 
might deliver for individual nation-states. The substantive proposals promulgated by Egyptian 
Arabists usually envisaged Arab “unity” as the formal association of Arab regimes in a new 
federalist structure. The terms used were variously “the Arab alliance” (al-hilf al-‘arabi), the 
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“Arab bloc” (al-kutla al-‘arabiyya), the “league of Arab nations” (‘usbat al-umam al-‘arabiyya), 
“the Arab union” (al-ittihad al-‘arabi), or “the Arab league” (al-jam’a al-‘arabiyya).  Specific 
proposals for Arab federation generally accepted the internal political autonomy of the separate 
Arab states, each of which would retain the exclusive right to determine its own domestic 
policies. The sphere of authority of the league, alliance, or federation was usually defined in 
terms of interstate cooperation in such non-political areas as finance, commerce, legal matters, 
and education; the coordination of foreign policy; and the negotiation of inter-Arab defense 
arrangements. Some Egyptian Arabists occasionally called for “comprehensive Arab unity 
beginning at the Persian Gulf and ending at the Atlantic Ocean” or for “the formation of a greater 
Arab nation.”174 However, calls for complete Arab unity represented a minority view in 
Egypt.175 The criteria for any Egyptian-Arab collaboration were functional rather than national, 
being suggestions for what were, in effect, informal anti-imperialist alliances directed not at the 
Arabs per se but to all the peoples of “the East” who shared the common problem of resisting the 
domination of Western imperialism. 
Nor were there significant practical links between the Egyptian and Arab nationalist 
movements after World War I. The Wafdist delegation in Paris in 1919 is reported to have 
declined to collaborate with an embryonic “Society of Eastern Nations” that was taking shape 
among non-European delegations to the Peace Conference on the grounds that its own mandate 
from the Egyptian people related only to the independence of Egypt.176 In London a year later, 
Sa’d Zaghlul declined to comment on the situation in Syria and Palestine on the grounds that his 
own political focus was Egypt alone. The idea of Arabic-speaking peoples forming one 
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interrelated unit was presented both as an outmoded concept in conflict with the “spirit” of the 
post-World War I world, with its focus on the nation-state, and an idea “contradictory” to the 
existence of the modern Egyptian nation-state. In 1925, Sa’d Zaghlul dismissed Arab unity as 
“no more than the union of the weak with the weak. And what sum will you get by multiplying 
zero by other zeroes?”177   
Rather than seeing any affiliation between the post-War Egyptian and Arab nationalist 
movements, leaders of the Wafd, in particular, expressed a definite sense of superiority over 
Arabs as well as a considerable feeling of resentment over the perceived favorable treatment 
accorded Arab, as opposed to Egyptian, nationalist aspirations by the Allied Powers in 1918-
1919. This was apparent as early as a meeting of Egyptian leaders with High Commissioner 
Wingate on November 13, 1918, when one of the delegates spoke of Egyptians “consider[ing] 
themselves far more capable of conducting a well-ordered government than the Arabs, Syria[ns], 
and Mesopotamians [sic] to whom the Anglo-French governments have granted self-
determination.”178 The complaint was repeated frequently in the following year, when Arab 
representatives were allowed to proceed to Paris while Egyptian requests to do the same were 
rejected. Egyptian nationalist leaders considered Egypt “vastly superior” to areas such as the 
Hijaz, Arabia, Syria, and Lebanon (as well as to Eastern European states such as Greece, Serbia, 
and Romania), and so certainly more fitted for participation in the Peace Conference.179 As Sir 
Ronald Graham described the situation in April 1919, “there is no doubt that Egyptian amour-
propre has been wounded by the absence of Egyptian representation at the Peace Conference, 
when India and, still worse, the disliked and despised Bedouin of the Hedjaz have been 
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represented.”180 Eventually, however, the Egyptian nationalists were able to elevate the 
preference given the Arabs of Western Asia to one of the causes of the emergence of a 
strengthened Egyptian nationalist movement after World War I:  
Another cause of encouragement to us was the recognition of our brothers of the Hedjaz, who 
speak the same language as ourselves and are of the same religion as most of us. The Arabs of the 
Hedjaz did not have before a separate political existence like ourselves. In fact, within a century, 
they were under our political control…was it illogical for us to expect from the British 
Government, in view of the oft-repeated assertions of its members, treatment at least as generous 
as that accorded to the Arabs of the Hedjaz? 181 
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Chapter Five: Nationalists in Europe 
 
The history of colonialism is often portrayed as a black-and-white encounter between 
colonizers and colonized. The careers of Kamil, Farid, Jawish, and others, however, particularly 
when their European activities are highlighted, demonstrate the fallaciousness of this simplistic 
and dichotomous interpretation. In a very real sense, these European-based Egyptian nationalists 
do not fit in such a rigid colonizer versus colonized paradigm. These activists’ education, cultural 
habits, and linguistic abilities endowed them with a chameleon-like quality to function equally 
well in either a European or an Egyptian environment. It was this cultural flexibility that 
facilitated their unprecedented access to European mass-media outlets and enabled them to 
communicate clearly and sympathetically to a European audience.1 Watani leaders used the 
colonial metropoles to further their own independence movements; in addition, they relied on 
inter-European rivalries, such as that between France and Britain, to further their anti-colonial 
goals.  
Anti-colonialist nationalists, then, had a considerable level of agency in dealing with the 
various governments that tried to keep them under control. For instance, colonial activists 
developed their own intricate strategies of smuggling literature across national borders, they 
misled the authorities about their own location and about the cities where they were printing their 
journals. When anti-colonialists in one country were confronted with the danger that the local 
government might hand them over to their “own” empire, they used their contacts in the local 
press and tried to create public scandals. In so doing, colonial activists were often able to tap into 
                                                 
1 Ziad Fahmy, “Francophone Egyptian Nationalists, Anti-British Discourse, and European Public Opinion, 1885-
1910: The Case of Mustafa Kamil and Ya’qub Sannu’,” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle 
East, Vol. 28, No. 1 (2008), 183. 
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the strong nationalist feelings that continued to exist in most European countries. This did little, 
of course, to reach domestic audiences in Egypt; and, therefore, achieved few concrete results.  
Because of the limited space for formal dissent, or indeed for any discussion of the 
imperial project within Egypt, the relative freedom of movement afforded by the intermediate 
spaces of Europe was central to the politics of both the British colonial state and the Egyptian 
nationalist opposition. Throughout the twentieth century, anti-colonialist nationalists increasingly 
became active in the cities of Western Europe. New networks created by this mixing of diasporas 
extended between the major European metropoles. In a newly-emerging pattern, the European 
continent increasingly became a space in which Egyptian and other anti-colonial nationalists 
could meet, print, and disseminate political material, and collaborate and coordinate anti-colonial 
action, seemingly outside the reach of the British police.  
From the mid-nineteenth century, there was a steady increase in the number of Egyptians 
who became politically active in Europe. Jamal al-Din Al-Afghani (1838-1897), for example, 
was active in Britain, France, Germany, and Russia in the 1880s and early 1890s, working 
together with European anti-colonialists and writing articles against the British occupation of 
Egypt. Joining this tradition of Egyptian nationalist attempts to turn European publics and 
governments against the British Occupation, Mustafa Kamil was particularly attendant to 
advertising the Egyptian position to European audiences, which he believed could be effectively 
harnessed to force the British out of Egypt. Kamil, who studied law in Egypt and later in France, 
became involved in politics during his time as a student in Europe. During his trips to Europe, 
and particularly to France, he became committed to intense lobbying for Egypt’s independence.2 
                                                 
2 For the first few years, Kamil’s European activities were financially supported by the Khedive ‘Abbas Hilmi. 
‘Abbas Hilmi first met with Kamil in an official visit the Khedive made to the Khedival Law School on 28 
November 1892. (Ahmad Shafiq, Mudhakiraati fi nisf qarn, 2nd Edition (Cairo: Al-Haya Misriyya al-‘amma lil 
Kitab, 1994), Vol. II, Part I, 50.)  Noticing the potential usefulness of the young Kamil, ‘Abbas Hilmi established a 
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Very early in his career, Kamil began utilizing an external strategy for swaying European public 
opinion towards the Egyptian nationalist cause.3 Kamil gave top priority to his campaign abroad, 
first to remove Cromer as Consul-General, and then to persuade the British to leave Egypt. To 
these ends he started his European-language newspapers and toured the capitals of Europe, 
making speeches against the British occupation. In a 5 August 1895 al-Mu’ayyid article, Kamil 
openly described his European propaganda strategy:  
The wise among the British have realized the danger of their occupation of Egypt. What they need 
to know is the true feelings of the Egyptian nation, its fears, hopes, and the truth. This would force 
their government to evacuate the Nile Valley. The best thing that we Egyptians can do now is to 
advertise the truth to Europe with as many languages as possible, especially in English and 
French.4  
 
Working toward this goal, Kamil spent every summer between 1895 and 1907 in Europe, 
publicizing Egyptian nationalist causes. Kamil sought the support of British and French liberals; 
he visited London for the first time in 1904, and later published a collection of his speeches in 
Paris.5  
He spent a great deal of time in France attempting to gain support by publicizing Egypt’s 
plight, and succeeded in gaining the assistance of prominent European socialists. The primary 
                                                                                                                                                             
strong bond with him and supported many of his nationalist efforts. ‘Abbas Hilmi sponsored Kamil’s continuing law 
education in Toulouse, where the latter received his law degree in November 1894. Juliette Adam, L’Angleterre en 
Egypte (Paris: Imprimerie du Centre, 1922), 144-5; al-Rafi’i, Mustafa Kamil, 51-4; al-Sayyid, Egypt and Cromer, 
156-7. 
3 Kamil’s friendship with the renowned French author Juliette Adam was among the most important elements in 
opening the doors of French society to Kamil. Adam, editor of the Revue des Deux Mondes, an anti-British French 
periodical, hosted a literary salon in Paris attended by many prominent French journalists and political figures. 
These contacts included leading French editors and writers such as Edouard Drumont (editor of La Libre Parole), 
Ernest Judet (editor of Le Petit Journal and L’Eclaire), and Henri Rochefort (founder and editor of L’Intransigeant.) 
See Mustafa Kamil, Lettres Egyptiennes Francaises adressees a Mme Juliette Adam, 1895-1908 (Cairo: Madrisit 
Mustafa Kamil, 1909), 16; and Juliette Adam, L’Angleterre en Egypte (Paris, 1922), 146-7; Arthur Goldschmidt, Jr., 
“The Egyptian Nationalist Party,” (Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Harvard University, 1968), 314-5. 
4 See al-Mu’ayyid , 5 April 1895, cited in ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Rafi’i, Mustafa Kamil, ba’ith al-haraka al-wataniyya 
(tarikh Misr al-qaoumi min 1882 ila 1908), 5th Edition (Cairo: Dar al-Ma’arif, 1984), 60. See, also, Mustafa Kamil, 
Lettres Egyptiennes Francaises addressees a Mme Juliette Adam, 1895-1908 (Cairo: n.p., 1909), 16; and Adam, 
L’Angleterre en Egypt, 146-7. 
5 Muhammad Farid, Les Intrigues Anglaises contre l’Islam: Par Mohammaed Farid Bey (Lausanne, 1917), 
published by Perrin in 1906. 
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reason for Kamil’s insistence on making Europe the forum for debate about British control of 
Egypt was that he saw the Occupation as an international issue that could only be solved with 
sufficient diplomatic pressure on Britain. Under Kamil’s leadership, the European versions of Al-
Liwa usually used arguments for Egyptian independence based on European liberal ideas, such 
as the status of Egypt under international law or the rights of nations.  
Kamil’s official arrival on the European scene was signaled by his June 1895 
presentation of a petition and a symbolic poster to the French Chamber of Deputies.6 The poster 
depicts Kamil, with the Egyptian masses behind him, presenting a written appeal to France 
asking her to help Egypt in gaining her independence from the British. At the bottom of the 
picture, a vigilant British soldier with sword in hand closely guards Egypt, portrayed as a 
handcuffed and kneeling woman.7 Kamil printed thousands of copies of this poster and 
distributed them to major European and even American newspapers.8 Less than a month after the 
French Chamber of Deputies presentation, Kamil delivered his first political speech in Europe. 
Many journalists and writers attended the event, held in an auditorium at the University of 
Toulouse on 4 July 1895. Kamil began his speech by declaring the illegality of the British 
occupation under international law and the mismanagement of Cromer, whom he accused of:  
purposefully appointing incapable, indifferent, or traitorous men at the head of Egyptian 
government ministries and other administrative positions. In this manner he not only manipulates 
                                                 
6 Soon after Kamil’s return he and the Khedive founded a new anti-British secret society, which included the leading 
Egyptian and European members of the Palace clique and maintained close contact with the French Consul and 
several French officials in the Egyptian Government. (Shafiq, Mudhakkirati, Vol. II, Part I, 190 mentions among its 
members himself, Rouiller, Isma’il Shami, Yusuf Siddiq, Mahmud Salim, and Aristide Gavillot. This society may be 
identical with Jan’iyyah Ihya al-Watan, mentioned in ‘Ali Fathi Kamil, Muṣṭafá Kāmil Bāshā fī 34 rabīʻan : 
sīratuhu wa-aʻmāluhu min khuṭab wa-aḥādīth wa-rasāʼil siyāsīyah wa-ʻumrānīyah (Cairo: Matba’at al-Liwa, 1908-
10), Vol. II, 243; Goldschmidt, “Egyptian Nationalist Party,” 77-8.) 
7 al-Rafi’i, Mustafa Kamil, 61; Fahmy, “Francophone Egyptian Nationalists, Anti-British Discourse, and European 
Public Opinion,” 176-7. 
8 See Kamil’s 8 June 1895 letter to ‘Abd al-Rahim Ahmad (Khedive Abbas’s secretary), in Mustafa Kamil, Awraq 




these men like an instrument under his control but he uses the incompetence of these men to 
attempt to prove to Europe that our country lacks a governing managerial class.9  
 
Playing to his audience, Kamil represented the French as benevolent and culturally 
superior to the English and devoted the second half of his 1895 speech to singing the praises of 
French culture:  
Yes gentlemen, it is France’s duty...to interfere and save us...France which has generously 
awakened Egypt from its profound sleep and has always treated us like its dearest offspring, 
earning in the process our eternal respect, emanating from the depths of our hearts and souls.10 
 
Later in the same year he published, in French, a small bulletin outlining the dangers of the 
British occupation of Egypt, which was then translated into Arabic.11 He also wrote an article for 
the Viennese press on the same subject and spoke at the French Geographical Society. In 1896, 
British Prime Minister Gladstone received three open letters from Kamil requesting full British 
recognition of Egypt’s sovereignty.12 The European publicity of the Egyptian nationalist cause 
was so important to Kamil that in 1907 he established two new versions of his Watani al-Liwa 
newspaper, in both English (Egyptian Standard) and French  (L’Etendard Egyptienne.)13  
                                                 
9 See Kamil’s 4 July 1895 speech presented in Toulouse, reprinted in Kamil, Egyptiens et Anglais, 26-7; Ziad 
Fahmy, “Francophone Egyptian Nationalists,” 177. 
10 Kamil, Egyptiens et Anglais, 43; Ziad Fahmy, “Francophone Egyptian Nationalists,” 177. 
11 Mustafa K amil, Le peril anglais: Consequence de l’Occupation de l’Egypte par l’Angleterre (Paris: Imprimerie 
G. Camproger, 1895; repr., Paris: Imprimerie Albert Lanier, 1899.) 
12 Jack A. Crabbs, The Writing of History in Nineteenth-Century Egypt: a Study in National Transformation (Cairo: 
American University in Cairo Press, 1984), 149-50. 
13 For more on British views of al-Liwa, see FO 141/480/18. Similarly, Ya’qub Sannu’, who resided in Paris from 
1877 until his death in 1912, presented almost weekly lectures to French audiences on a variety of topics related to 
Egypt and Islam. In his lectures, political cartoons, and articles, Sannu’ sang the praises of French culture while 
baiting the Anglophobia of French readers and audiences with attacks on the British. He was particularly adept at 
using his own newspapers to lure the mainstream French press into covering stories favorable to Egyptian nationalist 
goals. For a book-length biography of Sannu’, see Irene Gendzier, The Practical Visions of Ya’qub Sanua 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1966.) (Ziad Fahmy, “Francophone Egyptian Nationalists,” 170; ‘Abd 




It was also in Europe that students from Egypt and other colonies organized under the 
auspices of nationalist leaders in exile.14 This development was supported by the already 
existing, although limited, connections between colony and metropole that had been established 
for the purposes of education. Most of the early immigrants to Europe were students who were 
beneficiaries of the campaign to educate Egypt’s future lawyers, doctors, and philosophers in 
European universities, a policy practiced by successive Egyptian governments.15 While some 
students came to Europe already active in the nationalist cause, others likely became more 
interested in nationalist causes due to their exposure to anti-colonialist groups in Europe.16 In 
1912, Consul-General Herbert Kitchener (1850-1916) noted that, 
all of these students have a tendency to devote themselves to politics, often of a dangerous and 
subversive character, and they attend meetings where they openly advocate a revolution in this 
country…Unless some check is put on these proceedings, I greatly fear that…they may easily 
become a menace to the maintenance of tranquility and order in this country.17  
 
In the first decade of the twentieth century, Egyptians were studying abroad in ever-increasing 
numbers, especially in British, French, and Swiss schools and universities. Whenever the number 
of Egyptians studying in any city exceeded one dozen, they tended to form their own social club, 
which usually then took on a political coloring. By 1908, the large students’ societies in London, 
                                                 
14 British authorities had already become aware of this tendency to political awareness in the case of Indian 
nationalists a few years earlier. (India Office Library: Report of the Departmental Committee on Indian Students, 
Judicial and Public Department, No. 840/1908.) Upon realizing that Egyptians needed similar “supervision” while 
studying in Britain, they established a system of student “advising” based on the model already developed for Indian 
students. In 1912, Inspectors from the Egyptian Ministry of Education were established in London, Paris, and 
Geneva. FO 371/1363, p. 62-5, 93, Kitchener to Grey. Mellini, 172, notes that supervision of these students included 
surveillance by Scotland Yard. (Khan, 107; India Office Library: Report of the Departmental Committee on Indian 
Students, Judicial and Public Dept. No. 840/1908.) 
15 See, for example, FO 10317/1641/16, A.J. Pressland, Confidential, 24 November 1924, “Reports on activities of 
Egyptian students in Switzerland.” 
16 British authorities became even more concerned with Egyptian student agitation in Europe after connections 
between Ibrahim Wardani, the assassin of Egyptian Prime Minister Butrus Ghali, and student and nationalist groups 
operating within Europe were discovered. 
17 PRO: FO 371/1363, Kitchener to Grey, p. 93 
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Paris, and Lyons were essentially Nationalist satellite organizations. For this reason, the British 
were very concerned that Egyptian students, like their Indian counterparts, be heavily supervised.  
Influencing European public opinion regarding the ills of the British occupation and 
“enlisting sympathy” for Egyptian independence was one of the key objectives of the Egyptian 
nationalist movement. Kamil contended it was necessary to get Europe interested in the Egyptian 
liberation movement, and find cooperation and insight in foreign political circles. It was clear to 
most nationalists that European support was absolutely essential, as Egypt would not be able to 
force a British military evacuation on its own.18  
Farid held that the power to change Egypt’s system of government ultimately rested in 
British, not Egyptian, hands. It was, therefore, Paris, London, Vienna, and Berne that provided 
the main stage on which the Nationalist leaders presented their campaign for Egypt’s 
independence.19 In addition, the anti-imperialism of at least segments of the European left were 
particularly attractive to Egyptian nationalists anxious to win over public opinion in Europe. 
In appealing to American and European audiences, nationalists consistently argued that 
Britain had no right to occupy Egypt militarily in 1882 and should have evacuated the country, 
together with the Sudan, as soon as possible.  By rights, Egypt was a privileged Ottoman 
province; in no sense did it belong to the British Empire.  The khedive and his ministers should 
not have been obliged to obey the diplomatic representative of Great Britain or any other foreign 
country.  The Nationalists assumed that, if they could just persuade enough governments or 
enough members of an enlightened European public to listen to their legal case, European 
governments would be influenced to force the British to withdraw their occupying army.20 At the 
                                                 
18 Amira Sonbol, The Last Khedive of Egypt: Memoirs of Abbas Hilmi II (Reading, UK: Ithaca Press, 1998), 104. 
19 Goldschmidt, “Egyptian Nationalist Party,” 173. 
20 Farid, Awraq, 11; FO10302/3560/16, Cairo, 23/11/24, containing copy of appeal to Europe and US urging that 
British demands are contrary to the independence of Egypt (Egypt Association of Great Britain & Ireland.) The 
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same time, the Egyptians also wished to present themselves in a positive light to the European 
public, showing, through their behaviors and habits at conferences and in publications, that they 
were “a calm and peaceful” people, “capable of governing themselves.”21  
From the signing in 1904 of the Entente Cordiale, which settled a number of 
disagreements between France and Britain and paved the way for diplomatic cooperation 
between the two countries against Germany, no European country had endorsed the cause of 
Egypt’s independence from British rule; but the Nationalists never ceased to hope that a 
concerted propaganda campaign might sway liberal opinion in their favor, and that ultimately 
some government would change its course.22 In a letter to Juliette Adam, Kamil referred to the 
Entente Cordiale as “this ominous Anglo-French accord which will have disastrous results for 
our poor country and our unhappy Khedive.”23 Kamil then continued,  
My compatriots today detest France more than England itself. I know that it is very cruel to tell 
you that but is not frankness the base and the soul of all friendship? I suffer doubly for you and 
myself. Imagine then that France is the first power in Europe which has sanctioned the Occupation 
by an official act. What a humiliation for Egyptian and French patriots. You have no idea of the 
English at the present time, they mock us “poor creatures” who have believed in France, and they 
have reason to mock.24 
 
Kamil’s letters to French writer Juliette Adam (1836-1936), his speeches, and his articles 
poignantly express his disappointment with France. He noted as early as 1897 that the French 
were failing to support the Nationalists and the Khedive.25 Saddened by French weakness in the 
Fashoda Incident, Kamil published an article in al-Mu’ayyad asserting that Egypt, even if France 
                                                                                                                                                             
British harbored consistent fears of colonial appeals to European and American supporters. See, for example, FO 
141/434/2, “Egypt and America,” which voices concern over the 1922 Senate debate on Egyptian independence, 
Indian students in the United States, and propaganda efforts on their behalf. 
21 Congres National Egyptien. Statuts. 
22 Mustafa Kamil to Juliette Adam, 10 May 1904, from Letters, 134-8; Goldschmidt, “Egyptian Nationalist Party,”  
83-4. 
23 Mustafa Kamil to Juliette Adam, 10 May 1904, Letters, 134-8 
24 Kamil, Egyptian-French Letters, 135-6. 
25 Kamil, Letters, 30-6. 
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abandoned her cause, could still look to Germany and the Ottoman Empire.26 It was to Fashoda 
that he attributed the Khedive’s growing disposition to make peace with the British .27  
It was after 1905 that transnational anti-colonialism in Europe developed into a 
widespread, sustained pattern; and the organizational framework for an Egyptian nationalist 
propaganda campaign in the cities of Western Europe had coalesced by mid-1908. In many 
cases, “seditious” actions and writings were punishable in Britain; however the laws governing 
them were much less severe than in the colonies. This meant that an Egyptian who, for instance, 
published an anti-colonialist pamphlet in Britain might be punished only relatively lightly, while 
he might be imprisoned for many years for publishing the same pamphlet in Egypt. It was this 
contradictory inner division of imperial rule that, for anti-colonialists, seemed to turn the 
Empires’ metropolitan centers into a much safer place for their activities than the territories from 
which they originated. The British files on the “Activities of Egyptian nationalists abroad” called 
attention to the creation of missions, financed from nationalist funds, being established in the 
principal European capitals, “which would probably succeed in keeping the nationalist 
movement well-advertised.”28 The British were also “tolerably certain that they [Egyptians] will 
be in close contact with Indian revolutionaries and British communists in London, and financial 
                                                 
26 Mustafa Kamil, “Malicious Joy and Intimidation,” al-Mu’ayyad, 6 November 1898. The Fashoda Incident of 1898 
involved a confrontation between the Anglo-Egyptian army commanded by General Kitchener, which had just 
reconquered northern Sudan, and a French expeditionary force headed by General Marchand, which had crossed 
from West Africa to the east to take control of the upper Nile. Although Marchand had preceded Kitchener by 
several months, he lacked the forces on the scene and the support back home that were available to the British. 
Despite a brief war scare in London and Paris, Marchand agreed to withdraw. France’s concession to Britain in the 
Sudan started the reconciliation between the two countries and led to the Entente Cordiale of 1904. 
27 Kamil, Letters, 64, 66, 74. The issue of the Fashoda Incident created a division between the Khedive and the 
Nationalists. The majority of the nationalists supported the French, in hopes of French assistance in driving out the 
British military occupation; while the Khedive backed the claims of the British, in support of Egypt’s own territorial 
claims over the area.  
28 Murray to Foreign Office, 1 May 1922. 
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aid from Egyptian sources might make the difference between the outbreak or failure of an 
embarrassing strike by British extremists.”29  
In fact, it is not surprising that the first efforts of the fledgling nationalists were directed 
abroad; they perceived the Occupation as having been inspired more by European issues and 
power struggles than by events such as the ‘Urabi Revolution. So, they correspondingly expected 
the solution to come from European intervention, as well. Fathi Radwan, a Nationalist Party 
spokesman, explained that, “Mustafa Kamil did not believe in negotiations.”  Rather,  
he believed in the necessity of taking advantage of international conditions. . . In every place, 
Mustafa Kamil proclaimed that the independence of Egypt was an international interest, and that 
the achievement of this independence was necessary to guarantee the interests of the various states 
of the East.30 
 
  
During the years before the First World War, the links between nationalists of different 
colonies were strengthened. A new generation of nationalist politicians was keenly aware that 
they were involved in a complex web of issues which affected the whole of the British Empire, 
and imperialism more generally, not only their own territories. The rise of international news, the 
telegraph, and the congregation of young, educated students and activists in London and other 
European cities provided the context for the increasingly effective connections between diverse 
anti-colonial nationalists; and Western Europe quickly became the main center of activity for 
many leading anti-colonialists of the early twentieth century.  
Major European cities provided nationalists with avenues to express and organize their 
programs, a forum for the development of allies, and an area relatively free of censorship or the 
threat of further exile. Anti-colonialists in Britain and France were often able to make use of this 
fact in order to protect themselves from persecution in the relatively quiet metropoles of Europe. 
                                                 
29 Murray to Foreign Office, 1 May 1922. 
30 Nadwat al-Hilal, “al-Za’im al-Shabb Mustafa Kamil,” HL, February 1948, 27, quoted in Israel Gershoni and 
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However, while Europe provided nationalist leaders with a relatively safe place from which to 
operate, it also resulted in these actors becoming caught in a feedback loop of exiled dissidents. 
While this was, no doubt, beneficial for the growth of nationalist movements and was greatly 
effective in promoting the cause of independence to sympathetic audiences in Europe, the 
myopic focus on the metropoles of Western Europe meant that individual nationalist movements 
had less success in mobilizing prospective domestic constituencies. The mobilization and 
persuasion techniques perfected in the capitals of Europe were exercised mostly on European 
publics, rather than constituencies at home. Nationalists like Kamil, Farid, and Jawish focused 
their attention on interacting with metropolitan political elites in the hopes of gaining 
concessions toward autonomy at home and eventual independence. Presumably, they assumed 
that domestic popular support would form when needed, and did not focus the necessary 
attention on developing institutional and popular capacities in Egypt.  
Scholars have explored the influence of European thought on colonial activists from both 
Egypt and India. What has been less adequately explored is the way in which these nationalists 
were also exposed to the ideas and ambitions of actors from other colonies, whom they met in 
the shared capitals of Europe. The existence in London and other European centers of Irish, 
Indian, and Egyptian migrant communities presented radicals from each country with numerous 
opportunities to interact and exchange ideas.31 However, despite the significance of Mustafa 
Kamil and others’ European activities, historians have only briefly examined these events. Israel 
Gershoni and James Jankowski’s Egypt, Islam, and the Arabs, the most comprehensive work on 
                                                 
31 The alignment of nationalist action in the British capital was not lost on British authorities. This was a time when 
leaders of the Irish Land League, such as Michael Davitt, supported by English radicals, such as Charles Bradlaugh, 
were organizing in the capital. The addition of anti-colonial nationalists to this mix resulted in a great deal of 
concern for British officials. 
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early Egyptian nationalism, does not cover Egyptian nationalist efforts in Europe.32 Short of a 
brief mention in their introduction of how Kamil “hoped to use the French as a lever against the 
British in Egypt,” the authors pay little attention to Kamil’s European campaigns.33 However, as 
elite activists fled, or were exiled from, their countries for Europe or America, they found 
themselves in an arena more conducive to practical collaboration with fellow anti-imperialist 
nationalists. These relationships proved beneficial to all sides, producing an anti-imperial, 
nationalist alliance which would continue to worry the British over the next several decades.  
Geneva soon became the unofficial nerve-center of Egyptian student politics abroad. 
Muhammad Fahmi, an instructor in the Law Faculty of the University of Geneva, organized a 
“Young Egypt” Congress there in September 1908. The participants, mainly students, formed a 
permanent committee to organize future annual Young Egypt Congresses.34 Fahmi was not a 
Nationalist, but the Permanent Committee promptly launched a campaign to publicize the 
projected 1909 meeting. One of the members, ‘Ali al-Shamsi, planted articles in various 
European newspapers advertising the Congress, visited the other Egyptian student clubs in 
Europe, and wrote frequently to Muhammad Farid soliciting Nationalist Party endorsements.35 
The large Egyptian colony in Geneva established a Nationalist club known as the Sphinx Society 
(Jam’iyyat Abu al-Hawl), which then became the model for similar clubs in other European 
cities where many Egyptians were studying. In the spring of 1914, Farid personally presided over 
                                                 
32 Israel Gershoni and James Jankowski, Egypt, Islam, and the Arabs: The Search for Egyptian Nationhood, 1900-
1930 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987.) 
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the inauguration of Sphinx Society chapters in London, Paris, Lyons, Liege, Antwerp, and 
Brussels.36 After delivering one such speech at a party given in his honor by the Sphinx Society 
of London in February 1914, Farid wrote in his diary,  
This party raised my hopes for the Egyptian youth, for I find among today’s young people higher 
patriotic sentiments and feelings that in the preceding generation. They are closer than before to 
the idea of forcibly freeing their country, for they spoke with great courage and without caution, 
declaring their ideas with complete candor, even though they were sure that some of the people 
there were spies.37  
 
The strength of Egyptians’ presence in Europe was demonstrated by the Egyptian 
National Congress, which was held from 22 to 26 September 1910. The Conference was 
supposed to have been held in Paris, but the French authorities, acting “entirely on [their] own 
initiative because [they] did not desire that Paris should become the center of an anti-British 
crusade,” decided to ban it.38 In explaining their sudden about-face, French government officials 
referred to French obligations toward England under the 1904 treaty that formed the basis of the 
Entente Cordiale. French officials allegedly told Muhammad Farid that the government could not 
allow a conference aimed at the expulsion of the British from Egypt to take place on French soil 
because the French had agreed, in 1904, not to undertake anything against Britain’s involvement 
in Egypt.39 Farid replied that, after all, he had been allowed to take part in a conference of 
members of “oppressed nations” in London in the previous year. Was it possible “that the French 
government presented itself as more English that the English government itself?” he asked. Did 
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he have to go to “Rome, to Brussels or even to Berlin” for the “right to protest, that France, 
considered until now the country of liberty par excellence, refuses us?”40  
To the government’s dismay, much of the French public seemed to agree with Farid’s 
criticism. France’s left and left-liberal press, stressing the right to free speech, was highly critical 
of the government’s actions. For instance, the leftist publication Humanite pointed to the 
hypocrisy of the French government, if it outlawed the Egyptians’ meeting but, at the same time, 
invoked “the modern right of nations to govern themselves when talking about Alsace Lorraine,” 
which the French were at the time trying to reclaim from Germany.41 Conservative voices were 
equally critical of the government’s actions, which they saw as weakening French power, 
independence, and sovereignty in the face of British demands. A French journalist who 
interviewed Farid commented that a simple interdiction of the congress would have been 
acceptable; however, to “admit to foreigners (the Egyptians)” that the French government was 
obliged to refer to a “neighboring power regarding an internal matter” was unacceptable. It 
seemed to the interviewer that “we have descended [even] lower that the [tiny] republic of San 
Marino!”42  
In reaction to similar criticism, the French government had already realized the need to 
bring forward a different line of arguments, according to which the conference had to be 
outlawed because it was not only directed against Britain, but was also threatening French 
interests in North Africa. The argument put forth was that the Egyptians did not only pursue a 
nationalist campaign in a more narrow sense, but were in fact part of a larger movement that 
included resistance groups in French territories, such as Morocco.43 By appealing to the danger 
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to France’s standing as an imperial power, the government might not have neutralized the attacks 
from the left; however, it hoped to bring over the French nationalists to its own side. There was 
most certainly British pressure in this direction, as well; but there was also the fact that al-Liwa 
had carried out a press campaign against French colonial policy in Morocco, Tunisia, and 
Algeria.44 
Meanwhile, Farid used the international press to convince his readers of the unjust 
actions of the French against Egyptian activists. In Farid’s publication of the incident, he drew 
attention to the many college students from Egypt who had used up all their resources to travel to 
Paris for the congress only to learn that to attend they would need to go to Brussels, something 
which many reportedly could not afford. Farid brought further attention to the fact that many 
Egyptian activists were stranded in Paris without money after a long voyage that had lost its 
purpose. Many of the Egyptians who had made it to Brussels, in turn, had arrived at the last 
minute without having been able to make any arrangements beforehand. They, therefore, had “all 
the trouble in the world finding a place to stay.”45 At four o’clock in the morning “one could still 
see some of them erring around in a lamentable way on their search for a hotel.”46 For Farid, 
these images of wandering were symbolic of what the French authorities had done to the 
Egyptian national cause as a whole. In addition to being something of a media sensation for the 
Egyptian nationalist cause, the scandal surrounding the Egyptian congress showed the 
widespread opposition in France to any exaggerated British influence on French internal affairs. 
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The strong French public opinion against any hint of cooperation with the British was the very 
reason Farid concentrated his efforts there. 
Despite their concern, British officials noted that it would be fruitless to pressure Belgian 
authorities to do more than monitor it, as Belgian law allowed for any unarmed gathering.47 But 
prior to their departure for the conference, the Egyptians and Indians met at a party in Paris. 
There were approximately one-hundred and fifty Egyptian and Indian nationalists, and twenty-
five Europeans, mostly French and German journalists, present. The Indians wore badges, and 
the Egyptians rosettes, of red and white ribbon, the national colors of Egypt.48 Muhammad Farid 
attended the conference in the company of Madame Cama and Sarojini Naidu, an Indian 
nationalist poet who would become the President of the Indian National Congress, and who was 
also the sister of Chattopadhyaya. Also in attendance were Aiyar and M.P.T. Acharya.49 
Chattopadhyaya, Aiyar, and Acharya also took great interest in the preparations for the Congress 
and had a number of meetings with Farid. Another India House member, Lala Har Dayal, was 
also there and openly discussed ways to obtain military training for nationalists. The official 
secretary of the conference, Muhammad Lutfi Goma’a, acknowledged in his memoirs that much 
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of the planning for the conference was done in the home of Madame Cama, and the Indians there 
had helped in the preparations and editing of the speeches.50 The Criminal Intelligence Division 
actually reported during the conference itself that the “Indians had all but overtaken the 
proceedings.”51 The main paper, “The Future of Egypt,” read before the Congress by the 
Secretary al-Ahly, had actually been written by Har Dayal. Another paper, “A Review of the 
Condition of the Egyptian Army under British Occupation,” read by Dr. Mansur Rifa'at, had 
been written by Chattopadhyaya.52 The speech written by Har Dayal contained a direct reference 
to India in which the author called upon the Egyptians to prepare for action:  
Go to India, see for yourself. India is the eternal and awful warning for all weak and fallen nations. 
If you wish to observe the effects of British rule, go to India and look around you. May our 
children never be reduced to such a plight! May they kill themselves nobly and bravely rather than 
live in Egypt, if Egypt becomes a second India…The failure of the national movement will mean 
the moral and intellectual death of the nation.53  
 
The 1910 proceedings also included a number of speeches that promoted the growing 
relationships among anti-British movements. After a speech by Madame Cama, in which she 
urged Egyptian students to avoid studying in England and go to France or Switzerland instead, 
India House’s Har Dayal is recorded as “causing a stir [by] rising and calling upon all Egyptians 
to refuse to enter the Egyptian Army.”54 However impressed European opinion might have been 
by the unanimity of Egypt’s political parties on the need for national independence, or the 
seriousness with which they delved into such intriguing questions as “The Evils of the 
Occupation,” “The Participation of the Army of the Occupation in the Smuggling of Hashish,” 
and “A Comparison between the Egyptian and Irish Questions;” the most striking feature of the 
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Congress must have been the participation of four members of the British House of Commons.55 
For example, Kier Hardie attended and delivered a speech in which he warned the delegates 
about the dangers of Britain’s policy of dividing religious and ethnic communities in their 
colonies.56 MP Dillon also weighed in with a promise of Irish Parliamentary support for an 
Egyptian demand for Home Rule.57  
At the Brussels Conference, it was decided that close contact would be maintained 
between the Egyptian, Indian, and Irish national movements. An Irish delegate to the Congress 
proposed “the formation of an Egyptian, Indian, and Irish congress so as to unite in one gathering 
the victims of English domination.”58 A committee of Rifa’at, Dryhurst, and Chatto, representing 
Egypt, Ireland, and India, respectively, was formed for the purpose. The idea of joint action 
between the three groups was depicted in a cartoon in La Patrie Egyptienne, published in Geneva 
by Muhammad Farid, which depicts an Irishman putting the corpse of England into a coffin, 
while Indians and Egyptians dig its grave.59  
Though Kamil routinely sought French support for Egyptian goals, often appealing to the 
historical connection between the two nations, he was well aware of the irony of using France’s 
disparaging paternalistic colonial discourse to counter Britain’s colonial ambitions, as his 18 
September 1895 letter to Khedive ‘Abbas Hilmi’s secretary shows:  
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Like any realistic person knows, nations only cater to their best interests. The French, just like the 
English, regardless of how they pretend to be loyal to us, will do whatever is in their best political 
interests. Therefore through our rapprochement and our amicability toward them we are merely 
employing a purposeful political maneuver to gain their trust and perhaps, even if it is temporary, 
we can benefit from them politically.60  
 
Working toward this end, throughout his speeches and articles in France, Kamil attempted to 
stress the commonality of Egyptian and French strategic and political interests, particularly when 
directed against Great Britain.  
At the turn of the twentieth century, France had more economic and cultural capital in 
Egypt than any other European country, including Great Britain - a reality that the French very 
much wanted to maintain. Kamil effectively exploited this fact and announced in one of his 
speeches that Britain was working hard to end the annual Egyptian student missions to France, in 
order to “bring an end to French influence, which is still very extensive and overly dominant.”61 
Similarly, in an 18 June 1899 speech presented in Juliette Adam’s salon in Paris, he declared to 
the audience:  
The wars which your neighbors from across the English-Channel have been waging against your 
cultural influence and prestige on the banks of the Nile is without a name. English hate has 
especially targeted the French language, for they have been zealously and tirelessly attempting to 
replace their language for yours.62 
 
Kamil even melodramatically declared to his audience that “destroying French influence in 
Egypt” ranked as the number one British internal policy in Egypt.63  
Kamil was especially adept at tapping into the intellectual resources and professional 
contacts of some of his European friends and acquaintances. Occasionally, he went so far as to 
                                                 
60 See Kamil’s 18 September 1895 letter to ‘Abd al-Rahim Ahmad, in Kamil, Awraq Mustafa Kamil, 51-2. 
61 Kamil, Egyptiens et Anglais, 28. 
62 Kamil, Egyptiens et Anglais, 213, 216. 
63 See Kamil’s 18 June 1899 speech presented in Adam’s Paris salon, reprinted in Kamil, Egyptiens et Anglais, 213, 
216. See also Kamil’s 11 December 1895 speech presented at the Societe de Geographie de Paris, reprinted in 
Kamil, Egyptiens et Anglais, 51. In this early speech, he declared to the audience: “All that England does in Egypt 




instruct some of them to write articles and letters on the Egyptian question to the editors of 
mainstream French newspapers.64 In a letter dated 29 May 1904, one week before he was due to 
deliver a major political speech in Alexandria, Kamil dictated to Juliette Adam a short news 
dispatch detailing his yet-to-be-delivered speech: “I would be very happy to see a dispatch in Le 
Figaro which reads: ‘Mustafa Kamil, the editor of al-Liwa has given a speech yesterday night in 
Alexandria in front of a large crowd of listeners...the speaker affirmed that the Egyptian people 
are motivated more than ever before to achieve national independence.”65 In another letter to 
Adam, dated 21 July 1906, Kamil, incensed over British newspaper articles characterizing 
Egyptians as religious fanatics, solicited Adam for a response: “I beseech you to write an article 
in the Figaro, the Gaulois or even a letter in the Temps, to describe the degree of tolerance and 
hospitality you witnessed when you were in Egypt.”66 Publicity campaigns, however, did not 
take place in a political vacuum. Anti-British sentiment and a growing consensus of the need for 
British withdrawal from Egypt were already taking root in France. By the mid-1880s the French 
public was inundated with mainstream French newspapers calling for British withdrawal from 
Egypt. Many of the articles discussed possible timeframes for the British evacuation of Egypt 
and stressed the importance of such an evacuation for “engendering France’s ‘benevolent’ 
secularizing policies in the Orient.”67 Anti-colonialists were often able to appeal to German or 
French populations’ beliefs in granting political asylum to refugees, for example, and to these 
Europeans’ interest in protecting their national independence against pressure from abroad. Anti-
colonial nationalists could thereby create public scandals that severely restricted the possibilities 
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for government action against them. Throughout the pre-war and inter-war periods, the fear of 
negative political repercussions resulting from public scandals, particularly in Europe or the 
United States, was surprisingly successful in restraining the British government’s activities. In 
this context, it is important to note the strong negative reactions in the French public sphere to 
any open collaboration between British and French officials against anti-colonialists.  
Kamil and, later, Farid were fully aware of the intricacies of British colonial discourse 
regarding Egyptians’ fundamental unsuitability for self-government, and took every opportunity 
to publicly refute it. As far as the nationalists were concerned, the source of Egypt’s problems 
was not any defective character of its people or its social institutions, but rather British 
occupation and the policies of the colonial administration. The nationalists obviously had a stake 
in portraying Egyptians as a mature and civilized people who were, thus, fit for immediate self-
government. Egypt was not, Kamil insisted, like the Congo or Somalia, where European colonial 
rule might be justified by the low level of civilization of the indigenous population.68 In a speech 
presented to the Societe de Geographie de Paris, Kamil denounced the British assertion that 
“Egyptians are not fit to govern their own country is a calumny, which any reasonable person 
must refute.”69 Kamil also addressed the issue in the British press. In a letter to the editor of The 
Times, Kamil announced:  
You will tell me, I know, that the Egyptians are not ripe as yet for self-government. It is the old 
answer, the answer we always get...Our nation has awakened, and nobody will be able to 
command its sleeping. Instead of crying out at it that it awoke too soon, or that it is dreaming, it is 
necessary to satisfy its vital necessities.70  
 
 
The Nationalists were, therefore, suspicious when their political opponents published 
books and articles emphasizing the backwardness and fanaticism of the Egyptian masses, fearing 
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such depictions would be used to legitimize British rule. From their perspective, the elimination 
of British rule rather than its perpetuation was a precondition for social progress. As proof, the 
nationalists cited the failure of Egypt’s British controlled government to spend sufficiently on 
education. The nationalists, therefore, vigorously denounced suggestions that independence be 
put off until an inevitably lengthy process of reform had prepared the way. As they saw it, 
occupation under any pretext meant continued backwardness and subjugation. 
Kamil also addressed accusations of Egyptian (and wider Islamic) fanaticism, and announced in 
one of his speeches that not only had the “English committed an injustice after an injustice, but 
they have convinced Europe that we are a fanatic people, hostile to all Christians. This is the 
biggest of all lies! We are not fanatics, or hostile to Christians. We are a wise and hospitable 
people and the proof is incontestable.”71 To make his case, Kamil mentioned that for thirteen 
centuries Egyptian Copts and Muslims had lived together like brothers. Concerning Egypt’s 
treatment of Europeans, he declared, “For the last century, we were in direct contact with Europe 
and especially France, and we were never hostile to anyone. On the contrary, the entire world 
finds in Egypt the most generous hospitality. If our enemies claim that we are religious fanatics, 
it is time to put an end to their legendary deceits.”72 Because the British frequently equated 
Egyptian nationalism with religious fanaticism and xenophobia (both of which charges would 
strike a chord with other colonial powers), Kamil coined the slogan “Libre chez nous, 
hospitaliers por tous” (Free in our country, hospitality to all), which would later become the 
motto of the English, French, and Arabic versions of al-Liwa/The Standard.73  
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Perhaps no other issue did more to promote the cause of Egyptian nationalism in Europe 
and among European publics than the 1906 Dinshawai trial and subsequent executions. Kamil 
was keenly aware that in order to maximize the political capital of this incident, arousing the 
Egyptian masses would not be enough; and so he quickly set out to internationalize the 
incident.74 On 11 July 1906, he wrote a lengthy article to Le Figaro titled “A la nation anglaise et 
au monde civilise,” which publicized and condemned the events.75 Kamil’s account of the 
Denshawai trials caused widespread revulsion in European circles already predisposed to think 
the worst of British rule in Egypt. According to Kamil, “the Dinshawai affair has certainly 
produced in England a very painful impression: it has had nevertheless this salutary effect of 
making everybody understand that the Egyptians do not love the Occupation, contrary to the 
official assertions, and of drawing more closely their attention to Egypt.”76 The Figaro article 
was carefully crafted to shame the British into making political concessions; it caused an instant 
journalistic sensation throughout continental Europe; and, more importantly for putting pressure 
on the British government, for the first time some mainstream British newspapers were 
sympathetically covering Kamil.77  
Foreign Secretary Edward Grey made an attempt to justify Cromer’s actions regarding 
the Dinshawai incident by stating in Parliament that “Islamic fanaticism had flared up all over 
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North Africa, and likewise in Egypt.”78 Echoing this, the pro-British al-Muqattam published an 
article under the title: “Fanaticism spreads about and takes violent forms,” in which it was argued 
that the so-called fanaticism of Egyptian Muslims had to be kept in check by the British 
Occupation by whatever means necessary. This attempt to cast nationalists as uncivilized 
fanatics did not have the intended effect on domestic Egyptian audiences, however. According to 
Salama Musa, “Once I saw some young men buying copies of al-Muqattam and tearing them to 
pieces so that nobody could read them. Even Copts, who had so far shrunk from taking part in 
the national movement, now became nationalistic-minded and anti-British.”79  
 
The British Response 
The British were also well aware of the dangers of inciting European public opinion in 
support of Egypt, according to a 1907 article in The Times of London:  
If any fresh proof were required that it is somebody’s interest to make mischief between England 
and France by reviving, if possible, in a new form the Egyptian question, it would be found in the 
persistent efforts of the Egyptian Nationalists to enlist sympathy for their cause in this country 
(France) through the medium of the Paris Press. A short time ago the Nationalist agitator 
Mustapha Kamel (Mustafa Kamil) Pasha ventilated his views in the Temps. Today he contributes 
an article to Le Figaro.80  
 
Even after the signing of the Entente Cordiale, the British felt threatened by Kamil’s European 
campaign:  
The Egyptian nationalists...seek through last night’s publication in the Temps to denounce England 
to France and to enlist French sympathy for their cause. If successful, they would kill two birds 
with one stone. They would further their own affairs as well as the policy of Germany so far as it 
is directed toward undermining the Anglo-French entente.81  
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In what they referred to as “counterblast propaganda,” the British authorities began to launch 
their own press campaigns in Europe.82 Leading papers in France, Italy, and Switzerland were 
supplied with what the British saw as “full and accurate information as to events in Egypt.”83 
One strategy that British officials employed was to make use of the members of the French press 
to whom they had the most direct access, namely the British correspondents of French 
newspapers.  The hope was that if these correspondents were provided with a pro-British 
interpretation of events, they would telegraph it back to their papers in Paris and elsewhere in 
France.  There it would work like an anti-body against a possible infection of “seditious” 
Egyptian thoughts.84  
Against this background, a major concern of British authorities in Cairo was the foreign 
press’ criticism of their policy toward Egypt. As Robert Greg, an official on loan to the Egyptian 
government, wrote in a report to the British residency in Cairo in April 1919, “the foreign 
colonies here were at the outset far from ill-disposed to the Nationalist Movement, and so far as 
their letters to Europe have escaped censorship are not likely to contribute to putting our (Great 
Britain’s) case in a favourable light on the Continent.”85  High Commissioner Edmund Allenby 
(1861-1936) then wrote to the foreign secretary, Lord Curzon, arguing that it was essential for 
leading European newspapers such as Le Temps (Paris), Journal des Debats (Paris), L’Echo de 
Paris, Journal de Geneva, and Corriere della Sera (Milan) to be “supplied with full and accurate 
information on what is going on [in Egypt.]”86 And, as the High Commissioner elaborated, this 
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was especially crucial “in view of (the) propaganda which the Nationalists will certainly carry on 
abroad and the large sums they will be willing to spend on subsidizing more venal [foreign] 
newspapers.”87  
In terms of the press campaign’s content, the central strategy was to counter the 
Egyptian’s arguments about a unity of interest between the Egyptian population and the French, 
while British officials tried to argue that the Egyptian’s efforts were not a localized and specific 
threat to British rule alone but constituted a much more general anti-imperial danger.  The British 
authorities stressed, first of all, that the Egyptians’ activities were undermining the standing of all 
colonial powers in North Africa. After all, the agitation in Egypt could easily lead to “a 
nationalist movement with Turkish [sic] sympathies spreading along [the whole of the] North 
African littoral.”88 To this end, Allenby thought it necessary that British officials in Paris, Rome, 
and Berne be supplied with weekly news telegrams about the situation in Egypt. These 
telegrams, he added, ought to emphasize the danger of a nationalist movement with Ottoman 
sympathies spreading from Egypt to the detriment of both French and Italian colonization 
projects, the growth of a “Bolshevist anarchical spirit” in Egypt, the threat to European property 
in Egypt, and the potential disruption of trade and menace to foreign interest, business and 
institutions.89  
The intense focus on influencing European publics and governments had consequences 
not only for the Watani Party, but also for Egyptian nationalism, in general. Kamil’s privileging 
of his campaign abroad, rather than an immediate organization of the Nationalist Party in Egypt, 
was a critical mistake. Not only did it result in a lack of centralization within the Watani Party, 
but it allowed for the domestic emergence of the Umma Party with its prestigious membership 
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and more moderate program. Moreover, despite the gains Egyptian nationalists made in 
European circles, their impact within Egypt was significantly less. The relocation of the 
nationalists to Europe, and their focus on their campaign there, resulted in a generation of 
radicals who were unable to translate their effectiveness in Europe into a strong, cohesive 
movement at home, and who largely proved useless following the defeat of the Central Powers.90  
Active participation in political life within Egypt became increasingly difficult 
throughout the early twentieth century, thereby pushing leading personalities of the National 
Party into exile in Europe, from where they then attempted to organize nationalist resistance 
within Egypt. The repressive measures of successive British Consul-Generals, in addition to 
internal disputes, weakened the Nationalist Party within Egypt and deprived it of its leaders, 
which resulted in the shift of its activity to cities outside Egypt. Small groups of expatriates 
clustered in, for example, Constantinople, where Shaykh Jawish held an influential position 
editing CUP newspapers; and in Geneva, where Farid took refuge after traveling for several 
months from one country to another to avoid extradition. With the outbreak of the First World 
War, the Nationalists outside Egypt, not hampered by government censorship, surveillance, or 
internment, suddenly found themselves transformed from being a discredited movement of 
student activists into a valuable appendage of the Turco-German war machine and of the retinue 
of the exiled Khedive. Because their membership drew on the most radical individuals, who had 
either been exiled or chose to leave Egypt to avoid jail or other punishment, the cohort of 
Egyptian nationalists in Western Europe tended to belong to the more radical branches of Watani 
Party. For example, Egyptian nationalists such as Farid, Jawish, and Rifa’at, as well as Tunisian 
Salih ash-Sharif, Algerian al-Hajj ‘Abdallah, Moroccan Muhammad ‘Itabi, and Syrian Shakib 
                                                 
90 This may be contrasted with the Indian example, in which the Indian nationalist movement benefited from earlier 
generations of students studying in England and then returning with the new technologies of mass politics, which 
they then used to effectively organize a wide portion of the population. 
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Arslan spent the First World War in exile in Constantinople, Berlin, and Geneva. This 
concentration of leading nationalists would result in increasing radicalization and collaboration 
among these activists. However, the absence of Watani leaders from Egypt, combined with their 
support for the Ottoman Empire during the War, would also result in their increasing inability to 
influence the domestic nationalist movement.  
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Chapter Six: Egyptian Nationalists, the Ottoman Empire, and World War I 
 
 
Because of ‘Abbas Hilmi’s collaboration with the Occupation government under the 
entente policy with Gorst, in the eyes of many Egyptians he had become a traitor to the 
nationalist cause, and opposition to his authority grew.1 Because of the mounting tide of political 
persecutions in Egypt in the first decade of the twentieth century, an increasing number of 
‘Abbas Hilmi’s opponents left Egypt to work abroad, particularly in the friendly environment of 
the Young Turks’ capital at Constantinople. Whereas Egypt had been a haven for Turkish exiles, 
the Ottoman Empire after 1908 became a refuge for Egyptian reformers, progressives, and critics 
of ‘Abbas Hilmi’s regime. Egyptian nationalists welcomed the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 
and sent a delegation to Constantinople in 1909 to court the possibility of formal Egyptian 
representation in the restored Ottoman parliament. Eventually, upon the ouster of the Watani 
Party’s chief, Muhammad Farid, and its publicist, Shaykh ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Jawish, from Egypt in 
1911, the two Watanist leaders progressed to Constantinople, where they entered into 
collaboration with the Ottoman regime for the purpose of promoting clandestine opposition to 
the British presence in Egypt. Farid had decided that the Nationalist Party should adopt a strategy 
of supporting the Ottoman Empire (and, when the First World War erupted, Germany as well) 
and assist the Ottomans in the War to the best of its ability. When, for instance, a group of 
Egyptian students based in London asked for his advice regarding whether one of their 
manifestos should call for the “total” independence of their home country, Farid urged them to 
                                                 
1 Eldon Gorst was sent to replace Lord Cromer in 1907 by the new Liberal party government, with instructions to 
give Egyptians greater responsibility to manage their internal affairs. With his politique d’entente, Gorst quickly 
improved relations with Khedive ‘Abbas Hilmi and weakened the National Party. The appointment of Butrus Ghali 
as prime minster, popularly ascribed to Gorst, angered the Nationalists and many other Muslims, leading to press 
attacks. Butrus’ subsequent assassination, and the extremely unpopular revival of the Press Law and Gorst’s attempt 
to extend the Suez Canal concession, caused Gorst to abandon his lenient policy in favor of a harsher one, using the 
Exceptional Laws and various penal measures to stifle the Nationalists. (Arthur Goldschmidt Jr., Biographical 
Dictionary of Modern Egypt (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), 65-6.) 
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omit the adjective in the question, lest it alienate the Committee of Union and Progress 
government.2  
Moreover, the nationalists found that the Ottoman government was most accommodating 
in arranging employment for those who found themselves in Europe without monetary support. 
Egyptian nationalists were shown favor under the Young Turk administration, both because of 
the Watanists’ general willingness to support the Ottoman Empire as a bulwark against the 
British, and the nationalists’ increasing animosity toward ‘Abbas Hilmi, with whom the Young 
Turks were also increasingly at odds. In Constantinople, Egyptian nationalists found that the 
Young Turks were willing to meet with them and allow them freedom to campaign against 
‘Abbas Hilmi’s refusal to relinquish his autocratic power - power that he was now sharing more 
willingly with the British under the entente that existed between Gorst and the Khedive. 
Farid grounded this policy in Egyptian national interests. Egypt, he believed, could 
liberate itself from British occupation and achieve political independence only through the 
military strength of the Ottomans and the Germans. Once this was achieved, he hoped that the 
Ottomans would permit Egyptian autonomy under the aegis of the nationalist movement headed 
by Farid and the Watani party. Until the fundamental incompatibilities of their visions became 
clear in the course of the War, Watani Nationalists, almost all of whom were idealistic exiled 
expatriates with limited resources, were happy to take whatever support they could from the 
Young Turk government. It was this fundamental difference between Egyptian territorial, anti-
colonial nationalism and multi-national Ottomanism that would eventually undermine any 
Young Turk-Egyptian Nationalist collaboration.  
                                                 




In the period leading up to the First World War, the Ottoman capital served as a safe 
haven, not only for Watani nationalists, but also for the Khedive himself. In Constantinople, 
‘Abbas was pressured to demonstrate his goodwill toward the Young Turks in tangible ways; 
after his initial resistance, financial “contributions” were exacted from him.3 In an attempt to win 
friends in the new Ottoman regime, ‘Abbas Hilmi purchased what was described as a sizeable 
interest in the newspaper Tanin, the main Young Turk organ. Of course, ‘Abbas Hilmi faced no 
easy task in acquiring popularity in Young Turk circles after his long history of harassment of 
the Young Turks in Egypt at the Sultan’s behest. ‘Abbas Hilmi also had influential enemies in 
Constantinople, the most important of whom was a prominent member of the Halim branch of 
the Muhammad ‘Ali dynasty living in Turkey, Prince Sa’id Halim, who was widely suspected of 
having his own ambitions to become Khedive of Egypt. Nevertheless, ‘Abbas Hilmi did his best 
to charm important Young Turks by being pleasant and hospitable during his 1909 visit and 
trying to overlook the differences in political outlook that separated him from the Young Turk 
regime.4 
The Young Turks seemed eager to cooperate with Egyptian nationalists against ‘Abbas 
Hilmi, however. For example, Muhammad Farid was praised in a Turkish newspaper, Courrier 
d’Orient, which, after speaking of Turco-Egyptian fraternity, proceeded to claim that there was 
virtually no one in Egypt who did not advocate Ottoman solidarity – except for the entourage of 
the Khedive.5 Articles in the Ottoman press similarly advertised that many of the leaders of the 
Egyptian nationalist movement were now living in Constantinople and that they were insisting 
that ‘Abbas Hilmi proclaim a constitution similar to the revived Ottoman one.6 Nevertheless, 
                                                 
3 FO 800/193, Lowther to Hardinge, 27 July 1909. 
4 FO 371/662, Lowther to Grey, No. 34192, 7 September 1909. 
5 FO 371/662, Extract from the Courrier d’Orient, 19 July 1909. 
6 FO 371/661 Lowther to Grey, 15 March 1909. 
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British Intelligence in Constantinople discovered a secret report, addressed to the Committee of 
Union and Progress, recommending cooperation with Egypt’s Nationalists to enhance the 
prestige of the Caliphate.7 Likewise, a Constantinople weekly, Sirat-i Mustaqim (The Straight 
Path), eulogized Ibrahim Wardani, the assassin of Butrus Ghali; and the Committee of Union 
and Progress’ Arabic mouthpiece, Dar al-Khilafa, was barred from Egypt for printing an anti-
British article ascribed to ‘Ali al-Ghayati.8 The British also knew of other links between the 
Young Turks and the Nationalists, such as Baha al-Din al-Monastirli in Cairo, and several 
estranged relatives of the Khedive resident in Constantinople.9 Similarly, Egyptian students who 
were members in nationalist groups were also able to gain admittance to Turkish schools after 
they had been expelled from Egyptian schools for their association with Wardani or other 
nationalists.10 
By 1909, then, Constantinople had become the destination for Egyptian nationalists of all 
stripes, including Egyptian opponents of ‘Abbas Hilmi’s rule. Nationalist leaders such as 
Muhammad Farid and Sheikh ‘Abdul ‘Aziz Jawish found support and encouragement from high 
ranking persons there and a safe haven from the persecutions to which they were being subjected 
                                                 
7 FO 371/893, Lowther to Grey, Therapia, 4 July 1910, no. 443, Secret. 
8 FO 371/893, Cheetham to Mallet, Cairo, 14 August 1910, private. One of the best known of the early exiles was 
poet ‘Ali al-Ghayati, who fled to Anatolia to escape the sentence which had been issued in absentia as a result of his 
publication of the nationalist poem, “Wataniyyati,” attacking Khedivial despotism. (‘Ali al-Ghayati, Wataniyyati , 
2nd edition (Cairo, 1938). The book contained three introductions, by Muhammad Farid, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Jawish, and 
al-Ghayati himself. Accused of commending al-Ghayati’s revolutionary book, both Farid and Jawish were tried in 
criminal court and sentenced to six and three months, respectively.) Once in Constantinople, al-Ghayati, like the 
Young Turk exiles in Egypt in the previous era, turned to journalism, working for the newspaper Dar al-Khilafa. On 
13 September, 1910, he published a poem that insulted ‘Abbas Hilmi and called for a revolution. There were 
subsequent attempts to smuggle the paper into Egypt, at least some of which were thwarted by Egyptian customs. 
(FO 371/894, Cheetham to Grey No. 35445, 24 September 1910.) 
9 FO 371/ 893, Cheetham to Grey, Ramleh, 9 September 1910, Private; Goldschmidt, “Egyptian Nationalist Party,” 
253-4. 
10 In 1909, Wardani himself had been received by the Sultan as a member of a Young Egypt deputation. (FO 
371/1892, Lowther to Grey, 10 October 1910.) 
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in Egypt.11 Just as Egypt in previous years had refused to extradite Turkish political refugees, so 
now the Turks refused to hand over Egyptian political figures to the Egyptian authorities for 
prosecution.12  
Watani member, writer, and editor Shaykh ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Jawish made his first trip to 
Constantinople in January 1909, and in April of the same year, Farid arrived.13 Farid made a 
second trip to Constantinople in July of the same year, this time at the head of a large Nationalist 
delegation to attend the official celebration of the first anniversary of the restoration of the 
Ottoman Constitution. Included in the delegation were three members of the Watani Party 
Administrative Committee, and a few younger Nationalists, one of whom was Ibrahim Wardani. 
One of the delegates also represented the Umma Party. To the considerable annoyance of the 
Khedive, who was also in Constantinople, the delegation was invited to attend the Committee of 
Union and Progress banquet held on 23 July at Yıldız Palace. ‘Abbas Hilmi and Ambassador 
Lowther both complained to the Porte about what they considered favoritism shown toward the 
Nationalists, and they helped prevent Farid’s delegation from later obtaining an audience with 
the Sultan.  
Muhammad Farid returned to Constantinople in March 1912, fleeing his Egyptian jail 
sentence for his participation in the publication of al-Ghayati’s book of nationalist poems. He left 
                                                 
11 Jawish was feted in Constantinople, while ‘Abbas’ relations with the Young Turks were in a state of serious 
disrepair. (FO 371/1113, Cheetham to Grey, No. 17006, 29 April 1911.) Farid also enjoyed a tenuous relationship 
with the CUP government. In his memoirs, he recorded that Enver Pasha had been enthusiastic in welcoming him, 
while Tal’at had been reserved and Cemal Pasha had barely concealed his contempt. (Goldschmidt, “Egyptian 
Nationalist Party,” 308.) 
12 FO 371/893, Cheetham to Foreign Office, 9 September 1910.  
13 FO 371/659, Lowther to Grey, Constantinople, 8 February 1909, no. 44; Muhammad Farid, Awraq Muhammad 
Farid (Cairo: Al-Haya Misriyya al-‘amma lil Kitab, 1978), 6f. According to Farid, “I stayed in Constantinople until 
3 May 1913. While I was there I tried to revive the Egyptian Club, which had been shut down and its members 
dispersed because of Kamil Pasha’s oppression of the Egyptian nationalists, the arrest of Shaykh Jawish, and his 
extradition to the Egyptian government in an effort to please the British and the Khedive. It continues to make 
progress and did take part in the student congress that was held in Geneva from 25 to 30 July 1914, appointing 
Isma’il Labib to represent it. I think it very likely that Mahmud Mazhar, who fired the bullets at the Khedive on 25 
July, was one of its members.” (Muhammad Farid, Arthur Goldschmidt, The Memoirs and Diaries of Muhammad 
Farid: An Egyptian Nationalist Leader (1868-1919) (San Francisco: Mellon University Research Press, 1992), 53.) 
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again in August when the Young Turk government fell and a pro-British new cabinet took 
power. During his time there, however, he broke with Jawish as he had with the Khedive, 
because the former refused to print articles attacking the latter. According to Farid,  
Only occasionally would I go to Istanbul to get some articles published in Le Jeune Turc or al-
Hilal al-Uthmani before we quarreled with Shaykh Jawish.14 One hint of the conflict was his 
pained look at having to publish my articles against the khedive, leading to his refusal eventually 
to print them at all.15  
 
Jawish’s position as a paid employee of the Ottomans had made him cautious, particularly in the 
year that the CUP government was out of power. As a result, Farid then turned to the French 
paper La Siècle and published articles in which he accused ‘Abbas Hilmi of aspiring to replace 
the Ottoman Sultan as Caliph, an accusation which would be repeated much more often in the 
future.  
Well before the advent of the First World War, rifts were already starting to show within 
the different factions of the Watani Party. Though there were obvious strains between the Watani 
nationalists and the Khedive himself, there were, likewise, increasing signs of stress within the 
Party. The Egyptian expats (as well as naturalized Egyptians who did keep their contact with 
Egypt) in Constantinople were roughly divided into two groups, loosely represented by Jawish, 
on the one hand, and Farid, on the other.16 This split between the two major figures in the Watani 
movement would prove to have serious detrimental effects on the Party’s possibility for success. 
Farid himself was most distrustful of the intentions of the Young Turk regime concerning Egypt, 
fearing the restoration of “despotic” Ottoman rule over Egypt, and that the Young Turks wished 
                                                 
14 Le Jeune Turc was a morning paper founded by CUP leader Jelal Nuri in 1908. One of Farid’s articles was 
mentioned in a dispatch from Yusuf Siddiq to Khedive  Abbas, Chibukle, 7 May 1912 (French), in the Abbas Hilmi 
papers, Durham, file 85/172, microfilm 25. 
15 Farid, Awraq, 47-8. 
16 Farid, Awraq, 191, 292-3. 
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to “eat Egypt.”17 He demonstrated a typically Egyptian sense of superiority to the Ottoman 
“Turks,” maintaining that “we [Egyptians] are much more advanced than they [Turks]” and 
asserting that Egyptians would not accept the re-imposition of any form of autocratic Ottoman 
rule.18 
By the start of War, Farid was particularly suspicious, bitter, and critical of ‘Abd al-‘Aziz 
Jawish.19 Their relations, as portrayed in Farid’s diaries, especially between 1912 and 1919, were 
characterized by resentment and enmity on Farid’s part. Farid and Jawish were at the time widely 
(and in subsequent historiography) seen as the joint successors of Mustafa Kamil’s nationalist 
legacy. They shared the experience of being political exiles forced to conduct their nationalist 
struggle from abroad, as well as offering consistent support for the Ottoman Empire. Despite all 
this, Farid unfailingly feared the disloyalty, intrigues, and opportunism which he believed Jawish 
embodied. According to Farid, “The shaykh’s opposition to me became apparent during my 
political activities when the Khedive came to Istanbul in the summer of 1912, for we had 
decided, together with the students, to stage a demonstration against him at the train station.  The 
shaykh urged me to call it off and advised the students to stay away.”20 Furthermore, in Farid’s 
opinion, Jawish had no legitimate place in the leadership of the Nationalist Party. “The man 
[Jawish] would have fallen into oblivion,” Farid wrote in February 1913, “if the Unionists (the 
Committee of Union and Progress government) had not given him a job in some matters 
                                                 
17 Farid, Awraq, 192, 280. 
18 Farid, Awraq, 280. 
19 Farid and Jawish met at the International Congress of Orientalists in Algiers in April 1905. Farid and Jawish 
[“Chawiche”] were listed in Actes du XIVe Congres International des Orientalistes, Alger, 1905 (Paris: LeRoux, 
1906), vol. I. (Farid, Awraq, 92.) 
20 Farid, Awraq, 46. (FO 141/746/1, Ahmed Mukhtar and Sheikh Shawish,”10, 11, 15 September 1912.) Farid went 
on to comment that “In Istanbul I received the best possible welcome and much willingness on the part of the CUP 
to help me, but a quarrel arose between Shaykh Jawish and me over the [Egyptian] students, their club, and their 
political activity without him.  [Dr.] Ahmad Fu’ad was aiding his new policy, which called for closing the 
[students’] club and stopping their political activity.  I backed the students.  The club continued despite the disdain 
of the shaykh and his helpers.” (Farid, Awraq, 45) 
150 
 
involving the Arabs and education. This is the result of his vacillation and weakness.”21 In early 
1916, Farid wrote that a high official of the Ottoman Foreign Ministry had told him that Jawish 
was presenting himself as an official spokesman of the Nationalist Party. Farid answered: “We 
don’t care what Jawish says because he has no position in our party, because he wasn’t a member 
of our administrative board or even an ordinary member, just a salaried writer for our 
newspapers, to write for our benefit, as he now writes for Germany in Berlin.”22 On another 
occasion, Farid sharply condemned what he perceived to be Jawish’s opportunistic support for 
the Grand Vizier Sa’id Halim Pasha, Farid’s chief rival in the ruling Ottoman leadership, and 
someone Farid held in utter contempt; and Jawish’s work with Tal’at Pasha (1874-1921), who 
was minister of posts and the most influential Committee of Union and Progress member.23  
From Jawish’s perspective, however, the fall out with Farid had been due to Farid’s jealousy as a 
result of Jawish refusing to publish articles Farid had sent (the two men clearly differed as to 
why the articles had not been printed), in addition to a spat between the two men’s families. 
Farid’s memoirs leave no doubt that the acrimonious relations and deep rifts between the 
two were severely detrimental to the effectiveness of the Egyptian nationalist struggle as it was 
waged by the Watani Party from 1912 to 1919. The new pressures generated by the eruption of 
the First World War and the need to reorganize the Egyptian nationalist struggle led Farid to 
reach an agreement with Jawish on furthering the “Egyptian question” during the War. It was, 
apparently, a temporary and shaky accord, however. Farid continued to suspect that Jawish was 
duplicitous, owing conflicting allegiances to several opposing groups, including to Farid, the 
Khedive, the Ottomans, and Arab nationalists. Jawish was also suspected of being an “informer” 
                                                 
21 Arthur Goldschmidt, Jr., (trans.) The Memoirs and Diaries of Muhammad Farid, an Egyptian Nationalist Leader 
(1868-1919) (San Francisco: Mellon University Research Press, 1992), 96. 
22 Goldschmidt, Memoirs, 339. 
23 Goldschmidt, Memoirs, 346. 
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for the CUP on the activities of Farid and the nationalist exiles.24 It was Jawish, not Farid, who 
consistently had the ear of the leading Young Turks; so, Farid’s three-month stay in 
Constantinople in 1913 accomplished almost nothing to establish closer ties with the Young 
Turk government. According to the journal The Near East, of 13 October 1913, Farid was 
actually given 1500 Francs to leave Constantinople, ostensibly because he was fomenting 
dissension among the Turks. During his stay, Farid had written an article accusing nationalist and 
khedival advisor Shaykh ‘Ali Yusuf of aiding an Arab separatist society in Cairo and had 
inspired a pamphlet blaming the Khedive for the Ottoman reverses in the first Balkan War of 
1912.25  
Shaykh Jawish returned to Constantinople in 1912.  The former editor of al-Liwa had 
spent most of the previous year smuggling arms to the Ottoman forces defending Libyan Tripoli 
from Italian attack.26  Returning to his journalistic activity under the aegis of the Sultan and the 
Committee of Union and Progress, Jawish became the editor of al-Hilal al-Uthmani (The 
Ottoman Crescent), which started publishing in March 1912 as a daily; and Constantinople’s al-
‘Alam al-Islami (The Islamic World), both labeled “Pan-Islamic” by British officials. In editing 
                                                 
24 Farid, Awraq, 424. 
25 Goldschmidt, “The Egyptian National Party,” 288, 288n2. Shaykh ‘Ali Yusuf (1863-1913) was a journalist and 
founder of al-Muayyad, the first Muslim paper to challenge and later surpass in popularity the dominant Syrian 
dailies, al-Ahram and al-Muqattam. When ‘Abbas succeeded to the khedivate, al-Muayyad became the Palace 
organ, often publishing articles by Mustafa Kamil and others hostile to the British occupation. ‘Ali later broke with 
the National Party, as the Khedive became more and more reconciled with the British. He eventually became 
estranged from the nationalist movement. As ‘Abbas drew closer to Gorst, ‘Ali espoused collaboration with the 
British occupation and created a Palace-based political party. He later also distanced himself from the paper he 
himself had created. 
26 The example of Tunisia, which the French had first detached from the Ottoman Empire, and then taken possession 
of, was a cautionary tale to the Egyptian nationalists. (James Jankowski, “Ottomanism and Arabism in Egypt, 1860-
1914,” Muslim World, Vol. 70, No. 3/4 (July 1980), 232.) Influential figures in Cairo quickly rallied to the Ottoman 
cause during the 1911-12 war with Italy for control of Libya: Prime Minister Muhammad Sa’id denounced as 
traitors all those who argued that the conflict offered an opportunity for Egypt to assert its independence from the 
Empire, while Prince ‘Umar Tusun led a public campaign to raise funds to finance the Ottoman war effort. (Afaf 
Lutfi Sayyid-Marsot, Egypt and Cromer; a Study in Anglo-Egyptian Relations (New York: Praeger, 1969), 203. See 
also Jamal Zakariya Qasim, “Mawqif Misr min al-Harb al-Tarabulusiyyah 1911-1914,m” al-Majallah al-
Tarikkiyyah al-Misriyyah 13 (1967); Muhammad al-Tayyib al-Ashhab, Barqah al-‘Arabiyyah: Ams wal-Yawm 
(Cairo: Matba’ah al-Hawari, 1947), 345-349; FO 371/1113, Cheetham to Grey, 29 April 1911.) 
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al-Hilal, Jawish was assisted by Dr. Ahmad Fu'ad, an ex-member of the Watani Secret Society 
Tadamun, and by 1912 Jawish was employed by the Ottoman Ministry of the Interior.27   
Jawish was a particular favorite of the Committee of Union and Progress, as he was a 
fervent supporter of the Caliph as the bulwark of Islamic sovereignty, and thus, of the Ottoman 
Empire.  He did not see this as incompatible with his Egyptian nationalism, an attitude shared by 
many Watanists.28 Jawish continued to coordinate intelligence, especially on the activities of al-
Hizb al-Watani, as well as the political dimension of the Indo-Egyptian movement during his 
time in Constantinople. In this context, a British Secret Service report submitted by Wingate to 
Philippides Bey, the Chief of Secret Police in Cairo, provides valuable insight into the fate of 
Jawish following the outbreak of the War. According to the report,  
At the time of the Tripoli war, Indian Red Crescent parties sent to provide medical aid were fertile 
sources of recruitment and conspiracy. Several well-known nationalists and anti-British 
personalities joined forces with Jawish, including the editor of the Delhi Comrade, Muhammad 
Ali. A number of meetings between Indian and Egyptian student nationalists and Pan-Islamites 
[sic] had been held in Cairo at the Club des Ecoles Superieures, and in Constantinople there were 
Indian schools under the direction of Jawish, while in Switzerland and Germany, Egyptian 
Societies known as the “Sphinx,” supplied with money by von Oppenheim’s Eastern Bureau, 
offered a warm welcome to Moslems [sic] of all nationalities and the opportunity to undermine the 
Allied cause. The Sheikh al-Islam and the Director of Public Security were among the leading 
members of the Pan-Islam Party in Constantinople, and two newspapers subsidized by the 
government and the CUP, Turc Pourdi and Al-Hedayat, circulated widely in Europe, North Africa, 
Syria, Afghanistan and India. Soldiers in the Egyptian and Indian armies were offered attractive 
terms to desert to the Turks. In Geneva, La Patrie Egyptienne, carried the appeals of Jawish and 
the Constantinople leaders, and of Abdurrahman al-Riadh their leader in Jerusalem, to Indians 
who might be tempted by the offer of eventual freedom from “imperialist yoke” in return for 
support for Germany and Turkey [sic].29  
 
Also in the summer of 1912, not long after the Cairo police had foiled the “Shubra Plot” 
to kill the Khedive, the Prime Minister, and Consul General Kitchener; Egyptian Customs 
arrested a young Egyptian enrolled in the Ottoman Military Academy for trying to smuggle into 
the county a seditious circular named al-Qasas, which not only cursed the Egyptian government 
                                                 
27 PRO-FO 141/746/4681.  Process verbal.  Interrogation of Shaykh Jawish. 10-15 Sept. 1912. 
28 Khan, 116. 
29 H.V.F. Winstone, The Illicit Adventure: the Story of Political and Military Intelligence in the Middle East from 
1898 to 1926 (London: J. Cape, 1982), 166-7. 
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for accepting the Occupation but also praised Ibrahim Wardani as a true patriot.30 The courier, 
Ahmad Mukhtar, who had previously studied in France, claimed the pamphlets had been sent by 
Jawish, who was brought back to Cairo for questioning. The report draws attention to “The 
Nationalists at Constantinople” (Farid and Jawish) and their receipt of £20 per month from the 
German Embassy. Mention is also made of nationalist societies throughout Europe, with 
Constantinople as the central headquarters. According to the report, “The Egyptian Nationalist 
Party of Constantinople consist now of Fareed [sic], Shaweesh [sic], the employees of the Hilal 
el-Osmany, some Indians who have a society of their own similar to the Nationalist Party, and 
some Algerians and Tunisians who have a society which helps the Turkish government by 
sending arms and ammunition to African Tripoli.”31 The Egyptian Government, fearing that the 
Nationalists might use Constantinople as a base from which to direct revolutionary activities in 
Egypt, demanded Jawish’s extradition.32 Watani member and editor of al-Liwa, Mansur Rifa’at, 
                                                 
30 FO 141/746/1, Cairo, 27 August 1912, “Ahmed Mukhtar and Sheikh Shawish.” The pamphlet smuggled in by 
Ahmed Mukhtar” was entitled La Vengence, and criticizes the despotism of ‘Abbas, accusing him of putting 
patriotism second to the English to the detriment of the nation, and notes that “notre redempteur feu Ibrahim el-
Wardani.” Goldschmidt, “Egyptian Nationalist Party,” 94.  
See Khan, 118-9 for a further explanation of the Shubra Plot. In brief,, an unsuccessful attempt was made on 
Consul-General Kitchener’s life by a group of young men associated with al-Liwa. The then chief of Cairo’s secret 
police claimed later that the evidence had been concocted, though all of the “conspirators” served their full terms 
anyway. The leader of the group, Imam Waked, had been a friend of Wardani’s and had met Jawish earlier the same 
year in Europe, where he had supposedly purchased several guns. According to Ziauddin (p. 243), the group held 
their first meeting at Wardani’s grave. See Badrawi’s description of the case, Malak Badrawi, Political Violence in 
Egypt 1910-1925: Secret Societies, Plots, and Assassinations (London: Curzon, 2000), 86-92; and PRO documents 
F.O. 141/430/5334/1. The Shubra plot. 21 August 1917. Note communicated by Sofer Pasha, dated 4 August 1917, 
FO 371/1363, Kitchener to Grey, No. 28284, 3 July 1912; FO 371/163, Cheetham to Grey, No. 31892, 22 July 1912; 
FO 371/1363 Cheetham to Grey, No. 35949, 18 August 1912. (Khan, 118-9.) 
31 FO 141/746/1, Cairo, 27 August 1912, “Ahmed Mukhtar and Sheikh Shawish,” p. 5-6. 
32 FO 141/746/1, Cairo, 27 August 1912, “Ahmed Mukhtar and Sheikh Shawish.” Shawish was arrested on 3 
September 1912 in Constantinople by Ottoman Forces at the behest of Britain. According to British authorities, by 
1910, nationalist activities in Europe were in full vigor and Wardani’s crime was the direct outcome. Specific 
mention was also made of the fact that Shawish (sic) and Omar Bey Lutfi were also responsible for the 
establishment of night schools for the ostensible purpose of elementary education, but really intended to spread the 
principles of Nationalism and Revolution among the lower classes. For the British, then, “the difficulty before us is 
not the presence of a dangerous political movement, which does not exist, but how to find the means to check the 
wild ideals of the exalted nationalists from affecting the student class.” FO 371/1363, Cheetham  to Grey, Ramleh, 
27 August 1912, telegram no. 49.  
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was also implicated; but he fled to Switzerland.33 Although Jawish denied any connection to the 
pamphlet, it was established during the investigation that the Egyptian Students Club in 
Constantinople was openly anti-British, and supposedly had a portrait of Wardani hanging in its 
hall.34 The fact that the Club president, Muhammad Kamal al-Khashin, had also belonged to the 
nationalist secret society Tadamun lent credence to these accusations. British authorities were 
particularly incensed that al-Qasas invited readers to refer to the history of India and Ireland to 
have an idea of the misfortunes, famine, and adversities that befell those countries, and therefore 
what awaited Egyptians as a result of British occupation. Although they released Jawish, 
Egyptian authorities instituted increased surveillance on ships coming from Constantinople and 
on the large Turkish émigré community in Egypt, to prevent further importation of “seditious” 
materials. 
Along with Jawish, Khedive ‘Abbas Hilmi also arrived in Constantinople in the summer 
of 1912. The Khedive had earlier broken with Farid, who resented the former’s abandonment of 
the Nationalists during Gorst’s tenure as Consul-General, when there had been no real limit 
placed on ‘Abbas Hilmi’s spending or domestic authority vis-à-vis representative institutions or 
the Watani Party. Documents coming from Constantinople, which had quickly become the center 
for extremist agitation against the Egyptian government, intercepted in the summer of 1912 
included manifestos calling for the assassination of Egyptian government authorities, glorifying 
Wardani, and personally attacking the Khedive. In one manifesto, ‘Abbas Hilmi was condemned 
for abdicating in the face of Kitchener’s power, for declaring Egyptian neutrality in the Turko-
Italian War, for visiting the English King (“Your master, but not your Sovereign”), preoccupying 
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himself with base personal interests at the expense of those of the nation, and associating with 
evil persons who were a discredit to the nation. In another editorial, ‘Abbas Hilmi was charged 
with being a vile traitor, an ignoble ruler, dishonest, abject, with no will of his own; controlled 
by others even in his own purely private affairs; conniving with the English to bring down 
liberal, nationalist forces; persecuting those who were dedicated to the country’s welfare; turning 
against patriots so as to obtain what he wanted from the British; letting the British manage the 
country in their own interests; and removing the serious members of the court while surrounding 
himself with vile men from the standpoint of decency and honor – men who shared his 
inclination for libertinism, debauchery, and immorality.35 By 1912, however, the Khedive no 
longer had a good relationship with the British either, and was seeking rapprochement with the 
Nationalists.36 During 1916-1917, the Khedive cut back the personal financial support he had 
granted several nationalist activists who were close to Farid, increasing the latter’s hostility. In 
the summer of 1917, ‘Abbas returned to Constantinople and made his peace with the CUP in an 
attempt to maintain the possibility of reclaiming his title. A number of Egyptian personalities 
tried to revive the contacts between the Khedive and Farid and the Nationalists, as well. 
However, in October 1917 it was Farid who rebuffed such overtures, declaring “there is no 
connection between the Khedive and the Nationalist party.”37  
 
Egyptian Nationalists during the First World War 
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Despite the frequent ruptures in their alliances, the outbreak of the First World War 
resulted in a situation in which Farid, Jawish, ‘Abbas Hilmi, and the Young Turk government 
saw opportunities in mutual help and alliances. Many of the Watani Party’s luminaries, including 
Farid, were already in Constantinople or other cities of Europe when the Protectorate was 
declared in 1914 and were happy for the moral and, more importantly, financial support that the 
Ottomans and the German Foreign Ministry were willing to provide in return for Egyptian 
support and help against the British. Farid remained conflicted and skeptical, however, of the 
motivations of both the governments of the Central Powers, as his diaries made clear. Many of 
his war-time efforts were as concerned with protecting Egypt from the Ottomans as they were 
with expelling the British. Farid returned to Constantinople from Geneva in August of 1914 to 
make peace with the Committee of Union and Progress and discuss Egypt’s future with the 
Ottoman Triumvirate. At the urging of Baron von Wangenheim, German ambassador to the 
Ottoman Empire, and in hopes of re-establishing unity among the Egyptian Nationalists, Farid 
mended fences with the Khedive and Jawish.38 Thus by October 1914, the Watani Party had set 
up an “Egyptian government in exile” in Europe.   
Farid went to Constantinople to make peace with both the Turks and ‘Abbas Hilmi, who 
was still in Constantinople at the start of the War recovering from an assassination attempt and 
prevented by both the Ottomans and the British from returning to Egypt from “enemy 
territory.”39 On 6 August 1914, the Ottomans prevented the Khedive’s return to Egypt, fueling 
speculation that the Ottoman government hoped to remove Abbas both as Khedive and potential 
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leader of an Arab movement for autonomy.40 The British decision to prevent the Khedive from 
returning to Egypt in December 1914 left the latter willing to once again make common cause 
with the Turks and the nationalists in order to oust the British from Egypt.41  
With both Farid and the Khedive in Constantinople at the start of the War, Farid hoped 
that ‘Abbas Hilmi would assist the Nationalist party. As a first step, ‘Abbas Hilmi wanted to 
coordinate joint political action for Egypt’s liberation from the British with the aid of the 
Ottomans and the Germans. Thus in August 1914, Farid sent ‘Abbas Hilmi an official letter 
asking him to head the Egyptian nationalist struggle for the ouster of the British and the 
restoration of the “autonomy of Egypt,” and urging him to seize the opportunity afforded by the 
War to demand Egypt’s independence, or at least to press for internal autonomy and 
constitutional reform.42 Farid assured ‘Abbas of the full support of the Nationalist Party and of 
the “entire Egyptian nation.” Farid then arranged a meeting with ‘Abbas Hilmi in which the two 
reached an “agreement” which was to serve as the foundation for joint activity between the 
Nationalists and the Khedive during the War. On the basis of their mistaken assumption in late 
1914 and early 1915 that the Ottoman army would conquer Egypt, drive out the British, and 
restore the Khedive with the assistance of the Nationalists, Farid and ‘Abbas Hilmi cemented 
their ties. When the Ottoman effort proved ineffective, Farid learned that ‘Abbas Hilmi was 
secretly developing alternative political options in the form of ties with anti-Ottoman Arab 
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nationalist organizations (relations which antedated the war) and, indeed, with the British as 
well.43  
Once in exile, and particularly after the onset of the war, Farid’s Ottoman orientation 
became even stronger, together with his commitment to Ottoman goals: preserving the integrity 
of the Empire and defeating Britain in the war. As already mentioned, this policy was a central 
element in the traditional strategy of the Nationalist Party. Its underlying rationale was that only 
the Ottoman state, of which Egypt was an integral part, could oust the British and return the 
country to the Egyptian people. Finally, once the Empire was openly at war with Britain and 
allied with Germany, old Ottoman hopes of conquering Egypt and expelling the British for the 
first time seemed realistic. Thus, an immediate common interest was created between the 
Egyptian Nationalists and the Ottoman Unionists. The now ex-Khedive remained hopeful for 
some time that his ostensible suzerain would help him regain his throne; but the Ottomans did 
not trust him much more than the British did, and the Khedive’s offers to lead a military 
campaign to conquer Egypt were ignored. Thus, when World War I began, the Khedive found 
himself in a precarious situation, thanks to his pre-War anti-British, pro-Arab, pro-German, and 
Islamist policies.44  
Recognizing that he was not likely to regain his throne with Grand Vizier Sa’id Halim 
and Cemal Pasha (1872-1922) in charge in Constantinople, ‘Abbas Hilmi moved to Switzerland 
in the summer of 1915. Perhaps because of the competition from Farid’s supporters and the 
Terreki Islam group in Geneva, he set up his own Office Musulman International in Lausanne. 
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Khedive of Egypt and the Great Powers, 1914-18,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 33, No. 1 (January 1997), 21) 
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There, ‘Abbas Hilmi was reported by British intelligence “to have been engaged in efforts to 
organize a ‘Supreme Oriental Revolutionary Society’ uniting Egyptian, Indian, and Arab 
Nationalists in a common anti-imperialist front.”45 It is unlikely that he had any real success, as 
his disengagement from the Ottomans meant that he had very little to offer potential allies, other 
than monetary support.46 Throughout January 1915, ‘Abbas Hilmi mobilized pressure on the 
Ottomans not only to permit him to lead the Egyptian expedition, but also to affirm him publicly 
as Khedive. He mounted his campaign first through the Egyptian nationalists and then through 
the German and Austrian governments. At the beginning of January 1915, Farid and fellow 
nationalist Muhammad Fahmi voiced the ex-Khedive’s demands when they visited the leaders of 
the German government’s Oriental section, Max von Oppenheim and Otto von Wesendonk in 
Berlin. A week later, the German government relayed its wishes to the Ottoman government that 
the latter issue a proclamation placing the ex-Khedive at the head of the Egyptian expedition. 
Furthermore, news arrived in both Constantinople and Berlin that the Austrian government 
treated ‘Abbas Hilmi as a head of state, granting him a meeting with the foreign minister, Count 
Leopold Berchtold, and an audience with the Emperor, Franz Joseph.47  
Though they were supported by exiled Egyptian nationalists, including Farid, Ottoman 
War Minister Enver Pasha (1881-1922) rejected ‘Abbas Hilmi’s efforts to convince the 
Ottomans to return the Khedive as ruler to Egypt. Throughout the remainder of 1915, the 
German ambassador in Vienna worked unsuccessfully for the rapprochement of the ex-Khedive 
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and Egyptian nationalists with the Ottomans.48 Enver continued to accuse the ex-Khedive of 
conspiring to incite Arabs against the Porte.49 The Ottoman government, moreover, ignored a 
request from the German embassy on 25 November 1915 that once Ottoman troops invaded 
Egypt, the Porte would place the Khedive back in power there. Instead, according to Hans 
Humann, the naval attaché at the German Embassy in Constantinople, the Ottoman government 
planned to name either Grand Vizier Sa’id Halim or the Shaykh al-Senussi of Libya as the new 
Khedive.50 In January 1918, the ex-Khedive complained to the German ambassador, Johann 
Heinrich Count von Bernstorff, that he felt like a ‘prisoner’ in Constantinople. Ottoman leaders, 
he said, refused even to discuss Egypt with him. Furthermore, ‘Abbas Hilmi found himself the 
target of anti-Arab elements at the Porte, and particularly of Cemal Pasha, who associated the ex-
Khedive with the Arab rebellion. Cemal Pasha’s hostility toward ‘Abbas Hilmi was so evident 
that the German government remarked that the former exercised “the utmost caution” in his 
relations with the ex-Khedive.51  
The amity between the Khedive and the Young Turk government, based on a precarious 
balance of interests, was soon upset by the Grand Vizier Sa’id Halim, who continued to regard 
himself as the rightful Khedive.52 He openly proposed the creation of a new nationalist group, 
the “Ottoman Egypt party,” to be led by Shaykh Jawish, having as its object the displacement of 
‘Abbas Hilmi in favor of Sa’id Halim, and the reduction of Egypt’s status to that of an ordinary 
                                                 
48 The Germans accepted completely the ex-Khedive’s claims of his influence in the Middle East and with Britain, 
in part because Berlin continuously received erroneous reports from Egypt of his popularity there. 
49 McKale, 26. 
50 McKale, 21. 
51 McKale, 33. 
52 This claim was made based on the Ottoman law of succession, followed in Egypt through the reign of Isma’il; it 
stipulated that the succession should go to the oldest living male member of the dynasty. In fact, though, there were 
several living members of the Khedivial family older than Sa’id Halim, including Husayn Kamil. Following the 
resignation of Sa’id Halim as Grand Vizier, it was easier to reconcile the Nationalist factions that had hitherto 
favored one side or the other. When Jawish and ‘Abdul Malik Hamza came to Stockholm to take part in an 
Ottoman-sponsored Congress of Muslim émigrés, they agreed to accept Farid’s leadership and apologized for their 
past misconduct. Farid, Awraq, 263f; Goldschmidt, “The Egyptian National Party,” 333-4. 
161 
 
Ottoman province. Sa’id Halim played on the suspicions entertained by many Turks about the 
Egyptian Nationalists by complaining that Farid’s followers were wearing lapel pins with the 
slogan, “Egypt for the Egyptians,” and claiming that they would demand the evacuation of 
Ottoman troops within twenty-four hours after Egypt’s liberation from the British.53 The Watani 
Party’s slogan was unacceptable to Ottomans like Sa’id Halim, who were intolerant of local, 
national loyalties.54 ‘Abbas Hilmi gathered that Sa’id Halim was building up a group of 
Egyptians who would be “nationalists” in the Ottoman sense – that is, willing instruments of 
Ottoman policy in Egypt – as a counterweight to the al-Hizb al-Watani.55 Farid was similarly 
concerned that the “Anglophile” Sa’id Halim Pasha was “obstructing the Nationalist activities to 
promote his own claims to the Egyptian khedivate.”56 Indeed, Sa’id Halim had been trying to 
woo Jawish away from Farid and the Khedive; and had warned the Young Turk government that 
the Watanists wanted Egypt for Egyptians, not the “Muslim nation,” and would demand an 
immediate evacuation of Ottoman troops after the War.57 Just as Farid and ‘Abbas Hilmi feared, 
Shaykh Jawish was, in fact, working to further Sa’id Halim’s candidacy for the Khedivate, but 
was unable to win support for this position among other Egyptians. 
Farid’s diaries reiterate another issue that weakened his party. As mentioned above, his 
firm policy, and, hence its slogan, was “Egypt for Egyptians.” Some of his rivals, notably 
Shaykh Jawish when he was working for the Ottoman government, called instead for Islamic 
unity.58 Farid himself was not averse to using Islamic appeals, including the Ottoman call for a 
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jihad against the British and their allies; and he was, after all, editing a magazine called Terreki-
Islam (“The Progress of Islam”). However, Farid was extremely cautious of anything that hinted 
at a sectarian cause, as he firmly believed that the success of Egyptian nationalist efforts rested 
on their ability to appeal to Egyptians of all religions. Although Farid appealed to Germany for 
support, he refrained from committing himself to German Islamic propaganda when he was 
approached by the Foreign Ministry to take part in editing al-Jihad, a German organ issued in 
1915 that appeared in various languages, including Arabic.  He believed that Germany sought to 
control and propagate Islamist ideas to serve her own interests, and warned Tal’at Bey, the 
Turkish Minister of the Interior, that leaving Pan-Islamic propaganda in the German hands might 
endanger the Ottoman Empire, unless the latter took the initiative. On various occasions, Farid 
told the German Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Arthur Zimmerman, that he was thinking of a 
Pan-Islamic Union modelled on the same lines as the Pan-Germanic Union, to be founded after 
the War and led by the Ottomans, but each Muslim country should enjoy autonomy and share 
equal rights with the Turks. Farid believed that an alliance between the Germanic and Islamic 
Unions would be the stronghold against imperialist European Powers.59 Farid needed Ottoman 
financial and moral support and he tried to align the Egyptian Nationalists with Muslims of other 
countries then under British (or French or Russian) imperial rule. But he wanted Copts and other 
non-Muslim Egyptians to support his party’s policies; and he did not want Egypt, if liberated by 
the Turks in the War, to be reduced in status to a simple Ottoman province.  His fear of Turkish 
maladministration, stated often in his diaries, was supplemented by a fear that Sa’id Halim would 
take control of Egypt and persecute or even banish the Nationalists.60 
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For his part, ‘Abbas Hilmi’s position had been a vacillating one for some time, reflecting 
the division of his entourage into pro-British and pro-Ottoman factions. When the news of his 
deposition arrived in Constantinople, he was no longer in the Ottoman capital. Moreover, in light 
of his deposition by the British for collaboration with the enemy, the Khedive was hesitant to be 
shown to have links with Germany and stayed in Switzerland for two years attempting to not 
outwardly choose sides. He did, nevertheless, embezzle large sums provided by the Germans to 
purchase controlling shares in leading Paris newspapers.61 The Khedive wavered between the 
British and Ottomans, but finally decided to throw in his lot with the Turks, despite his 
uncertainty as to the War’s outcome, as this choice at least afforded him some hope of regaining 
his throne.62  
The major issue for Farid throughout the War had, therefore, become defining the line 
between his Egyptian nationalism and his Ottomanism: the impending War, while welcome in 
the sense that Britain was being increasingly challenged, was also forcing the issue of what 
exactly the Egyptians wanted from the Ottomans, or even from their own khedive. The issue of 
British evacuation had always been uppermost in Watani minds; now that the possibility was 
becoming more real, Farid was forced to think about what form the future government should 
take. The fact that ‘Abbas Hilmi had never supported the Watani request for a Constitution was 
becoming more ominous, as were Ottoman descriptions of Egypt as a “lost province.” Despite 
Umma accusations to the contrary, the Watanists were not interested in seeing Egypt lose the 
autonomy she had enjoyed since the days of Muhammad ‘Ali.63 Through discussions with the 
leading figures of the Committee of Union and Progress government, Farid sensed that they 
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wanted to withdraw the privileges bestowed on Egypt through the firmans of 1841and 1873 and 
turn her into a mere province controlled by the Ottoman government from Constantinople.64  
Such apparent intentions widened the gap between the Young Turk government and the 
leadership of the Egyptian Nationalist Party and brought the latter closer to Germany, thinking 
that they might use the German influence in Constantinople to safeguard the autonomous rights 
of Egypt and that a victorious Germany  might help Egyptian nationalist aspirations owing to 
Germany’s interests in the Suez Canal.65  
Due to Farid’s apprehensions about Ottoman intentions towards Egypt, he went 
specifically to meet with the German ambassador in Vienna in December of 1914, to ask the 
Germans to instruct the Committee of Union and Progress to issue a statement concerning 
Egypt’s status. Indeed, the group had Jawish write a manifesto which the Khedive ‘Abbas Hilmi 
signed, granting a constitution to Egypt and encouraging Egyptians to support the Ottomans, 
who would be liberating Egypt from foreign occupation. The Committee of Union and Progress, 
however, refused to endorse the manifesto and it was never published, thereby confirming many 
of Farid’s suspicions.66 It was almost certainly due to Farid’s efforts that the Committee of 
Union and Progress government eventually issued an irade-i saniyya (statement of intent) on 12 
February 1915, announced by Sultan Mehmet V, confirming Egypt’s traditional autonomy 
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within the Empire, which went some way to assuage Farid’s fears about the possibility of an 
Ottoman takeover of Egypt.67 
The connections between Farid and the Young Turk government continued to deteriorate 
throughout the course of the War. When Farid attempted to travel to Germany in November 
1916, he found he had to wait two months for a visa, a delay he attributed to the machinations of 
the Committee of Union and Progress.68 In the meanwhile, Jawish was shuttling between 
Constantinople and Berlin regularly, as he edited die Islamische Welt, a German Pan-Islamic 
weekly published in Berlin from November 1916 to August 1918, while also remaining deeply 
involved in Enver Pasha’s plans. By this point, prominent Nationalist ‘Abd al-Malik Hamza had 
persuaded Jawish to break ties with Farid because of the latter’s alliance with the Khedive.69 
Farid refused to break ties with ‘Abbas Hilmi not out of personal loyalty but rather because he 
saw the pressure to do so as a plot by Sa’id Halim to divide the Egyptians.  Indeed, Farid wrote 
in his diaries in 1916 that he was disappointed to find that “Pan-Islamism” had been “replaced by 
tatrik (turkification);” and, despite often referring to the Arab revolts against the Ottoman 
Empire as crippling, Farid actually seemed supportive of the Arab Revolt in the Hejaz, pointing 
out the brutal execution of twenty-two Arab notables, falsely accused of treason, in May 1916. In 
addition, Farid remained suspicious about the intentions of the Ottomans toward Egypt. “The 
Turks,” he wrote:  
don’t know administration, as has been observed in Syria and elsewhere. We won’t agree to be 
under their administration under any conditions because we are much more advanced that they are 
and our country is better organized than [it was] before the British came in. In short, the Turks 
want to swallow Egypt, but we’ll not easily agree to being eaten up. We’ve opposed the British 
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and will oppose whoever wants to eat us up, whoever he may be, because we’re fighting for 
independence. The most we’ll accept is to be with the Turks as Hungary is with Austria…on the 
condition that we have equality in laws and complete internal autonomy.70  
 
So concerned had Farid grown regarding the intentions of the Ottoman government toward 
Egypt, he even told some Tunisians in Berlin that he would accept a constitutional regime under 
British protection in Egypt.71 The German government continued to offer some support, 
including an offer to finance an office in Switzerland for mobilizing the Egyptian nationalists 
who were gathering there, but Farid suspected that they were setting up intelligence bases and 
refused “to be used by them.”72 Towards the end of the War, Farid had begun to question the 
decision to ally with the Central Powers at all. According to Farid,  
The Turks have abandoned pan-Islam…except for Enver Pasha…On the other hand, it is hopeless 
to expect Germany to help us against the Turks, because they need them and do not want to anger 
them…There is no hope of securing Egypt’s liberation through the Turks and the Germans.  
Indeed, if they did enter Egypt, Turkey would make her an ordinary Ottoman province, or else the 
Germans would stay, and we would be in the same situation as we are in now.  It is better to let the 
British remain, and to make an agreement with them to obtain the constitution, even if only 
gradually, than to let the Turks or the Germans take their place.73  
 
In September 1916, Farid directly accused the Young Turk government of holding a 
“contemptuous view of non-Turks, and estrangement of all other [Muslim] nationalities.”74 The 
Unionists, obsessed with making military gains in the “Turkish” areas of Anatolia “are not 
interested in the Egyptian cause,” he argued.75 Indeed, “some of them said they would rather 
have Egypt be British than independent, because if it were independent it would pose a threat to 
the Empire because of the education, intelligence, and acumen of its people.”76 The best 
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indication of the instrumentally Ottomanist orientation of Muhammad Farid is that, as the 
prospect of an Ottoman victory became increasingly unlikely throughout the course of the War, 
Farid began to think in terms of a rapprochement with the British as long as they would 
recognize Egyptian internal autonomy and establish a representative regime in the country.77 
 
The End of the War 
Germany’s unconditional surrender in November 1918 dashed the hope of the 
Nationalists that Egypt might be liberated by Turkish or German arms or by a negotiated peace, 
and the value of their party as a means of opposing or discrediting British rule in Egypt 
plummeted. Farid and his followers fled to Switzerland, but they retained little money or 
influence.  The leadership of Egypt’s independence struggle was seized by Sa’d Zaghlul and 
other members of the Umma Party, the Nationalists’ pre-War rival.   
The defeat of the Ottoman Empire and her allies left stranded the Egyptian Nationalists 
who had committed their political fortunes to those of the Central powers. and while Watanis 
were extremely popular, they did not have a power base to rival the Wafd and other entrenched 
interests. Few of them ever regained any influence in Egypt’s political life. The armistice of 
October 1918 and the obvious defeat of Germany had put an end to the hopes of the Egyptian 
Nationalists in Germany.  The defeat did not only affect Germany, but also the future of the 
Egyptian Nationalist Party’s leadership. In Egypt, they lost ground to the new nationalist 
leadership of al-Wafd and Sa’d Zaghlul, particularly following the popular uproar over Zaghlul’s 
participation in the Paris Peace Conference.  Although the pre-War Nationalists remained active 
as individuals in Europe and as a party in Egypt, they ceased to constitute an important bloc in 
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Egyptian politics after the rise of the Wafd and the death of Muhammad Farid in 1919.78 The 
main reason that the Nationalists lost their leadership position was, of course, the outcome of 
World War I; but the Party’s decline was hastened by internal dissensions and lack of funds. The 
departure of both Muhammad Farid and ‘Abd al-Aziz Jawish from Egypt between 1911 and 
1912, due to fear of more jail time, seriously damaged the party’s fortunes in Egypt, as Jawish 
had been the party’s most visible, albeit controversial, spokesperson; and Farid was not only the 
organizer but also the main financier of party activity.79 The leading Nationalists’ stand in World 
War I barred them from public participation in the postwar independence struggle, resulting in 
the ascendance of the Wafd Party and a significantly more conservative Revolution. 
Unlike the Watanists, the Umma Party remained largely pro-British in their statements 
throughout the War, with Party leader Ahmad Lufti al-Sayyid, as always, rejecting any Ottoman 
claims on Egypt.  He also accepted the British Protectorate, believing formal recognition of 
Egypt in the Empire would strengthen her bargaining position for autonomy after the War. In his 
memoir, al-Sayyid claimed to have negotiated with the British for Egypt’s direct support in the 
War effort in exchange for a declaration of independence. The idea was rejected by London, 
supposedly as they doubted the loyalty of Egyptian troops to the British over the Ottomans.80  
Unlike most of the high-ranking Watani Party members, almost all of the Umma leaders 
remained in Egypt under the Protectorate, often in government employment, and were pleased to 
see the Khedive replaced by a more pro-British, far less autocratic figure in ‘Abbas Hilmi’s 
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uncle, Husayn Kamil.81 The continued residence of Umma Party members in Cairo, combined 
with their resistance to allying with the Central Powers, meant that the Umma and Wafd Party 
nationalists would replace Watani nationalists as the official representatives of Egypt’s bid for 
independence. Following the War, the Watani nationalists were very nearly blackballed from 
Egyptian public and political life, the consequence of having supported the Ottoman Empire and 
Germany. While former Watanist Muhammad ‘Ali Alluba was actually one of the initial 
members of the Wafd delegation with Zaghlul, most of the other Wafd leadership was from the 
Umma Party group that the Watanists had seen at best as too cautious in not pushing for 
immediate independence, and at worst as British collaborators. Muhammad Farid, who still felt 
he could not return to Egypt at the end of the War, was actually rebuffed by the Wafd when he 
offered to join or align with them. Zaghlul believed that Farid’s support for the Central Powers 
had undermined his credibility and that the Wafd’s negotiations with the British would go more 
smoothly without the stigma of Farid’s support.82 According to historian Muhammad Anis,  
As for Farid Bey’s joining the Wafd, the Wafd  has decided not to make him the offer because of 
the great danger it would pose to the Egyptian Question, which needs the continuing sympathy of 
the Allies, among whom Farid has become famous-especially with the French-for his 
collaboration with their enemies and his involvement, together with the Khedive and [Paul] Bolo 
[Pasha], in activities that have greatly harmed their reputation in Europe.   It is no secret to you 
that the British have accused the Egyptians of not having a spontaneous movement and have 
alleged it arose out of the intrigues of the Turks and the Germans. Including a man like 
Muhammad Farid in the Wafd would necessarily support the criticism of our enemies and damage 
our cause…83  
 
Following the War, the émigré Nationalists grew ever more quarrelsome and split into 
separate cliques.84 None of the Watani-affiliated Egyptians chose to stay in Constantinople after 
the War, and most did not stay in Europe long either. Only Mansour Rifa’at remained in Berlin, 
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from where he wrote a number of pamphlets and articles, often criticizing his former colleagues 
for betraying their ideals by returning to Egypt while the British remained there.85 Rifa’at never 
forgave Farid or even his own brother, Ismail Labib, for making peace with Jawish, and became 
much closer to several Indian nationalists over the course of the War.86 At the time of Farid’s 
death, the Egyptian Nationalists still in Europe were divided between the Jawish faction, mainly 
in Berne and centered around Ottoman Ambassador Fu’ad Salim, and the Egyptian Committee in 
Geneva. Most of the anti-British nationalists – Egyptian, Indian, or other – soon left Berlin, 
fearing a possible Allied occupation and extradition to British jurisdiction.87 Farid, who had been 
in Berlin to recover his papers for just that reason, then travelled to a Swiss sanitarium. The 
“Geneva faction” of the group set up an independent “Egyptian Committee,” which tried to carry 
on the struggle with a new name; its membership included Ismail Labib, Muhammad Fahmi, ‘Ali 
Shamsi, and Yahya Dardiri. The group tried to overcome the stigma of the now-discredited 
Watani-German alliance by barring anyone who spent the War in Berlin from membership. This 
was particularly ironic given that the core membership included Ismail Labib, Farid’s right-hand 
man who had spent much of the War shuttling between Constantinople and Damascus at Farid’s 
direction, and ‘Ali Shamsi, who had been a paid agent of the Germans when the War began.88 
Jawish, on the other hand, tried to organize his own following in Berne and declared himself 
Vice-President of the Watani Party in the absence of Farid. When Jawish had exhausted the 
funds given him by the Ottoman government in the course of the War, however, he went back to 
                                                 
85 On 19 December 1916, Rifa’at was described as the “head of Egyptian malcontents in Berlin” and in 
communication with the Sultan of Turkey. “Whilst protesting against British dominion in Egypt, Rifa’at cited the 
case of Poland and expressed the hope that after the war Turkey would abandon its suzerainty and give Egypt to the 
Egyptians.” Another report relates that, in the posting of Egypt’s new constitution, Rifa’at insulted Zaghlul, whom 
he compared to the “group of powerful traitors in Ireland, who betrayed the Irish nation and now pose as leaders of 
the free state of Ireland.” (Secret, 9 April 1919, Berne, “Egyptian Nationalists and the Young Turks”; M.M. Rifa’at, 
Der Patriotismus bei den Aegyptern (Silesia, 1923), 8, 11.) 
86 Khan, 150-1. 
87 Goldschmidt, “The Egyptian Nationalist Party,” 367. 
88 Khan, 161-2. 
171 
 
organizing students in Germany for two years, and then returned to Egypt in 1923. While in 
Germany, however, he remained on the radar of British Intelligence, who believed him to be 
responsible for the “general exodus of Egyptian students to Berlin.”89 
Following the War, although ‘Abbas Hilmi remained a nuisance to Britain in Egypt, the 
British knew that most of the Egyptian nationalists and then Sultan Ahmad Fu'ad (1868-1936, r. 
1917-1936) loathed him and consequently what little chance he had of achieving his ambitions. 
Britain, while steadily continuing to liquidate ‘Abbas Hilmi’s remaining properties in Egypt, and 
thus eliminating his influence even further, also exploited his machinations as a lever against 
Fu’ad and, after 1936, Fu'ad’s successor Farouk (r. 1936-1952), and the later Egyptian 
Nationalists.90 
The Watani activists found themselves having to define their position on the Wafd’s 
activities at a time that their own organization was not only divided in different leadership camps 
but also was split between those who had stayed in Egypt and the many who were only now 
returning. It is likely also that many of the Nationalists who returned to Egypt resented the fact 
that those that they had seen as British collaborators before the War, most particularly Zaghlul, 
were now the heroes of the nation and the independence movement for which many Watanists 
had faced jail and exile just a few years previously.91 The Party’s Administrative Committee 
decided not to work with the Wafd when it accepted the Constitution of 1923 but lost a number 
of its members as a result. Among these were Jawish’s supporters from the War days ‘Abd al-
Malik Hamza and Isma’il Kamil, who had returned to Egypt in 1920 at Watani expense. The 
Geneva faction’s ‘Ali Shamsi traveled to Paris to join the Wafd while it was still campaigning 
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there and ran on their ticket for a seat in the Chamber of Deputies. He eventually became 
Minister of Education and then Director of the Egyptian National Bank. Amin al-Rifa’i joined 
the Wafd Central Committee in April 1919.92 
Other returnees from Europe among the Watanists chose to devote their efforts to civil 
and cultural organizations, with or without direct access to the political machine that was now 
dominated by the Wafd. Isma’il Labib set up his own “Egyptian Free Nile Union,” while Amin 
al-Rafa’i founded an influential newspaper, al-Akhbar. Jawish and ‘Abd al-Hamid Sa’id also ran 
in the 1924 elections unsuccessfully, although Sa’id would later get a seat in the Chamber of 
Deputies. Jawish accepted a post in the Department of Primary Education and kept it until his 
death in 1929; but both he and Sa’id put much of their energy in the 1920s into the Young Men’s 
Muslim Association (YMMA), which maintained a strong relationship with the Watani Party 
over the following decades. 
 
Post-War Ottoman-Egyptian Relations 
British reports occasionally spoke of continuing Ottoman sentiment in Egypt after the 
War, or of “Young Turk” instigation of anti-British activity. But more considered British 
evaluations of the Egyptian nationalist movement in late 1918 and early 1919 came to the 
conclusion that the movement was oriented primarily toward Egyptian rather than Ottoman 
goals, that it was “national in the full sense of the word,” and that it was equally “anti-British, 
anti-Sultanian, [and] anti-foreign.”93 Neither British nor Egyptian sources on the Revolution of 
1919 indicate any direct contact between the Wafd and the Ottoman government. In fact, upon 
the arrival of their delegation in Paris in April 1919, the leaders of the Wafd publicly emphasized 
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the exclusively Egyptian nationalist character of their movement and disavowed any connection 
with the now-discredited Young Turks.94  
A similar lack of collaboration seems to have characterized the relationship between the 
Wafd and the parallel Turkish nationalist movement which emerged in the early 1920s. In 1920, 
Lord Allenby was unable to find evidence to corroborate press reports of a financial connection 
between the Egyptian and Turkish nationalist movements; and, in 1922, visits to Ankara by both 
Wafdist and Watanist delegations were coldly received by the new Turkish government, which 
refused to support Egyptian admission to the post-War peace talks.95  
The success of the Turkish War of Independence (1919-1923), however, quickly became 
a model for nationalist movements, more generally. For many nationalists, the Turkish 
experience in the 1920s seemed to point out the proper path to follow to attain the goals of 
modernity and nation-building: that of a revolution that would alter all aspects of society 
suddenly and thoroughly. Kemalist Turkey was also a continuous vindication of the territorial 
nationalist course that Egyptian intellectuals had chosen.96  
British reports in late 1922 on the Egyptian reaction to the victories of the nationalist 
forces led by Mustafa Kemal indicate a general Egyptian sympathy for the Turkish nationalist 
movement, but no sense of direct Egyptian involvement. Nevertheless, Mustafa Kemal and his 
movement received considerable public adulation in Egypt; Egyptians sent messages of 
congratulations to the Turkish nationalists for their victory over the Greeks; committees in 
support of the Kemalists emerged at al-Azhar; Mustafa Kemal himself was praised in the 
Egyptian press and by several poets; and in general the British had “no doubt that the greatest 
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enthusiasm and satisfaction prevails amongst all classes over the Kemalist victories.”97  Even 
after the November 1922 deposition of the Ottoman Sultan, to whom many Egyptians had 
previously pledged their support, British reports observed that “there is a good deal of pro-
Kemalist enthusiasm and propaganda in Egypt.”98  
It was the victory of the nationalists as Turkish Muslims that was emphasized by many of 
Egypt’s leading poets; Kemal was compared to the Muslim heroes Khalid ibn al-Walid and Salah 
al-Din, and Turkish nationalist military victories to the Battle of Badr. When the Kemalists’ 
struggle against Western domination was contrasted to the collaboration of the Sultan’s regime 
with the Allies, the virtues of the Turkish nationalists were extoled over the Ottoman regime, and 
the Sultan’s hostility to the Egyptian nationalists was criticized. British evaluations of the subject 
also emphasized the expectations some Egyptians entertained that Mustafa Kemal would 
“liberate Egypt” from Britain. And that religiously inclined Muslim Egyptians called for 
Egyptian support for the Turkish nationalist movement in 1922.99 In one scenario, Mustafa 
Kemal was expected to follow his successes in Anatolia by reconquering Thrace, liberating Syria 
from the French, and then invading Egypt and entering as a conqueror. According to some 
Egyptians, then, “it [was] unnecessary to worry about the election of a Parliament, or about the 
return of Zaghlul, as Kemal will redeem his promise [sic] to bring Zaghlul back himself.”100 It 
seems some Egyptian nationalists had not given up the hope of Ottomans, representing a bulwark 
against the encroachment of Western empires – an image many then associated with Mustafa 
Kemal Ataturk, delivering Egypt from the British Occupation.
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Chapter Seven: Inter-Colonial Connections, 1906-1928 
 
In addition to ties with Ottoman and European state and non-state actors, the Egyptian 
nationalist movement drew tactical inspiration and a variety of political techniques from a larger, 
trans-national, anti-colonial movement already in operation in the first decades of the twentieth 
century. In the early twentieth century, Egyptians saw their national movement as being part of a 
larger, international, anti-imperial movement. If imperialism was a general source with only 
local variations, anti-colonial movements would have to be trans-national as well in order to 
defeat it. Egyptian nationalists shared with other anti-colonial nationalists a struggle for political 
and economic independence from the same imperial system. This was especially true of Egypt’s 
connection with other countries colonized by Great Britain, particularly Ireland and India, which 
were natural allies and utilitarian partners in combating the same imperial enemy. In the first half 
of the twentieth century, British, Indian, Egyptian, and Irish elites alike believed that 
fundamental parallels existed between the countries’ historical experiences,  imperial 
governance, and resistance efforts. For this reason, Egyptians saw anti-colonial cooperation as 
the best way forward to achieve independence.  
By the first decades of the twentieth century, the struggle for autonomy from Britain had 
become the most immediate element in the nationalist struggle for all three colonies - Egypt, 
India, and Ireland. This commonality of purpose made their anti-colonial movements and 
strategies even more similar. British tactics, personalities, and policies, and the nationalist 
reaction to each, were shared across the British colonies. There was no distinction, certainly not 
in the minds of Egyptian nationalists themselves, between a commitment to territorial national 
independence and a larger anti-colonial framework, participation in which would help to ensure 
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their narrower goals of independence and territorial nationalism.1  There was a fundamentally 
utilitarian aspect to most of the nationalists’ rhetoric and alliances; keeping this fact in mind 
allows one to analyze the Egyptian nationalist movement in its entirety.  
The tendency to align the goals of specific nationalisms with wider anti-imperialist 
movements created a space for experimentation and expression among nationalists from different 
colonies and of a variety of political convictions. Thus, the Egyptian nationalist movement went 
through a process of engaging with a series of overlapping and occasionally competing 
definitions of nation that was reflected in their relationships, not only with the British and 
Ottoman Empires, but also with the movements against these empires. Despite often being 
anachronistically linked with nationalist movements in the “Middle East,” throughout the 
twentieth century, Egyptian nationalists maintained much stronger ties with other anti-British 
colonials than they ever did with other regional (or co-religious) actors, as countries occupied by 
the same imperial power would be able to cultivate more useful and strategic ties than would be 
possible with unaffiliated colonized nations. With the Indian and Irish independence movements, 
Egyptian nationalists shared not only a colonial master but concrete ties of communication and 
collaboration initially forged in the pre-War era by individuals from each of the colonies who 
grew up in a world dominated by the British Empire. Egyptians very clearly saw their 
independence movement as part of an anti-British movement; and, while understanding the 
plight of other Middle Eastern colonies, did not see themselves as having any natural alliance or 
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similarities with other groups in the region.2 In fact, most Egyptian nationalists viewed Arab 
anti-Ottoman efforts to be detrimental to their own bid for independence, as the Ottoman Empire 
was widely seen as a potential counter-weight to British control in Egypt. 
Within the general framework of the growing internationalist outlook of the early 
twentieth century, bilateral contacts between nationalists marked the first step toward solidarity 
and cooperation. According to John Stuart Mill, “Those Englishmen who know something about 
India are even now those who understand Ireland best.”3 Ireland and India are most often 
compared to one another in works on the British Empire, particularly those from the perspective 
of the Empire. But Egypt, anachronistically grouped with Middle Eastern colonies, also shared 
much with Ireland and India, in terms of both imperial policy and nationalist resistance. 
Throughout the period under consideration, British officials as well as Egyptian, Indian, and Irish 
nationalists placed the three nations within a common classification. Aside from occasional 
references to what they saw as a “Pan-Islamic” threat, the British themselves never grouped 
Egypt into discussions of Arab nationalism; nor, crucially, did the Egyptians themselves. 
Egyptian nationalist Mansur Rifa’at took the connection between the British colonies one step 
further, arguing, “As long as British imperialism continues to rule our country and to suppress 
our people, no soldier of our peoples should raise the weapons against his oppressed brothers, i.e. 
no Indian should fight in the battles of the British in Ireland and no Irish should be prepared to 
placate the Egyptians.”4  
                                                 
2 While there certainly was some cultural affinity and sympathy toward other colonized nations, Egyptian 
nationalists did not see Arab nationalist movements as integral or helpful to their own movement, as discussed in 
chapter four of this thesis. 
3 John Stuart Mill, England and Ireland (London, 1868), quoted in C.A. Bayly, “Ireland, India, and the Empire: 
1780-1914,” Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, vol. 10, no. 1 (2000), 377. Irish nationalists also famously 
sponsored Home Rule Societies in India. 
4 Der Neue Orient, Berlin, nos. 1-2, 1919, p. 33. 
178 
 
The connection between Ireland and India – both in terms of circumstances and 
leadership connections – has been increasingly validated by scholars.5 However, Egypt does not 
normally enter this discussion; yet Egypt was clearly a part of these broader movements. 
Egyptians, as well as the Indians and the Irish, placed Egypt within a self-identified group of 
anti-British, anti-colonial nationals. The growing calls for national self-determination within the 
Empire were cumulative and mutually reinforcing, and the British themselves viewed the three 
movements as dangerously interconnected.6  
For their part, the British, on the other hand, were concerned about the effect the example 
of any one of the three colonies might have on the others.7 The British were certain that 
concessions in one colony would be demanded in the others; and they clearly saw the occupation 
of and resistance from the three national groups as intimately interconnected. In the view of the 
British government, the Egyptian case was closely interlocked with the Irish problem. They saw 
a step back from anything but full power in Cairo as a warning of a possible retreat in Dublin. 
Attacking the proposals of the Milner Mission to grant Egypt greater autonomy in 1920, then 
Minister of Air Winston Churchill wrote: “If we leave out the word ‘Egypt’...and substitute the 
word ‘Ireland,’ it would with very small omissions make perfectly good sense and would 
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constitute a complete acceptance of [Irish nationalist and Sinn Fein leader] Mr. [Eamon] de 
Valera’s demands.”8  
The literature specifically on the issue of Egyptian-Indian connections is scant; and, 
while the connection between Irish and Indian nationalists has begun to be explored, Egyptian-
Irish networks have not until recently begun to receive scholarly attention.9 Similarly, with the 
exception of a few articles written on the role of India-trained British officials in Egypt, most of 
the works connecting the two regions do so in terms of Pan-Islamism or, much later, the modern 
Non-Aligned Movement. While several historians of the British Empire have shown that empire-
wide “problems” and British reactions to them should be studied in tandem, few have focused 
their attention on the interconnections between the anti-imperialist nationalists themselves.10 
Roger Owen’s article on Lord Cromer’s “Indian Experience” and his more recent book on 
Cromer address the impact of time in service of the British Raj on imperial administrators; and 
Robert Tignor has argued for the “Indianization” of the Egyptian administration under British 
authorities.11 These works explore the effect of service in India on British colonial officials in the 
first years of the Occupation of Egypt, but they are not concerned with the connections between 
Indian and Egyptian populations. Both Donald Reid and 'Afaf Marsot have also mentioned 
Cromer’s Indian ties in their works, but only Elie Kedourie’s and Jacob Landau’s works on the 
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caliphate really draw direct connections between the populations of the two colonies.12 However, 
like Martin Kramer, Kedourie and Landau place Indian-Egyptian contacts in a “Pan-Islamic” 
context, an approach that conceals more than it exposes.13 Similarly, the majority of post-World 
War I scholarship which discusses Indian-Egyptian contacts refers to Pan-Islamism and the 
Caliphate issue. However, there were other, more significant lines of communication and the 
reliance on “Islamism” as an explanation distorts the true nature of these alliances.14  
      
The Example of Ireland 
Throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, British policy makers and 
commentators, as well as Egyptians, Indians, and Irish themselves, clearly grouped Egypt within 
the nexus of an anti-British, anti-colonial, nationalist struggle. As anti-imperialist Wilfrid 
Scawen Blunt remarked, the Gladstone cabinet, which ordered repression in Ireland, was also the 
one which crushed the Egyptian national movement.15 According to Blunt, “the two causes, the 
Irish and the Egyptian, the Catholic and the Mohammedan [sic], seemed to me to stand on a 
common footing of enlightened humanity.”16 Blunt also observed that the “connection of 
misfortunes between the two countries (Egypt and Ireland) was a fatality, not a little tragical both 
in the countries themselves and doubly so to English honour.”17 According to Blunt, there was a 
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16 Wilfrid Scawen Blunt, The Secret History of the English Occupation of Egypt: Being a Personal Narrative of 
Events (New York: H. Fertig, 1922), 110. 
17 Blunt, Secret History, 110. 
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“curious connection between Egypt and Ireland in the political ideas of the day. His (Irish Peer 
Lord Miltown, 1835-1890) account of Ireland is singularly like that of Egypt by Egyptian 
officials.”18 The trajectories of Egypt and Ireland, in particular, can also be compared because 
the composition of new national leaderships did, in fact, begin to consolidate within the context 
of interrelated developments in the British imperial system.19 At least in the early inter-war 
period, Egypt and Ireland were arguably more alike than either was to India, as a result of the 
similar timelines of the 1916 Easter Uprising, the 1919 Egyptian Revolution, and the near 
simultaneous changes of status for the colonies in 1922.20  
As an inspiration and example for other nationalist movements, Irish nationalism is most 
often associated with Indian nationalism, but its influence can also be identified in Egypt, 
particularly in the 1919 Egyptian Revolution.21 The Nationalist movement in Egypt and the 
search for a constitutional settlement inevitably drew comparisons with Ireland and the 1916 
Uprising. For example, in a 1922 memo, High Commissioner Lord Edmund Allenby (1861-
1936) warned that the success of Irish nationalists might encourage Egyptians to follow similar 
methods. According to Allenby, the Irish settlement would not have much effect except to show 
Egypt that violence was the shortcut to concessions and that Egyptians would compare the 
                                                 
18 Blunt, Secret History, 220. For a biography of Wilfrid Blunt, see Elizabeth Longford, A Pilgrimage of Passion: 
the Life of Wilfrid Scawen Blunt (New York: Knopf, 1979). 
19 Rifa'at authored a book, published by the Patrie Egyptienne group in Geneva, entitled Le Probleme de L’Ulster 
1914 criticizing British policy in Ireland. (M.M. Rifa’at, et al, Le Probleme de l’Ulster: malicieuse attaque dirigee 
contre la nation Irlandaise (Geneva: Patrie Egyptienne, 1914). 
20 As a result of the Anglo-Irish Treaty, signed 6 December 1921; the Irish Free State created by the Treaty came 
into force on 6 December 1922 by royal proclamation following the approval of the Irish constitution. While it did 
not grant Ireland republican status, under the Treaty Ireland became a self-governing dominion with complete 
independence in domestic affairs, power to levy all taxes, regulate foreign trade, raise an army, and considerable 
freedom in the realm of foreign policy. A stark difference between Egypt and Ireland, however, is the rise to 
prominence of the more militant Sinn Fein movement, which displaced the moderate nationalist Irish Parliamentary 
Party following the Easter Uprising. In Egypt, on the other hand, the more radical Watani Party was replaced by the 
moderate Wafd Party following World War I and the 1919 Revolution. 
21 For examples of contemporary commentary drawing attention to the similarities between the situations in Ireland 
and Egypt, see The Times, 19 April 1919 and 20 December 1920. 
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concessions granted to Ireland with those refused to Egypt.22 In fact, Allenby’s analysis was 
proven to be correct when Egyptian nationalists went on to use the example of the Anglo-Irish 
agreement of 1921 in their own push for a guarantee of independence in 1922. 
Interestingly, while the British government remained concerned about the fraternization 
of Egyptian and Indian nationalists, it was Egypt and Ireland which they tended to group together 
in terms of policy. The very similar timelines of the two colonies, and the dual Irish and 
Egyptian “disasters” following World War I likely account for this. The Whig Party in 
Parliament, led by Lord Harrington, successfully urged “intervention,” in Egypt. Egyptian 
historian Afaf Lutfi Sayyid-Marsot attributes the internal British division on the issue of the 
status of Egypt between the more conciliatory and liberal Gladstone and the more hardline 
Whigs to a similar split on the Irish issue.23 For example, incidents in Ireland reflected heavily 
on British policy in Egypt when the brother of Lord Hartington was assassinated.24 In the 
Egyptian context, one important result of the assassination was Hartington’s (and others’) hard 
line against ‘Urabi and Egypt. As for the Tory opposition, Sir Edward Hamilton, Private 
Secretary to Gladstone, remarked in his diary in June 1882 that “Ireland has been up till now the 
chief course of their violent language; now it is Egypt as well.”25 Ireland also featured 
prominently in the journal al-‘Urwa al-Wuthqa, jointly edited by Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani and 
Muhammad Abduh and widely read by nationalists in Egypt. Under the heading Ireland, they 
wrote,  
                                                 
22 Archibald Wavell,  Allenby: A Study in Greatness (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1941.) 
23 Afaf Lutfi Sayyid-Marsot, Egypt and Cromer; a Study in Anglo-Egyptian Relations (New York: Praeger, 1969), 
22. 
24 On 5 May 1882, Lord Hartington’s brother, Lord Frederick Cavendish, who had just been appointed Chief 
Secretary in Dublin, was, together with his Permanent Secretary, murdered while returning on foot to his official 
residence. This crime became known as the Phoenix Park Murders. The assassins were associated with the Fenians 
of the Irish Republican Brotherhood. 
25 Sir E.W. Hamilton, D.W.R. Dahlman (ed.), The Diary 1880-1885 (Oxford, 1972), vol. 1,  292. 
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Every day the English put forward proof by way of logic and evidence by way of argument that 
they only went to Egypt with the intention of safeguarding the peace and laying the foundation of 
justice, but whenever they set up their premises to convince the naïve by their famous judicial 
arguments, the Irish contradict them with practical proofs which demolish their premises and 
nullify their result. For hardly a moment passes without their acting to break the power of the 
English government in Ireland.26  
 
The Egyptians were all too aware of the juxtaposition of British imperial rhetoric, which 
justified colonization on the basis of a “civilizing mission,” and the reality of Occupation. 
Irish nationalists were, likewise, interested in events taking place in Egypt. According to 
Indian nationalist Subhas Chandra Bose (1897-1945), “outside their own shores the two 
countries which interested [the Irish] the most were India and Egypt.”27 Among the foremost 
Irish supporters of Egyptian independence was Lady Gregory (1852-1932), an Irish nationalist 
who was active in the cause of Egypt and who received what she described as her “education in 
politics” from her time there.28  With her husband, Sir William Gregory, she travelled to Egypt 
in 1881; and while there, she “first felt the real excitement of politics, for [she] tumbled into a 
Revolution.”29 While in Egypt, Lord and Lady Gregory became frequent visitors to Ahmed 
‘Urabi’s house in Cairo, and Lady Gregory formed friendships with his wife and mother, as well. 
In 1882, Lady Gregory published a monograph entitled “'Urabi and His Household,” which also 
appeared serialized in The Times. Her aim was to provide a human and personal account of 
‘Urabi, counteracting the imperial propaganda, which made him out to be a bloodthirsty 
militarist, a backward fanatic, or both. ‘Urabi reciprocated her friendship and later presented her 
                                                 
26 Al-Urwa al-Wuthqa, Third edition, Beirut, 1351/1933, p. 304-5. 
27 Subhas Chandra Bose, Letters, Articles, Speeches, and Statements, 1933-1937 (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 
1994), 352. 
28 Isabella Augusta Gregory was an Irish writer and folklorist. She co-founded the Irish Literary Theatre and Abbey 
Theatre with William Butler Yeats and Edward Martyn, and was a critical force in the Irish Literary Revival of the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. James L. Pethica, ‘Gregory , (Isabella) Augusta, Lady Gregory (1852–1932),’ 
Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004; online edition, Oct 2006. 
[http://www.oxforddnb.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/view/article/33554, accessed 23 Sept 2013] 
29 Lady Gregory, Seventy Years: Being the Autobiography of Lady Gregory (New York: Macmillan, 1974), 34. 
184 
 
with his portrait, signed and dedicated to her. When the Gregorys returned to London in 1882, 
they launched a strong campaign against British interference in Egypt.30 
The British were also concerned with Irish, and particularly Irish-American, attitudes to 
British imperial action in Egypt.31 Both the Foreign Office and Cairo Embassy catalogued 
numerous newspaper clippings from Ireland and the United States critical of the British presence 
in Egypt. Importation of this “seditious” material came first from England and America in the 
shape of the Indian Sociologist of London and occasional articles in The Gaelic American of 
New York. Paris and San Francisco also became centers for the preparation and distribution of 
revolutionary print to be sent to the colonies, with the appearance of the Bande Mataram and the 
pamphlets of the Ghadr Party, respectively.32  
 
The Indian Connection 
In addition to the Irish influence, the example of India’s nationalist movement was also 
considerable for Egyptians. Beyond the truism that control of Egypt was crucial to Britain’s 
                                                 
30 Lord and Lady Gregory were closely connected to Wilfred Scawen Blunt and his anti-imperialist activities. 
31 The British were particularly concerned about the newspaper The Gaelic American.  
32 James Campbell Ker, Political Trouble in India (Delhi: Oriental Publishers, 1973), 64. The Indian Sociologist: An 
Organ of Freedom, and Political, Social, and Religious Reform was edited by Krishnavarma 1905-1914 and then 
1920-1922. Originally produced in London, publication moved to Paris in 1907 and remained there until 1914 when 
Krishnavarma moved to Geneva. While there, Krishnavarma abandoned publication under pressure from Swiss 
authorities; publication resumed in 1920, and continued until 1922. The stated purpose of The Indian Sociologist, as 
described in its first issue, was to “endeavor to inculcate the great sociological truth that ‘it is impossible to join 
injustice and brutality abroad with justice and humanity at home.’” 
The Gaelic American was a weekly publication under the same ownership as Irish Nation. The paper worked 
together with Indian nationalist organizations in Britain and the United States, including India House in London and 
its sister organizations in New York. It frequently reprinted articles from The Indian Sociologist, and Gaelic 
American editor George Freeman was an associate of Krishnavarma. The Gaelic American also developed close 
cooperation with the nationalist political journal, Free Hindustan. (Harold Fischer-Tine, “Indian Nationalism and 
the “World Forces”: Transnational and Diasporic Dimensions of the Indian Freedom Movement on the Eve of the 
First World War,” Journal of Global History, vol. 2 (2007), 325-344.) 
The first edition of Bande Mataram, self-described as “a monthly organ of Indian Independence,” is dated Geneva, 
10 September 1909, and on the front page it is stated that “all communications should be addressed to Madame 
Cama, Poste Restante, Geneva, Switzerland.” (Ker, 113) 
The Ghadr Party was founded by Punjabi Indians in the United States and Canada with the aim of liberating India 
from British rule. 
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control of India, Egyptian nationalists also recognized that Indians had been working against 
colonial control for a generation longer than they themselves had, and Egyptian activists availed 
themselves of Indian experience and support from the very beginning of the twentieth century. 33 
At international conferences as well as formal and informal meetings, Egyptians met with 
Indians and many other colonized peoples to discuss their programs, goals, and philosophies. 
Coverage of Indian affairs in the Egyptian native press also included a great deal of discussion of 
imperial and nationalist concerns; and the interaction of colonial expatriates, particularly 
students, in the European metropoles was documented by a number of contemporaries, including 
the British who remained concerned about the potential alliance. 
Cooperation between Indians and Egyptians is evident in the print materials they 
produced in this period, as well. In July 1909, the Egyptian periodical al-Hurriya published a 
series of articles examining imperialism, and compared the British imperial project in India and 
Egypt.34 One article bluntly stated that “the aim of imperialists/colonialists is well known: they 
consider the colony a milking cow to be milked for as long as possible,” and pointed out that 
Indians were “working towards national liberation more actively than...our brothers...the 
Egyptians, and establishing schools funded by wealthy Indians,” which were unmatchable steps 
when it came to the liberation of peoples and individuals.35 In their struggle for national 
liberation the Indians did not content themselves with establishing schools, the article continued, 
but founded India House, an organization that advocated political assassination as a necessary 
means for liberation, in London. Political assassination, in that case, was morally and legally 
                                                 
33 For an explanation of the theory that the British Occupation of Egypt was predicated on controlling access to 
India, see, for example, Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians: The Official Mind of 
Imperialism (London: Macmillan, 1961). For critical analysis of Robinson and Gallagher’s argument, see A.G. 
Hopkins, “The Victorians and Africa: A Reconsideration of the Occupation of Egypt, 1882,” Journal of African 
History, vol. 27 (1986) 
34 Al-Hurriya, 11 July 1909. 
35 “Kharijiyya: Shay’ ‘an al-hind: Jihad fi sabil al-Hurriya,” al-Hurriya, 24 July 1909, 14. 
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justifiable, and those who engaged in it “followed the paths of saints.”36 Al-Hurriya’s coverage 
of Indian resistance movements and assassination attempts continued throughout 1909; in each 
article, the author approved in no uncertain terms of the use of violence for national liberation. 
Hailing as a hero Madan Lal Dhingra, the student who killed Sir Curzon Wylie in London and 
was subsequently hanged, the author asserted that Lal Dhingra’s single action was greater than if 
“a million Indians bore arms to liberate India.”37 
The Indian press in Paris repeatedly proclaimed its solidarity with the Egyptian cause. 
Both sides attempted to create a common discourse of martyrdom, for instance comparing the 
fate of Madan Lal Dhingra with the execution of the “brave Egyptian martyr” Ibrahim Nassif El-
Wardani, who in February of 1910 had killed Prime Minister Butrus Ghali of Egypt in retaliation 
for his close collaboration with the British occupation.38 In October 1910, the Indian nationalist 
Shyamji Krishnavarma even offered a “thousand franc prize for an essay on the best means of 
attaining Egyptian emancipation from the robber rule of England, the common enemy of India 
and Egypt.”39 The Indian and Egyptian nationalists also exchanged material to be used for 
publication. In 1914, for instance, Indian activist Bhikaiji (Madame) Cama lent Mansur Rifa’at, 
editor of the nationalist publication La Patrie Egyptienne, blocks of photographs of the Indian 
“martyr” Dhingra, which were then published in the Egyptian journal.40 
 
                                                 
36 Ibid., 15. 
37 “Kharijiyya: Al-Hind ‘Ala tariq al-Istiqlal wa’l-Hurriyya,” al-Hurriyya, 7 August 1909, 47; Ilham Khuri-Makdisi, 
The Eastern Mediterranean and the Making of Global Radicalism, 1860-1914 (Berkeley, University of California 
Press, 2010), 109-110. 
38 Weekly Report of the Director of Criminal Intelligence, 27 September 1910, British Library, Oriental and India 
Office Collection (OIOC), POS 3095. 
39 Weekly Report of the Director of Criminal Intelligence, 8 November 1910, BL, OIOC, POS 3095. 
40 Weekly Report of the Director of Criminal Intelligence, 5 May 1914, BL, OIOC, POS 3095. For further examples 
of anti-imperialist nationalist issues addressed in La Patrie Egyptienne, see, e.g., issues of 15 February 1914 and 13 





Before World War I, the significant connections between Egyptian and Indian 
nationalists centered not in the colonies, but in the metropoles of Europe. At this time, the 
Egyptian nationalist movement was most coherently organized around the Watani Party and its 
president after 1908, Muhammad Farid. The Indian counterpart of the Watani Party, the 
“extremist” or “Tilak” group, while not organized formally as a party at all, was nevertheless the 
most visibly activist of the Indian nationalist groups both in India and abroad; and it was this 
group which reached out to Egyptian and other nationalist movements in the first decades of the 
twentieth century.41 Connections between Egyptian and the Indian nationalists were forged, then, 
between the Watanists and the “extremists,” rather than between the “moderates” of each colony 
that would eventually come to represent the nationalists of the inter-war era.42  
Watani leader Mustafa Kamil’s frequent trips abroad put him in contact with European 
sympathizers as well as other colonial nationalists who were active in European capitals. It was 
in the cities of Europe – London, Paris, Berne, Berlin, and Vienna – that concrete alliances 
between Egyptian nationalists and their counterparts from other colonies were solidified; and 
Egyptian revolutionaries living abroad had numerous, close contacts with Indian nationalists. 
Not only did Indian nationalists share a common enemy with the Egyptians, both also shared 
allies among European socialists and Irish revolutionaries. The initial contact between Egyptian 
and Indian nationalists occurred at the beginning of the twentieth century, when relatively large 
numbers of Egyptian students began to go abroad for study, mostly to France and Britain but also 
                                                 
41 Bal Gangadhar Tilak (1856-1920) had been convicted of inciting the murder of a British plague inspector in 
Poona in 1897. He had claimed that the inspector had brought his fate upon himself through his high-handed 
behavior with natives, and that the only way to make the British leave was through violence. His inspiration, along 
with that of Bipin Chandra Pal (1858-1932) and Lala Lajpat Rai  (1865-1928) led to the identification of the Indian 
nationalists who demanded a complete break with Britain as the Lal-Bal-Pal group. 
42 The Wafd and Congress Parties, respectively. 
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to Germany and Switzerland. Kamil recorded that he met Indian students during his visit to 
London the summer following Dinshawai (1906), and that the connection was continued on his 
second trip the following year.43  On 24 July 1907, Kamil attended with W.S. Blunt a reception 
held by the Pan-Islamic Society in London. ‘Abdallah Suhrawardy, a vice-president of Indian 
Home Rule Society and Honorary Secretary of the Pan-Islamic Society, welcomed the “Egyptian 
hero” thus:  
Return to your beloved country, and continue your struggle for freedom, and in moments of 
dejection and despair, remember that you are not quite alone, that henceforth the best wishes and 
dwellers of the banks of the Rhine and Danube, the Ganges and the Euphrates, accompany the 
efforts of a son of the valley of the Nile.44  
 
The exposure of Egyptians to Indians living or studying in Europe began at approximately the 
same time that students became active in forming “social” expatriate organizations, which often 
became political circles as well. Among the most famous of these salons was that of Madame 
Cama in Paris. In August 1910, Madame Cama received several visits from Mohammad Farid, 
who in 1908 had become the successor of Mustafa Kamil as the President of the Egyptian 
National Party.45 Farid mentions her warmly in his memoirs, and according to police reports, 
                                                 
43 Mustafa Kamil, Al-masa’ala as-Sharqiyya. British anti-imperialists were quick to seize the Dinshawai incident to 
criticize the actions of Cromer in Egypt. Wilfrid Blunt, who had earlier supported Urabi, now received Kamil for the 
first time and penned a bitter pamphlet, Atrocities of Justice under British Rule in Egypt (London: T.F. Unwin, 
1906). Later he and his supporters subscribed over £200 for the construction of a school in Dinshawai. His views 
found support among such writers as George Bernard Shaw, who described the Dinshawai Incident in his preface to 
John Bull’s Other Island (New York: Brentano, 1907), and were echoed in the House of Commons by the Irish 
nationalists and the Radical wing of the Liberal Party. Sir Edward Grey, the Foreign Secretary, was subjected to 
recurrent and hostile questioning, especially by the Irish MP John Dillon (1851-1927), about British rule in Egypt 
(Hansard, 4th series, House of Commons, CLVII, 1366f; CLIX, 361, 956, 1111, 1133-35, 1411-1414); and a group 
of Radicals, headed by John M. Robertson, formed the “Egyptian Committee” to investigate conditions in that 
country. (Arthur Goldschmidt, The Nationalist Party of Egypt, PhD Dissertation, Harvard University, 1968, p. 131-
2) 
44 Indulal Yajnik, Shyamaji Krishnavarma, Life and Times of an Indian Revolutionary (Bombay: Lakshmi 
Publications, 1950), 208-9. 
45 Bhikaji Rustom Cama (1861-1936) was posthumously named the “mother of the Indian revolution.” Born to a 
wealthy Parsi family, Cama went to Paris to recover from the plague in 1901. She spent most of her life in Europe 
working on behalf of Indian independence, only returning to India, negotiated under certain conditions, in 1935. 
Muhammad Lutfi Goma’a wrote a moving eulogy to Cama a year after her death, “Wataniyyat al-parsee fil hind wa 
man takun Madam Cama,” Muhallat al-Rabita al-‘Arabiyya, 6 October 1937 (Issue 70), p. 12-15, which was 
reprinted in M.L. Goma’a, Mabahith fi al-Tarikh (Cairo: ‘Alam al-Kutub, 2001). 
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Farid was introduced to Madame Cama by French Socialist Jean Longuet (1876-1938.)46 Both 
Farid and British Criminal Intelligence noted that Cama’s home was a gathering place for 
activists from India, Egypt, Ireland, and other colonies, as well as members of the early Socialist 
movement.47 Among Madame Cama’s many regular visitors, in addition to Farid, were Shayamji 
Krishnavarma, Jean Longuet, the Khedive ‘Abbas Hilmi, and the M.P. of the Socialist Party in 
Britain, Kier Hardie.48 
The connections between these anti-British, anti-colonial nationalists became deeper and 
more comprehensive during the first decade of the twentieth century when nationalist 
movements in Asia and Europe were becoming more active and garnering more national and 
international attention. An “Indo-Egyptian Nationalist Association” was founded in London in 
January 1909, the objectives of which were “to promote social intercourse between Indians and 
Egyptians, and thus to bring the two nations into contact with each other in order to gain India 
for the Indians and Egypt for the Egyptians.”49 The British authorities at the time consoled 
themselves with the thought that this Indo-Egyptian Association was not closely related to the 
Egyptian Students Association, the largest Egyptian association in England, “as the majority of 
                                                                                                                                                             
Prior to the 1910 Egyptian Congress, Madame Cama  received many visits from a man “who came to her house in a 
motor car,” according to British intelligence. The man was later recognized as Farid. Korshed Adi Sethna, Madame 
Bhikhaiji Rustom Cama (New Delhi: Publications Division, Govt. of India, 1987), 81. 
46 Many of the India House members who later joined Cama’s salons in 1909 had decidedly socialist leanings, not in 
small part because of the considerable support they had been given by the French, and even British, Socialist Parties. 
They also admired the Russian anti-Tsarists, both for their ideology and their methods. Indeed, Cama had said that 
“only Russian methods” would free India. In addition, the manual on how to make bombs that Savarkar used and 
sent to India was procured by Cama from Russian revolutionaries in Paris. (NAI: Foreign Department, Secret 
Internal, Feb 1910, nos. 56-59, and NAI: Home, Political Department, October 1910, Nos. 1-18 B, quoted in Indulal 
Yajnik, Shyamaji Krishnavarma: Life and Times of an Indian Revolutionary (Bombay: Lakshmi, 1950), 234;) 
47 Muhammad Farid, Mudhakirrati ba’ad al-hijra (1904-1919), Ed. ‘Asim ad-Desuqi, collected in Awraq 
Muhammad Farid, Vol. I (Cairo: Al-Haya Misriyya al-‘amma lil Kitab, 1978), 210-15. 
48 Shyamji Krishna Varma (1857-1930) was an Indian nationalist, lawyer, and journalist. Krishnavarma founded the 
Indian Home Rule Society and India House in London in 1905, as well as publishing the influential Indian 
Sociologist. Krishnavarma moved to Paris in 1907, fearing prosecution from British authorities. 
James Kier Hardie (1856-1915) was a Scottish socialist and the first independent Labour Member of Parliament. He 
was  active in anti-colonial causes, and was eulogized as the most loved and most hated man in Britain by the 
Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. 
49 NAI: Home, Political Department, July 1909, No. 19. 
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Egyptians,” according to the British, “hate Indians.”50 Whatever the opinions of the Egyptian 
Association, the Watani-sympathetic Egyptians cultivated long-term working and personal 
relationships with Indian nationalists. Watanist ‘Issam Diya al-Din claimed that Muhammad 
Farid was turned to the use of secret societies and violence directly by his association with Irish 
and Indian revolutionaries. Diya al-Din noted that Farid’s paper, al-Liwa, reported – indeed, 
celebrated – nationalist violence in India, particularly by students, in at least six articles between 
May 1908 and January 1909.51 According to London intelligence, a meeting of Watani 
nationalists was held at Caxton Hall in London in 1909 to express support for the decision of the 
Indian nationalists to hold a congress at Nagpur. A noticeable feature of this meeting was the 
attempt to create an entente with other oppressed nationalities, including Persians, the Young 
Turk Party, Young Egyptians, and the Irish.52  
In addition to the many anti-colonial and nationalist conferences held in Europe in the 
pre-War period, there is considerable evidence of personal friendships between Indian and 
Egyptian nationalists. Indian and Egyptian activists in Berlin often worked together. Indian 
nationalist P.T. Acharya, for instance, thought that his Egyptian friends in Berlin were “better” 
than his Indian ones. He knew Mansur Rifa’at from the time of Indian-Egyptian cooperation in 
the context of the Egyptian national Congress held in Brussels in 1910.53 Similarly, Muhammad 
Farid remembered prominent Indian revolutionary “Chatto” (Virendranath Chattopadhyaya) 
                                                 
50 NAI: Home, Political Deposit, April 1909, no. 21-26. The British were particularly wary of the political activities 
of students in Europe. One can only assume that the British presumed there would be discord between Egyptian and 
Indian nationalists because of the British government’s own obsession with casting populations in terms of religion. 
51 Issam Diya’ al-Din, Al-hizb al-watani wa al-nidal al-sirri, 1907-1915 (Cairo: al-Hay’ah al-Misriyal al-Ammah lil-
Kitab, 1987), 65. In 1899, Mustafa Kamil bought a printing press in Europe, hired a small Egyptian staff, and 
published the first issue of al-Liwa (The Banner) on 2 January 1900. Although its circulation was modest for the 
first few years (estimated at 1500-2000 copies per day in 1903), al-Liwa was soon recognized as the foremost 
spokesman for Egyptian nationalism. (Arthur Goldschmidt, Jr., “The Egyptian Nationalist Party,” (Unpublished PhD 
Dissertation, Harvard University, 1968), 105). 
52 Secret DCI, Calcutta, B. February 1909, Nos. 2-11; Secret No. 3, March 1909, Nos. 148-150; FO No. 104620, 9 
July 1919, Basil Thompson to R. Graham, Memo on Indian and Egyptian Conspirators in England, Directorate of 
Intelligence, Special Report No. 3, Confidential. 
53 Extract from a letter dated 4 September 1923, Berlin No. 21, from P.T. Acharya, BL, OIOC, L P&J 12 102. 
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fondly in his memoirs, and the Criminal Intelligence Division reported that Chattopadhyaya 
moved into the same building as Farid in Paris when his own flat was being remodeled.54 
Another Indian “said to be an intimate friend of Madan Lal Dhingra” stopped in Egypt on the 
way back to India from England to visit the Watanist Hamid al-Ahly.55 The two had apparently 
been friends at Oxford; and Har Dayal stayed with one of the members of Nassif al-Wardani’s 
secret society when he initially went to Constantinople.56     
Among the most important Indian influences on Egyptian nationalism, and particularly 
worrying from the perspective of the British government, was the “notorious” Shayamji 
Krishnavarma.57 An accomplished scholar of Sanskrit and the first Indian M.A. from Oxford, 
Krishnavarma had established the Indian Home Rule Society in London in 1905. He also 
established a fellowship in honor of his hero Herbert Spencer for Indian students to study in 
England on condition of not accepting employment in the Indian Government afterwards. His 
friend Sardarsingh Rewabhai Rana (1878-1957), a merchant in Paris, established three more 
scholarships the same year with the same conditions. In response to concerns that the Spencer 
and Shivaji scholars would not be able to find lodging in the colleges, Krishnavarma established  
                                                 
54 NAI: Home, Political B, June 1912, no. 37-40, p. 12. 
55 NAI: Home, Political B, October 1910, no. 1-8, CID Weekly Report, 6 September 1910; PRO: FO 371/894, p. 8-
9. 
56 Lala Har Dayal (1881-1949) gave up his Government of India scholarship to Oxford when he came to the 
conclusion it was a form of accepting British claims on India. He was one of the foremost Indian revolutionaries and 
continued his activism from the United States, starting the “Ghadr movement.” By 1918, however, he had changed 
his mind entirely, and became a supporter of Britain’s role in India. Har Dayal was also a key organizer of one of the 
major “Pan-Islamic” plots of World War I, a plan to set up a Provisional Government of India in Afghanistan and 
convince the ruler to join in an attack on northern India. The plot has been examined extensively in the literature on 
Pan-Islamism, as much of the funding was provided by the Ottomans. However, the group of Indians who went to 
Afghanistan included Har Dayal’s Ghadr colleague Barakutallah, along with a Hindu prince, Raja Mahendra Pratap, 
who had contacted Chattopadhyaya through Krishnavarma. Though the group met with Mehmed V, Enver Pasha, 
and even the Khedive before starting for Afghanistan, the prominence of Hindus in the plan indicates an anti-British 
alliance even more than “Pan-Islamism.” The Indians did indeed set up a Provisional Government of India and tried 
to coordinate an uprising in India with an attack from Afghanistan. The discovery of the “Silk Letter Plot” by 
Criminal Intelligence may have prevented considerable complications for the British during the War. For Har 
Dayal’s biography, see Emily Brown, Lala Har Dayal: Hindu Revolutionary and Rationalist (Tucson, AZ: 
University of Arizona Press, 1975.) 
57 “Notorious,” according to The Times of London. 
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a boarding house and cultural center named India House in Highgate.58 The house soon became 
the central headquarters for “revolutionary Indians” and was called the “most dangerous 
organization outside India.”59 India House was shut down by British authorities one month after 
the assassination of Sir William Curzon-Wylie (1848-1909), although most of the residents 
relocated to an “Indian Restaurant” at Red Lion Passage.60 Most of the India House group left 
England within the year because of intense police scrutiny, although the group quickly 
reorganized around Madame Cama in Paris. 
 
Nationalist Journalism in European Metropoles 
The decade immediately preceding the First World War witnessed an explosion of 
nationalist journalism in both Egypt and India. While there has been considerable scholarly 
interest shown in the effect of these papers on their local readers, their role as avenues of 
communication across colonies has attracted less attention, except with respect to the alarm 
about increasing “Pan-Islamism.” However, the horizontal communication provided by these 
publications was actually more crucial to the unification of nationalist elites from various 
colonies. These papers shared not only articles, but sometimes mailings, and, occasionally, 
personnel. In addition, as a result of the circulation of these publications, prominent nationalists 
were able to share strategies and information. There was considerable interaction between the 
editors and promoters of these organs, which demonstrates not only the increasing sophistication 
of the nationalists but also the international character of their movements. However, crucially, 
these print media were not generally distributed vertically, leaving domestic populations 
separated from nationalist leaders in Europe. Therefore, these publications helped to create a 
                                                 
58 Hugh O’Donnel introduced Mustafa Kamil to India House during his visit to Britain in July 1906. 
59 Valentine Chirol, Indian Unrest (London: Macmillan, 1910), 148; Khan, 61-2. 
60 HO 144/AI/180952. 
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trans-national anti-colonial elite without, particularly in the Egyptian case, necessarily 
motivating or organizing their potential domestic constituency.  
Throughout the cities of Europe, anti-colonial nationalists traded and shared publications 
in attempts to advertise their respective causes and coordinate information and strategies. Among 
the most well-known nationalist publications was Krishnavarma’s The Indian Sociologist, which 
functioned as the official organ of the Indian nationalist Home Rule Society.61 The banner of the 
Sociologist included a quote from Herbert Spencer, “Resistance to aggression is not simply 
justifiable but imperative, non-resistance hurts both altruism and egoism.”62 The publication 
carried articles on a number of colonial matters, including issues that affected Irish and Egyptian 
nationalists. For example, in addition to publishing La Marseillaise in Urdu, Hindi, Gujarati, 
Bengali, and Marathi for his readers, Krishnavarma included prominent articles on Ireland and 
Egypt. Banned in India, notes on the articles and circulation of The Indian Sociologist were a 
regular feature in British Criminal Intelligence Division reports.63 It was institutions like India 
House and The Indian Sociologist which led to the creation of a supervisory office for Indians 
abroad, who were “liable to drift into bad company.”64 This “bad company” often included 
Egyptian students, and a similar office was subsequently created to track Egyptian movements. 
The authorities were well aware of the importance of the press in the nationalist 
movements, as evidenced by the fact that a weekly Report of the Vernacular Press was compiled 
for the intelligence services of both the Government of India and the Egyptian Ministry of the 
Interior. The difficulties of controlling the “native presses” of the colonies and their European 
counterparts were complicated by the multiple jurisdictions the British authorities attempted to 
                                                 
61 The Indian Sociologist was started in London by Krishnavarma in January 1905, and appeared regularly every 
month until July 1914. 
62 Emily Brown, Har Dayal, Hindu Revolutionary and Rationalist (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1975.) 
63 Khan, 62-3. 
64 FO 371/1363; note from India Office to Grey, p. 65. 
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juggle. The anti-colonial movement extended across the globe, so that British measures to cope 
with increasing rebellion in their colonies in the early twentieth century had them searching for 
seditious mailings from the United States, Switzerland, and France, as well as Germany and 
Russia. According to J.C. Ker of the Indian Civil Service, “The censorship imposed on 
mails…during World War One…indicated the magnitude of the evil, and the extent to which the 
measures adopted [by the British government] in times of peace were defective.”65 
For example, Al-Liwa and its European language versions often carried articles from 
Krishnavarma’s Indian Sociologist and Cama’s Bande Mataram. Indeed, one of the reasons for 
the existence of The Egyptian Standard and L’Etendard Egyptienne (the English and French 
versions of al-Liwa, respectively) was to communicate with sympathizers from other 
movements, including the Indian and Irish nationalists, as well as Socialists and European 
sympathizers.66 A newspaper funded by Madame Cama was started in Berlin in 1911 as well; the 
publication Talvar was edited by Chattopadhyaya and modeled on Bande Mataram, but couched 
toward a German audience, an idea that Savarkar had pushed before his arrest.67 In late 1909, 
Krishnavarma also printed an article in the Sociologist  
bringing to the notice of the Indian Nationalists the names of two new allies, Egypt-Organ of 
Egyptian Independence and the Islamic Fraternity – an organ devoted to promoting fraternal 
                                                 
65 Ker, 64 
66 The Standard was staffed by young Irish nationalists. The successor to William Maloney as Editor of The 
Egyptian Standard was Frederick Ryan, who had been active in the Sinn Fein League. (FO 371/448, J.B. Dinghooly 
to Grey, Dublin Castle, 21 January 1908. Ryan later worked with Blunt on Egypt and died suddenly while visiting 
him in April 1913. (Wilfrid Scawen Blunt, My Diaries; being a personal narrative of events, 1888-1914 (London: T. 
Fisher Unwin, 1932)824f)) Expatriate Russian socialist, Theodore Rothstein (1871-1953) also worked for The 
Standard and  later wrote Egypt’s Ruin (London: Eifield, 1910), a critique of Cromer’s claim that he had regenerated 
Egypt financially. After the Bolshevik Revolution, Rothstein returned to Russia and became Soviet Ambassador to 
Iran. The Standard became a weekly in April 1909 and gradually faded out of existence. Attempts to revive the 
French version, l’Etendard, proved abortive and the Nationalists thereafter adopted a policy of subsidizing Egypt’s 
numerous independent European newspapers. There was considerable criticism within the Party of Farid’s decision 
to terminate the European-language papers. (Muhammad Farid, Awraq Muhammad Farid (Cairo: Al-Haya Misriyya 
al-‘amma lil Kitab, 1978), 11f; Goldschmidt “Egyptian Nationalist Party,”192-3.  
67 Talvar’s inaugural edition in November 1909 carried an article praising Wardani. 
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feelings among the followers of Islam and those of other sister religions, the former published at 
Geneva and edited by our friend Mr. Mahomet Loutfi Goumah [sic].68   
 
The latter paper referred to by Krishnavarma, Islamic Fraternity, was co-edited from Tokyo by 
an Egyptian named Ahmad Fadli and an Indian national, Mohammad Barakatullah.69 According 
to The Indian Sociologist, both new papers contained “articles on subjects of vital interest and 
importance not only to the followers of the Prophet, but also to all who cherish the idea of 
National renaissance.”70  
The crucial problem of these publications, the goal of which was to rouse nationalist 
feeling, was the difficulty in distributing them to the colonies. Of the papers handed back and 
forth among the students in Madame Cama’s salon, only L’Humanite was fully legal in India. In 
Egypt, the articles from the “objectionable” papers were re-printed in al-Liwa or similar papers, 
despite regular reprimands and censored sections. Even within Europe, the papers caused trouble 
for British authorities. The British Socialist publication Justice consistently criticized actions 
taken against Egyptian or Indian activists. Blunt’s Egypt-Organ of Egyptian Independence was 
barred from the country for which it was named in 1912 for its criticism of the new Consul 
General, Lord Kitchener.71 And Blunt’s book India under Ripon had already been banned by the 
Government of India, leading to a flurry of articles in the London Press and even a question in 
                                                 
68 Islamic Fraternity was started in Tokyo, early in 1910, by Muhammad Barakatullah. Ahmed Hafiz Mohammad  
Barakatullah (1859-1927) was a Bhopal native who had become friends with the India House group while studying 
in England. He spent most of his life outside of India working to expel the British. Although remembered as a “Pan-
Islamist,” he was also instrumental in Indian nationalist organizations in the United States, Germany, and Russia. He 
was a professor of Urdu in Tokyo for several years before going to the United States. During the First World War, 
he worked with the Indian Independence Committee in Berlin and then traveled to Afghanistan with other activists 
to set up a provisional government of India there. After the Armistice, and the withdrawal of Afghani support, 
Barakatullah returned to Berlin where he worked, with the funding of the Comintern, on Indian nationalist 
propaganda. 
69 NAI: Foreign Department, Secret Internal, January 1913, no. 1, Macdonald to Grey, 15 October 1915.  
70 Yajnik, 285; Khan, 90-93. 
71 PRO 307/1363, Kitchener to Grey, Cairo, 4 April 1912, No. 38. 
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Parliament.72 Of the openly revolutionary pamphlets, Bande Mataram and the Indian Sociologist 
were printed in Paris and Geneva. As a result, these, like Talvar and The Gaelic American were 
far outside the reach of British authorities. Thus, papers had to be stopped upon entry into the 
colonies rather than at their source. The Gaelic American was only banned in India when 
customs officials discovered that copies of the Sociologist, Talvar, and Bande Mataram were 
being wrapped inside it in New York before it was sent on to India.73 Similarly, the Government 
of India had placed Egyptian papers al-Liwa and al-Mu'ayyad on a watch list. Of course, none of 
these papers were illegal in Britain itself; therefore they could be read by correspondents abroad 
and paraphrased at home. Many Egyptian papers used this method to get information that 
Reuters was not allowed to cable to them directly; al-Jarida occasionally devoted entire articles 
to such news.  
The role of activists of other nationalities in helping the Indians and the Egyptians was 
also crucial. Both the Egyptian and Indian extremist journals also carried notes from The Gaelic 
American74 and the British paper Justice. In fact, the Egyptian Standard was edited by Irishmen 
associated with the “Sinn Fein League,” a fact that did not escape the notice of British 
authorities.75 Under the editorship of Frederick Ryan, who served as an editor of Mustafa 
Kamil’s al-Liwa in Cairo, the Standard also carried occasional articles from Blunt’s Egypt, 
which Ryan had also previously edited. Furthermore, Barakatullah had founded a “Pan-Aryan 
Association” in New York with the help of the Indian nationalist S.L. Joshi, George Freeman of 
                                                 
72 Wilfrid Scawen Blunt, India under Ripon: a Private Diary (London: T.F. Unwin, 1909.) 
73 NAI, Home Political B, Nov 1910, #17-24, p. 8-10. 
74 The Gaelic American was owned and run out of New York by George Freeman, an Irish  nationalist and, 
according to PRO documents, a Sinn Fein contact. (It should be noted, however, that British authorities tended to 
name any Irish nationalist activities as connected to “Sinn Fein,” so his association with the party is not clear.) 
75 William Maloney and then Frederick Ryan ran the Standard. See PRO: FO 371/248; file 14376. Cromer to Grey, 
27 April 1907, no. 72 and FO 371/448, J.B. Dinghooly to Grey, Dublin Castle, 21 January 1908. 
197 
 
the Gaelic American, and John Devay of Clan Na-Gael.76 From 1909 to shortly before World 
War I, Egyptian Watanist Mansour Rifa’at helped edit the Sociologist on occasion; and probably 
served as the unnamed correspondent who sent articles from it and Bande Mataram to al-Liwa.  
However, despite the widespread practice of publishing anti-colonial tracts in Europe, as 
the First World War loomed, fewer European powers were willing to tolerate these publications 
within their borders. Fearing increasing repression, Egyptians like Mansur Rifa’at had already 
made their move to Switzerland before the beginning of the War and began publishing their 
newspapers there, especially in Geneva. However, it soon turned out that, due to wartime 
pressures, the Swiss authorities were less willing to tolerate such activities on their territory than 
Indian and Egyptian nationalists had hoped. The August 1914 edition of Mansur Rifa’at’s 
newspaper, La Patrie Egyptienne, in print from January 1914, was confiscated by the authorities 
at Geneva.77 Soon after, the Swiss police seized 1500 copies of a book dedicated to Savarkar and 
encouraging Indian troops to revolt, for which Rifa’at had written the preface. The author’s 
newspaper, La Depeche Suisse, was also outlawed; and Rifa’at was expelled from Switzerland.78 
 
Controversy Surrounding the Egyptian National Congress in Paris  
Anti-colonial nationalist bonds extended beyond the realm of publishing. From 1909 on, 
Egyptian activists increasingly attracted the attention of the British political police with British 
officials first noting the Egyptians in relation to the Indians in France. The police argued that the 
creation of a spirit of cooperation between the two groups was one of the primary goals of the 
                                                 
76 NAI: Foreign Department, Secret Internal, February 1910, nos. 56-59. 
77 La Patrie was the official paper of Rifa'at’s brainchild Club des Patriotes Egyptiens in Geneva, which probably 
shared considerable membership with Farid’s own Society for the Progress of Islam, which published Progress de 
l’Islam / Terreki Islam from 1913. (Farid, 101; ‘Issam Diya al-Din al-Sayyid Ali Al-Saghir, al-Hizb al-Watani wa-
al-nidal a-sirri 1907-1915 (Cairo: Al-Haya Misriyya al-‘amma lil Kitab, 1987), 259. 
78 Weekly Report of the Director of Criminal Intelligence, 15 December 1914; Weekly Reports of the Director of 
Criminal Intelligence, 29 December 1915, BL, OIOC, POS 3095. 
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Paris Indians.79 British officials became particularly concerned when in 1909 a Parisian “Indo-
Egyptian Club” was founded.80 There, the cooperation between Indian and Egyptian nationalists 
developed on a broader scale in the course of the preparations for an Egyptian National Congress 
which was to be held in Paris from 22 to 26 September 1910.81  
 
 
Assassination as Politics: Dhingra and al-Wardani  
One of the most oft-cited connections between Indian and Egyptian pre-War 
revolutionary tactics was the similarity between two infamous assassins, Indian nationalist 
Madan Lal Dhingra (1883-1909) and Egyptian Ibrahim Nassif al-Wardani (1886-1910.)82 While 
studying in England, Dhingra assassinated Sir William Curzon-Wylie in July 1909. Wardani, a 
pharmacology graduate who had just returned to Egypt from Great Britain, assassinated Egyptian 
Prime Minister Butrus Ghali in February 1910.83   
                                                 
79 Weekly Report of the Director of Criminal Intelligence, March 14, 1911, BL, OIOC, POS 3095. 
80 Weekly Report of the Director of Criminal Intelligence, January 30, 1909; Weekly Report of the Director of 
Criminal Intelligence, February 27, 1909; Weekly Report of the Director of Criminal Intelligence, March 13, 1909, 
BL, OIOC, POS 3094. 
81 Indeed, Indian nationalists delayed one of their own conferences in order to have it coincide with the Egyptian 
meeting. (Weekly Report of the Director of Criminal Intelligence, 30 August 1910; Weekly Report of the Director 
of Criminal Intelligence, 6 September 1910, BL, OIOC, POS 3095.) 
In the weeks before the congress, in a symbolic gesture of solidarity, the Indian nationalists Aiyar, Chattopadhyaya, 
and Acharya began to “wear the fez in imitation of the Egyptians.” (Weekly Report of the Director of Criminal 
Intelligence, October 11, 1910, BL, OIOC, POS 3095.) The invitations to the Congress had been sent out by Farid’s 
mistress “Aziza de Rocheburne” and a student named Hamid al-Ahly, noted by the British as an “extreme Egyptian 
nationalist.” (FO 371/1364, Kitchener to Grey, 27 October 1912, no. 117; “L’interdiction du congres jeun-egyptien,” 
Liberte, 16/17 September 1910.) The close cooperation between the nationalist liberation movements of India and 
Egypt abroad was further strengthened in 1910 when Virendranath Chattopadhyaya (1880-1937), V.V.S. Aiyar 
(1881-1925), and other revolutionaries left London and settled in Paris after the arrest of V.D. Savarkar (1883-1966) 
by the British police. 
82 The assassination of Curzon-Wylie by Dhingra deeply affected British authorities, not least because Dhingra’s 
declared motive was to rouse his countrymen against the British Government of India, which was already under 
considerable pressure from the uproar surrounding the 1906 partition of the Province of Bengal. (By 1907, there 
already had been several murders in India, and authorities feared that the unrest was spreading beyond Bengal.) 
(Khan, 63) 
83 Wardani was condemned to be executed for his crime. Khedive ‘Abbas Hilmi, who had the option to commute the 
sentence, did not exercise it. Since the Grand Mufti had issued a decision that the requirements for imposing the 
death penalty under Islamic law had not been met, ‘Abbas Hilmi’s refusal to pardon Wardani set the Khedive at 
odds with the religious authorities. (FO 371/890, Gorst to Grey, No. 20991, 4 June 1910.) The Grand Mufti refused 
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Indian nationalist Krishnavarma was accused by both the press and Dhingra’s family of 
having inspired the crime. In response, Krishnavarma wrote to the Daily Telegraph in July 1909 
to state “that political assassination is no murder,” despite denying his own involvement in the 
assassination and affirming his personal respect for the victim.84 A violent debate was also 
conducted in The Times, the Daily Telegraph, and London’s broadsides and pamphlets about the 
moral culpability of the Englishmen who published and distributed the Sociologist, as well as 
those who had argued for clemency for Dhingra or sympathy for his ends, if not his means. In the 
fallout of the affair, Arthur Horsely and Guy Aldred, the successive printers of the Indian 
Sociologist, became the first Englishmen to be imprisoned for Indian nationalist activities.85 
Though the Indian reaction to the assassination of Curzon-Wylie was rather muted, the 
Egyptian response to Dhingra’s crime was very much in line with what Dhingra had been trying 
to accomplish in India.86 While the pro-British paper al-Muqattam ignored the news about 
Dhingra entirely, al-Liwa, now under the management of Watani Party Secretary Sheikh ‘Abd 
al-‘Aziz Jawish, expressed open adulation, according Dhingra the title of hero and then martyr.87 
                                                                                                                                                             
to issue a fatwa sanctioning Wardani’s execution, and numerous efforts were made to spare his life. Nevertheless, 
Wardani was hanged in extreme secrecy on 28 June 1910, exactly four years after the Dinshawai executions. 
84 Daily Telegraph, 24 July 1909, p.1; Khan, 71. 
85 Yajnik, 272; and James Campbell Ker, Political Trouble in India: 1907-1917 (Delhi: Oriental Publishers, 1973), 
175. Horsely was convicted on 23 July 1909, and Aldred on 10 September 1909. The Sociologist was subsequently 
printed in Paris. Guy Aldred (1886-1933) remained a political activist and organized the Savarkar Release 
Committee two years later. He remained in contact with and helped another India House friend, Har Dayal, as late as 
the First World War, and he wrote an account of some of these events in The Golden Echo (New York: Harcourt and 
Brace, 1954.) 
86 The British cited Jawish’s article in the 17 August 1909 issue of al-Liwa as particularly inflammatory. The article, 
titled “al-Yawm Yuqtil Dhingra” (“Today Dhingra Will be Killed”), was an unapologetic panegyric of Dhingra, who 
was to be executed that day; and the article was deemed dangerous by the British authorities for its potential to incite 
copycat assassinations. (FO 141/492, 3 May 1910, Ronald Graham to Sir Eldon Gorst; al-Liwa, 17 August 1909. al-
Liwa, 17 August 1909. For a translation see James Alexander, The Truth about Egypt (London: Casell Press, 1911), 
264) For this article, in addition to receiving another fine, Jawish was sentenced to prison. 
87 In addition to often alienating the few Copts who belonged to the Watani Party, Jawish’s frequent invectives also 
bothered the more liberal and secular Muslim segments of Egyptian society. While these groups were the minority 
of Egypt’s population, they were the ones with the most financial and political power, and the main source of funds 
for the nationalist movement. Despite his popularity with some, Jawish played a key role in the breakdown of the 
Watani Party, both in terms of  its waning local popularity and  the decision to support the Central Powers in the 
First World War. Nevertheless, Jawish’s resilience and ability to remain a significant factor in Egyptian civil, if not 
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The paper received a formal warning from the Egyptian Government on August 25, 1909, after it 
published an article and a poem glorifying Dhingra.88 Placards praising Dhingra were also 
distributed in Ireland, believed by the British Parliament to be the result of Kier Hardie’s 
influence.89 Egyptian poet ‘Ali al-Ghayati eulogized Dhingra in the pages of al-Liwa in “To 
Dhingra, after execution:”  
How can I eulogize you, Dhingra, in words; the nation alleges it would be a crime to do so. /You 
were a bold man, jealous of the honor of your country;/ you were free from the blemish of 
submissiveness and cowardice. /Life impelled you towards death, /so that even the sentence of 
death and the impending execution did not frighten you. /Then you gave up life rejoicing, and the 
sentence passed was executed. /You died yesterday, and your death is but another name for life; 
/your memory will be perpetuated for all time to come. /So greetings to you while tears are 
flowing; /and greetings while the heart is ablaze with anger. /And greetings to you; you are both 
alive and dead; /The Nile and the pyramids present their greeting to you. /O young man of India, 
within the soul is a hidden grief which is excited by pain. /I intended to display it on the day of 
your death; /But the authorities came in between me and the grief (i.e. fear of the authorities would 
not permit me to do so). /But it will soon become manifest after some time passed; /And the 
neglectful nation will know that we are not asleep.90  
 
The Foreign Secretary’s office authorized the formal government warning to al-Liwa from 
London, writing in the margins of the report, “[T]his seems to be a case in which action should 
certainly be taken. Otherwise the bad effects of the article may not be confined to Egypt.”91 The 
Government of India declared that the poem brought “into contempt or hatred the Government 
established by law in British India or [excited] disaffection towards said Government.”92 Indeed, 
                                                                                                                                                             
political, society even after World War One (in fact, he was far more successful than many other Watanists in 
staking out a position following the First World War) has been little appreciated. Upon returning to Egypt following 
the War, Jawish remained active in religious groups, including being one of the founders of the Young Men’s 
Muslim Association. Although marginalized from nationalist politics after 1919 by the Wafd, Jawish was eulogized 
at his death by Ahmad Shawqi. (Khan, 57-8.) 
88 Rather ironically, Prime Minister Butrus Ghali was concerned that “some over-strung student or ignorant peasant 
of bemused hashash [would] emulate the Indian assassin at the expense of some Egyptian official, conceivably 
himself.” (FO 371/660, letter no. 98, 20 August 1909. ) 
89 The Parliamentary Debates, HOC, 10th Volume of session from 30 August to September 1909, column 18. 
90 Translation of the Government of India in NAI, Home, Political A, October 1910, #81-84A, p. 17; Khan, 74-5. Ali 
al-Ghayati  was an Azharite well known for his poems. He eventually settled in Geneva, where he spent 27 years. 
While there, he published Minbar al-Sharq in Arabic and its French version La Tribune d’Orient from 1922 to 1937. 
He returned to Egypt in 1938 and continued publishing the Arabic version of the paper  until his death. The paper’s 
masthead carried the slogan, “The East for Easterners.” 




the poem was included by al-Ghayati in his book Wataniyati (My Patriotism) and smuggled into 
India within the year.93  
When Nassif al-Wardani shot Coptic Egyptian Prime Minister Butrus Ghali (1846-1910) 
on 10 February 1910, nine months after the assassination of Sir Curzon-Wylie, it was also a 
publicly declared political murder. Wardani was arrested on the spot and questioned by the 
Parquet. Upon his arrest, Wardani called the killing of Ghali a patriotic act. Ghali had just argued 
for the extension of the Suez Canal Company’s concession, and Wardani was one of a number of 
nationalists who believed that Ghali was a traitor who served British, rather than Egyptian, 
interests. In addition to extending the Canal’s concession, Wardani claimed that Ghali, by his 
support for the renewal of the Press Law of 1881, and through his role as a Native Judge in the 
Dinshawai trials of 1906, had betrayed the country by accepting the portfolio of Prime Minister 
when no other Egyptian was willing to take it under the conditions imposed by the British.94 The 
Egyptian Gazette, the organ of the British community in Egypt, blamed the assassination directly 
on Nationalist agitation against the Canal project, writing that the Government’s decision to 
include the Assembly in the extension vote had been taken as a sign of Egyptian weakness and 
had inflamed the peoples’ emotions. The article further argued that the assassination should be 
inducement to the British Foreign Office to take stock of the situation in Egypt brought about by 
its changes in policy following Cromer’s retirement. The paper placed the responsibility for the 
policy of allowing the Assembly a voice in the Canal vote directly on the Foreign Office, arguing 
that Gorst would not have advised it; and that, now, perhaps, the Liberal Government in Britain 
would return to the old policies employed by Cromer.95 
                                                 
93 Ironically, al-Ghayati would support Britain during World War I in the pages of his Geneva journal La Tribune 
d’Orient, arousing the ire of the Watanists. 
94 PRO FO 371/890 Gorst to Grey, Cairo, 24 February 1910, no. 2 
95 The Egyptian Gazette, 21 February 1910, p.3; Carter, The Copts in Egyptian Politics, 294. 
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The assassination of Butrus Ghali also complicated sectarian issues within the nationalist 
movement and Egypt at large. As a result of the communal politics of a Coptic Prime Minister 
being assassinated by a Muslim Egyptian, the immediate result of Wardani’s crime was not to 
raise nationalist spirits so much as to exacerbate communal tensions.96 Much was made of the 
fact that Wardani was a Muslim and his victim was a Copt. Unfortunately for the Watani Party, 
the initial popular belief was that Wardani’s motive was a religious one, and this soon 
overshadowed the non-sectarian nationalist interpretation in the popular consciousness. In fact, 
the concluding speech of one of Watani’s defense lawyers, Ibrahim al-Hilbawi, was so politically 
charged that the session had to be closed to the public, but it later turned out that the speech had 
already been printed in the newspapers. Hilbawi was trying to regain the popularity he had lost 
when he served as prosecuting attorney in the Dinshawai trial. However, Wardani himself never 
used religious language regarding his victim, and spent his trial discussing his nationalist 
motivations. Thus, when al-Wardani was asked upon his arrest why he shot the Prime Minister, 
he unhesitatingly replied: “because he betrayed the nation.” However, songs and slogans 
                                                 
96 Wary of the dangers sectarianism posed to the nationalist project, the nationalist leadership and the higher-ranking 
clergies of both religions, used every tool at their disposal to preempt any possible sectarian fissures. The ongoing 
exchange of clergy, with priests speaking in mosques and shaykhs speaking in churches, coupled with a media blitz 
emphasizing the unity of the Revolution, achieved overwhelming success. (FO 141//781/8915, “Intelligence Report 
on the Egyptian Situation,” 15 April 1919; Fahkri ‘Abd al-Nur and Yunan Labib Rizq, Mudhakkirat Fakhri ‘Abd al-
Nur: Thawrat 1919: dawr Sa’ad Zaghlul wa al-Wafd fi al-harakah al-wataniyah (Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 1992), 57-
60. Fakhri ‘Abd al-Nur (1881-1942) was one of the most influential Coptic Christian Wafdist leaders. One of the 
consummate fears of the nationalists was the threat that communal issues might hamper the development of a 
cohesive independence movement. They also made certain assumptions, likely from the Ottoman context, that 
Christian populations were naturally predisposed to allying with European powers, and European governments were 
likewise adept at exploiting communal tensions for their own benefit. The fear among Egyptian nationalists 
regarding the possible effects of sectarianism on their movement also influenced their reluctance to participate in 
Islamic and pan-Arabist movements. Farid, perhaps most of all, maintained an anti-colonial outlook which eschewed 
communalism, and Jawish actually complained to a member of Terreki Islam in Constantinople that Farid was 
accepting non-Muslims into the Club. (Farid, Awraq, 101; Khan, 122))  According to British intelligence reports, at 
many of the Azhari meetings Copts gave more violent speeches than Muslims. (FO 141/781/8915, “Intelligence 
Report on the Egyptian Situation,” 8 April 1919.) One of the leading and most subversive speakers at al-Azhar was a 
Coptic priest named Marqus Sergius, who quickly developed a national reputation for his vehement patriotic 
speeches. One of his more famous sayings was: “As a servant of God my duty is to celebrate marriage and funeral 
rites, and I long to bury the authority of England and to marry Egypt to liberty and independence.” (FO 
141/781/8915, “Intelligence Report on the Egyptian Situation,” 7 April 1919.) 
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celebrating the killing of “the Christian” were popular enough in the streets to provoke a storm of 
protest in Coptic papers, which also interpreted Wardani’s act as a communal one.97 
Furthermore, the difference between the Watanists and the supporters of the Umma group 
became clear to all Egyptians, as al-Jarida unequivocally condemned any sort of political 
violence, while the debate within the Watani group was not over the issue of violence, but rather 
the role of the Palace and the Ottomans within Egyptian nationalism. Watani journalist Jawish 
continued his attacks on Butrus Ghali, vilifying him as a traitor to the nation, while expanding 
his attacks on the entire Coptic Egyptian community, accusing them of collaboration with the 
British.98 Some of the more radical Coptic newspapers, such as al-Watani and Misr, were as 
                                                 
97 Groups of Muslim youths marched in the streets, shouting “Wardani, Wardani, illi ‘atal al-Nasrani” [Wardani, 
Wardani, who killed the Christian]. (Ronald Storrs, Orientations (London: I. Nicholson & Watson, 1937), 84.)  As a 
result, the guards assigned to Wardani were all Christian, as it was believed that they would be less likely to allow 
poison to be smuggled in to him; and the Coptic warden tasted all of his food. The lesson of the episode were not 
lost on the nationalists; fifteen years later, when the target of an assassination being organized by a secret nationalist 
unit was Christian, the assassin they sent was a Copt. (Tariq al-Bishri, Al-Muslimun wa al-Awbat fi itar al jama’a al-
wataniya (Cairo: Dar ash-shuruq, 2nd Edition, 1988, 146-50.)  In December 1919, an unsuccessful attempt was made 
on Prime Minister Yousef Wahbah’s life by medical student Iryan Yusuf Sa’d. Iryan had joined a secret society 
called the Black Hand, but his immediate superiors seemed to be working at the behest of ‘Abd al-Rahman Fahmi. 
(When Zaghlul formed a cabinet, Iryan was pardoned. Al-Bishri, al-Katib 115 (1970), 135; Mustafa Amin, al-Katib 
al-Mamnu: Asrar Thawrat 1919,Vvol. 1 (Cairo: Dar al-Maarif, 1976), 133-4.) Sa’d volunteered for the assassination 
knowing that if a Muslim killed the Prime Minister, inter-communal problems would result. Wahbah was targeted 
because he formed a government at a time the nationalists hoped to prevent the formation of the government. (B.L. 
Carter, The Copts in Egyptian Politics (London: Croom Helm, 1986), 69.) 
98 Jawish was sentenced to jail for an earlier Dinshawai article, published 28 June 1909 in al-Liwa, which 
commemorated the Dinshawai incident and in which he not only accused the British of murder, but also held 
Egyptians, including the then Prime Minister Butrus Ghali, culpable. (Al-Liwa, 28 June 1909, “Fi zikra Dinshawai.” 
‘Abd al-Rahman Rafi’i, Muhammad Farid Ramz al-ikhlas wa al-tadhiyah (Cairo: Maktabat al-Nahdah al-Misriyah, 
1948), 123.) Furthermore, both Jawish and Muhammad Farid were prosecuted for having written prefaces for al-
Ghayati’s Wataniyati a few months later. Jawish served three months in jail and Farid six. Al-Ghayati fled to 
Constantinople and was sentenced in absentia to a year of hard labor. (Khan, 76-77.)) In the article that resulted in 
Jawish’s jail sentence, entitled “Reminiscences of Dinshawai,” Jawish went on the offensive, particularly attacking 
Butrus Ghali for his role in the trial, writing, “Hail to those innocent souls which Butrus Ghali Pasha, President of 
the special tribunal, tore from their bodies as silk is torn from thorns! He took these souls in his hand and offered 
them as a holocaust to the cruel and oppressive tyrant whose only aim is to destroy us…He (Boutros) belongs to a 
party among the Egyptians which fears the English more than God – people who only seek fortune and promotion, 
even though their country is oppressed and their own dignity ‘sacrificed.’” (This excerpt was quoted and translated 
in FO 141/492, 3 May 1910, Ronald Graham to Sir Eldon Gorst. See also FO 371/664/30776, 16 August 1909.) 
In an article in al-Liwa, 17 June 1908, Jawish argued that only Muslims should hold important political positions in 
Egypt. (FO 141/492, 3 May 1910, Ronald Graham to Sir Eldon Gorst.) 
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militant as Jawish in their attacks on Muslims and Islam, prompting scores of accusations and 
counteraccusations.99  
Despite Watani attempts to squelch communal divisions within the nationalist movement, 
the 1910 assassination of Butrus Ghali not only elevated civil strife between Muslims and Copts 
to new heights, but was an important factor in a repressive governmental policy directed at the 
Watani Party, leading to the imprisonment or exile of most of its leadership. This suppression 
was especially intensified with the application of martial law during World War I, leaving a 
significant leadership vacuum in what was just then becoming an increasingly populist 
movement. Ironically, the mantle of nationalist leadership was inherited by the elitist and non-
populist Sa’d Zaghlul Pasha and many of the original members of the Umma Party, which 
predominantly consisted of the Egyptian landed elites.100 This shift from urbanized, Effendi 
nationalists to a party of landed elites resulted in a new group of nationalists who were more 
willing to ally with the British when Egyptian popular demands turned too subversive, which 
would have effects on the extent of popular reforms enacted in the wake of the 1919 Revolution.  
The wide-spread belief that Wardani’s act was based on religious hatred was particularly 
ironic given that those most likely to blame violence on “Islamic fanaticism” – the British – 
acknowledged that there was no evidence of such motivation. According to Sir Eldon Gorst,  
The motives of the crime were purely political. The murderer had no personal grudge against the 
victim, and was not attacking under the influence of religious fanaticism, and in defence of his 
deed merely repeated the accusations which have, in season and out of season, been alleged 
                                                 
99 See al-Watan, 15 June 1908. 
100 The Umma Party favored a more gradual road to independence, advocating the need for consulting with and 
benefiting from the British whenever possible. Inherent in this policy was an aversion to any change in the stability 
of the status-quo and a general distrust of the masses, who were deemed unfit for political independence. For an 
official platform of the Party, see al-Jarida, 21 September 1907. Many of the leading figures of the Umma Party, 
like Zaghlul, Mahmud Sulayman Pasha, Ali Sha’rawi Pasha, and Lutfi al-Sayyid would later form the new Wafd 




against Boutros Pasha, in violent and threatening language in the columns of the Nationalist 
Press.101  
 
The British Government in Egypt had been well aware of Ghali’s general unpopularity. Butrus 
Ghali had become so tainted and so unpopular with his countrymen that, outside the Coptic 
community, few Egyptians mourned him. As a result, Wardani was lionized by many zealous 
nationalists as a patriot and a martyr. Gorst had no doubts that Boutros had been killed “because 
he (Butrus) was our instrument.”102 It was further noted that “It [was] odd that the Copts, 
although sad for Boutros’ death as a Copt, do not seem as a party to regret the occurrence.”103 
The assassination, and the public’s reaction to it, led Krishnavarma to promote the idea of 
a Pan-Asian revolutionary society in Paris.104 When Wardani was sentenced to death, 
Krishnavarma sent a telegram to the Khedive Abbas Hilmi II: “Your Highness’ own interest and 
humanity, enslaved by England, imperatively demand royal clemency favoring martyr 
Wardani.”105 The telegram was subsequently published in l’Humanite.106 In addition, 
Krishnavarma printed Wardani’s final statement before his execution in The Sociologist (despite 
British injunctions that no one be present at the execution), along with a translation of al-
Ghayati’s poem, noting that  
there is surely something sublime in the indifference to the terrors of imminent death displayed by 
this brave Egyptian martyr, who in his last moments upon Earth could, like the Indian martyr 
Dhingra, turn his thought solely upon the grand destiny of his country and remain utterly 
indifferent to the cruel fate impending over him.107  
                                                 
101 FO 371/111; Egypt No. 1 (1910), Sir Eldon Gorst on the dangerous influence of press campaigns in Egypt, p. 
528. 
102 FO 800/47, Gorst to Grey, No. 311, 23 April 1910. 
103 Wingate Papers, 290/2/117, Letter from Phipps, 24 February 1910. 
104 For a discussion of Farid and Rifa’at meeting Krishnavarma in Paris, see FO 371/890, Cheetham dispatch, 10 
October 1910. 
105 Yajnik, 281-4. 
106 Yajnik, 281-4. 
107 One telling incident connected to the assassination of Butrus Ghali occurred at the Egyptian National Congress 
held in Brussels in 1910: Krishnavarma offered a thousand franc prize “as a memorial to martyr Wardani” for the 
essay best describing “the best means of attaining Egyptian emancipation from the robber rule of England.” Because 




It was partially due to Krishnavarma’s propaganda that Dhingra and Wardani were linked in a 
song by al-Ghayati, who was then punished for sedition by the Egyptian government.108  
Government officials also connected Wardani  and Dhingra. The connection of 
Wardani’s crime with Indian nationalists was immediately made in the wake of Ghali’s murder. 
Under the headline announcing Ghali’s assassination, British paper The Egyptian Gazette 
printed: “The students of Dhingra?”109 According to the article, 
Of late the Anglophobe native journals have made a specialty of setting before their readers every 
detail they could get about the unrest in India. The assassinations of officials were gloated over, 
and when Sir Curzon Wylie was murdered in London last summer, al Liwa the official organ of 
the Nationalist Party published a poem glorifying Dhingra, his murderer.110  
 
 
The connection between the two assassins may have been closer than even the authorities 
suspected. According to Ahmad Fouad Nassar, a founding member of the Egyptian Society in 
Lausanne in 1906, Wardani and Dhingra actually had met when Wardani was in London in 1908 
to help Muhammad Farid’s student group Young Egypt.111 An indication of the close 
                                                                                                                                                             
(Arthur Goldschmidt, The National Party from Spotlight to Shadow (Haifa: Institute of Middle Eastern Studies, 
University of Haifa, 1982), 17; Oeuvres du Congres National Egyptien, Bruges 1911, p. 36f; Khan, 102-3.) 
Despite an official ruling that no witnesses be allowed, it is suspected that Muhammad Farid attended the execution 
and relayed the information to Krishnavarma. 
108 Al-Ghayati’s Wataniyati was published in July 1910 and lent credence by the introductions written by 
Muhammad Farid and ‘Abd al-Aziz Jawish. Several of the poems glorified Wardani as a national hero, including a 
poem detailing the day of Wardani’s trial; others compared Wardani with Dhingra, or insulted the Khedive and 
accused him of being a collaborator. According to the Egyptian government, the book broke three penal codes: 
acting as an apology for a crime; being an affront to the office of the Khedive; and attempting to bring hatred and 
contempt upon the Government. (FO 141/492, Sir Eldon Gorst to Grey, 17 July 1910; FO 141/492, Gorst to Grey, 
11 July 1910; Ziad Fahmy, “Popularizing Egyptian Nationalism: Colloquial Culture and Media Capitalism, 1870-
1919,” (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Michigan, 2007), 204-5.) 
Due to his support, Krishnavarma subsequently received a photograph of Wardani, along with a brief note reading, 
“the friends of Wardani send you a copy of his portrait and his handwriting. Those who give their lives for their 
native land will never be forgotten.” (Yajnik, 285.) 
109 Ahmad Fu’ad Nassar also mentions the role that Dhingra played in exciting the imaginations of young patriots in 
his memoir published in Kul Shay wa al-‘Alam on 8 March, 1930 (Issue 226); Khan, 81 
110 Egyptian Gazette, 21 February 1910, p. 3. 
111 According to Nassar’s account, Wardani, along with Mahmoud Azmi and ‘Abd al-Hamad Sa’id, had just set up a 
Young Egypt branch in Paris and was apparently traveling around Europe on this mission. In London, Dhingra and 
other “Indian revolutionaries” had met with their Egyptian friends at the home of Ibrahim Ramzi to discuss the Suez 
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relationship between the Paris-based Indian and Egyptian nationalists is evident from a 
handwritten manuscript by Chatto, “Some Unpublished Facts on the Egyptian National 
Movement,” found among his private papers. According to this manuscript, Wardani had 
assassinated Butrus Ghali Pasha for his alleged intention to sell Egypt’s share in the Suez Canal 
to Britain and had been inspired by Dhingra’s 1909 assassination in London.  
The Egyptian Gazette could have carried the Dhingra-Wardani connection even farther, 
as some British officials did in confidential Foreign Office papers. Wardani had been sent abroad 
to study in London, Paris, and Lausanne. Upon his return to Egypt in January 1909, he was 
active in the Watani movement, holding posts in the labor syndicates and night schools 
organized by the Party in working class sections of Cairo.112 In these activities, he often 
collaborated with Jawish, and was undoubtedly well acquainted with the Dhingra case. 
Furthermore, British officials were convinced that Wardani had been involved not only with 
Egyptian, but foreign, “extremists” while in France and London.113 The British authorities were 
also alarmed to discover that Wardani belonged to the Society of Fraternal Solidarity (al-
Tadamun al-Akhawi), a cell within the Watani party that included men who would assassinate 
other Britons in subsequent years. A Foreign Office official noted that “the society originated in 
1905 and consisted of seventeen members, some of whom are now living abroad. They mostly 
belong to the student class, but include some Government officials among their number.”114 
Watani Party leaders disclaimed any knowledge of the society, but had to admit that Wardani 
was a Party member.  
                                                                                                                                                             
Canal concession. Nassar misidentifies Dhingra as the assassin of “Curzon, ruler of India.” (Ahmad Fu’ad Nassar, 
Kul Shay wal- ‘Alam, March 8, 1930 (Issue 226).) 
112 FO 141/802, Note from Ronald Graham to Gorst, 30 June 1910, “Imprisonment and Execution of Ibrahim Nassif 
al-Wardany,” 2. 
113 Malak Badrawi, Political Violence in Egypt 1910-1925: Secret Societies, Plots, and Assassinations (London: 
Curzon, 2000), p. 37. 
114 FO 141/802, note of 25 March 1910, draft of note from Gorst to Grey, No. 33. 
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Police also raided Muhammad Farid’s house in hopes of finding ties between Wardani 
and the Nationalist Party. Farid’s papers do include a letter from Wardani, dated 13 July 1909, 
concerning arrangements with the Ottoman Ministry of Education for the admission of Egyptians 
into Turkish higher schools. However, Farid may have destroyed his other letters before the 
Parquet summoned him for questioning about his Party’s role in the assassination.115 Although 
Wardani insisted that he had acted alone, eight other members were booked on charges of 
conspiracy, but were later released. Tadamun members were fortunate that the legal code did not 
prohibit the formation of secret political societies; but the fact that the authorities had gotten the 
names of most of them in the course of the Wardani investigation effectively dispersed the 
Society for several years.116 Some members found themselves unable to continue their studies or 
work in Egypt due to unofficial sanctions imposed by British supervisors or headmasters; most 
went abroad to Europe, particularly Constantinople.117 Ironically, then, the efforts of the 
Egyptian authorities to punish the members made them more dangerous as they put themselves 
outside of the reach of British authority altogether.118 
While the British diligently investigated Wardani’s connection to the Watani party in 
Egypt, it seems they did not follow the leads to his European connections closely enough.  It was 
indeed in Europe that he had met a number of students from Egypt and other colonies who were 
organizing under the auspices of nationalist leaders in exile; and there he became known as an 
                                                 
115 Goldschmidt, The Nationalist Party of Egypt, 230-2, Farid, Awraq Muhammad Farid, 246. 
116 Khan, 82-4. This legal gap was soon corrected. The following year, the Law of Associations, which was based on 
a similar Indian law, had a chilling effect on almost all political activity from 1912 onwards. 
117 According to the Parquet’s investigation, so many of the Society’s members were studying in Europe in 1908 that 
the decision was made not to include them in calculations of how many members would constitute a quorum. 
(Badrawi, 65.) 
118 Among these young men were Ahmad Fu'ad, a medical student who went to Constantinople, and Shafiq Mansur, 
a fourth year law student who continued his studies in France. Fourteen years later, Mansur would become the 
leader of the assassins of Sir Lee Stack, the British Sirdar of the Egyptian Army. Ahmad Fu'ad’s personal nemesis, 
the Dean of the School of Medicine, Dr. Keatinge, was also later assassinated. (Khan, 83)  
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activist.119 Wardani had represented the Lausanne students at the forty day memorial observance 
for Mustafa Kamil, attended the Geneva Congresses, and participated in the Nationalist 
delegation to the Ottoman Constitutional celebrations in 1909. British authorities also belatedly 
discovered that an “Indo-Egyptian Association” had existed during the tenure of both Dhingra 
and Wardani in London, although the British could never prove the participation of either man in 
it.120 Egyptian nationalist Ahmad Fu'ad Nassar confirmed in 1930 that the two actually did meet 
in 1908 and that the Indo-Egyptian Association did, in fact, exist.121 Wardani had also been one 
of the members of the Egyptian Society in Europe that had openly disavowed the Khedive’s 
patronage when ‘Abbas Hilmi refused to honor their 1908 request to work toward a 
Constitution.122 The Ottoman Empire did not hesitate to use the case to its advantage, and played 
on Islamic loyalties in order to stir up popular feeling. Ottoman papers, many of which reached 
Egypt, portrayed Wardani as a hero and martyr in the cause of Islam and of patriotism. Butrus 
Ghali was depicted as a traitor, and the Suez Canal Concession extension as a plan to keep Egypt 
in bondage to European governments and financiers. The Khedive himself was further criticized 
for seeking money from foreign sources, a practice that would only expose Egypt to continued 
European interference.123 
 
Inter-colonial Ties in the Post-War World 
                                                 
119 Khan, 90. 
120 NAI: Foreign Department, External B, January 1911 #549, p. 17-18. 
121 Ahmad Fu’ad Nasser, Kul Shay wa al-Dunya, 8 March 1930. This article is the only reference to the Association 
found in an Egyptian source. There are only three references to it in British documents, though the tone of the 
references indicates that the existence of the club was well known. 
122 Al-Liwa, 18 June 1908.  See also Ahmad Fouad Nassar, “Kayfa assisat a jamaiyaa misriyya biuruba,” Kul shay 
wa al-‘alam, Feb 9, 1930 (Issue 222); (Khan, 87.) 
123 FO 371/890, Lowther to Grey, No. 14914, 22 April 1910; FO 371/890, Lowther to Grey, No. 26771, 16 July 
1910; Cheetham Correspondence, Letter to Mallet, 13 August 1910. The mention of European economic 
interference would, of course, bring up an unfortunate comparison to Khedive Isma’il. 
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One of the most important features of the anti-British, Indian, Irish, and Egyptian 
nationalist movements was their simultaneous rise to prominence in 1919 in the light of the end 
of the First World War and subsequent international promises of independence and self-
determination.124 The advent of the Wafd Party of Sa’d Zaghlul in Egypt and the Indian National 
Congress of Gandhi invoked for the first time a direct confrontation between these leading 
nationalist organizations and the British government.  
The year of 1919 represented a turning point which accelerated the political 
developments in India, Ireland and Egypt; and the similar circumstances in which the nationalist 
groups of each found themselves spurred further cooperation between them. Both the Wafd and 
the Congress developed as modern political parties at approximately the same time after World 
War I; the main political opponent of both was British imperial policy; and both had to adapt the 
strategy and tactics of their political resistance to essentially identical colonial practices and 
institutions. Particularly in the inter-war period, the constellation of problems of the liberation 
movements in India and Egypt, as well as the immediate reactions to the events in Palestine and 
elsewhere, were often reflected in the official documents of the Congress and Wafd parties and 
proved the growing awareness of common tasks and objectives in the struggle against the 
colonial policy of the British.125 The connections between the two groups continued to grow in 
the interwar period so that, by the end of the 1930s, direct negotiations between representatives 
of the Indian National Congress and the Wafd Party had begun.126   
                                                 
124 Not only did World War I and the movement for self-determination create expectations among colonized 
peoples, but the period was a momentous one in Ireland (the beginning of the Irish War for Independence), Egypt 
(the Egyptian Revolution of 1919), and India (the beginning of the Khilafat movement), specifically. 
125 In India, Egypt began gradually to be considered an Asian rather than an African country from a political point of 
view, and was integrated into “Pan-Asiatic” conceptions. Niroslav Krasa, “Relations Between the Indian National 
Congress and the Wafd Party of Egypt in the Thirties,” Archiv Orientalni 41 (1973), 213. 
126 Jawaharlal Nehru, Jawaharlal Nehru: An Autobiography (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1985); B.P. 
Sitaramayya, History of the Indian National Congress, Vol. 22 (Delhi: S. Chand.) 
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The Irish independence movement also initially kept near simultaneous pace with the 
developments in Egypt after the First World War.127 On 14 November 1921, a meeting was held 
under the auspices of the Egyptian Independence Society in London and attended by Labour 
leader George Lansbury (1849-1940), Jack Mills, M.P., Makram ‘Ubayd, and “a man named 
Murphy.” Murphy read a message from Irish nationalist Art O’Briain expressing sympathy from 
the Irish Republic to the Egyptian nationalists and adding that both countries were suffering 
under the heel of the same tyrannical force, namely the British government. Murphy went on to 
state that, should the Peace Conference in Lausanne fail, the Irish Republican Army would “take 
a lot of crushing,” and that the young men of Egypt would no doubt emulate the example of 
Ireland. 
It was at this time that Egyptian nationalist Ibrahim Rashad made an extended visit to 
Ireland, recorded in his book, An Egyptian in Ireland, published in 1920.128 Rashad regarded 
Ireland as a first-rate example to Egypt, it being “for the intellectual among the rising generation 
in every country…to investigate and make known those movements in other lands from which 
their own people may learn.”129 He argued that “[Egyptians] must study in progressive 
community the secret of their (the Irish) advance, so as to help in formulating a policy for the 
building of a modern Egypt on a sound national basis.”130 A large part of his admiration for 
Ireland was based on a sense of common enmity toward the British; and his book is full of bitter 
criticism of Britain, particularly in his chapters on the history of the Irish national movement. He 
                                                 
127 For an excellent analysis of connections between Irish and Indian nationalists within the shared lexicon of the 
British Empire, see Kate O'Malley, Ireland, India and Empire: Indo-Irish Radical Connections, 1919-64 
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also directly compares Sinn Fein with Egyptian nationalists, and Sinn Fein founder Arthur 
Griffith (1872-1922) with Sa’d Zaghlul. Rashad commends them both on their refusal to 
negotiate with Britain on any grounds other than that of complete independence. Above all, 
Rashad was impressed by the Labour and Cooperative movements in Ireland; and he devotes five 
full chapters to agricultural and industrial cooperation, in the hopes of inspiring similar 
movements in Egypt.131 
A 1921 memorandum on “Sinn Fein and Egyptians” outlined the British concern with the 
interactions between the two nationalist groups. According to the report, Michael MacWhite, a 
representative of the Irish Free State in Geneva, met with the Egyptian nationalist Ali Bey 
Shamsi in Geneva and expressed the opinion that the talks concerning an Anglo-Irish Agreement 
were bound to fail. MacWhite, furthermore, argued that the English proposals were a way to 
restore temporary calm to Ireland so that the troops then in that country might be used in Egypt 
and India. He also stated that films depicting the Irish Republican Army at maneuvers were 
being shown in England and America, and that their display in India and Egypt would likely 
have a profound effect, showing the real weakness of British power.  
However, following the 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty, ties between Egyptian and Irish 
nationalists declined. According to information also obtained from MacWhite, ‘Abbas Hilmi had 
connections with Irish Republicans. Shortly before the Anglo-Irish agreement, ‘Abbas Hilmi and 
‘Aziz Hassan attempted to recruit officers from the Irish Republican Army to organize a rising in 
Egypt. According to MacWhite, prior to the Anglo-Irish agreement, he had had a secret 
interview with ‘Abbas Hilmi who was staying in Geneva at the hotel La Residence under an 
assumed name. MacWhite withdrew from the talks after the Anglo-Irish agreement and nothing 
                                                 
131 Rashad later played a leading role in the Egyptian Cooperative Movement and eventually became an Under-
Secretary in the Ministry of Social Affairs and a director of the Agricultural and Cooperative Bank, a post he still 
held in 1952. He also published a book in Arabic on cooperatives, drawing largely from his time in Ireland. 
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resulted from the plan, except that the Khedive rebuked MacWhite for the “betrayal of the anti-
British cause.” Also in 1921, after a rupture of negotiations in London, Sa’d Zaghlul and 
Makram ‘Ubayd attempted a similar rapprochement with Sinn Fein. They launched plans for 
getting in touch with the group in both Ireland and the United States. Zaghlul proposed that 
‘Ubayd should go first to Ireland and then proceed to the United States to gauge the kind of 
assistance that might be obtained. However, by this point, according to ‘Ubayd, the “English and 
Irish [had made] peace;” and the plan was, therefore, called off. From then on, the Irish 
connection with anti-British Egyptian nationalists was significantly curtailed. 
Although Egyptian-Irish connections were largely deflated by the Anglo-Irish agreement, 
the Egyptian relationship with India, both publicly and politically, only continued to grow in the 
inter-war period. The depth of Egyptian interest in India during the 1920s can be seen in the 
press coverage of Indian nationalists. While the activities of Gandhi and the nationalist 
movement had to compete with major local upheavals for Egyptians’ attentions in the early 
1920s, by the middle of the decade, newspapers, books, and organizations were once again 
hailing their Indian “brothers” in the struggle against colonialism. Al-Ahram, for example, 
followed the Indian delegation sent to prepare for the Caliphate Congresses from February 1925, 
before it reached Cairo in March, making sure the paper’s readers were aware of the concerns the 
Indians had, not only about the need for a unified spiritual authority, but for that authority to be 
truly independent. The Indians made it clear that their respect for Egypt’s Islamic role was so 
great that they would have supported housing the Caliphate in Egypt were it not for the presence 
of the British Army and Britain’s “special relationship” with the technically independent state.132 
The Indian delegation was followed, both by the news-reading public and by the British 
authorities’ informers, in a way that representatives from other countries were not. Similarly, 
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news about Indian nationalists who had had personal connections with World War I-era 
Watanists was reported regularly, including articles on Barakatullah in December 1925, the death 
of Hakim Ajmal Khan in January 1928, and the death of Abu Sayyad in June 1929. 
Perhaps most indicative of the attitude of the Egyptians towards the Indian independence 
movement was the sub-heading of the front-page articles written by al-Ahram’s editor-in-chief 
on 12 and 13 November, 1929 describing India’s communal problems as well as its nationalist 
movement: “He who knows the causes of the illness of another’s body can defend better his 
own.”133 The second article, also headlined as “Talk of India,” was sub-headed “the gospel of 
Wilson and the spirituality of Gandhi.”134 The series was introduced with the argument that India 
was particularly important for Egyptians to watch “because the affairs of this land are our affairs 
and we suffer from the same pains as she does.”135 The paper goes on to describe India’s national 
and nationalist challenges with specific references not only to the way in which Egypt was 
affected by Indian affairs but also how India’s nationalism was sister to the Egyptian. These 
analogies between Egypt and India were repeatedly emphasized in the local Egyptian press. The 
Balagh of 24 January 1928 pointed out how similar events in India were to what had taken place 
in Egypt in 1919. On 5 February 1928, the same paper drew connections between the Milner and 
Simon Commissions and the receptions they had met with in Egypt and India, respectively.136 
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136 Lord Lloyd to Austen Chamberlain, 5 March 1928. The Cairo Residency was subsequently convinced that the 
refusal of Nahas to cooperate with the British was due at least in part to the support he had received from Nehru 
during the latter’s visit.  
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While the pre-World War I European-based national leaders from both colonies had been 
marginalized by local and mass-based national leaders who had emerged from the post-War 
uprisings, there were still several points of continuity in the interwar period in the relationship 
between Indian and Egyptian nationalists which were the result of earlier shared activism. Visits 
of Indian nationalists to Egypt were also greeted with enthusiasm. When Dr. Mukhtar Ahmed 
Ansari and Hakim Ajmal Khan arrived in August 1925 for a month-long visit, the press followed 
the men extensively in a series of articles that included multiple-page spreads of the interviews 
with Dr. Ansari and included extensive information on the Indian nationalist movement. In an 
interview on 29 August 1925, Dr. Ansari was asked to give an explanation of Indian nationalist 
activities and goals, including specific questions on the effectiveness of an economic boycott and 
the Gandhian principles of cottage industry as a spiritual as well as economic exercise. In 
addition to relating their many meetings with representatives of al-Azhar, the Society of the 
Eastern Bond, and the Watani Party, al-Ahram described the two men’s roles in the Indian 
nationalist movements at some length, emphasizing their connection to Gandhi and their work 
towards unity (“kutla wahida”) between Muslims and Hindus in the sacred struggle (“harika 
muqadasa”) of nationalism.137  
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Vol. 1, no. 1, 15 October 1928, p. 3-11. 
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Chapter Eight: Local and Global Interactions 
 
 
“The Egyptian Question is, in Reality, an International One…”1 
The end of the First World War, and the subsequent peace settlement, changed the 
internal and international situations in colonized nations so radically that nationalist movements 
began to reinvent not only their logistical operations and communication networks, but also their 
discourse and methodologies on the international stage. Egypt in 1919 participated in the great 
wave of nationalist uprisings that had already engulfed India, China, Ireland, and Turkey. The 
1919 Egyptian Revolution also took place within the context of both the international growth of 
communist and socialist movements and the push for national self-determination. Domestic 
Egyptian issues, such as political and economic suppression at the hands of foreigners, in 
addition to the disastrous impact of the First World War on the Egyptian economy, made allying 
with international movements such as communism very attractive for Egyptian nationalists. In 
addition, the notion of self-determination was gaining increasing legitimacy in the post-War 
world; and Egyptians began to base much of their argument for independence on this new global 
norm. Therefore, the discourse and methodologies of Egyptian nationalism can only be 
accurately viewed in this context of prevailing international norms. Muhammad Farid, for 
example, argued for both the independence of Egypt and the return of control of the Suez Canal 
to Egypt with appeals to international norms: "Our demands are based on the natural law, which 
provides that every state govern itself and develop its own character accordingly."2 The motives 
behind the use of this new discourse went far beyond the desire to satisfy or undermine European 
                                                 
1 Muhammad Farid, Die Islamische Welt, Vol. 2, Berlin (1918) 1, 15. 
2 Wolfgang G. Schwanitz, Berlin-Kairo: Damals und Heute: zur Geschichte deutsch-aegyptischer Beziehungen 
(Berlin, 1991), 45. 
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critics, but institutions and governmental arguments based on European models provided 
powerful ideological ammunition to those resisting direct imperial control.  
While scholars have analyzed the interaction between local and global forces in the 
broader context of British imperialism, they have ignored the impact of these international 
phenomena on anti-colonial nationalists. This influence was crucially important, however, as it 
provided nationalists with both new tools and expanded room to maneuver in attempting to draw 
attention to their movements.  
The end of the First World War led to the creation of a novel discursive space within the 
international arena; this new space presented nationalist leaders with unprecedented 
opportunities to further their cause and bolster their legitimacy both at home and abroad. The 
legitimizing language of self-determination, combined with the institutional forums afforded by 
the Paris Peace Conference, prompted nationalist leaders to change the discourse used to 
describe their political goals.3 Their goals did not change, but nationalists now used the language 
of self-determination in presenting these goals. This use of terminology and language 
recognizable to European audiences allowed anti-colonialists access to a discourse of legitimacy 
and offered them a voice in the international arena. The conclusion of the Armistice in 1918 on 
the basis of the Fourteen Points led many in the colonial world to assume that U.S. President 
Woodrow Wilson and his proclaimed principles would dominate the peace negotiations and 
shape the postwar settlement. It made sense, therefore, for nationalist leaders to adopt Wilsonian 
rhetoric to define their group’s collective identity and goals vis-à-vis international society.4  
The quick succession of the 1906 Iranian Constitutional Revolution, the 1908 Young 
Turk Revolution, the First World War, the Bolshevik Revolution, and the rise to power of 
                                                 
3 Erez Manela, “The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial 
Nationalism,” (PhD Dissertation, Yale University, 2003), 22. 
4 Manela, 39. 
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Ataturk gave birth to a new international political norm. The dual global focus on 
constitutionalism and self-determination as the markers of the modern nation-state led to a novel 
way in which nationalists could voice their bids for independence. These benchmarks were 
initially used as a way to restrain colonized nationalists, but this discourse was turned back on 
the imperial powers as anti-colonial nationalists began to use these very same barometers to 
make their argument for independence. The promise of constitutional self-government was 
predicated on the presence of a particular type of government and a set of established criteria, as 
laid out by the colonizing powers as the necessary elements of an independent, mature state. 
Egyptian nationalists used this new normal to repackage their demand for independence into one 
that mimicked many systems in Europe and could not, therefore, be labelled as exceptional based 
on a paradigm of racial difference or inferiority. In this way, Egyptians could utilize and contain 
European influence in service of Egyptian national interests. 
Egyptian nationalism and the push for independence were generated domestically; and 
the use of a new international, European-approved rhetoric, was integral to the efforts of the 
Egyptian nationalists to consolidate their power and resist European penetration. In this can be 
seen a continuation of the European publicity campaign launched in the late nineteenth century 
by Mustafa Kamil. It was, in many ways, the marginal freedom of activity granted by the new 
transnational norms that made it possible for Egyptian nationalists to create a revolution 
considered more respectable and acceptable by global publics. However, the invocation of 
transnational ideologies did not necessarily imply a convergence of interests or goals. Though 
there were issues in common with other groups and with transnational associations, alliances 
with communism, socialism, and other anti-colonial groups were never very successful, as the 
ultimate aims of each group were different and targeted toward distinct goals. Similar problems 
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existed between Egyptian territorial nationalism and other transnational movements. While 
sympathy between nationalists pushing for territorial independence and ideologically-defined 
international groups existed, Egyptian nationalists remained loyal to these larger groups only 
insofar as transnational groups could guarantee favorable results for Egyptian territorial integrity.   
Following the Ottoman Empire’s defeat in the First World War, the near simultaneous 
rise of Bolshevik and Wilsonian internationalism particularly affected the trajectory of the 
Egyptian nationalist movement. Bolshevik and Wilsonian internationalism provided two viable 
“western” alternatives to the declining Eurocentric imperial world order and offered Egyptian 
nationalists new means with which to spread their cause. The new international milieu created by 
the First World War and its aftermath resulted in an environment where certain modes of 
conduct and discourse became prevalent. In particular, the new international consensus favoring 
self-determination and the argument that colonialism was only a temporary stop on the way to 
“preparing” subject populations for independence and self-government gave anti-colonial 
nationalists new weapons in their struggle for international recognition and support for their 
cause. Similarly, the rise of global communism and the birth of the Comintern, in particular, 
overturned the notion that a nation must Europeanize in order to be considered ready for 
independence. Instead, internal, domestic issues of class began to come to the forefront, as 
transnational class movements took over from ideas of liberal internationalism.  
As a result of the Allies’ wartime rhetoric, the watchwords of independence and self-
determination for colonized populations now had to be afforded a legitimacy they had previously 
been denied in the international arena.  According to Egyptian writer Salama Musa,  
Of course there was among the Egyptian public much divergence of opinion with regard to these 
two revolutions, that of Lenin and that of Mustafa Kemal. However, the general feeling was, that 
the old world was now shattering its chains, and proceeding unhampered on the road to new 
freedom; and though it was prone to stumbling and falling, it would certainly continue to stand up 
and keep going. On the whole, therefore, the two revolutions were to us a cause of great optimism, 
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just as much as they were a cause of concern to the English imperialists.5 
 
It was not only the words of Wilson and the Allies, but the triumph of Communism and 
Kemalism that seemed to truly be ushering in a new international system. Underpinning 
Egyptian nationalist activities was the continued belief that imperialism, despite local variations 
in colonial policy and rule, was a single global force; the same essential spirit animated British, 
French, and Italian imperialism alike. This homogenization of imperialism served an obvious 
mobilizing function: because Western imperialism was a unitary phenomenon, it could be 
confronted successfully by a united front of anti-imperial nationalists from diverse colonies.6 For 
Egyptians, this quest for success in numbers would manifest itself through extensive 
participation in international organizations, collaboration with other anti-British nationalists, and 
sympathy (though very little, if any, action) with Arab nationalists.7 Just as post-colonial 
scholars have pointed to the truism that, in order to fight against the colonial state, those seeking 
independence had to embrace the same governmental structures and discourse of their erstwhile 
masters; so, in an era in which the international system became paramount, anti-colonial 
nationalists embraced the new legitimacy of international cooperation.  
The First World War, and particularly the subsequent promises made regarding a change 
in the international order, acted as a catalyst in the continued development of anti-colonial 
                                                 
5 Salama Musa, The Education of Salama Musa (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1961), 111. 
6 The Muslim Brotherhood (founded in 1928) likewise considered all Western imperialism as springing from the 
same source. An exposition of the Brotherhood’s position on Western imperialism appeared in Salih Mustafa 
‘Ashmawi’s pamphlet “Disbelief is a Single Community and Imperialism a Single Humiliation.” ‘Ashmawi 
criticized those who did not view colonialism as one force: “They have forgotten that disbelief is a single 
community and imperialism a single humiliation, and that [European powers] have but one goal, which is the 
obliteration of Islam and the humiliation of Muslims.” 
7 In 1926, a letter from the Cairo Residency to the Foreign Office in London listed the local recipients of invitations 
to the conference planned by the League against Colonial Oppression in Brussels. The list for Egypt was extensive, 
longer than that of any other country except India, reflecting the familiarity of the conference organizers with 
political activism in Egypt. Cairo noted that “invitations seem to have been issued in a very catholic spirit, for 
common ground between e.g. al-Azhar University scholar Sheikh Ahmed Muhammad Shaker, al-Azhar professor 
Sheikh Abu al-‘Uyun, Suleiman Effendi Fawzi, Minister of Agriculture Abbas Pasha Daramalli, and the Publisher 
of Kawkab esh-shark and Wafdist Hafez Bey Awad, is hard to find.” It would seem clear that the anti-imperial 
nature of the Congress was all the common ground needed for the delegates. 
221 
 
nationalism. The notion of self-determination voiced by the European nations themselves 
provided a legitimacy that nationalist movements could use on the international stage, utilizing 
the standards and vocabulary of the imperialists themselves. This was evidenced by, for example, 
the Easter Rising in Ireland in 1916 and the Egyptian Revolution in 1919, both of which aimed at 
dislodging the British presence and creating a fully independent nation. These revolutions were 
evidence, not of new goals, but of new methodologies in accordance with a new global 
recognition of the “rights of nations.” According to the Egyptian delegation at the Peace 
Conference,  
“The right to life and liberty can no longer be confined to certain continents or certain latitudes. 
We claim the right to have our independence recognized a) because independence is a natural right 
of nations; b) because Egypt has never ceased to reclaim hers even at the cost of the blood of her 
sons; c) because she now considers herself freed from the last ties of Turkish sovereignty; d) 
because she judges the moment to have arrived when she can proclaim the right to full sovereignty 
justified by her moral and material conditions.” 8  
 
Both revolutions called on the legitimacy of the modern nation-state, put forward by European 
imperial powers themselves, to advocate for their independence in international arenas. Both 
revolutions were suppressed by the British, but both also made the continuation of the existing 
style of British rule impossible.  
One of the ideological justifications for the continuation of Western imperialism was the 
promise that imperial powers were “preparing” native populations for effective self-governance. 
There had been an insistence that the white man’s “civilizing mission” was indispensable to the 
colonial world to such an extent that “after the white man left [it]…seems to have become little 
more than a nasty mix of tribal chieftains, despotic barbarians, and mindless fundamentalists.”9 
Arguing against the British designation of Egyptians as barbaric, irrational, and therefore 
                                                 
8 Memorandum to the Peace Conference., quoted in Makram ‘Ubayd, Complete Independence versus the Milner 
Scheme; or, The Zaghlul-Adly Issue (London, 1921), 1. 
9 Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism (New York: Knopf, 1993), 333. 
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incapable of self-government, nationalists appealed not only to the Andersonian political lexicon 
of what constitutes a nation-state, but also the new Wilsonian rhetoric of self-determination to 
put the demand for Egyptian nationhood in terms shared by the British (and European and 
American) experience. In this way, the intellectual legitimation for British colonialism was 
severely undermined by the working of the Allies themselves. Egyptian nationalists, therefore, 
particularly relied on this shared lexicon when presenting their case to European and American 
audiences.  
 
Liberal Internationalism and the Rights of Nations 
Both Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points and the foreign policy of the Russian Bolshevik 
regime ostensibly endorsed the right of nations to self-determination. Increasing international 
acceptance of this principle during the following decades contributed to the undermining of the 
ideology and practice of colonial empire. Though the First World War and the revolutions that 
followed may have been the end of classical colonialism in one sense, by severing the ties of the 
more radical nationalists from the mainstream and from each other, the tumult of 1918-1919 may 
have actually given the British Empire a new lease on life, as the Empire moved from direct 
imperialism in places like Ireland and Egypt to looser forms of control.  
In light of new, raised expectations, it seemed plausible to most Egyptians that the post-
War peace conference would decide whether Egypt would become independent or a fully 
colonial possession. Egyptian nationalist leaders saw Wilsonianism as a means to gain 
independence and secure a new national state. For them, Wilsonianism was an idealistic vision 
about the inevitability of population politics, turning away from imperial globalism. However, 
with the Paris Peace Conference’s endorsements of demands by Greek, Armenian, and Kurdish 
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nationalists, and its rejection of Egyptian, Arab, and Turkish demands, Egyptian nationalist 
leaders began to search for alternative ideologies.10 Zaghlul and others came to the conclusion 
that the “global consensus” on the legitimacy of self-determination had very definite limits. 
Neither the European Allies nor Wilson ever meant for popular politics to be extended to all 
populations. Self-determination was to be selectively granted to those populations the Allies felt 
met the appropriate criteria of “Westernism” or served a purpose for Euro-American global 
strategy.  
During the Peace Conference, Great Britain had secretly proposed to strip Egypt of what 
remained of her independence, although this was not known to most Egyptians at the time. The 
plan to integrate Egypt fully into the imperial system proposed by Judicial Advisor to the 
Government of Egypt, Sir William Brunyate, would have limited the power of Egyptians to 
affect the decisions of state. Brunyate’s proposal would have given foreign nationals resident in 
Egypt a veto power in the Senate with which they could override any majority coalition formed 
by Egyptians.11 British plans to incorporate Egypt fully into the imperial system, despite 
promises to the contrary, were, thus, becoming clear. Sir Reginald Wingate, in his capacity as 
High Commissioner (served 1917-1919), spelled out his plan in an interview with Sultan Fu’ad 
by telling the latter that Allied recognition of the Protectorate had been “the knockout blow” to 
Egyptian hopes of independence.12 Thereafter, hope of influencing state policy by electoral 
means would have been impossible, and the Egyptian social and political elite would have been 
                                                 
10 Samuel Moyn and Andrew Sartori, Global Intellectual History (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), 75-
77. 
11 The most concise rendition of the history behind Brunyate’s proposal and the terms of the proposal itself are to be 
found in ‘Abd al-Rahman Rafi’i, Fi a’qab al-thawrah al-Misriyah: Thawrat sanat 1919 (Cairo: Dar al-Ma’arif, 
1987 printing), pp. 71-2. 
12 FO 371/1180. The account is contained in a message from Sir Reginald Wingate to Lord Cromer regarding an 
interview with the Sultan on 12 December 1918. The message details how Fu’ad “visibly blanched as I told him it 
was a case of ‘victor’ and ‘vanquished’ and [Fu’ad] remarked that the interests of 14 million Egyptians had to take 
precedence over those of 150,000 foreigners.” 
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pushed back toward colonial status. Thus, in early 1919, many who had previously chosen a path 
of negotiation with the British joined more radical nationalists in challenging the state and 
demanding immediate independence; their resolve may also have been strengthened by their 
misperception that the international community, particularly due to the views espoused by U.S. 
President Woodrow Wilson and the focus on self-determination, would come to their aid.13   
 
 
The New World That Never Was: The Promise of Self-Determination 
 
The wartime discourse of the Allies, with its promise of self-determination and national 
sovereignty, allowed Egyptian and other nationalists to iterate demands for independence and 
evacuation of occupying powers using the rhetoric of the colonial powers themselves. Public 
statements on the part of the Allies meant to appease local nationalists at crucial turning points in 
the War, with assurances of future independence, were transformed into weapons to further the 
nationalist cause when those promises went unfulfilled. Regardless of the intention of the Allies 
to keep these promises, their rhetoric became part of the ideological and political milieu of the 
first half of the twentieth century, and could then be used to legitimize anti-colonial nationalism 
using the Europeans’ own words. In this way, European powers lost control of their own 
rhetoric; and had to attempt to distance themselves from the very standards for colonial 
independence they themselves had created.  
In addition, the act of turning European arguments about liberal internationalism and the 
criteria for the modern nation-state back on the imperial powers presented a conundrum for the 
latter. European governments had told their own populations that colonialism was a civilizing 
                                                 
13 Instructive in this regard are the telegrams addressed to Woodrow Wilson in 1919 that make up a large fraction of 
the White Book published by the Wafd. See, Egyptian Delegation to the Peace Conference: Collection of Official 
Correspondence from November 11, 1918 to July 14, 1919 (Paris: Egyptian Delegation, 1919); see, also, Ellis 
Goldberg, “Peasants in Revolt – Egypt 1919,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 24, No. 2,  275-6. 
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mission destined to allow for native self-government, but their post-War actions displayed 
another reality altogether. This dichotomy between rhetoric and policy would affect not only the 
methodologies of the nationalists, but also emerging European public opinion. It also influenced 
nationalist attempts to reach and influence European publics by highlighting the hypocritical 
nature of imperial policies. Keeping this in mind allows one to place the Egyptian nationalist 
movement into its larger international context.  
A crucial component of the new demands of the nationalists was the use of the promise of 
self-determination that was to be found in Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points. While Allied use 
of Wilsonian terms certainly had an impact on nationalist demands, scholars who have taken on 
this issue have often oversold Wilson’s own importance, while simultaneously minimizing what 
colonial nationalists had already been doing.14 During the first two decades of the twentieth 
century, the goals and methodologies of the nationalists did not change; only the rhetoric, and, 
perhaps, more importantly, the expectations were new. What the rhetoric of Wilson, and, at the 
same time, Lenin, did give anti-colonial nationalists was a target to aim at in their rhetoric, while 
undoubtedly raising certain expectations.15 But talk of anticolonial nationalism and a “new world 
order” had been circulating for years already, focusing on events such as the Iranian 
Constitutional Revolution of 1906, the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, and the rise of Marxism, 
                                                 
14 See, for example, Erez Manela, The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of 
Anticolonial Nationalism  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).  
15 The peace proposal publicized in late 1917 by the Bolshevik government in Russia called for the settlement of 
colonial questions through popular referenda, which likely played a major part in Wilson’s decision to explicitly 
espouse the principle of national self-determination. Indeed, the term “national self-determination,” was coined not 
by Wilson, but by Lenin in the first place. In 1919, on behalf of the Hizb al-Watani, Farid appealed to the 
participants in the Russian-Central Powers peace negotiations at Brest-Litovsk to recognize “the need for the 
liberation of Egypt in line with the principle of nationality aspired to by all of the powers.” (Berliner Tageblatt, 
Berlin, 4 January 1918.) Farid expressly referred to the solemn recognition of the principle of self-determination by 
the “Soviets in Petersburg,” and personally expressed his thanks to Lenin in a telegram. (Muhammad Farid, Awraq 
Muhammad Farid, Vol. 1 (Cairo, 1978), 389.) 
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Socialism, and Communism. Wilsonian language, then, shaped strategies and the language of 
appeals, but did not fundamentally alter the nature or aim of the nationalist movement.  
Though the idea of national self-government was hardly new to anti-colonial nationalists, 
Wilson’s pronouncements offered a discourse of legitimacy on which to base anticolonial 
demands. Because nationalist demands were now based on the West’s own criteria, many 
believed colonial powers could not but grant independence to occupied territories. These 
pronouncements, of course, also raised expectations of achieving national independence in any 
post-War settlement. As Egyptian historian ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Rafi’i explained, Wilson’s 
principles had such a “quick and decisive influence on Egyptian public opinion” because they 
reflected “the feelings that filled the hearts of the educated class in Egypt.”16 Wilson’s rhetoric 
became important because it created a way for anti-colonial nationalists to mold their own 
arguments within an intra-EuroAmerican discourse on sovereignty and personal freedom. 
According to Salama Musa,  
With this new doctrine, Wilson appeared as if he were a prophet. The world that was groaning 
under the weight of the British Empire was given a quickening breeze by the proclamation of these 
new principles that spoke of equality and freedom and self-determination. They stuck in our 
minds, these principles; we became devoted to them and thought much about ways by which we 
could profit from them. The English authorities were much annoyed by these principles, but they 
could not prevent the effect they had, nor repudiate them.17  
 
Wilson’s celebrated arrival in Paris as the champion of self-determination suggested to Egyptian 
nationalists that the Peace Conference would be the arena in which their voices would finally be 
heard, and their independent identity, and the rights attendant to it, recognized.18 
                                                 
16 ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Rafi’i, Thawrat 1919: tarikh Misr al-qawmi min sanat 1914 ila sanat 1921 (Cairo: Dar al-
Ma’arif, 1987), 57. 
17 Musa, 99-100. In a similar fashion, Allied rhetoric such as the Atlantic Charter would later be used as potent tools 
for nationalists in the Middle East. (‘Abd al-Rahman al-Rafi’i, fi a’qab al-thawra al-misriyya, Vol. 3 (Cairo, 1951), 
159-161. Rafi’i compares the influence of the Atlantic Charter and other wartime declarations in Egypt to that of 
Wilson’s declarations during World War I.) 
18 Manela, 25. 
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The Paris Peace Conference and President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points raised the 
average Egyptian’s expectations for acquiring major concessions from the British, if not 
complete independence. In the first few months of 1919, the Egyptian streets were filled with 
hopeful expectations: Woodrow Wilson and the Americans were viewed as literal saviors who 
would unilaterally grant Egypt its independence. A popular expression coming out of the desire 
for Wilson’s assistance with Egyptian demands for independence asked: “Oh Wilson, we have 
gathered together and to whom shall we address ourselves? For we have no real newspapers – 
only those lunatics in the Muqqatam.”19 The Wafd, at least initially, also took Wilson’s Fourteen 
Points at face value and had high hopes regarding the possibility of help from the Americans. On 
16 February 1919, Sa’d Zaghlul sent a telegram to Woodrow Wilson pleading with him for a 
hearing at the peace conference. How could the “[peace] conference officially hear the Syrian 
delegation which was until recently a part of the Turkish Empire,” Zaghlul asked, and “refuse to 
listen to the voice of all Egyptians?” He then reproached Wilson, asking: “Is it reasonable to you 
that those who were fighting against the Allies have the right to voice their demands and Egypt, 
which participated in the war on the side of the Allies, is denied this right?” The telegram was 
intercepted by British censors.20 
In fact, appeals to Wilsonian rhetoric had become commonplace among the Egyptian 
ruling class in the wake of the War. Already in October 1918, Sultan Fu’ad himself told the High 
Commissioner Sir Reginald Wingate of his desire for “Home Rule for Egypt along the lines of 
President Wilson’s Fourteen Points,” and Prince ‘Umar Tusun Pasha (1872-1944), a particularly 
popular member of the royal family who ideologically and financially backed the nationalist 
movement, claimed that the idea of challenging the protectorate occurred to him “after the 
                                                 
19 Quoted in Ziad Fahmy, “Popularizing Egyptian Nationalism: Colloquial Culture and Media Capitalism, 1870-
1919,” (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Michigan, 2007), 243. 
20 FO 371/ 3714/38763, Cheetham to Curzon, Cairo 23 February 1919. 
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publication of President Wilson’s Fourteen Points.”21 In various manifestos and petitions 
composed and distributed during this period, the nationalists justified their demands on 
Wilsonian grounds: independence was “a natural right of nations,” they argued; and since the 
principle of self-determination prohibited the imposition of foreign rule on a people against its 
will, Britain had no legal ground for its presence in Egypt.22  
Nationalist activists at the Peace Conference, headed by Sa’d Zaghlul, worked to marshal 
public support for their demands within Egypt, convening mass rallies, circulating petitions, and 
launching press campaigns to propagate and advance their cause. At the same time, they 
appealed for support to the international community, especially, naturally, to President Wilson 
himself. In a telegram sent to Wilson in December, Zaghlul assured the President that  
No people more than the Egyptian people has felt strongly the joyous emotion of the birth of a 
new era which, thanks to your virile action, is soon going to impose itself upon the universe, and 
to spread everywhere all the benefits of a peace whose calm and durability will no longer be 
troubled by the ambitions of hypocrisy or the old-fashioned policy of hegemony and furthering 
selfish national interests.23 
 
Zaghlul went on to beseech the President to exercise his influence so that the British would allow 
the Egyptian nationalists their day in Paris. This, Zaghlul pointed out, was no more than their 
“natural and sacred right.”24 In addition, the Wafd succeeded in reminding European 
governments of the issue of Egyptian independence by “bombarding” the Paris Peace 
Conference attendees, as well as the public, with “countless pamphlets and documentary ‘white 
books’ giving their version of…Anglo-Egyptian relations and the ‘repeated pledges’ [of the 
                                                 
21 Wingate to Balfour, 17 November 1918, British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the 
Foreign Office Confidential Print, Part II, Series G, vol. 1, 86. 
22 See, for example, ‘Ali Shamsi, An Egyptian Opinion: Egypt and the Right of Nations: An Appeal to the 
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decadence. Avant-propos de M.M. Rifat. Tome 1 (Geneva: 1914); and Mohamed Fahmy, An Open Letter Address to 
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British]…to withdraw from Egypt.”25 In this they were helped by the many Egyptian 
organizations already present in Europe, a significant number of these being Sphinx Societies or 
other Watani-connected groups.26 Similarly, as the 1919 Egyptian Revolution unfolded, a stream 
of telegrams, letters, and petitions poured into the American diplomatic agency in Cairo. These 
were sent by members of various organizations, professions, and walks of life within Egyptian 
society, as well as by Egyptians living abroad. Many of the messages protested the arrest of 
Zaghlul and his associates ahead of the peace conference; and all decried British oppression and 
solicited urgent American assistance against it.27  
In order to try to pressure the Allies to include Egypt in the peace negotiations, the 
Egyptian delegation’s members attempted to contact the peace conference delegates in order to 
provide the latter with manifestos, and they sent information to members of the French 
parliament.28 In addition, the Egyptians also tried to influence French public opinion as a whole. 
In publishing their articles, the Egyptians made use of a number of anti-colonialist connections to 
the press that went back to the pre-War era. They came in contact with the Socialist editor Jean 
Longuet, who had repeatedly supported Indian anti-colonialists in the past.29 The arguments 
brought forward by Egyptian nationalists often built on well-established templates. One of their 
                                                 
25 Christina Phelps Harris, Nationalism and Revolution in Egypt (Stanford, CA: The Hoover Institution, 1964), 93.  
26 Other Nationalists, however, refused to support the Wafd. At the instigation of Prince ‘Umar Tusun, they formed 
a rival delegation, al-Wafd al-Watani, with ex-Premier Muhammad Sa’id as its leader.(Muhammad Sa’id and Sa’d 
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before its scheduled departure, however, the Nationalists, sensing trouble, dissolved it and sought a reconciliation 
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28 FO 141/828/3, Delegation Egyptienne, Appel au Parlement Francais, 31 July 1919. 
29 FO 608/213/5, Peace Congress: British Policy in Egypt, 9 April 1919. 
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central strategies was to stress the traditional cultural and political connections between Egypt 
and France.30 As the delegates explained in their appeal,  
These relations of friendship continued during the whole course of the last century. They gave a 
purely French character…to our national education. In addition, our laws are nothing but French 
laws. All this has created, in the heart of the Egyptians, a trust in France that authorizes them to 
ask her to raise, in the name of Law and Justice, her voice in… [Egypt’s] favor.31  
 
Egyptian nationalists distributed their pamphlets in English, French, German, and Italian (Italy 
being the only country not to have approved the protectorate by 1920.)32 
Throughout the course of the settlement negotiations, the British, in response to the 
lobbying of Egyptian nationalists, were intent on restraining the Egyptian delegates’ activities 
and public relations campaigns.33 As a British official noted, it was  
most important that apart from information which passes through diplomatic channels between 
His Majesty’s Government and Egypt, we should be kept fully informed of the movements of 
these persons, of their interviews with officials and others, of their statements and of statements 
made to them both in France and England.34  
 
In order to achieve this goal, the correspondence between the Egyptian delegation in France and 
their “friends in Egypt” was intercepted and deciphered. All of the delegation’s propaganda 
material was to be sent to the British authorities in order to allow British spokespersons to 
“officially” respond to Egyptian descriptions of the British as “harsh,” “tyrannical,” “brutal,” and 
prone to atrocities. The contacts between the Egyptian delegation and continental communists 
were to be monitored, as well as possible movements of Egyptians between France and Egypt.35 
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32 E14897/1641/16, Allenby to Foreign Office, Pamphlet issued by Gabriele d’Annunzio, Fiume, including one 
letter from Zaghlul and one report on the position of Egypt, 13 November 1920. 
33 Daniel Brueckenhaus, The Transnational Surveillance of Anti-Colonialist Movements in Western Europe, 1905-
1945 (Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Yale University, 2011), 231-2; FO 605/213/5 Decypher, General Allenby 
(Cairo), 17 April 1919. 
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At the behest of the British, French authorities agreed to give directions to the press to 
cease printing information that had been received from the Egyptian delegation. While the 
French authorities had no legal means to outlaw such publications, their influence over most 
newspapers was strong enough to force the papers to acquiesce to governmental demands. In 
May of 1919, French officials informed the British that the former’s censor had been “instructed 
to prevent [the] publication of information inspired by nationalists or having the character of 
anti-French or anti-British propaganda in Asia Minor or North Africa.”36 The French authorities 
also agreed to send a notification to the press, reminding them of the fact that the French 
Government had already recognized in principle, in 1914, the British protectorate over Egypt.37 
Following this argument, therefore, a criticism of British actions was implicitly a criticism of the 
French government, as well. Only the socialist press, which prided itself on its independence 
from government intrusion, continued to publish “subversive” articles in support of Egyptian 
nationalism.38 
French officials continued to extend their cooperation with the British beyond hindering 
Zaghlul’s delegation. When, in May 1919, some members of the Egyptian National Party in 
Switzerland voiced their wish to come to Paris, the French informed the British of their 
application. Similar to Zaghlul’s group, the aims of the more radical “Swiss Egyptians” was “to 
get into contact with the leaders of the [French] Republic, [and] with French public opinion, to 
make the voice of the Egyptian people heard even to the English nation, [and] to submit…[their] 
cause to the English delegates and their allies.”39 The French authorities asked the British for 
                                                                                                                                                             
delegation was a secret weekly paper, which encouraged Egyptians to “fight until you drive them (the British) out,” 
and described England as the “typhoid of Europe, a plague.” (Pamphlet: Reflections les Affaires Orientals, 16 
August 1921, “Peace Congress – Turkey and the Middle East.”) 
36 FO 608/214, British Delegation, Paris, May 1919. 
37 FO 608/212, No. 9, Paris, 13 May 1919. 
38 FO 608/213/5, Derby to Curzon, Paris, 25 April 1919. 
39 FO 608/213/5, Bern, Hotel Gurten-Kulm. 
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their opinions about whether this group should be let into the country. The issue was complicated 
by the fact that, in their application, the Swiss Egyptian association referred explicitly to the 
British decision to allow Zaghlul’s group to come to France. The Swiss group now demanded to 
be treated in a similar manner.40 Here, the British and French made use of the fact that the Swiss 
Egyptians had been openly pro-German during the war, while the Zaghlul deputation, whose 
strategy was to portray themselves as pro-French, had no or few connections to Germany. A 
French official suggested that this would give the Entente powers a reason to differ in their 
stance towards the two groups. The Swiss Egyptians were prevented from entering in view of 
their “continuous pro-German activities.”41  
In the meantime, the British were also working behind the scenes to ensure official 
American recognition of their protectorate over Egypt, playing on their fears regarding 
transnational anti-colonial groups. In a confidential memorandum dated 17 April 1919, the 
British Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour described the situation in Egypt as “daily becoming 
more serious.”42 He added that the “extreme nationalists,” whom he described as “chiefly paid 
agents of the revolutionary party in Turkey and [the] Bolshevists,” claim that “President Wilson 
is definitely supporting” them “in their attempts to stir up a Holy War against the infidels.”43 
Having thus invoked the specters of revolution, Bolshevism, and Islamic fanaticism all at once, 
Balfour concluded that it was of the utmost importance that the United States recognize the 
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protectorate and help “remove from Egyptian politics the dangerous religious and Bolshevist 
appeal which is now gaining force.”44 The British assessment of the situation in Egypt was 
shared by American officials, as well. Hampson Gary, the American diplomatic agent in Cairo, 
reported that the disturbances in Egypt were “rapidly developing into Bolshevism” and 
exhibiting “an animus against all foreigners and their property.”45  
This generalized fear on the part of Europe and the United States of the spread of 
Bolshevism underscored the shared colonial and anti-colonial view that imperialism was a global 
issue with only local variations. British officials tried to argue that the Egyptians’ efforts were 
not a localized and specific threat to British rule alone but constituted a much more general anti-
imperial danger. The British authorities stressed, first of all, that the Egyptians’ activities were 
undermining the standing of all colonial powers in North Africa. The agitation in Egypt, they 
said, could easily lead to “a nationalist movement with Turkish sympathies spreading along the 
North African littoral.”46 Secondly, the British argued, any agitation in Egypt would contribute 
to the growth of a more generalized Bolshevist agitation, which would travel across imperial 
borders equally easily and would challenge any colonizing country’s economic interests.  
In the weeks following the recognition of the protectorate, in addition to repeated official 
inquiries from Zaghlul, dozens of messages from Egyptians protested the decision to recognize 
the Protectorate and implored the United States to reverse its decision and aid Egyptians in their 
struggle against the British.47 One such message, signed by seventy-two Egyptian physicians, 
was among the many that noted the disjuncture that had emerged between Wilson’s rhetoric and 
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his recent decision, calling upon America to give Egyptians not only “platonic sympathy,” but 
“real and active help to realize their legitimate national aspirations.”48 On the morning of 22 
April 1919, the Egyptian papers printed the communique containing President Wilson’s 
acceptance of the Protectorate, giving the Egyptian nationalists “a very unpleasant and 
unexpected shock.”49 To counter some of the effects of the declaration, within just a few hours, 
dozens of nationalists “came down to all the bars and Cafes armed with pamphlets, and urged all 
to take no notice of the proclamation.”50 In his memoirs, writer, politician, and lawyer 
Muhammad Haykal (1888-1956) recalled that Wilson’s decision to recognize the protectorate 
felt “like a bolt of lightning”:  
Here was the man of the Fourteen Points, among them the right to self-determination, denying the 
Egyptian people its right to self-determination and recognizing the British protectorate over Egypt. 
And doing all that before the delegation on behalf of the Egyptian people had arrived in Paris to 
defend its claim, and before President Wilson had heard one word from them! Is this not the 
ugliest of treacheries?! Is it not the most profound repudiation of principles?!51  
 
 
As the U.S. president’s failure to uphold and implement his own principles was quickly 
becoming apparent, Egyptians’ faith in Wilson, in the United States, and in the new liberal 
international order that Wilson had championed, began to crumble.52 The failure of liberal 
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nationalism, and, in particular, the failure of Wilson to live up to the promises of the Fourteen 
Points, and of the Allies to honor assurances of self-determination, allowed for the rise of 
Lenin’s star among anti-colonial nationalists, and of Socialism and Bolshevism as alternative 
international systems. Liberalism in Europe, Egyptian nationalists soon discovered, resolutely 
failed to amount to liberalism in the colonies. For Egyptians, it was clearly a racially segregated 
liberalism. As early as 1895, Muhammad Abduh summed up the widespread sentiment when he 
stated that, “We Egyptians believed once in English liberalism and English sympathy; but we 
believe no longer, for facts are stronger than words. Your liberalness we see plainly is only for 
yourselves, and your sympathy with us is that of the wolf for the lamb which he deigns to eat.”53  
 
International Bolshevism 
Among the most crucial international movements of the post-War period were 
communism and socialism. In this context, the movements that most closely impacted Egyptian 
nationalists were the Russian Revolution of 1917, the Turkish War of Independence, and the 
Non-Cooperation and Khilafat Movements in India.54 That a hiatus of only sixteen months 
                                                                                                                                                             
associations….The sin of our nation in his eyes has been that it seeks to free its territory and demands the natural 
right to self-government – and this from Mr. Roosevelt, who made war on Spain to oblige the Spaniards to evacuate 
Cuba and the Philippines! Mr. Roosevelt seems to be one of those who divide the human race into two sections, a 
superior and an inferior, and would have the one be slave to the other.” According to Egyptian nationalists, 
Roosevelt had “out-Cromered Cromer,” (Egyptian Gazette, 30 march 1910, 3.) Even Lutfi al-Sayyid made a speech 
of refutation, wondering if Roosevelt was aware that the British had obstructed the founding at the very university at 
which he spoke. (al-Jarida, Supplement, 29 March 1910.) (“Mr. Roosevelt and Egypt,” Manchester Guardian, 6 
June 1910, reprinted in Muhammad Farid,  Campagne de Muhammad Bey Farid, Chef du Parti National Egyptien: 
Paris, Lyon, Londres, May-June 1910, 6th Edition, (Bruges, Belgium: The St. Catherine Press, 1910), 89-92.) All 
Egyptian dailies covered his trip from early march to mid-April, 1910 (including al-Ahram, al-Mu’ayyad, al-
Muqattam, al-Shab, Misr, al-Jarida, and the Egyptian Gazette.) See also Ahmad Shafiq, Mudhakkirati II, Part 2: 
212-215, and Yunan Labib Rizq, “Tiyudur Ruzafalt wa al-Haraka al-Wataniyya al-Misriyya,” al-Siyasa al-
Duwaliyya 9 (October 1973), 98-111. 
53 Quoted in Reza Aslan, No god but God: the Origins, Evolution, and Future of Islam (New York: Random House, 
2005), 232; Pankaj Mishra, From the Ruins of Empire: the Intellectuals who Remade Asia (New York: Farrar, Straus 
and Giroux, 2012), 261. 
54 Following the unsuccessful revolutionary attempt in Russia in 1905, a group of Russian fugitives found refuge in 
Egypt. They founded the Bolshevik Group (Majmu’at al-Balshafik.) Some of the group’s members were Jews, the 
most prominent of whom was Theodore Rothstein, who worked for the newspaper The Egyptian Standard, a 
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separated the Russian Revolution of November 1917 and the Egyptian Revolution of March 
1919 gave rise to particular fears within the Government of Egypt, among both British officials 
and upper class Egyptians, that socialist and communist ideas would infect the nationalist 
movement in Egypt. The fears mounted as the Egyptian Revolution produced phenomena, such 
as strikes and sabotage, which the British and some in the Egyptian upper classes considered to 
be strongly suggestive of Bolshevism.  
In some ways, colonial officials were correct in their assessment that communism and 
socialism had effects on Egyptian nationalism. However, the popularity of these movements had 
significantly more to do with local conditions than strict allegiance to any transnational 
ideologies. Egyptians who had suffered from disruptive European financial control and the 
disastrous effects of the War-time economy found the communist focus on workers’ rights and 
land reform extremely attractive. Salih as-Sharif at-Tunisi, a nationalist who worked out of 
Berlin and who was in frequent contact with Egyptian nationalists there, voiced the feelings of 
many anti-colonial nationalists regarding the global importance of the Russian Revolution. 
According to at-Tunisi,  
The Revolution that brought freedom by the Russian nation to the different peoples of this great 
nation has raised hopes in all oppressed nations for an early liberation. This hope is the more 
justifiable since the delegates of the Russian workers, soldiers and peasants did not demand 
freedom only for themselves, yet claimed and supported it in line with the principles of true 
democracy shared by the free peoples of the other countries. This new breath of democracy has 
prompted…the community of oppressed nations to join their voices with that of the Russian 
democracy and to stretch out its hands to go jointly in the direction of this noble and grand aim.55  
 
                                                                                                                                                             
publication of the Watani Party. ‘Ali Ahmad Shukri, who translated Rothstein’s book, The Destruction of Egypt, 
into Arabic, recounted that during his stay in Egypt, Rothstein maintained close links with Lenin and the Socialist 
Democratic Party of Russia. During Lenin’s exile in France and Switzerland, he often dispatched his missives to the 
Bolsheviks in Russia via Egypt in order to avoid their falling into the hands of the Tsarist intelligence service. (Rami 
Ginat, A History of Egyptian Communism: Jews and their Compatriots in Quest of Revolution (Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 2011), 25.) 
55 S. Cherif, Appel du genre humain a la verite (Berlin, 1919), p. 3. 
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Similarly, in a telegram to the attendees of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in 1918, Farid, officially 
speaking for the Watani Party, thanked both the Egyptian nationalist party operating in Berlin 
and the Soviet government for inspiring humanity with freedom and equality. Farid drew 
particular attention to the public explanation of the promise of self-determination on the part of 
the new Russian government, and explained that it had awakened among the nations under 
colonial control “the hope of new life, to a life of happiness, which is based on the liberation 
from the chains of capitalism.”56 In this view, global capitalism was connected to foreign control 
of the Egyptian economy and to the British occupation. Farid went on to request that the Soviet 
delegation propose the liberation of Egypt from British occupation as part of the Versailles Peace 
Treaty, because, as Farid explained, “The Egyptian question is in reality an international one,"57  
reflecting Farid’s belief that colonialism was a European problem and therefore would find its 
solution in Europe. 
Although neither official communist nor socialist movements were ever popularly 
established in Egypt in the interwar period, communism was an attractive ideology to many 
Egyptians, particularly workers, who suffered poor conditions at the hands of their employers, 
many of which were foreign companies; and fellahin, to whom the communist stance on land 
redistribution was very attractive.58 In addition, communism dovetailed with nationalist Egyptian 
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aspirations of ridding the country of foreign influence, in both the political and economic 
spheres. Among both the middle and working classes, global and foreign capital, and economic 
imperialism more generally, triggered fears that were magnified by the perception that the 
Egyptian state could not protect local interests and economies from foreign penetration. These 
grievances were compounded by the fact that nearly all of Egypt’s major industrial and transport 
enterprises were owned or managed by foreigners, and that even the middle-and lower-level 
supervisory personnel with immediate power over the largely Egyptian manual workers were 
overwhelmingly, if not exclusively, foreigners. Economic deprivation was also accompanied by 
ethnic, cultural, and religious discrimination, which mirrored the imperial political system. At the 
same time, many companies explicitly barred Egyptians from promotion to the better-paid, more 
highly-skilled jobs held by foreigners, thus preserving an ethnic division of labor that worked 
against the indigenous majority.59 Indeed, foreigners were generally paid more than Egyptians 
even for the same job.  
Many in Egypt saw a connection between the economic repression exercised by foreign 
firms and global capitalism vis-à-vis local economies, on the one hand, and the political 
repression of British colonialism, on the other. The country’s political domination by a foreign 
occupying power facilitated economic domination by foreign capitalists, resident abroad or in 
Egypt itself. This dual repression, therefore, created a natural connection between anti-colonial 
                                                                                                                                                             
Communist Movement, 1936-1954,” (PhD Dissertation, Harvard University, 1984), 158-60.) The political manifesto 
of the Egyptian Communist Party, which was presented in January 1923, indicated a radical anti-British orientation 
that called for, among other things, “the nationalization of the Suez Canal, [and] the liberation and unification of 
Egypt and the Sudan.” (Sa’id, 21; Selma Botman, The Rise of Egyptian Communism, 1939-1970 (Syracuse, NY: 
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59 This interconnection of race and foreignness with the ability to claim higher employment status and higher 
salaries mirrors the causes of the ‘Urabi Revolution in 1882. 
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nationalism and workers’ rights groups, if not with communism officially. In July 1919, General 
Allenby, the British High Commissioner in Egypt, commented in a dispatch to London that “the 
native working classes have apparently identified in their own minds the Syndicalist [trade 
union] movement and the Extremist [nationalist] agitation.”60 The British authorities in Egypt, 
then, had grasped the extent to which the emerging movement of Egyptian workers had come to 
be infused with a strong sense of nationalism.61 
The realities of workers’ lives also provided concrete reasons for them to see nationalism 
as a sensible way of understanding their daily financial and political realities. Imperial political 
and foreign economic penetrations into Egypt were intimately connected; it made sense for 
workers and artisans to identify their problems and grievances with Egypt’s subordination to 
foreign control. Therefore, it was logical to see their aspirations and struggles for a better life as 
bound with the cause of national liberation. In the Egyptian case, segments of the urban working 
population developed links with the nationalist movement early on, found in their own concrete 
experience reasons to feel themselves a part of that movement, and came to interpret and 
conceptualize their own concerns in nationalist terms.  
Throughout the first decades of the twentieth century, both the Watani and Wafd-Umma 
Parties also sought to capitalize on the increasing focus on workers’ issues and incorporate 
support for labor issues into their movements. However, there was often also conflict between 
Egyptian nationalist leaders and leaders of international communism, as Egyptians wanted to be 
able to harness the workers’ movement to assist their own national movement without giving up 
any power to ideologically communist organizations. There was also little room for the 
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development of a full-fledged communist movement in Egypt. Unlike, for example Vietnam or 
China in the interwar period, a strong nationalist movement already existed through popular 
mandate in Egypt; and Egyptian communists were, therefore, unable to assume leadership of the 
national movement or create popular support for communism by linking the cause of national 
liberation with the struggle for socio-economic transformation. The connection between 
independence and improved economic and social conditions had already been made in the minds 
of many Egyptians; and by 1919 the Wafd was considered the legitimate vehicle for both of 
these aspirations.       
There was good reason for political movements for independence in Egypt to find 
common cause with those disaffected by the country’s twentieth-century economic status. 
Foreigners directly invested their capital in land companies, established mortgage and credit 
companies and banks, and gained control of the import and export trade. European banking 
houses also lent vast sums of money to the Egyptian state, which used most of it to develop the 
country’s infrastructure – irrigation, railroads, and port facilities – in order to facilitate the 
cultivation and export of cotton. It had been heavy borrowing from abroad which had led to a 
downward spiral of indebtedness culminating in bankruptcy in 1876 under Isma’il. As has been 
shown above, foreign financial controls had been imposed on the Egyptian government which in 
turn stimulated a nationalist reaction and led to Egypt’s occupation by British forces in 1882.  
Whereas ownership of the land itself was largely in the hands of an Egyptian agrarian 
bourgeoisie, the country’s economy as a whole was largely controlled by foreign interests by 
1914. A significant portion of the Egyptian-owned land was mortgaged to European-dominated 
banks, the most powerful of which was the Credit Foncier Egyptien. In addition, credit, foreign 
trade, and shipping were almost entirely in non-Egyptian hands. Virtually all of Egypt’s 
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industrial and transport enterprises were either owned or managed by non-Egyptians. And, of 
course, effective state power was in the hands of Great Britain, whose officials protected the 
interests of metropolitan capital and of the legally privileged foreigners resident in Egypt. In his 
close study of the Egyptian economy, A.E. Crouchley estimated that, of the slightly more than 
£E100,000,000 of paid-up capital in joint-stock companies operating in Egypt in 1914, 
£E92,000,000 was controlled by foreign interests.62 Thus, as Egyptian nationalist aspirations 
began to be expressed after World War I, it was inevitable that nationalists should call attention 
to the overweening economic power of the foreign interests and demand a more genuinely 
national economy.63  
Indeed, all of the banks in Egypt were foreign-controlled. In 1898, a National Bank had 
been established, but this organ was run by leaders of the British community in Egypt and even 
had a separate London executive committee.64 The other banks were either branches of major 
European firms or banks opened with their headquarters in Egypt but funded and administered 
from overseas. The main Egyptian export was cotton, and the preparation and movement of this 
crop from Egypt to Europe was controlled at all levels by foreign interests. Banks played a major 
role in purchasing the crop for overseas shipment; the ginning firms in Egypt and the export-
import houses were also run by Europeans, while a select group of brokers and merchants, called 
the Alexandria General Produce Association, monopolized the grading and overseas sales of 
Egyptian exports. Although there had been remarkable growth in the number of joint stock 
companies operating in Europe during the British occupation, nearly all of these firms were run 
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by Europeans.65 The stability of the social order of the monarchy, then, including the privileged 
status of foreigners, ultimately depended on the British military occupation.  
Many Egyptian journalists and thinkers echoed the demands for more indigenous 
Egyptian control of the economy. A favorite argument of the intensely nationalistic newspaper, 
al-Akhbar, was the need for Egypt to create the economic infrastructure necessary for the 
political independence which it hoped that Zaghlul and the Wafd would soon win.66 Egyptian 
nationalists called for genuinely and purely Egyptian political and financial structures, and were 
suspicious of foreign influences.67 As a co-founder of the Umma Party’s newspaper, al-Jarida, 
Tal’at Harb, who would go on to found Bank Misr, made certain that the paper carried articles 
dealing with economics.68 He himself wrote several articles on the subject, one of which 
contained a plea for creating the economic basis of political independence. While admitting that 
almost all Egyptians favored complete independence, he reminded readers that Egypt still 
depended on foreigners as doctors, engineers, merchants, and industrialists. Harb bemoaned the 
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the inability of Egyptians to mobilize large amounts of money, hence their dependence on foreign banking and 
lending institutions. Because foreign firms monopolized the capital available in Egypt, they were able to fix prices 
for Egyptian exports and expropriate the lion’s share of Egypt’s foreign trade earnings. Thus, despite the fact that 
Egypt had a prosperous overseas trade, the country did not retain this wealth. Lutfi made a trip to Italy to study 
agricultural cooperatives. The so-called father of the Egyptian cooperative movement, ‘Umar Lutfi, also 
championed the idea of ‘a big national bank’ and he founded an Egyptian Financial Cooperative Company (Sharikat 
al-Ta’awun al-Maliya) in 1909. (Tignor, 55.) Bank Misr had a number of novel features which reflected its 
nationalist orientation. All shares had to be owned by Egyptians – a restriction justified on the ground that otherwise 
foreigners would buy up most of the shares and take control of the bank. The language of the bank was to be Arabic, 
despite the fact that almost all of Egypt’s financial and commercial firms employed French. The nationalist 
orientations of the bank were elaborated upon in many speeches and press articles. Perhaps the most insightful is 
Tal’at Harb’s speech of 8 May 1920, at the formal opening of the bank. (Tal’at Harb, Majnu’at Khutab, vol. 1, 45-
63; Tignor, 57.) 
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absence of factories producing clothing and other articles of consumption, and was angered that 
foreigners owned the coffee shops and hotels so popular with Egyptians. In concluding this 
article, he exhorted Egyptians to establish their “domestic independence” first, by becoming 
good hotel managers, cooks, and builders; from this economic base he expected Egyptians to 
enter the medical, engineering, and banking professions.69  
Tal’at Harb continued to display his expertise in economic matters when he published 
Qanat al-Suways, which attacked the British plan to extend the Suez Canal concession for an 
additional forty years. He argued that, despite having invested huge amounts of labor and capital 
in the construction of the canal, Egypt had realized trifling gains. Harb also argued that the Suez 
Canal Company made its huge profits at the expense of the Egyptian people and its government; 
and that the Egyptian Parliament should not extend the concession unless the company was 
willing to make far-reaching changes in the distribution of funds between shareholders and the 
Egyptian people and to allow Egyptians a voice in the company’s administration.70  
The continuing nationalist push for independence, the specific effects of European 
economic and political penetration, and the severe economic measures taken by the Egyptian 
Government during World War I, were all pushing Egyptians toward revolution in 1919. In 
particular, the requisitioning by the British of livestock and labor, and the shift to increased 
cotton production for the War effort, negatively affected Egyptian peasants in a disproportionate 
manner. To cheaply supply its factories, the British kept raw Egyptian cotton prices artificially 
low, allowing them to reach only 56% of the world market price. This greatly angered the 
Egyptian landed elites and was certainly one of the motivating factors in the overwhelming 
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support the elites gave to the independence movement.71 In this context, it is no wonder that rail 
lines, the symbol of both the British Empire’s political supremacy and the loss of Egyptian 
economic sovereignty, would become the focal point of much of the industrial sabotage in 
support of socio-political independence.72  In addition, the middle classes were increasingly 
resentful because of the ever expanding number of British bureaucrats employed in large 
numbers during the War.  Most of the urban population was also angered during the First World 
War, which included tight censorship of all newspapers and the wide application of martial law, 
which heightened the resentment of all segments of society and contributed to a growing sense of 
injustice and oppression.73 A popular chant reflected the adverse effects of the British occupation 
and the particular hardships brought about by the First World War was, “Pardon us oh Wingate! 
But our country has had enough! You took our camels, donkeys, barley, and wheat aplenty / 
Now leave us alone!”74  
By the end of the First World War, then, nearly every segment of Egyptian society had 
reason to resent British rule and be receptive to renewed nationalist agitation. In addition to 
political repression and long-standing economic issues, the War had further disrupted the 
country’s economy. Although large landowners had generally benefited from global high cotton 
prices, they resented official agricultural policies designed to serve British interests rather than 
their own. The bulk of the peasantry suffered from the requisitioning of their animals and their 
                                                 
71 Nathan J. Brown, Peasant politics in Modern Egypt: Struggle Against the State (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1990), 200. 
72 Collective punishment was also used; it became standard British policy to burn the village nearest to any damaged 
railway tracks. 
73 FO 371/3714/39690, Cheetham, “Egyptian Political Situation,” March 9, 1919.  For a detailed British analysis of 
what caused the revolt, see Great Britain.  Egypt No. 1 (1921), Report of the Special Mission to Egypt, 7-12; Ziad 
Fahmy, “Popularizing Egyptian Nationalism,” 244-5. 
74 Because this song was sung in the streets, there were many simultaneous versions of it, with slightly different 
lyrics. According to a contemporary, the first verses of the song went: “Pardon us oh Wingate! But our country is 
ruined (khirbil)…They killed our children, pillaged our country and exiled our leader…” See Mustafa Amin, Min 
Wahid li-‘Asharah (Cairo: al-Maktab al-Misri al-Hadith Lil-Tiba’a wa al-Nashr, 1977), 187; Ziad Fahmy, 
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grain, and, later in the War, from being drafted by the hundreds of thousands for forced labor 
with the Allied armies in the Middle East and Europe. The temporary weakening of ties with the 
European economy stimulated significant growth in those industries that produced substitutes for 
imports unavailable during the War, or which catered to the needs of wealthy Egyptians and the 
very large Allied forces stationed in Egypt. Low food supplies, largely a result of the shift to the 
monopoly crop cotton, in addition to inflation, only exacerbated the situation for Egyptian 
workers and fellahin.  
The British attempted to frame worker and fellahin disaffection as reflective of a situation 
on the brink of Bolshevik catastrophe. Egyptian elites were, likewise, wary of increased activism 
on the part of the fellahin, which was as motivated by anger at local economic conditions as it 
was by the nationalist movement. Landowners and omdehs generally were reported to be 
seriously alarmed at the attitude of the fellahin, the damage done to property, cattle theft, danger 
to the water supply, and the likelihood of further unrest. Landowners also became increasingly 
angered with Cairo and the effendi nationalists to whose activities they attributed their losses. 
Landowners were uneasy at the appearance among the fellahin of what, from their point of view, 
they regarded as the worst symptom of Bolshevism, namely the proposal to partition large estates 
for the benefit of the small holders and landless peasants.75  
 
A Bolshevik Fatwa 
Due to the fear of international conspiracies that might undermine British imperial power, 
the British took a particularly close interest and remained very active in studying and attempting 
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to repress what they considered to be a “communist threat” in Egypt.76 The activity of small 
circles of intellectuals, such as Joseph Rosenthal and Salama Musa, reflected a broader public 
interest in communist ideas, if not Communism itself.77 The strong showings of the Bolsheviks 
on the international stage in the early part of the twentieth century were also widely applauded as 
defeats for the imperialist powers, including Britain. British authorities sought to counter this by 
launching an anti-Bolshevik propaganda campaign which included distribution of the 1919 fatwa 
by the Grand Mufti of Egypt condemning Bolshevism.  
While religious elites in Egypt had tended to remain divorced from issues of political or 
economic imperialism, on 2 July 1919 the then Grand Mufti of Egypt, Shaykh Muhammad 
Bakhit, issued a fatwa against Bolshevism.78 The Sheikh’s opinion identified Bolshevism with 
                                                 
76 See, for example, “Bolshevism in Egypt,” Cheetham, 16 October 1919, Confidential, in which Bolsheviks are 
described as foreign agents, and Bolshevism as a philosophy which appeals to fellahin with promises of distribution 
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of the Milner Commission?” (The Egyptian Mail, 22 October 1919.) The author of an editorial comment in al-Afkar 
made a similar suggestion, writing that, as the Grand Mufti Muhammad Bakhit and other leading ulama had taken 
trouble to express their opinions on many unimportant matters, they should not mind doing the same with respect to 
the Milner Mission, an issue which concerned the fate of the nation.  The author stressed that “those...whose duty it 
is to give legal opinions have to tell us what religion and Muslim law order us to do with regard to a Commission 
which proposes to deprive the nation of its natural rights and lead it to recognize the Protectorate and thus come 
under a foreign power, an eventuality which is forbidden by canon law.” The article ended with an expression of 
hope “...the Grand Mufti, the Rector of the Azhar and the principal ulama will tell us what Muslim law says on this 
grave question, so that the nation may know what its duty is.” (al-Afkar, quoted in The Egyptian Mail, 22 October 
1919; John D. McIntyre, Jr., The Boycott of the Milner Mission: A Study in Egyptian Nationalism (New York: Peter 
Lang, 1985), 87-91.) A few days later, when some Azhari students warned the Mufti in the press that “...the nation is 
in great doubt as to your patriotism as you have not given your opinion regarding the Milner Mission as you did 
regarding Bolshevism...,” Shaykh Bakhit once again refused to respond.” (The Egyptian Gazette, 28 October 1919; 




Mardukism and Zoroastrianism in ancient Persia.79 Bolshevik communism, warned Shaykh 
Bakhit, 
destroys all divine laws especially the doctrines of Islam, because it recommends what God has 
considered illegal in His book. It legalizes shedding blood, allows trespassing, treachery, lies, and 
rape, causing anarchy to spread among the people with regard to their property, their women, 
children, and inheritance, until they eventually become worse than theists...such people are 
nothing but apostates, whose “way” demolishes human society, destroys the order of the world, 
leads to apostasy, threatens the whole world with horrible distress and bitter troubles, and 
instigates the lower classes against any system founded upon reason, morals, and virtue.80 
 
The wording of this fatwa is indicative of the degree to which some of the top level of the ulama’ 
were committed to maintaining the political, social, and economic status quo in Egypt in the face 
of increasing nationalist agitation. The fatwa also represented a clear break with the main thrust 
of the nationalist movement because by 1919 Zaghlul, the Wafdists, and what remained of the 
Watanis were all deeply involved in the efforts to organize labor and to use syndicates as allies 
against the British protectorate. In addition, several of those involved in the labor movement in 
Egypt either identified with Bolshevism themselves or were regarded as Bolshevist by the British 
authorities in Egypt.81 This document drawn up by the Mufti is also remarkable for its lack of an 
appreciation for the conditions in Egypt which made some segments of society predisposed to 
identify with both nationalist aspirations and the spirit of socialist doctrines prevalent throughout 
much of the post-War world.82  
                                                 
79 Marduk is a Babylonian creator god. 
80 See the full text of the fatwa in FO 141/779, 9065/8. Two years later, another prominent religious figure attacked 
the growth of Egyptian socialism. Sheikh Mohammed al-Ghoneimi al-Taftazani quoted the Qur’anic verse, “Allah 
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248 
 
Shaykh Bakhit’s fatwa caused a storm of criticism in the Egyptian press and public 
debate in Egypt regarding the fatwa’s authenticity and timing as well as the causes and factors 
behind its publication. “An unacceptable fatwa,” declared Tewfik Habib in an article published 
in al-Akhbar on 19 August 1919. Habib wrote that the Mufti knew “absolutely nothing about 
Bolshevism,” and accused Bakhit of issuing the fatwa for political reasons, because England and 
her allies were enemies of transnational Bolshevism.83 Critics of the fatwa endeavored to 
persuade their readers that if true Bolshevism were adopted in Egypt, the country would be 
saved. For instance, articles published in the Wafdist paper Wadi al-Nil stressed that the aim of 
Bolshevism was to raise the oppressed majority and take the authority from the tyrannical 
minority in order to restore equality and make justice prevail among the people.84 In fact, most 
Egyptians saw the fatwa for exactly what it was – an attempt on the part of the British to 
discredit Bolshevism using incorrect assumptions about Egyptians and Islam.   
Despite its clear unpopularity, however, the British were overjoyed with the fatwa’s 
appearance; and made copies available for distribution throughout the Muslim population centers 
in the British Empire. High Commissioner Allenby sent copies of the fatwa, translated into 
several languages, to the Viceroy of India, the British political agent in Aden, the Civil 
Commissioner in Baghdad, the British High Commissioner in Constantinople, and the Governor-
General of the Sudan.85  
It soon became apparent, however, that the fatwa had far from the desired effect. The 
British campaign to capitalize on the fatwa was so clumsy that it was ridiculed in the press and 
actually resulted in an increased public interest in communism. The Egyptian population, 
intensely suspicious of British activities, responded to the heavy-handed move on the part of the 
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British with increased interest to the hitherto largely unknown doctrine of communism. Anything 
the British so disliked, they reasoned, could not be all bad.86 According to a British intelligence 
report, Islamic scholar and reformer Muhammad Rashid Rida (1865-1935) maintained, “Nobody 
ever knew in Egypt so much about real Bolshevism before the publication of the fatwa, and the 
newspapers never wrote so much about Bolshevism before this publication.”87 A Cairo Secret 
Police Report of 28 August 1919 likewise indicated that the fatwa “...has probably rendered 
Bolshevism more popular, especially as seditious workers have been persuading the Muslim 
public that Bolshevism is not at all contrary to the precepts of the Muslim religion, and that the 
fatwa in question has been made at the instigation of the English.”88 Early in 1920, the Cairo 
police reported:  
It is noteworthy that coffee-house talk of Bolshevism continues to be reported. It is entirely vague, 
and is probably an indirect result of alarmist leaders in the “Times” rather than of Bolshevist 
propaganda. Its general tendency is that the Bolshevists are coming to take Egypt, and it will be a 
fine thing for Egypt when they do. Then if a poor man wants money, he will just take it from the 
rich. Vague as it is, it has its importance as a symptom of economic unrest.89 
 
The fatwa was not only unpopular with workers and political activists. Criticism of the 
fatwa also came from Islamic circles. Rida maintained that from many points of view the fatwa 
was a mistake on the part of the Mufti as well as “on the part of the British government that 
asked him to publish it.”90 As Rida had observed, public interest in Bolshevism and media 
attention to it increased as a reaction to British efforts to discredit it. Bakhit, noted Rida, wrote 
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the fatwa in a poor fashion employing weak historical sources to justify his arguments. In Rida’s 
view, the spread of Bolshevism in Egypt was a definite possibility. A person with suitable 
rhetorical skills could easily spread the idea, if he spoke  
to the people in the street and the working classes [for whom] every verse in the Qur’an can be 
interpreted in favor of Bolshevism. Bolshevism is much akin to many teachings of the Mufassirin 
in the first period of Islam; Bait al-mal is Bolshevism, and the Hanbali madhhab is Bolshevism 
itself.91  
 
The correct way to combat Bolshevism was not “to ask a fatwa from a senile old man like 
Shaykh Bakhit,” Rida continued, “because everybody here believes that Bolshevism is good to 
make the British leave Egypt, and everybody believes that the fatwa has no value, because it is a 
fatwa de commande.”92 Rida stressed that in order to halt the development of Bolshevism it was 
essential to explain what real Bolshevism was. Bolshevism, stated Rida, was against the principle 
of proprietorship, and since there were powerful proprietors in Egypt who knew that Bolshevism 
would deprive them of their land, they would side with the government in order to prevent such a 
possibility. 
In reference to the fatwa and in order to explain his own view of communism, Rashid 
Rida went on to publish an article on socialism, Bolshevism, and religion in his journal al-Manar 
on 26 August 1919. Bolshevism, he reasoned, was the same as socialism, aiming at the 
elimination of “the authority of the greedy lords of wealth and their helpers, the rulers who 
support them, who have imposed their materialist laws that are based on devouring the rights of 
workers in their own countries and on the colonization of the countries of other, weaker 
peoples.”93 The literal meaning of Bolshevik, explained Rida, was “majority,” which meant that 
real rule among every people should be in the hands of the majority of the nation, and those were 
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the workers in industry, agriculture, and other fields. That could become possible when the 
authority of the lords of wealth and their high-ranking partisans was terminated. The Bolsheviks 
succeeded in Russia; there they overthrew the oppressive tyrannical tsarist state, “the oppression 
and tyranny of which did not prevent governments that claim to be democratic – the French and 
British –from allying themselves with it and making agreements with it on how to partition the 
Ottoman and Persian territories.”94 Although not in favor of Bolshevism, Rida sympathized with 
its struggle to restore justice and to liberate the oppressed:  
We are certain that it is inconceivable that their activities and systems would be in accordance 
with the rules of Islam; and it is not for the Muslims, who observe their religion, to follow them. 
But this is not something that pertains only to the Bolsheviks; it pertains to all the positivist laws 
that are followed in Europe and also in the East – such as in Egypt and the Ottoman state, where 
some regulations violate Islamic law. The Muslims wish for the success of the socialists in 
eliminating the enslavement of the peoples (all of whom are workers), while they reject their 
practices – and the practices of everyone else – that violate Islamic law. It is understood that we 




Global Communism, Local Economies, and the 1919 Revolution 
The distinctive mixture of local economic and political grievances with new international 
philosophies created the conditions for the Egyptian Revolution of 1919 and the subsequent 
movements by nationalist leaders. The issues that most concerned Egyptians were the social and 
economic issues they observed on a daily basis, namely increasing inequality, poverty, 
corruption, and the brutality of occupation, which was itself intimately tied to economic 
imperialism. Movements, therefore, that tended toward socialist or communist tendencies were 
always simultaneously about local priorities and trans-local connections. For example, the wave 
of strikes from March to April 1919 was sparked off by, and can only be understood in the 
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context of, the more massive explosion of popular protest against British rule. Strikes which 
raised economic demands were therefore regarded by strikers, and by the populace in general, as 
an integral part of the broader struggle of the Egyptian people for independence and as a 
genuinely nationalist activity.96 At the same time, the scale of the popular revolt and the general 
breakdown of order simultaneously terrified property owners and made it impossible for the 
British authorities to suppress the strikes.97 In addition, the strikers, the British, and the general 
Egyptian population began to see the strikes as tied to the political Revolution. A good example 
of this would come in September 1919, during a lengthy strike launched by the Cairo 
tramwaymen to compel the Cairo Tramway Company to carry out an agreement it had signed 
with workers in April of that year.98  
The connection between the Watani movement for independence and striking workers 
had a decade of history behind it by the time of the 1919 strike. The Nationalist Party had begun 
to provide open support for worker activism in 1909. In the autumn of 1908 the grievances of the 
Cairo tramway workers, alluded to earlier, produced a rising tide of agitation, culminating in a 
strike accompanied by clashes with the police in October. Certainly the nationalist press was 
strongly supportive of the strikers, who were depicted as subject to both the merciless greed of 
the foreign (in this case Belgian) monopolists who owned the tram company and the brutal 
repression of the British-controlled police who were ultimately able to break the strike. In 1909, 
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the nationalists moved beyond airing workers’ grievances and supporting their strikes to directly 
sponsoring the formation of labor organizations. Early in the year party activists established the 
Manual Trades Workers’ Union (Niqabat ‘Ummal al-Sana’i’ al-Yadawiyya) as a framework 
within which the growing numbers of workers and artisans with whom links had been forged 
through popular night schools or by other means could be organized. They thereby joined the 
broader movement of popular revolt manifested in street demonstrations, clashes with occupation 
troops, attacks on British and government installations and sabotage of railway lines. This 
unprecedented upsurge of worker militancy had its roots in economic conditions.99 In the case of 
the Cairo tramway workers, the strike, which originally shut down the tram system, was 
reinforced by an effective public boycott of the company, so that even when the much-disliked 
tram company was finally able to run some cars under heavy British guard, there were very few 
passengers.100  
Offering his own support for the striking workers in 1919, Tal’at Harb, the promoter of 
Egypt’s economic independence who was soon to found Bank Misr, published a series of articles 
in 1919 on the question of the tramways.101 In these articles, he not only attacked the foreign-
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owned concessionary company for its alleged greed and irresponsibility, but also expressed 
sympathy for the company’s workers.102  
The workers’ rights continued to be connected in the popular and official imagination 
with the Egyptian independence movement. Nevertheless, while the Russian Revolution did 
serve as an inspiration to several different nationalist groups, the fears of some that the Egyptian 
nationalist cause was tending toward Bolshevism were greatly embellished.103 For the most part, 
these exaggerations on the part of British officials and upper-class Egyptians were deliberate in 
order to scare nationalist forces away from the socialists and to intimate that the establishment of 
a socialist party in Egypt would jeopardize the cause of independence.104  If the socialist 
movement in Egypt was smaller than portrayed at the time, the alarm, however unfounded, did 
affect the revolutionary leadership. There was a profound fear on the part of the leaders of the 
Wafd of being seen to be in league with Russia, lest that negatively influence negotiations with 
the British. In a confidential letter from Sa'd Zaghlul to the Wafd Central Committee, dated 23 
June 1919, Zaghlul expresses his concern over reports that handbills were being distributed to 
the effect that Egyptians were relying on German assistance and championed the Bolsheviks. 
“Such handbills can only benefit our enemies who will claim that the Egyptian movement is in 
contact with the Germans and the Bolsheviks,” he wrote.105 The increasing distance placed 
between the former Central Powers and Communist supporters, on the one hand, and Egyptian 
                                                                                                                                                             
International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 8 (1977),  163.) According to Tal’at Harb, an Egyptian bank 
would free Egypt from its “financial slavery” [al-raqq al-mali] to foreigners. (Tal'at Harb, ‘Alaj Misr-al-Iqtisadi 
(Cairo, n.d.), p. 29.) For more on Tal’at Harb and the early history of Bank Misr, see Eric Davis, Challenging 
Colonialism: Bank Misr and Egyptian Industrialization, 1920-1941 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1983.) 
102 Published in al-Ahram ending on 17 September 1919; also collected in Hafiz Mahmud et al, Tal’at Harb (Cairo, 
1936), pp. 74-82. 
103 For further exploration of this argument, see Tareq Y. Ismael and Rif’at Sa’id, The Communist Movement in 
Egypt, 1920-1988 (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1990.)  
104 Reports on suggested Formation of Egyptian Socialist Party, Berne, 2 June 1917, Sir H. Rumbold, Confidential. 
105 Quoted in  Joel Beinin and Zachary Lockman, Workers on the Nile: Nationalism, Communism, Islam, and the 
Egyptian Working Class, 1882-1954 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), 139-40. 
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nationalists on the other put European-based Watani nationalists at a distinct disadvantage vis-à-
vis the Wafd.  
The Wafd was right to be concerned about the British reaction to any possible links 
between Egyptian nationalists and official communism. Despite the lack of evidence of foreign 
involvement in the 1919 Revolution, some British officials in Egypt had an extremely paranoid 
and exaggerated notion of the Bolshevik threat and saw evidence everywhere of a perceived 
Bolshevik-German-pan-Islamic conspiracy poised to engulf the Middle East.106 In the eyes of the 
British and French, communism in the colonies, which they were convinced was sponsored by 
Russia, was the newest and greatest threat to the continuation of their empires.107 After 1917, 
Bolshevik Russia had emerged as a new power whose “declared policy,” according to British 
officials, was to start a revolution in India. According to the British, the fact that the First World 
War had left behind “immense economic unrest and distress” in the colonies produced a situation 
“subversives” could exploit easily. The War had not only “made available stores of arms and 
munitions,” it had “bequeathed to all… [subversive] bodies a large library of literature,” that 
included both German war-time propaganda and communist writings.108 Moreover, after the 
Russian Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, and especially after the founding of the Communist 
International in 1919, the British saw a “master conspirator” behind the scenes which was, they 
believed, providing many anti-colonialists from the British Empire with financial and 
                                                 
106 Beinin and Lockman, 139-40. 
107 FO 141/779/9065/200, 201; FO 371/J2372/16/16. For example, Shapurji Saklatvala, the communist Member of 
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institutional support.109 In a May 1919 report, Hugh Whittal, the Director of Military 
Intelligence, wrote:  
The victory of the Allies has not, as might have been expected calmed the Anti-British agitation in 
the Moslem [sic] world, organised by Germany [sic] during the war. On the contrary, recent events 
in Egypt and India indicate that such intrigues have born tardy but apparently dangerous fruit… It 
is unwise to take the conspiracy other than somewhat seriously… The Germans and their Moslem 
friends have found moreover new and powerful allies in the Russian Bolsheviks, whose fear and 
hatred of England rivals their own, and who likewise plan to undermine British power by rousing 
the East to rebellion.110  
 
Ronald Graham, head of the Egyptian section at the British foreign office, agreed with Whittal’s 
assessment of foreign involvement in the affairs of Egypt; he believed that Egyptian grievances 
resulting from measures which Great Britain took during the First World War were “not 
sufficient to account for the present serious and organised outbreak in which the hand of the 
Young Turk and even the German agent, is clearly discernible.”111  
Even after the 1919 Revolution, suspicions persisted among some British officials that 
certain Egyptian nationalists had ties either directly or indirectly to Turkish Kemalists or Russian 
Bolsheviks. For example, in 1921, general staff intelligence in Egypt sent out copies of a 
memorandum entitled “Note on the Probable Liaison between the Kemalists, the Pan-Islamists 
and the Bolsheviks” to the general staff offices in Istanbul, Jerusalem, and Baghdad, the director 
of military intelligence, the British residency in Cairo, and the British-run department of public 
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security in Cairo (a part of the Egyptian Ministry of the Interior.) This document stated that the 
Baku Council of Action and Propaganda among the Eastern Peoples was functioning as an 
instrument for Russian Bolshevik initiatives in the Muslim World and had close contact with 
“extreme elements” of the Turkish nationalist government in Ankara.112 The report further noted 
that “Bolshevik” sources were probably responsible for accounts in the “Muslim press” from 
India to Egypt asserting that Great Britain would soon be bankrupt due to the extent of its 
commitments throughout the Middle East.113 A few days after the general staff intelligence 
report was issued, the acting director of the department of public security in Cairo opined that 
Turkish, as well as Egyptian and other Arab revolutionaries were “ready and eager to accept 
Bolshevik assistance to free themselves from British control.”114 Part of the reason for Britain’s 
insistence on finding the international conspiracy behind Egyptian nationalist agitation was the 
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Congresses of 1930 and 1932,” Journal of Middle East Women’s Studies, Vol. 4, No. 1, 85.) In terms of 
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113 Memorandum by G.S.I., Egypt entitled “Note on the Probable Liaison between the Kemalists, the Pan-Islamists, 
and the Bolsheviks,” 15 June 1921, GO 141/433, file no. 10770, part II. 
114 Beamon to G.S.I., Cairo, 20 June 1921, GO 141/433, file no. 10770, part II. 
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difficulty the British had in believing that the nationalist, pro-labor movement in Egypt was 
autochthonous; rather, British authorities were convinced it must have been controlled by, and 
imported from, Europe. This assumption highlights the fundamental problem in British 
assessments of the Egyptian nationalist movement. British officials framed their interpretations 
in terms of European backers or an international Islamism, rather than acknowledging the local 
causes of the Egyptian nationalist movement and its interrelations (rather than subjective 
position) with trans-national movements and ideologies.  
Despite scant evidence of involvement in Egypt, the Comintern’s activities in the 1920s 
gave an added urgency to British worries.115 The Comintern’s leaders promised to provide anti-
colonial nationalists with substantial financing, provided nationalists could prove their 
effectiveness in carrying out their revolutionary programs.116 As a result, the British believed 
that nationalist activities were coordinated behind the scenes in a “master conspiracy” of the 
Comintern and international communism more generally, with colonial nationalists as junior 
partners.117 According to a police report written in August of 1920, “the course of underground 
history since the Armistice” had been “in the direction of a coalescence of discontent in all 
countries, whether largely belligerent or allied, into hostility to Great Britain. In this coalescence 
the most incongruous elements have been or are being assimilated.”118 Among the “elements” 
cited were German reactionaries, Turkish nationalists, pan-Islamists, and communists.119  
                                                 
115 The Third International, also referred to as the Communist International, abbreviated Comintern, was established 
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While the British analysis of communist-nationalist intrigues was exaggerated, the 
international bases of communism did allow Egyptian and other nationalists greater access to 
finances, publications, and government officials. In the context of anti-colonial nationalism, the 
October Revolution of 1917 in Russia was most pertinent as a result of the reinvigorated, though 
not necessarily new, opportunities it created for international cooperation among nationalist 
groups.120 While international socialism certainly had many adherents of various degrees of 
ideological commitment throughout the twentieth century, the sponsorship of the Comintern 
during the inter-War period provided nationalists of various colonies access to international 
audiences, collaborators, and funding. Much the same way as “Pan-Islamism” became an 
umbrella for more than a religious ideology, and adherents to the “cause” received tangible 
benefits in terms of support and funding; socialism and communism were also used by 
nationalists to some degree to attract activists and funding for purposes more narrowly 
nationalist or philosophically hybrid than the official ideology would allow.121  
This is not to discount completely the power of socialism as an ideology attractive to 
anti-colonial groups; as Robert Young has pointed out, “For much of the twentieth century, it 
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was Marxism alone which emphasized the effects of the imperialist system and the dominating 
power structure involved, and in sketching out blueprints for a future free of exploitation most 
twentieth century anti-colonial writing was inspired by the possibilities of socialism.”122 For this 
reason, communism and socialism shared various goals with various revolutionary nationalist 
movements; however, the tendency to focus too heavily on official ideologies and foundations 
belies the myriad utilitarian and local uses for allying with communist organizations or 
espousing communist ideology. There was certainly overlap in the goals and ideologies of anti-
colonial nationalists, on the one hand, and communists and socialists on the other; and some 
individuals were ardent members of both camps. However, the differences in goals between the 
two movements would become clear over the subsequent two decades, as the dissimilarities 
papered over by the initial cooperation bubbled to the surface. <Example> This same 
phenomenon would come to characterize the relations of Egyptian nationalists with broader, 
ideological trans-nationalist movements, as the narrow goals of Egyptian independence diverged 
from or were no longer served by these international associations. 
Part of the British belief that foreign powers were pulling the strings of Egyptian 
nationalists sprung from the fact that, from its inception, Kamil’s nationalist movement had 
depended heavily on foreign and Palace support. As a result, the critics of Egyptian nationalism 
saw it as nothing but the product of France’s thwarted imperialist ambitions, Ottoman “Pan-
Islamic” intrigues, Khedive ‘Abbas Hilmi’s frustrated desire to be a despot, or some combination 
of these extraneous forces.123 Mustafa Kamil, however, defended the autochthonous nature of the 
Egyptian nationalist movement from the first. “We declare to the world,” Kamil said, “that the 
                                                 
122 Robert J.C. Young, Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 2001), 6. 
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Nationalist Party is independent of all states, governments, kings, and princes.”124 He observed 
that “no nation can rise except by itself or regain its freedom except by its own efforts” and 
exhorted his listeners to join ranks and work to “prove to friends and foes that we are of all the 
nations the most entitled to the constitution and independence.”125 Indeed, if Egyptian 
nationalism had been only the result of outside forces, it should have disappeared in 1904, 
following the Entente Cordiale and Kamil’s falling out with the Khedive.126  Egyptian 
nationalism was not the product of external forces seen by British analysts. Instead, it attempted 
to harness and utilize transnational ideologies and foreign allegiances in a bid for successful 
independence.  
Despite evidence that the Wafd was as interested as the British in suppressing any 
Bolshevist tendencies in Egypt, British Intelligence appeared to have been most eager to prove 
the existence of a link between the Wafd Party and Russia.127 “Bolshevism in Egypt” was the 
subject of two lengthy reports drafted by British military intelligence in Egypt and dated 23 
August and 8 September 1919. The British Government surmised that Russia had decided to 
insert itself into the Middle East with the explicit purpose of indoctrinating leftist and nationalist 
groups there. “It is now reported,” a British security report asserts, “that the Soviet agent at 
Jaddah [sic] is the principal agent on the Russian side in the attempt to coordinate the activities 
of the ‘Third International’ with those of the extreme nationalists of Egypt.”128 According to 
British intelligence, “Bolshevist influence is likely to confine itself to fostering any subversive 
tendencies which it can find ready to hand and to endeavoring to give an anti-British turn to any 
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126 The British assumed that the Nationalists were French-inspired and lacked native support. See, for example, FO 
78, Cromer to Salisbury, Cairo, 26 May 1900, enclosing Harry Boyle’s “Report on Moslem [sic] Feeling.” 
127 Mohammed Nuri El-Amin, “The Role of International Communism in the Muslim World and in Egypt and the 
Sudan,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 23, No. 1 (May 1996), 30; FO 141/779 (File No. 9065.), 
Letter No. 506 dated 16 October 1919, from the Residency, Ramleh to Earl Curzon of Kedleston,  
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local discontents.”129 Furthermore, British officials surmised that Bolshevist agents in Egypt 
were “directed to form a temporary alliance with the native exponents of nationalism, while not 
forgetting their own remoter aim. For, they are reminded, although Egyptian nationalism is a 
bourgeois movement, yet its trend is favourable to the Bolshevist policy of undermining the 
position of Great Britain.”130 In order to implement these tactics, the British believed that the 
Bolshevists had entered into a separate alliance with the Wafd and the Nationalist parties.131 
British intelligence reports also suggested that nationalists were distributing money to some 
striking workers, presumably, the British believed, to raise tensions and foment Revolution.132  
      
 
 
                                                 
129 Ibid. 
130 Ibid. 
131 El-Amin, 27. 
132 FO 141/781/8915, reports of 28 April, 7 May 1919. 
263 
 




In this thesis, I have sought to analyze the multiple contingent alliances and loyalties that 
defined the Egyptian Nationalist movement in the period 1882-1919, in order to illuminate the 
construction of both the Egyptian state and Egyptian identity as works in progress. I have 
focused on several different aspects of this interactivity, between different states as well as 
between state and society, to illustrate the variety of mechanisms through which Egyptian 
identity and nationalism were transformed. Though the Egyptian nationalist movement proved 
popular and capable of galvanizing public opinion, the Watani Party was hampered by their 
ideological ambivalence, and their indecisiveness regarding strategy and organizational capacity. 
By the time Eldon Gorst was replaced as Consul General by the more authoritarian Herbert 
Kitchener in 1911, the Nationalists were too divided and demoralized to mobilize either Palace 
or popular support against British rule. The Watani nationalists, in particular, were too often 
concerned with working abroad and courting foreign opinion and potential allies to pay sufficient 
attention to the creation of a domestic consensus and powerbase within the government. 
Watanists had, with their technological and linguistic capacities, come to dominate the global 
debate about Egypt; but, following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the First World War, 
they were unable to participate in any meaningful way in the domestic nationalist movement. On 
the other hand, through their leadership of the nationalist movement and protests in the period 
1918-1919, the Wafd party was able to gain legitimacy and dominate internal Egyptian politics 
despite the Party’s heavy membership of landholders and urban elites. Following the Revolution 
of 1919, the Wafd was presented for the first time with the task of speaking for the populace and 
governing without the mediating role of a repressive state or foreign occupier to serve as a 
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galvanizing opposition. The revolutionary movement – splintered and fragmented under the 
pressure of rebuilding the country – failed to create a unified coalition or a clear post-revolution 
strategy. The collapse of negotiations with Britain, the assassination of Sirdar Sir Lee Stack, and 
the ensuing British crackdown drove the Wafd from power and replaced it with Ahmad Ziwar’s 
(1864-1945, Prime Minister 1924-26) palace-dominated cabinet. Elections in the spring 
produced another Wafdist chamber, which the king immediately prorogued. For their part, hard-
liners in England had mistrusted Allenby since the independence declaration, and in May 1925 
he was forced out. 
Egypt is typically treated as a special case in the historiography of the modern Middle 
East, and not without reason. For instance, in his classic work on the “evolution of the Egyptian 
national image,” Charles Wendell argues that the “geographical or territorial factor” – the fact 
that “Egypt is determinable with unusual ease and little or no dispute” – greatly facilitated the 
rise of Egyptian national consciousness.1 At the same time, Ziad Fahmy’s recent monograph on 
Egyptian nationalism seems to take it for granted that Egypt is really only the Nile Valley 
(though with the caveat that Upper Egypt did retain some cultural distinctiveness): “The 
topography of Egypt...with most of its inhabitants living in an easily accessible thin strip of land 
stretching from Aswan to the Mediterranean, has historically facilitated centralization efforts.” 2 
However, one of the major tropes that scholars most commonly fall back on to make the 
argument for exceptionalism – the notion that Egypt, unlike the other nation-states that would 
emerge out of the Ottoman Empire after World War I, maintained a distinctive sense of territorial 
cohesiveness over its several-thousand-year-long history – bears further investigation. The 
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picture one tends to have of Egypt as a relatively continuous and stable geographical unit from 
time immemorial is in fact belied by the frequent changes in Egyptian definitions of themselves 
and the various identities and loyalties assumed by different sections of the population. The long-
standing historiographical and nationalist assumptions about Egypt’s geographical stability since 
the time of the Pharaohs actually conceal the set of fluid and tentative processes through which 
Egypt was constituted. This was also true for the makeup of the Egyptian state and the nationalist 
movement as it was formed in the period 1882-1919. 
The major ideological thrust of Egyptian nationalism in the period 1882-1919 was not the 
defense of the nation’s territorial integrity, but rather the assertion of a strong anti-colonial 
identity. This thesis has attempted to draw attention to the ultimately contingent and fluid nature 
of Egyptian national identity and the way in which this adaptability impacted the movement for 
national independence. Historiograpical debates have typically arisen between historians 
emphasizing the role of the educated, urban effendiyya class in defining the contours of national 
identity, on the one hand, and those scholars who critique notions of elite nationalism by 
shedding light on the contingent identities of large parts of the Egyptian body politic such as the 
fellahin, on the other.3 However, the various identities and loyalties comprising Egyptian 
nationalism differed across communities, over time, and even within groups. Egyptians of many 
stripes articulated their understanding of the wider cultural and political order from their own 
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particular perspective; and Egyptians were conscious of their culture and identity at multiple 
levels. The issue, then, is that the manner in which Egyptian political identities have been 
contextualized is fundamentally problematic. Individuals and groups identify simultaneously 
with several communities; these identifications are historically changeable, and often seem 
internally contradictory.  
Territorial nationalism is often considered to override other forms of identification within 
a society, such as religious, racial, linguistic, class, gender, or even historical ones, in order to 
encompass these differences in a larger identity. But the relationship among different identities is 
more complex than this. As a result, it may be possible to speak of different national identities 
and loyalties, which are not overridden by the nation-state, but actually help to define or 
constitute it. In place of the homogenous nation, there exists a heterogeneity of identities, 
overlapping and crisscrossing; contradictory and ambiguous; opposing, affirming, and 
negotiating their views of the nation. National identities are unstable not only because they are 
susceptible to splits, but also because most forms of nationalism include a transnational vision – 
such as pan-Africanism, pan-Arabism, or Socialism.4 In order to understand national identity 
more fully, it must be studied in relation to other identities, as part of the generalized category of 
political identity. This issue becomes particularly problematic when other universalizing 
identities are present, as is the case in Egypt. When considered in this way, one can see how the 
ambiguities, the changeability, the fungibility, and interplay of national identity with other forms 
of identification can be as subversive of the nation-state as it is supportive. Since the state is 
never able to eliminate alternative constructions of the nation, we can also ask if national 
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identification is as privileged over others as the nation-state and nationalist leaders like to 
suggest.5  
The most easily identifiable expressions of Egyptian nationalism as a fluid identity are 
the relationships between anti-imperialist movements, and the contingent alliances formed by 
Egyptian nationalists with a series of state and non-state actors. Watani leader Muhammad Farid 
and other nationalists believed that it was in the self-interest of the Nationalist Party to join with 
the Ottoman Sultan against the Khedive, for example, because it provided them with public 
legitimacy, a powerbase for opposing the British, and potential financial assistance. At other 
times, the Watanists allied with the Khedive, or with the Young Turk party against the person of 
the Sultan. When a particular contingent threat receded, it became easy for the nationalists to 
perceive a threat from precisely those groups with which they had previously cooperated. As a 
result of their educations, language abilities, and connections to European centers of power, the 
nationalists were able to utilize their chameleon-like identity, where different identities and 
loyalties were invoked depending on whether the immediate threat was directed against 
territorial nationalism, constitutionalism, religious nationalism, or anti-colonial nationalism. The 
Egyptian nationalist movement went through a process of choosing between the overlapping but 
occasionally competing definitions of nation that were reflected in their relationships not only 
with the British and Ottoman Empires but also with the movements against them, without ever 
coming to a firm conclusion.6  
In addition, the evidence of the Egyptian nationalist movement problematizes the 
categories that have traditionally been discussed in opposition to nationalism that sought a 
territorially sovereign nation-state. Nationalism was not always in competition with trans-
                                                 
5 Ibid., 161. 
6 Noor-Aiman Iftikhar Khan, “The Enemy of My Enemy: Indian Influences on Egyptian Nationalism, 1907-1930,” 
(Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Chicago, 2006), 9. 
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nationalist ideas and movements; in fact, it was often supported and partially defined through 
them. Despite the supposed “failures” of movements such as Islamism, Pan-Arabism, and Pan-
Africanism, they achieved considerable success as adjuncts to nationalist liberation movements. 
Debating the compatibility (or incompatibility) of Islam, territorial nationalism, Arabism, and 
liberalism sets up false dilemmas to the extent that these terms remain devoid of utility outside of 
an understanding of the local concrete, social relations and lived experiences that lend them 
substance and meaning. More productive answers may be sought in an understanding of how 
different appropriations of transnational movements by different political actors shape and 
circumscribe the discursive possibilities and organizing capacities of nationalism. Contestation, 
moderation, and negotiation between rival states, as well as between the state and rival elites 
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